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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
The problem which is concentrated upon is the breakdown of
argument in religious and metaphysical contexts where the extent of
disagreement appears so great that the possibility of change of opinion
seems ruled out. Nevertheless, people do change their minds and views
on what is olaimed to be a rational basis. What is the use of
rationality in religious, moral, and metaphysical argument?
This question is answered by examination of two accounts of the
nature of rationality and the propounding of an alternative approach to
the use of rationality in argument. W. Bartley III is a recent writer
on the subject of rationality in the field of morals and metaphysics,
who belongs to a notable school of philosophy. T.F. Torrance is a
parallel theological writer, concerned with rationality in theology in
relation to modern scientific theory. The views of rationality of both
men are presented within the context of their whole position and
emphasis. A criticism is presented which rests on three grounds.
Firstly, that both fail to take sufficient account of the limits of
rationality ana some central conoepts integral to rational argument.
Secondly, that their own views are faulty beoause of internal difficulties
and are inadequate to the complexity of the subject of rationality.
Finally, that one unfortunate consequence of both positions is the
impossibility of criticism by the removal of ground for the critio to
stand on. These writers instruct both positively and negatively in
terms of the ooncepts and emphases raised in relation to rationality
and what is omitted, how and why they err, and the unacceptable result.
The/
The alternative suggested has two parts. A basic distinction
between two senses of "rationality" is made, argued for, and related to
synonyms and antonyms of "rationality". This distinction is then
related to the various limitations which are necessary for appreciation
of the nature of rationality in the actual practice of argument.
These limits are the natural, situational, social, and psychological.
Together the distinction and its relation to the limits of rationality
form an account of the use of rationality in argument which deals with
the limits of rationality and clarifies related central concepts, is
internally valid and adequate to the complexity of rationality in actual
argument situations, as well as showing not only that criticism is
possible but also what the form of such criticism ought to be.
The thesis, therefore, seeks to present a method of approaoh in
religious and metaphysical dispute, as well as in all argument, based
on the role that rationality has in such disputes. Both what that role
is and its practical outworking in the actual situation of disagreement
are shown.
1
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION
1« Foreword
The introduction to the thesis consists of two parts. The first
will be a description of the actual genesis and development of the ideas
and arguments contained in the thesis. The second will be a summary of
the thesis and the argument of the thesis describing the problem of
rationality in relation to religious and metaphysical argument and the
contribution to the concept of rationality of W. Hartley III and T.P.
Torrance, offering a criticism of their work, and then seeking to offer
a solution to the particular problem raised by their accounts. This
will be presented in the context of an examination of the limits of
rationality.
The idea for the thesis began with an interest in the nature of
presuppositions. In philosophy of religion and morals and metaphysics
it was very evident that there was great disagreement as to theories,
facts and methodologies. The extent of the disagreement seemed so
great as to allow no successful communication of ono viewpoint to
another an' extreme difficulty as far as change of views was concerned.
Yet it remained true that there were such changes from belief to
unbelief and vice versa, from agnosticism to Christianity, from
socialism to conservatism, from moral anarchy to fascism. How was
this possible? It seemed first necessary to examine what was entailed
in having a view, in holding a particular viewpoint. Thus attention
was focused on Collingwood and Hare and the literature around these men
and their views. We looked at presupposition and presuppositions with
view/
view to clarifying what was necessary for a person to come to change
his mind or views. It soon became evident that this field was too
general and diverse, and in seeking to narrow its scope it became clear
that certain presuppositions were more important than others. Those of
ontology and rationality were the most obvious. The latter was the
choice for concentration. It was so for without a clear idea of what
the nature of the man who holds a particular ontology is, that same
ontology falls by the wayside. Our attention therefore centred on what
rationality was. This meant isolating particular views of rationality
especially with reference to the history of rationalism as a philosophical
doctrine. There was at the same time a desire to relate this in some
practical way to the philosophy of religion and in particular to the area
of apologetics. Gdven that rationality was of a particular nature could
a case be made to show that religion was on exactly the same footing in
fundamentals as morals and metaphysics? If so this would mean that
religion could not be dismissed ab initio as meaningless nonsense but
rather be subject to the same care and detailed examination as is afforded
to moral theories and metaphysical views.
The search then began for material on the nature of rationality
which was closely related to particular moral, metaphysical and/or
religious views. W. Bartley III was an example of a recent writer in
the area of morals and metaphysics who propounded a detailed view of
rationality which is a somewhat rare phenomenon. He also is readily
identifiable with a mainstream line of philosophical thinking based on
the work and influence of Karl Popper. He therefore became the first
subject of analysis. In light of his work and some of the emphasis on
criticism he makes, Bartley's position was a useful foil to that of T.F.
Torranoe./
Torrance. Torrance affords an example of a recent theologian who puts
this concern in a way that claims a close relation to modem scientific
thought and research. Torrance offered an alternative view to hartley
yet dealt with many of the same sorts of topics as Bartley giving unity
to any critique of both men presented in one work. Having therefore
decided on the particular choice of material for oritioism, I concentrated
on what these men had to say on the nature of rationality and presented
my critique in the following way. First of all, each nan*s view was
outlined by quotation and reference to that person's own work and
emphasis. I than nought to offer a critical analysis of their views
with particular reference to rationality and the themes which they had
1
stressed a3 important or which their accounts had dismissed too lightly.
Then some of these criticisms were looked at in relation to modern writers
and their oriticisms. Then I offered some areas of concern which were
important to tie together in any account of the nature and scope of
rationality.
Having criticised two authors and become familiar with the modern
state of the debate vis a vis rationality it behoved me to offer some
account of my own based both on the work of the chosen authors and in
2
light of the criticism made. For this purpose I therefore outlined a
basic distinction which was essential for any account of rationality
and for any argument, discussion, or communication. First of all
argument for the basic distinction was presented and then it was shown
that/
1. Chapters Two and Three.
2. Chapter Four.
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that this distinction dealt with the many different levels and terms
which are closely related to rationality in modern thought and
discussion.^ This was the central novelty of the thesis the
presentation of a detailed analysis of a basic distinction in the
nature of rationality which is a sine qua non of any discussion or
criticism of any view. Having argued for the distinction it was then
related to certain limitations which are necessary for a clearer
4
tinderstanding of the nature of rationality.
What is not attempted is the application of this distinction to
one particular area of religion or morals or metaphysics. This is not
because this is not the ultimate intention, but rather that it was more
important to show the need for the distinction, to argue for the
distinction, and to show how it related to what others have said in
expressing the limits of rationality in practice. It is the eventual
hope to go on to the next step and show how when this distinction is
applied and the point it makes in relation to the limits of rationality
to a particular problem in religion, morals and metaphysics, that
discussion becomes clearer and we are not left with the feeling of
aporia which characterises so much of modern philosophical and religious
controversy. Until such time the distinction must stand on its own
merits as necessary and important in relation to the writing on
limitations in connection with rationality.
It/
3. Chapter Four, Section One.
4. Chapter Four, Section Two.
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It is my contention that what this distinction in effect shows is
that when we are confronted with a problem in morals and metaphysios this
is in essence no different to any problem in religion and the same method
of approaoh for clarification, criticism, and justification with a view
to proof or disproof is used# Religion is thus no better or worse in
intellectual status than morals or metaphysics#
My thanks are due to Professor Hepburn, Principal Mclntyre and
Professor Torrance. To Professor Hepburn for supervision and instruction
in philosophical technique and approach# To Principal Molntyre for
supervision and instruction in religious techniques and emphases, and to
Professor Torrance who gave access to a great deal of material and spent
a great deal of time in discussion and argument in an attempt to clarify
his view. While it is true that without such supervision and help the
thesis would neither be a thesis nor a piece of fairly sustained thought
and argument, it must be acknowledged that the weaknesses and faults
result from personal oversight or an unwillingness to be corrected
believing that the point was important and had seme sort of merit#
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2. Outline of Argument
I have outlined the actual genesis and development of the thesis
in general terms, but now turn to a description of the actual thesis in
summary form, giving more details of how I set about thinking through
the material from the choice of authors and the critique of this, and then
the presentation of the development of my own view*
The starting point is the breakdown of argument and discussion
between two people or views which are held in complete opposition to
each other. It is evident that people do have different views about
all or many of the issues which are accounted important in life »
politics, religion, morality. Unfortunately the degree and scope of
disagreement seems in practice to lead to the situation where argument
is either beating one*s head against an apparent brick wall of ignorance
or unwillingness to see sense or the battering over the head of an
unwilling and insensible protagonist with what one considers an impressive
array of arguments and proofs. One tends rather to lose both the
argument and the person in such argument, yet it remains true that people
do change their minds, opinions and beliefs, though this does not prima
facie result from argument, discussion, or criticism. It is ay ^35 e-idtw
that this breakdown may in part at least result from a faulty analysis
of the concept of rationality as it relates to a capaoity which human
beings have which separates them from the apes or the amoeba, and I shall
attempt to show examples of this faulty analysis as it is found in the
works of two authors in relation to rationality, and then seek to rectify
this fault by offering an alternative way of approaching the concept of
rationality and clarifying its content by looking at some of the
limitations which are part and parcel of its nature.
Initially/
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Initially two examples of the sort of disagreement in mind will
be offered. Much of modern philosophy both in ethios and philosophy
of religion leaves the reader with the distinct impression that the
5
writers are at cross purposes with each other. Both sides accuse
the other of failing to grasp what is essential, important, and
relevant, and of applying false categories or of overlooking obvious
faots which oast new and illuminating understanding on the issue at
hand.
The first example is from modem ethics and in particular the
debate between what may be called the Foot-Anscombe school and the
Hare-Phillips view.0 Foot writing of Hare's "Language of Morals"
says that, "A man is desoribed as having imported a cactus, the first
cactus, into his own country, and it is implied that he can decide which
of the plants he shall count as good cacti, laying down criteria in
respect of such things as size and shape. There is no suggestion of
any limits to the criteria which can be the criteria of goodness in
oaeti, and Hare obviously thinks that this is quite an ordinary case of
the use of the word 'good*. I shall argue that on the contrary, it is
hard to find any genuine example of this kind, so that if Hare's account
of the 'good' in 'good man' were correct then this use of the work would
seem to be different from all other oases in which we speak of a good
such and such. My thesis is not, of course, that criteria for the
goodness/
5. &• Warnock, The Object of Morality p.viii. Beardsmore,
Moral Reasoning especially the chapter, "Common Assumptions".
6. W. Hudson (ea.), Is ana Ought. especially the following articles:-
P. Foot's "Moral Beliefs", "doodness and Choice", Anscombe's
"Modern Moral Philosophy", R. Hare's "Universalisability", D. Phillips
and H. Mounce's "On Morality*s Having a Point". Also R. Hare,
Language of Morals, and Freedom and Reason
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goodness of each and every kind of thing are determined in the same way
as they are deteirained for such things as knives, but rather that they
7
are always determined, and not a matter for decision". Here Foot
expresses the measure of disagreement and almost disbelief that any
thinking person could offer such an irrelevant and simplistic account
of the nature of moral judgement, but the other side feels equally
strongly, Phillips in conjunction with Mounce when discussing Foot's
type of view states, "For them, moral views are founded on facts, the
facts concerning human good and harm. We shall argue, on the other hand,
that moral viewpoints determine what is and what is not to count as a
relevant fact in reaching a moral decision. This philosophical
disagreement has important consequences, for if we veliave that moral
values can be justified by appeal to the faots, it is hard to see how one
man can reject another man's reasons for his moral beliefs, since these
reasons too, presumably, refer to the faots. If, on the other hand,
we hold that the notion of factual relevance is parasitic on moral
beliefs, it is clear that deadlock in ethics will be a common occurrence,
simply because of what some philosophers have unwisely regarded as
8
contingent reasons, namely, the different moral views people hold".
The second example of this basic disagreement which denies that
the opponent has either understood the problem or has any hope of solving
the real difficulty on their own account - in other words which denies
that/
7. P, Foot, "(Goodness and Choice" p.p,215-6, W. Hudson (ed.),
Is and Ought. R, Hare, Language of Morals, p.p.96-7*
8. Phillips and Mounce, "On Morality's Having a Point", p.235,
W. Hudson (ed.) Is and Ought.
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that tha opponent has any genuine ground to stand on or evidence to
9bolster hi3 view - comes from a recent work of Iris Murdoch. In
"The Sovereignty of G-ood" she attempts to retrace moral philosophy on
the grounds that there is something very seriously wrong with modern
moral philosophy. "Her complaint is twofold. We have overlooked
certain moral facts, i.e. 'that an unexamined life can be virtuous
and the fact that love is a central concept in morals* (p.p.1-2), and
we have allowed a particular philosophy of mind, typified by Stuart
Hampshire,10 to condition our moral philosophy. Murdoch's task is to
allow room for love and the virtuous peasant by casting doubt on tha
modern image of the moral man as a 'behaviourist, existentialist, and
IX
utilitarian' (p8)." Here again we have the extreme degree of
difference as to what constitutes the facts of the situation and with
this the accusation that the other has overlooked what is essential for
describing the true situation. When people disagree over the nature of
the problem, the facts involved, the way to solve it, and the sort of
solution which is desirable, their discussion is really a lack of
discussion and genuine communication and there is and can be no hope of
changing the other person's mind until and unless he adopts the different
presuppositions which will enable him to see the problem a3 the other sees
it, to appreciate the point and nature of the solution offered and thus
to associate himself in assisting this to come about. Yet can this change
come through argument and discussion alone? It is my contention that
the problem in this sort of situation of disagreement is exacerbated by
9. I. Murdoch, The Sovereignty of G-ood.
10. S. Hampshire, Thought and Aetion, especially Chapter Two and his
irnast Jones Lecture. "Disposition and Memory"
11. Review of I. Murdoch, The Sovereignty of G-ooa. Scottish Journal
of Theology Vol. 25 No.l 1972.
10
by a faulty account of the nature of rationality and if the nature of
rationality in relation to argument, discussion and criticism oan be
clarified, the ground Wfc.ll be clearer for real argument and discussion
to take plaoe in which there is both genuine communication and hope
of persuading the other person to change his view and to aocept what
before he did not.
This is an attempt to understand rationality as it relates to
argument between differing viewpoints and presuppositions. There
seems to be little forceful or successful argument in morals, metaphysios,
and religion, because each accuses the other of a kind of irrational!sm,
whioh fails to see what is crucial and stresses what is irrelevant or
even nonsensical. This leaves the critic no ground to stand on, no
basis for argument, and with the situation where he can say nothing
beoause according to his opponent he does not appreciate the first or
the last thing about his view of what the situation really is. The
need then is for two things* Firstly an account of rationality which
allows the critic some hope of being able to offer criticism and some
room to hold a different and oppo ing view with ntegrity and the
possibility of presenting his oase in such a way not only that he is
listened to but that he may pertuade the other to change his mind and
adopt a different view. The second need is for an account of rationality
which is in itself adequate to the complexity of actual argument and
disoussion. A fuller account of rationality is sought not only as a
means to assisting criticism and discussion, but also for itself, so
that we may better understand what we mean when we use words such as
"rational", "irrational", "reasons", and "reasonable".
The/
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The complaint against to. hartley III is twofold. It is that
his account of rationality is in itself faulty arm fails to do justioe
to important features of the nature of rationality, and that he leaves
no room for the critic to oppose his view with any hope of success.
There is a great deal wrong with Bartley's own view of rationality and
it leads to an unacceptable conclusion in which the critic has no means
of offering an alternative to Bartley's ideas. hartley begins his
thesis from the problem of the impossibility of rationality because it
is limited by the choosing of ultimate views. This choice it is argued
by others is an arbitrary one and hartley sets out to show how the
falsity of this account has arisen by an historical analysis of the
main views of rationality ana in particular the "tu quoque" argument
which, he claims, leads to ultimate ralativism. Bartley asks two
questions. What are the limits of rationality in the choice of the
rationalist way of life over and against all others? How is it
possible to be a consistent liberal rationalist? He analyses
Comprehensive and Critical Rationalism and claims to discover a common
structure to failure which links justification dftAcriticism. His
solution is Comprehensively Critical Rationalism which eliminates
justification and replaces it by criticism. The value of the approach
as he sees it is that it removes the threat to rationalism by allowing
the rationalist to be rational about his rationalism and removing
from the irrationalist the rational excuse for his irrationalism. It
also offers aew opportunities for understanding by enabling the posing
of more intelligent questions in a nev; spirit of tolerance which arises
from understanding the nature of criticism. The main problems which
become/
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become evident in Bartley's account are that he omits certain crucial
limits in his account, that his own account is inadequate and faulty
as it stands, and that he leaves the critic no ground to stand on for
criticism. His view leads to the situation where everything counts
for it and nothing against it, and the danger with such open-mindedness
is that it is really empty-mindedness.
T.F. Torrance offers an account of rati uiality but would
strenuously deny that his theology depends on this view. Nevertheless
his presentation seems to suggest just that situation. At the very
least thought it will be admitted that he presents a view of rationality
which is a departure from the main-stream of thought and writing on
the subject today, though Torrance would argue that its roots lie firmly
in past philosophical views as well as in modern scientific theory and
practice. It is not my brief to argue these points but rather to
examine his view of rationality as it is presented and to test its
adequacy. The complaint against Torrance is exactly the same as that
against Bartley. His own account is faulty in two ways. He omits
many things which are crucial for an adequate account of rationality,
and his own account is not internally valid. He does not make out
his own case. But there is the corollary to this that his view leads
to an rthhcceptable conclusion that the critic has no ground to stand on.
A beginning is made by examining Torrance's stress on the necessity to
distinguish clearly between the objective and the subjective. Torrance
suggests that there has arisen a cleavage between theology and experience
and the only cure for this is for theology to develop its own meta-
soience to express faith in today's terms. This entails a more
adequate/
13
adequate conception of science, allowing theology to have its proper
place as a science with its own distinctive subject-matter, a more
adequate sense of connection which is sufficient to the richness and
variety of reality, and finally a more adequate understanding of
conceptuality which concentrates on the changing, developing, and
stretching of language in the creation of new forms of expression
adequate to the subject-matter of theology. For Torrance
rationality is the core of objectivity in the sense that it is the
capacity to be true to the nature of the object. We are rational
then when we behave in a manner which is appropriate to what is not
us, thus referring properly to reality. " hat we know is to prescribe
for us the mode of rationality we are to adopt tovvards it.
The criticism of Torrance rests on his failure to include
crucially relevant features of rationality particularly related to
the limits of rationality. It is suggested that his own account is
faulty and specific details of the nature and extent of this faultiness
are included in the text, and finally it is argued that he leaves the
critic no ground to stand on. If you attempt to criticise Torrance's
view you are guilty of failing to appreciate the true nature of the
Object with which he is dealing, ana in the place of that, you are
guilty of subjectivism. The position of disagreement reduces to
this:- instead of suggesting that religion is placed at a disadvantage
because of the failure to develop new methods appropriate to the
uniqueness of theology, it is suggested that what is required is not
a different method, but the same one used with the same care and
rigour which is applied when it is used towards other fields and areas.
In/
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In other words, on my account, religion is no better and no worse
than morals and metaphysics, whereas Torranoe seems to be suggesting
not only that theology is different but that it is in some way better
beoause its subject-matter allows of no error if approached correctly.
It would be churlish and untrue to suggest that both writers are
totally wrong-headed and have nothing worthwhile to say. The reason
for the choice of these men is just that they do have a great deal to
say and a good deal o truth in their accounts. They raise central
issues and while I cannot always agree with their analysis, it is to
their credit that they draw attention to much that is important and
central in the understanding of rationality. The areas of agreement
with their work will be evident when I present my own account.
To deal with the undesirable result of Bartley and Torrance's
theories, that of leaving no room for the critic, it is necessary to
examine the whole view of the writer as regards rationality to see why
there was no scope left for the critic to attack their views with any
hope of success. Therefore, the writer's material is presented as he
expresses it with his emphases rather than my own. It is never the
writer's apparent intention to leave no room for the critic, so it would
be unfair to criticise solely on that basis, therefore to deal adequately
with the views a more basic critique is offered to show the weakness of
the vieijs as a whole in relation to rationality. This means that fault
is found with both the systematic view which does not leave scope for
genuine criticism and with the detail of the view which leads to such
unacceptable conclusions. Yet it is still true that I am able to
draw from their accounts certain important features of rationality which
are essential for genuine argument and discussion.
Having/
15
Having criticised others both in their account of rationality
and in the result of obviating criticism, an approach to rationality
which is in itself more adequate and also leaves room for criticism
needs to be delineated. An account of rationality is needed which
makes argument possible and potentially successful. To do this I
first of all argue for a basic distinction of two senses of rationality.
The claim is that this distinction is necessary for discussion to be
able to be conducted and that it removes the difficulties of Bartley
and Torrance's account. This distinction is mads and argued for, then,
it is seen how it also applies to irrationality. The distinction is
then related to other notions which are part and parcel of rationality
and in particular to p rsons and beliefs and opinions, then to reason
and reasons, dealing with explanation and action in terms of willing,
and finally intelligioility. It is shown that the basic distinction
applies and is relevant in each of these areas. It Is then shown
how this distinction opens the way to argument and discussion when it
is linked with the description of o rtain limits of rationality, the
natural, situational, social, and psychological. The basic distinction
provides, as if ..are, the bare bones of the approach to rationality
while the examination of the limits gives flesh and blood to the account
and to the notion of rationality, by bringing out important features
of that concept. I here draw on other writers, but am offering a
different sort of approach to rationality by means of examining the
division of the generax area of limits into four clearly defined areas
because this is what is involved in the practice of argument, and these
limits are anu must be in the context of the two senses of rationality
outline^/
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outlined and the actual limits in practice. If rational!ty is seen
in terms of the limits in argument and reasoning better appreciation
of the nature of rationality will be gained.
In other words, an attempt is made to clear the way for discussion
by making this basic distinction and by relating it to certain limits
of rationality. The application of this distinction and the description
of the limits form the background against which moral, religious, and
metaphysical discussion may take place. Two opposing sides need not
regard the other as irrelevant and meaningless, thus allowing no room
for the critic to offer criticism and gen ine discussion and communication
to take place. Hather the two sides may make the basic distinction
and apply the different kinds of limits to their own views and that of
their opponent thus setting out the areas of agreement and disagreement.
This is obviously no easy solution to the rational man and offers no
short cut, but rather a long, careful, detailed process, the outline of
which is offered. It does mean, however, that in discussion and
controversy another person's view will not be dismissed ab initio as
meaningless, but rather subjected to careful and detailed examination.
One begins with what is to count as rational in this situation by
drawing clearly between the two senses the necessary distinctions and
then clarifying the limits of rationality as they relate to this
particular case. Then one may go on to actual argument and discussion
and not vice versa. This entails that there is room for the critic
and the opportunity to seek and express areas of definition and limits.
It also means that the religious argument is nc different from any afKer
argument. Thus the ta3k of apologetics is made easier because the form
°uw*!?!L .arsument follows the sane line as any other argument witl/
with/
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with the making of the basic distinction between the senses of
rationality and the outlining of the limits in the particular case.
Thus an account of rationality is offered which is true to the
complexity of the subject-matter. This account of the basic
distinction and the limits not only leavos room for discussion and
argument, but actually paves the way for such discussion. It is
an attempt to put morals, metaphysics and religion in perspective,
in the sense that truth and falsity are not predetermined but rather
are open for debate and discussion.
In other words, controversy, discussion and argument are made
possible by an account of rationality which, while true to the
complexity of the issues involved and refusing to oversimplify,
nevertheless ooncentrates on the actual process of argument and discussion
by seeing that the words "rational" and "irrational" cover a distinction
which is crucial for discussion. That thsre are two senses of
"rationality" and that these senses can he related to the limits of
rationality, which gives oontent to the concept of rationality. This
interrelation clarifies the process of how one goes about arguing and
discussing. This isnot to saythat argument and discussion do not
take plaoe but that the breakdown of much argument and the nature 1
of successful argument are both as described. One thus is able to
do what Bartley and Torrance are not able to do both because of their
theories of rationality and the eff ct in practice of their theories of
closing the door to the critic by leaving him no ground to stand on.
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CHAFi'KR TWO - BARTLEY OK RATIONALITY
Section One - Bartley1s View of Rationality
W. Bartley III offers an example of a writer who is der-ply
concerned with the nature of rationality and the concepts involved in
it. He writes in the general field of metaphysics and more recently
morals and is well-known as a follower of Sir Karl Popper. He is a
useful starting point for an examination of the use of rationality in
religious and metaphysical argument because he deals with this very
area and also he both raises central questions concerning rationality
and stresses important concepts which are part and parcel of an adequte
aooount of rationality such as criticism. The section of the thesis
given over to the study of Bartley will take the following form.
Bartley will be allowed to speak for himself in the sense that the
presentation of his view will be in the form that he himself presents
it with the same sort of emphases as he expresses. This will be by
quotation and precis of his account. This will be in four sub-sections
dealing with the statement of the problem as far as Bartley is concerned,
the approach to that problem, his own positive theory of rationality,
and, finally the value of the new theory of rationality which Bartley
offers. This manner of presentation ensures that the writer in
question i3 not forced into a false mould for the benefit of some
ulterior criticism, but rather is fairly permitted to express his own
view and emphasis.
In section two, there will be offered a critique of Bartley's
view of rationality which will parallel the presentation of his own
material./
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material. Thus there will be the same sub-sections with the addition
of material from recent debate on Bartley in various journals; the
difference being that instead of presenting Bartley's views, these
sections will deal with the criticism against Bartley. There is,
however a general position behind the criticism of Bartley which needs
to be stated. The complaint against Bartley and his account of
rationality rests on three grounds. The first is that he fails to
examine all the limits of rationality and instead concentrates on only
one limit, that of logic, to the exclusion of the others. Without a
dear picture of the various limits of rationality and the practical
effect of these limits it is my contention that no account of rationality
is adequate either to the complexity of rationality itself or to the
work that rationality is called on to undertake in terms of argument,
discussion, and communication.
The second ground of the complaint against Bartley is in terms of
his own account. Bartley's own view of rationality, regardless of any
discussion or lack of it in relation to limits, is in itself inadequate
and faulty. Even if Bartley had dealt with all the limits of
rationality and their importance, he would not have given an account
of rationality which copes with the complexity of its nature. In
Bartley's case this is a four-fold failure. His statement of the
problem of rationality on the basis of the eoaptioal-fideist problem
is not adequate to form the basis for a solution to a
problem of rationality. But if this failure to make out a case for a
problem concerning rationality on the basis of th9 soeptic and the
fideist is sat aside and instead Bartley's ov.n presentation of the
rationalist/
20
rationalist dilemma concerning the solution to the problem of
rationality scrutinised, then it is clear that this dilemma is not a
real one in the way that Bartley suggests it, nor does it require the
kind of solution that he offers. Again, if this last criticism is
set aside and it is accepted that there is a problem as Bartley presents
it and that he shows a genuine dilemma, it will be argued that the
solution Bartley offers is not in itself adequate to the problem as
stated by Bartley. He does not solve his own problem on his own
positive account. finally under this heading of the general failure
of Bartlay's position, if these criticisms were ignored and instead it
was assumed that all was well with Bartley's account both of the problem
and the solution to that problem, then it is the case that the value of
his theoiy is not what he claims it to be. Bartley's account of
rationality is not satisfactory in the statement of the problem, in
the dilemma it presents, in the solution to the problem and dilemma,
and in the value it claims for itself.
The third ground of complaint against Bartley is that he not only
overlooks crucial limits of rationality and presents an account of
rationality which is inadequate, but also that his view leads to at
least one serious oonsequence. This is that he removes from the critic
the possibility of a serious attack and critique of Bartley's own view
by taking away any ground on which the critic may stand and any basis
from which the force of criticism may be felt. This is the sort of
problem which was introduced in the last chapter when attention was
drawn to the contemporary problems in moral and metaphysical debate
where there is the refusal and inability to accept the other person's
view/
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view and right either to hold or to express something different and
contradictory#* This is also the point of criticism which W&tkins
in particular levels against hartley and this will become evident
both in the general critique of Bartley and within the section devoted
to recent discussion of Bartley.
The ohapter devoted to W. Bartley III will first of all state
Hartley's own position as he presents it. Then it will offer
criticism based on three grounds - hia ailure to do justice to
rationality by omitting the variety of limits of rationality, the
faultiness of his own account even on its own terras, and the removal
of room for the critic to offer an alternative to or improvement in
hartley's position. These criticisms will however be presented by
integration into Bartley's own presentation rather than by forcing
his account into the mould of the criticisms. This is done both to
be fair to Bartley and his account as well as to show the weakness of
his aocount as a whole at the same time as seeing why his view leads
to the unacceptable conclusion it does lead to, namely that of excluding
criticism.
Nevertheless, the work of Bartley has both a positive and negative
benefit. fie raises important and central issues and ooncepts
concerning the nature of rationality which will be used in the present¬
ation of an approach to rationality on the basis of a distinction
between two important senses of rationality and in terms of an
examinetiory'
1. Chapter One p.T
examination of the limits of rationality as found in practice. As
well as the positive gains from Bartley in the issues and concepts he
discusses, there is the negative value which stems from learning from
the mistakes which he makes and from seeing why he is led into these
mistakes by the nature of the account he gives and the presentation
of the problem on his own terms.
Bartley will serve as an introduction to the sort of discussion
which is taking place about rationality in the contemporary scene.
He will help delineate the kinds of issues and concepts which are
considered important in modern debate, and he will allow the
appreciation of the way in which rationality may be and is used in
argument, whether this be religious or metaphysioal. His account
of rationality may be divided into four sections: the problem, his
approach, his alternative theory, and the value of his theory.
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1, The Problem of Rntiemailty
William Bartley III states that "The problem of rationality is,
in ef.ect, the problem of the critical analysis of the ap >eal to the
2
authority of reason".
What Bartley means by the opening quotation is more clear-defined
when he says, "This problem ...» is whether some form of relativist
existentialism is inescapable because rationality is so limited,
logically as well as practically, that the choioe between ultimately
competing religious, moral, and philosophical positions is, in the
Last resort, arbitrary. For example, is an individual's decision to
become a rationalist .... any leas subjective, relative, arbitrary,
3
irrational than an individual's decision to become a christian?
The concern expressed by Bartley is with the limits of
rationality, which he characterises as he discoveiy that "according
4
to one's theory of rationality, rationality is impossible". While
aware that there are factual, experiential, scientific, existential,
and practical limits to rationality, Bartley chooses to concentrate
on the logical limitations, on the grounds that it "is sufficient
without aid from other limitations, to perpetuate the aforementioned
5
conflict between rati nality ana the theory of rationality".
This/
2. The Limits of Rationality. p.!3« Hereafter referred to as "Q"
3. The Ratreat to Commitment p.vii. Hereafter referred to as "R.C."
4. "Rationality versus the Theory of Rationality" p.4. The Critical
I proach to Science and Philosophy. M. Bunge (ed.) Hereafter
referred to as "RvR.
5. RvR. p.5.
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This logical limitation is interpreted as the necessity to counter the
philosophical positions of Scepticism and Fideism. Bartley believes
that these threaten the whole conception and practice of philosophy
and that they share a common argument ana claim. He sets out to
deal with this philosophical claim and to refute the argument on
which both rest their claim. "The claim is that from a rational
point of view, the choice between competing beliefs ana positions
and ways of life, whether scientific, mathematical, moral, religious,
metaphysical, political, or oth r is arbitrary.This means that
rational procedures can be used to prove the logical impossibility
of acting or choosing on rational grounds between different world-
views and basic attitudes to life. This claim threatens the very
possibility of a rationalist being a rationalist on rational grounas.
Bartley asks, "Is an individual's decision to become a rationalist -
a rationalist of the Harvard pragmatist make for instance - any less
subjective, relative, arbitrary, irrational, (even when it is considered
from a rationalist point of view) than an individual's decision to become
or remain a christian?"'' His task is to show that this claim is
invalid and to achieve this he analyses the argument which supports it.
The argument offered by the sceptic and fideist is an analysis of the
usual rationalist defence of a particular idea. This analysis
presupposes what Bartley calls the "tu quoque or boomerang argument,








presuppositions." This argument consists of three parts: "1. For
certain logical reasons, rationality is so limited that everyone has
to make a dogmatic irrational commitmentj 2. therefore, the
christian has a right to make whatever commitment he pleases; and
9
3. therefore, no one has a right to criticise him for this." The
problem arises because "any view may be challenged with such questions
as 'How do you know?' 'Give me a reason', or even 'Prove iti' When
such challenges are accepted by the citation of further reasons which
entail those unuer challenge, these may be questioned in turn. And
so on forever. Yet if the burden of proof or rational justification
can be perpetually shifted back to a higher-order premise or reason,
the belief originally questioned is never effectively defended. In
order to justify the original conclusion, it appears that one must
eventually stop at something not open to question, for which one need
not provide reasons when demanded"The argument leads, the
sceptic and fideist claim, to the problem of "ultimate relativism",
for there oan be no appeal to a common standard by the way the problem
is presented. While the sceptic and fideist attitudes diverge at this
point - the sceptic suspending his judgement ooncerning different
viewpoints and the fideist irrationally committing himself to one or
other view - Bartley stresses that "a position that cannot escape
11







The importanoe of the argument is seen in the implication that
"the argument, if correct, implies that it is pointless from a rational
point of view for men to argue rationally ahout their extremely
12
different 'ultimate presuppositions' or commitments." But it is
not only pointless to argue rationally, it is also implied that"if,
since the limitation is a logical one, ail men share it, if no one
can escape irrational commitment, then no one can be criticised
rationally for having made suoli a commitment, no matter how
13
idiosyncratic". Bartley has thus uncovered a rational excuse for
irrationalism end with it, security for any irrational commitment from
criticism.
Bartley'3 analysis of the problem of rationality, by examining
the sceptical and fideistic olaia and argument, presents two problems
which he hopes to solve. The first is to ask "What the limits of
rationality are whan it comes to making a decision between the rationalist
way of life and some other way of life".lif In other words, is a real
rationalist possible even in theory? The second problem is: "How is








2, hartley's Approach to Rationality*
Bartley's method is to seek to solve the rationalist problem
16
by means of examining the crises of identity and integrity. Both
17
of these terms are derived from adolesoent psychology. The crises
of identity involves one's conception of oneself and the crisis of
integrity concerns the attempt to live up to one's identity and
purpose and cope with the lack of success which is usually involved.^
Bartley applies this to the rationalist who, he suggests, suffers a
continual orisis of integrity, trying to live up to an impossible
standard of rationality. This is itself derived from a neglected
orisis of identity by the failure to make clear what it is to be a
rationalist in the form of a theory of rationality. Bartley claims
that rationalists are over-committed to a notion of rationality which
it is impossible to attain, and this leads to the crisis of integrity
19
and allows the irrationalist to use the 'tu quoque" argument.
hartley examines attempts to answer the sceptic and fideist
argument, thus showing the need for his fusion of these attempts to
solve the problem. Rationality has historically taken the form of
a challenge to traditional authority; yet v/ithout falling prey to
arbitrariness/
16. RvR.p.p.8-9; tt.C.p.p.3,10,58»
17. Erik Erikson, Childhood and Society; Younft Man Luther, p.14






arbitrariness by appealing to rational authorities. This notion
of authority is crucial in Hartley's analysis. He presents two main
views of rationality: Comprehensive Rationalism and Critical
Rationalism. Comprehensive Rationalism is the traditional approach
of philosophy and has two main tenets: 1. to accept any position
that can be justified, established, or supported by rational criteria
21
or authorities, and 2. to accept only these positions. The problem
has been that no philosophical view has been able to supply adequate
rational authorities. This stems from the impossibility of holding
(l) and (2) together, which in turn, leads to the irrationalist
22
opportunity for the "tu quoque"
With the failure of the traditional approach of Comprehensive
Rationalism, modern philosophy has been characterised by Critical
Rationalism. Hartley selects A.J,Ay r as a typical example of this
view, which attempts to make the sceptic's victory^bloodless", by
accepting the unjustifiability of ultimate principles, but pointing
out that the notion of a standard by which to accept or reject ration-
23
sality does not make sense. Bartley claims that Ayer begs the
24
question and that his view ultimately reduces to a variety of fideism,
Ayer is compared with Barth and Tillich, as resorting to persuasive
25










The short answer to Ayer is simply to refuse to accept his position.
Bartley argues that the failure of Comprehensive and Critical
Rationalism is due to the common structure which determines both the
kind of questions one may ask and the answers which are impropriate.
This structure is based on a philosophical tradition which is
authoritarian. All questions within its sphere beg authoritarian
answers. Thi3 authoritarian structure is inforced by two features:
(l) the fusion of criticism and justification, (the notion of
justification is linked with the ability to give a proper authority
in support of one's view), and (2) the assumption that the quality
and degree of rationality pass through the relationship of logical
27
deducibility from the justifying premises to justified conclusions.
Bartley argues that criticism is not and need not be fused
28
with justification, and that transmissibility, which was originally
added through association with the criteria of truth and probability,
has "been improperly retained after the failure of these standards to
29
satisfy the role of criteria. Bartley states that the standard
of rationality necessary for the fusion of criticism and justification
is always based on an unwarranted assumption and ojen to irrationalist
30
rejoinders. Similarly, the transmissibility assumption falls to
the ground after the failure of the offered oriteria. The variety
of/
26. RvR.p.l9ff; R.c.pp.l34ff.
27. RvR.pp.22ffj R.C.pp.l41ff} Q.pp.83-5»
28. Q.pp.96-7; RvR.pp.2i-4; R.C.pn.147-150.
29. RvR.p.26; Q.pp.85-6.
30. Q.p.93; R.c.p.145; RvJt.p.p.22-3.
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of criteria for truth and probability fail to be suitable beoause they
offer no means of allowing a non-arbitrary, rational choice to be made
between competing oriteria."^"
In place of the unsuccessful candidates for a theory of
rationality, Bartley presents an amalgam called, Comprehensively
32
Critical Rationalism, based on the work of Karl Popper.
31. RvR. p.p. 25-7J Q.p.85.
32. Q.p.p.%ff j RvR.p.p.10,20j R.C.p.p.l46ff•
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3. An Alternative Theory of Rationality«
Bartley's Comprehensively Critioal Rationalism seeks to abandon
33
justification and substitute criticism. The stress thus is on the
34
elimination of error rather than the search for truth. Bartley's
solution to the problems of the fusion of justification and criticism
and the transmissibility dogma takes the form of the nonjustificational
35
philosophy of criticism, stressing testability and revisahility.
There are two features of the doctrine of criticism which are important.
The first is to make clear what oounts as criticism and the second, the
36
need to maximise criticism. Bartley offers four bases of criticism,
which are by no means exhaustive. He lists the checks of logic,
sense-observation, scientific theory, and the check of the problem.
In brief, these refer in descending order of importance to, internal
consistency, empirical refutation, conflict with scientific hypotheses,
and the relevance and success of the theory in light of the problem it
37
was designed to solve. However, one of the stresses is that this
nonjustificational theory of rationality must lead to a closer analysis
of the notion of "criticism" and exploration of various avenues of
38
criticism.
Bartley recognises the need to be thoroughgoing in his theory,
and emphasises that we must both maximise criticism and be willing to
holcl/
33* R.C.p.p.l46ff; RvR.o.p.21-4} Q.p.p.271-2, Foot-note.
34• RvR.p.21.
35. RvR.p.p.27-8} R.C.p.p.170,172-3.
^6. Q.p.p.267-8,304; R.C.p.p.156-75} RvR.p.;0.
37. R.C.p.p.l58ff; Q.p.273.
38. Q.pp.267-70; R.C.p.p.ljjfiff; RvR.p.22
hold everything, including his theory of rationality, up for critical
revision. This means that we must search for every possible criticism
against every view we hold and that we must be willing to be convinced
39
of the need to change even our view of rationality itself. There
is to be no retreat to commitment by any attempt to justify any view
40
irrationally. We are only to hold views which have been subjected
41
to criticism and have survived testing. Bartley recognises that,
in faot, this process is infinite; yet claims to have avoided a vicious
42
regress by removing the justification demand for criteria.
Rationality is thus criticism, and this involves testability and
43
revisability. We are to subject everything to the test and we
must be prepared to revise all or any of our views at any time, given
successful criticism. This entails, however, that both acceptance
and rejection are provisional. We accept or reject a view till
44
criticism changes it. Our task, as Popper stresses, is to try to
falsify and to examine continually all our presuppositions in light of
45
these attempts at falsification.
Bartley believes that by these means we may learn more about the
world by critioism, not only of our presently held views, but also of
past/





44. Q.p.93, p.p.274-5i RvR.p.28; R.C.p.p.152,157-8. See above p.3<
footnotes 3?
45. RvR.p.21} Q.p.p.99-93; R.C.p.p.151-2; K. opper, Open Society ch.VII.
past dogmas in every sphere of thought. We are oalled upon to
open all our views to criticism, to face up to these criticisms,
17
and to review our opinions in light of any successful criticism.
By rejecting justification and transmissihility, we are freed from
the orises of identity and integrity and may conoentrate on the
48





if.* The Value of the Alternative Theory.
Bartley relates that the value of his approach is to 3how how
we can shift the emphasis in rational discussion from justification to
49
nonjustificational criticism. The value of this is many-levelled.
By removing the grounds for the "tu quoque" argument of the fideist
50
and the sceptio, Bartley also removes the threat of arbitrariness
and irrationality to the practice of rationality and a viable theory
51
of rationality. By clarifying and solving the crises of identity
and integrity, showing the possibility of being rational about
52
rationality, Bartley allows the stress to fall on criticism. He
thus claims to have created new opportunities for understanding both
53
the notion of oriticism itself as well as philosophy past and future.
Now, we are told, we should aim to 1< arn from our mistakes, because we
realise that what matters is to learn to pose more and more intelligent
54
questions. Rationality is now seen to be a way of life in which we





50. RvR.p.31j Q.p.328j See above p.2-4
51. See above p*p.2-4y2.~7.
52. RvR.p.31j Q»p*p.335-6j see above p.p.2.T,3i.




The value of Bartley*s view is claimed to be that he allows
the rationalist to be rational about his rationality, while at the
same time removing from the iri-ationalist, the rational excuse for
56 57
hi3 irrationality, thus enabling both to be 'themselves" and to
fulfil the proper role appropriate to their respective positions. In
this way, irrationality is seen in its true light and can be criticised
58
without loss of integrity by the rationalist.
Almost more important, however, than the solution of the problem
of rationality, is a new "moral" standing, which is created. Toleranoe,
mutual respeot, and intellectual humility are now genuinely possible on
cu
a basis previously unrecognised. We are able to treat people properly,
by taking their views seriously, by inviting their criticisms, and even
helping them to criticise our own views more adequately. We are to
60
treat our opponents in discussion, as we would wish them to treat us.
Bartley describes this ethio as "respect", and claims this is only
61
possible if serious argument is possible. One aim throughout his thesis
has been to promote this "respeot" by illustrating the sort of
critical argument his view calls for and by revealing the unfortunate
62
consequences of the retreat to commitment.
56. BvB.p.31» Q.p.96A footnote, p.p.326-7







Seotion 2 - Grltlnue of Bartlev on Rationality
The problem of rationality as outlined by Bartlsy is closely
oonneoted with the ability of the sceptic and fidaist to make out a
case against the rationalist, accusing hia of being subject to the
same ultimate irrational commitment by putting an arbitrary end to
what would otherwise be an infinite regress. If it can be shown
that Bartley's analysis of the sceptie-fideist position is faulty then
this would clearly dissolve the problem of rationality as he has
expressed it. This will be the starting point of the critique of
hartley. The criticism rests on three points which will be
integrated into the criticism of this section. The three points
that must be borne in mind in the more general criticism of Bartley's
position are as follows:- his failure to examine all the limits of
rationality particularly by his concentration on one area to the neglect
of the other more important limits, the failure of his own account to
be successful #\ presenting a problem, dealing with the same
problem as he sees it, and ini, the benefits he claims accrue from
his view, and finally, the effect of removing from the critic all
possibility of argument which might change or modify his view.
This is the background of the critique, but the criticism of
Bartley will be presented in the following way. First of all it
will be questioned whether or not he has actually the problem that he
thinks he has, by showing that his description of the sceptic-fideist
is at fault. Then it will be assumed, for the sake of argument, that
Bartley has done exactly what it is claimed that he has not, that Bartley
has/
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has correctly described the sceptio-fideist position, but that his
description of the rationalist dilemma is faulty to the extent that
there is no genuine problem. This means that if it can be shown that
this is the case, hartley's claim to offer a solution to this problem
must be irrelevant until and unless he can show that there is a genuine
problem for the rationalist, Then the opposite of what we have shown
will be assumed, that Bartley has given an adequate account of the
nature of the rationalist dilemma, but it will be suggested that
hartley's solution to the problem is, on its own terms, inadequate to
solve the problem he thinks that there is and that he claims to have
presented. In o.her woi'ds, hartley'; solution does not do what he
claims it does do, even if it is allowed that it has genuine work which
needs to be done. Finally, the value will be examined which Bartley
claims results from adopting his approach regardless of whether it is
thought that there is a problem for Bartley to try to solve or that he
actually solves it. It will be argued that the value claimed for
Bartley's view is not fulfilled in its own terms ana does not come.up to
the high expectations which Bartley has for his approach. It is
claimed that Bartley fails to make out a case for the scaptic-fideist
and for tho rationalist dilemma. It is argued that his solution to
the problem he thinks arises from these accounts is in faot no solution
at all even if it is accepted that there is a problem. Finally, it is
shown that regardless of the problem, or solution, that the value of
hartley's approach is not what it is claimed to be.
These/
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These criticisms are presented in parallel fashion with Bartley's
own view and emphasis, hut this must not obscure the general ground
behind the criticism and the aim in view. It is that hartley*s
account is faulty in the three ways already stated. He omits what
ought not to he omitted. His aim account is inadequate both in
itself and as an account of the nature of rationality. His view
leads to unacceptable conclusions, specifically the exclusion of all
and any genuine criticism. These points are the basis of the ohoice
of and presentation of Hartley's view, while they are interwoven
into Bartley'3 own framework rather than being the mould into which
Hartley's view is rudely forced.
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1„ The Problem of Rationality
The first question to be considered aa far as Bartlcy is
concerned is whether or not he makes out a case which deals adequately
with the sceptic and fideist positkms. hartley has characterised the
sceptical-fideist argument as the "tu quoque" retort to any criticism,
on the basis that everyone has to make a dogmatic, irrational oommitraent.
It is of interest that he concentrates mainly on fideist examples of
the use of this argument and, in fact, o fers no concrete example of a
wholly sceptical position;"*" yet he claims that this argument is common
to sceptic and fideist. This is relevant because it is unfair to
characterise the christian view as irrationalist without more detailed
2
argument. The christian writers referred to by Bartley would wish
to claim that the commitment of the christian, while not based on formal
logic, can nevertheless be characterised as rational. This rational
basis may be described in at least two ways. Christian commitment
may be considered rational on its own terms, i.e. within the system of
belief itself.^ That is to say, for someone who accepts the christian
presuppositions it is totally rational to believe in Christianity. On
the other hand, it may be that christian commitment can be described as
rational in the sense of Pascal's Wager. Given that there is no
overriding evidence by which to choose between two views, it may be
argued that Christianity is the more rational commitment to make in
the sense that it offers greater emotional seourity, a "heaven to
gaiV
1. R.C.p.p.113,of.30-90; T.f.Torrance, Faith and Philosophy", p238,
Hibbert Journal. Vol. XLVII.fio.3. April 1949•
2. A. Maclntyre. "The Logical. Status of Religious Beliefs", p.p.178,185,
Metaphysical Beliefs.
3. Maolntyre, ibid, p.p.202,208-9; A. Farrer, "Revelation",p.100,
B. Mitchell, "The Grace of God".p.p.160,174-5» B. Mitchell (Ed.)
Faith and Logic.
gain and a hell to lose", or a satisfactory moral code by which to live.
It may be countered that there is within the christian tradition,
the concention of a "lean of faith". Fitz James Stephen comments; "In
all important transactions of life we have to take a leap in the dark ...
If we decide to leave the riddles unanswered that is a choice; if we
waver in our answer, that, too, is a choice; hut whatever choice we
make, we make it at our peril. If a man chooses to turn his hack
altogether on &od and the future, no one can prevent him; no one can
show beyond reasonable doubt that he is mistaken. If a man thinks
otherwise and acts as he thinks, I do not see that anyone can prove
that he is mistaken. Faoh must act as he thinks best; and if he is
wrong, so much the worse for him. We stand cai a mountain pass in the
midst of whirling snow ad blinding mist, through which we get glimpses
now and then of paths which may be deceptive. If we stand still we
shall be frozen to death. If we take the wrong road we shall he dashed
4
to pieces. We do not certainly know whether there is any right one."
This may be the case, hut Bartley makes mention of it only in a footnote,
and without argument must be guilty of failing to do justice to the
relation/
4. Fits James Stephen, Liberty. Eouality, Fraternity, p.353
5. R.C.p.p.89-90. Hartley offers three main examples, i.e. Tillich,
Maolntyre, and Mitchell's hook. None of these can be characterised
as irrational, "tu quoque" users without detailed argument. See,
for example, Tillich's discussion of the relation of faith and
rationality, especially his notion of "ecstasy", as well as his
attaok on scepticism, Dynamics of Faith. p.p.6-7,19»76-7. Maolntyre
seems oddly cast in this role, of. Metaphysical Beliefs p.p.178,185,
202,208-9 st al. Mitchell's book in general tone runs counter to
Bartley's claim. See the chapters on "The Grace of God", B. Mitchell
Revelation", A. Farrer, and "How Theologians Reason?", G-.C. S-tead,
in faith and Logic B. Mitchell (ed.)
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relation of this "leap" to irrationality. It may he argued that
this "leap" can he characterised more in terms of Pascal's Wager, again
laying stress on the sound rational grounds, in the broad sense of
rational, for suoh an action.^ Bartley seems to equate faith with
irrationality, but to do this he must show that these are one and the
same. One may have faith in a person without or with apparent good
8
reason, and yet be unable to delineate the reasons for suoh a faith.
Pew would wish to call this irrational unless there were considerable
evidence to suggest that this faith was misplaced. We would rather
stress that irrationality might better be described as acting without
any reason at all, and this could not be charged against most christian
commitment•
Bartley thus fails to clarify in what way the fideist - the only
genuine example he offers - is involved in irrational commitment.
Without snaking it dearer exactly in -what way the fideist makes an
irrational commitment, and how this constitutes a problem for rationality,
Bartley's presentation of the genesis of the problem of rationality
fails to make out its case. The strange critique of the rational excuse
for irrationality will be examined, but it must also be seen that
Bartley, having failed to offer any concrete example of s soeptical-
irrationalist view, merely stating rather than proving such, also fails
to/
6. For comment on Herkegaard's concept of "leap" see T.P. Torrance,
"Faith and Philosophy", p.p.245-6, Hibbert Journal, and J. Baillie,
Tho Sense of the Presenoe of God, p.261
7. For a useful explanation of the role of "reason" in Pascal see J.
Cargile, "Pascal *S Wager". Philosophy. 41,1966, p.252, and R.
Popkin's article on Pascal in Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.p.53.Vol.6.
8. For example, T. fcrovm, Martial Kpigraas. i.32
"I do not love you, Dr. Fell,
But why I cannot tellj
But this I know full well,
I do not love you, Dr. Fell."
See below, ohapter four, p.37d'
to understand the nature of scepticism. It would seem that Bartley*s
procedure is rather elaborate to deal with the sceptical threat.
Surely it would have been easier to examine in detail an example of a
sceptical use of the ntu quoque", if there be such. Bartley slides
over as irrelevant the difference between the sceptic and the fideist,
but it is just this very difference which is cruoial and which, indeed,
9
Bartley without realising himself brings out in another context.
The fideist, it is claimed, makes an irrational leap in one
10
particular direction, while the sceptic simply suspends judgement.
Bartley need only examine the standing of the sceptic, who tries, on
the one hand, to criticise any rational view on the ground of commitment
and then to claim that he is unable to make any judgement himself. It
may be asked, indeed, whether or not the soeptical position can of
itself be made sense of. This is surely much simpler and a more
adequate refutation of the sceptical position, than to be forced to
change one's view of rationality.11 One might argue that the
soeptical position is perfectly rational, if it claims that our
judgements are always likely to be false, then it makes good sense to
make as few judgements as possible. This however hinges on the
definition and description we offer of the soeptic, and Bartley offers
no such description or definition. On Hartley's own terms, if it
can be shown that the soeptioal argument is impossible, then there
can be no threat from that quarter to the rationalist, and thus




11. R. Bambrough's discussion of scepticism in Reason. Truth, and
uQq p.p.l/',93»i04»
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Having shown that Bartley's account of the sceptical-fideiat
position is over-cursoiryj attention is turned to the odd notion of
the rational excuse for irrationalism. Does it make sense to posit
of the sceptic, #10 by Bartley's own definition suspends all judgement,
the giving of a rational excuse for any view, far less his own irration¬
ality? To claim to have a rational excuse would be already to have
adopted a basis of judgement, which is anathema to Bartley's description
12
of the soeptic. The fideist seems to fare little better, if an
attempt is made to describe him as offering a rational excuse for his
irrationality# Does it literally make sense to suggest that irration-
sality can be rationally held, for surely that irrationality must in
some sense be rational? For the fideist such a rational excuse must
prove too much, leaving no room for faith. If the fideist is to be
someone who claims the necessity to make a "leap of faith", then he
would hardly wish to claim a rational ground for this, in the sense
that there must be some more or less absolute distinction between faith
and sight, faith and reason# If he does wish to claim such a rational
excuse, then surely the charge may be brought against either the sceptic
or fideist who makes this claim, of falling prey to the crises of
identity and integrity, rather than accusing the rationalist of such.
Part of the problem is the failure of Bartley adequately to define his
terms, and this will be a recurring charge.
The/
12. W.R. Sorley, "Tradition",p.p.12-14. Herbert Spencer Lecture.
Oxford 192b; "Skepticism'1 Vol.5, Encyclopaedia 01 liiilo soppy:
B. Stroud's review of A. Haess, Scepticism. Philosophical Review.
April 1971, p.253*
The point at issue here is whether or not Bartley in setting up
the nature of the problem actually succeeds in doing so. He claims
that because of the sceptic and the fideist move in presenting their
case to an irrational commitment based on rational grounds, then there
a dilemma for the irrationalist. The argument has concentrated on the
first part of this, the sceptic and fideist positions, to see whether
or not Hartley's account is satisfactory. He has not shown a clear
example of a sceptic, nor sufficiently analysed the fideist position.
He does not take account of the differences between the two positions,
nor draw attention to the extreme difficulty the sceptic has in
presenting his case in the way that Bartley suggests poses a serious
threat to rationality. Bartley has not made out the case for a
rationalist dilemma on the basis of the sceptical-fideist approach,
but it may be that his aooount of the rationalist problem has its own
merit.
Bartley offers us two definitions of what he means by rationality.
He states*- "I •••• reserve the words 'reason*, 'rationality', and
•rationalism' to refer broadly to that tradition whose members are
dedicated to learning through critical discussion"It is of note
that in "The Entreat to Commitment", he rather talks of rationalists as
"dedicated to the task of trying to learn more about the world through
| it
the practice of critical argument." Bartley may be concealing
something significant in the move from "discussion" to "argument".




rationalist accepts any position that can be justified or established
or supported by appeal to the rational criteria or authorities" and
15
"accepts only those positions that can be justified in this way".
Bartley is perfectly entitled to suggest any definition he chooses,
but we are at liberty to ask why it should be this one rather than
any other. Bartley offers no analysis or argument of the nature and
scope of reason and ra ionality. Yet his whole position, from the
setting of the problem to the presentation of the solution, is
dependent upon a particular view of rationality and the problems that
this view entails.
One of the grounds of complaint against Bartley is that he fails
to take adequate account of important features of rationality. In
particular he stresses only one of the limits of rationality, that of
logic, to the exclusion of the others. He argues that this alone is
sufficient to raise a serious problem for the rationalist. The problem
with such concentration on one area is twofold. It tends to belittle
the reality of the other limits and the equally serious effect whioh
they have for rationality. In practical terms, the whole spectrum of
limits must be faced and dealt with if rational argument and discussion
is to take place successfully. The second problem is that if Bartley's
account of the logical limit is faulty, then the concentration on logical
limits is wasted. The contention is that Bartley not only overlooks
other important limits but also fails to make a case for the sole study
of/
15. RvR.p.12; Q.p.52j R.C.p,109j see above p.32-
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of the logical limit beoause of failing to clarify the rationalist
dilemma on his own terms. Merely to state that there is a variety of
limits such as the factual experiential, scientific, existential, and
practical as well as the logical, and yet to give no account of these
either in practice or in theory sug ests that there is more to be said
about rationality than Bartley has said. In the final chapter, these
themes will be woven into an account of the importance and nature of
the limits of rationality as thqy are found in practice and as they
afleot the actual oonduct and course of argument, whether this be
religious, moral, or metaphysical.
Bartley also falls to make mention of many crucial faotors which
are regularly taken to be male s of rationality. He does not comment
on the view that; "Rationalism is that system of philosophical belief
which asserts that human reason unaided is competent to obtain objective
16
truth". He also overlooks the association of rationalism with
17
liberal opinion, the interrelation of thought and action i iplicit
16
in rational behaviour, rationality as opposed to faith, qua faith,
or experience,^ or in contradistinction to animal.^0 Bartley does
21
not analyse the relation of rationality to reasoning and thought,
22
its connection with logioal conception, or the problems that modern
23
theories have created for rationality. Part of the problem with
Hartley* s/
16. "Rationalism", Encyclopaedia Britannica. Vol.18.p.991
17. "Rationalism", Chamber's Encyclopaedia. Vol.VIIIp.564
18. J. Rawls, "Justice as Fairness", Philosophical Review. Vol.LXVII
1953,p.170.
19. &• Aarnock's article, "Reason", Encyclopaedia of Philosophy Vol.7«p84
20. A. Farrer, "A Starting-Point for the Philosophical Examination of
Theological Belief", pl8, Faith and Logic B. Mitchell (ed.)
21. H.A, Hodges, "Languages, Standpoints, arid Attitudes" , Rid do 11
Memorial Lecture p.47
22. VJS.-irkoirian's Article, "Cohen" "hoyclopaediu of Philosophy. Vol.2
p.126.
2jt P. Suppes, "Decision Theory", Fncyclooaadl.. of Philosophy Vol.2.p.310.
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Hartley'3 bald statement of definition is the allied failure to define
its opposite, "irrationality". "When people raise the bogey of
'irrational!sm' or a 'flight from reason', what do they mean by 'reason',
24
and why shoud we be so eager to safeguard it?" and "But how is the
notion of 'reason' itself to be understood, and in what respects is its
authority supposed to be flouted? It would scarecly be sufficient to
reply that denial of reason consists in illogicality or confusion of
thought, or that it manifests itself in a tendency to arrive at
unacceptable conclusionsj for this would apply to the work of many
25
thinkers to whom the label 'irra.ionalist' is clearly inapplicable".
Without a clear conception of the one term, it is difficult to see how
the other can be properly defined or understood.
Thus far a number of features have simply been enumerated which
are considered essential to the nature of rationality, which Bartley
overlooks without comment, In a more rigorous fashion, it might be
enquired why Bartley's view of rationality is to be preferred to other
prominent views, without examination of alternatives and argument for
the one rather than the others. Three modern discussions are chosen -
the three most notable - and the central stress of eaoh is merely
outlined to reveal the limited role of Bartley's own view.
2b
Bennett in his book "Rationality" i3 concerned to analyse
rationality, and this means to him, "to explore the content of the true
belief that human beings are on a certain intellectual eminence compared
27
with other terrestial creatures". For this analysis Bennett assumes
that/
24* Hodges, ibid, p.p.61-2.
25. I-. Gardiner, "irrational!ua", Bncyciopaodia of ^i+rosooky. vol*4,
p.p.213-4.
26. J. Bennett, 2atonality.
27. Bennett, ibid, p.p.4-5.
that language is essential for rationality and attempts to deduce a
basis for rationality by examination of non-rational beings, reducing
21
finally to the formula of being able to make universal dated statements.
29
The value and adequacy of Bennett1s views are not relevant here, but
rather the stressing of the difference of his approach, which was more
a conceptual analysis of "rationality", believing that by differentiating
rational from non-rational, the nature of rationality can be better
anpreciated.
30
R. Rdgley in his book, "Reason in Theory and Practice", wishes
to examine the relation of practical to theoretical reason. He
31
delineates the "logical features of theoretical reason", then moves
32
to analyse the "practical conception of reason". He arrives at the
broad scope of the role and function of practical reason, describing
33
the "normative function" that reason fulfils. Both Bennett and
Edgley, though sharing a common, though very broad, conceptual-analysis
method, offer different approaches from each other and from Bartley.
Bartley needs to offer argument on his own behalf for the rationality
of his approach and its benefit over and against other theories.
Bennett and Edgley offer genuine insight into a great many features
of rationality which tend to be assumed, and it is doubtful if anyone
properly/
28. Bennett, ibid, p.p.93-4.
29. See reviews of' Bennett, Rationality, in Philosophical Quarterly.
15, 1965J Philosophy, 40,1965; Philosophical Review, 75.1966
30. R. Edgley, Reason in Theory and Practice.
31. Edgley, ibid,p.p.17-19
32. Edgley, "ibid, p.p.37-9
33. Edgley, ibid, p.154.
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properly understands or is able to evaluate any attack on rationality,
until and unless it is clear what it is. Without such an analysis,
Hartley's whole position must he held in abeyance, until he has
examined more closely the nature of rationality, its relation with
"reason", "reasoning" and "rationale"j whether the sense of "reason"
34
varies if set in opposition to the concepts of experience, faith, or
35
passion, and what the interrelation of these commonly regarded
36
antonyms might be.
Theologically too, on the thene of rationality, Hartley's view
is at odds with that of Professor Torrance, who describes reason as
"the capacity to behave consciously in terms of the nature of the
37
object", and as "our capacity for objectivity". Torrance's stress
is on the need to "know something only in accordance with its nature,
and you develop your knowledge of it as you allow its nature to prescribe
for you the mode of the rationality appropriate to it. That is the
•90
kind of objectivity we adopt in all rational behaviour whatsoever."
Torrance argues from this that it is possible and rational to talk of
knowing G-od, as long as that is only in terms which are "anpropriate
35
to the divine Nature". Using this basically medieval theme of
rationality, Professor Torranoe seeks to show the relation of science
an^/
34. W.H.Walsh, Reason and Experience.
35. D. Hume's discussion of the passions in his Treatise and Enquiries.
36. Bambrough, Reason. Truth, and G-od. p.118
57» T.F. Torrance, "Faith and Philosophy", Hlbhert Journal; see below,
chanter three, section one.
38. T.F. Torrance, Sod and Rationality, p.52.
39« T.F. Torrance, ibid, p.p.52-3
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and theology, and to stress the nossibility of a scientific theology
based on a true ontolasrv. Torrance's view of rationality is, like
Bennett and Slgley, at odds with the brief statement of Bartley's view.
Again there is the need for closer analysis on the part of Bartley before
the adequacy of his view in comparison with the others, can oroperly be
fudged, and also the adequacy of his contribution to the problem of
rationality.
Bartlay is unsatisfactory about his desoriotion of the sceptical-
fideish nroblem, both in the details of fidsist and sceptical positions,
and of the problem their attack may be held to constitute. He fails to
give clear examples of the sceptical or fideist attack, and to show the
differences and internal difficulties which they encounter. Part of
the problem has been that Bartley has not given adequate definitions
and grounds for these definitions, especially in light of modern
discussion on the subject of rationality. Is, however, the problem
as serious as Bartley would, have people believe? This is meant in
two senses' "Is there a genuine problem caused by an infinite regress
and arbitrary commitment?" and "Is there a problem at all?"
Is there a problem created by the regress of justifying one's
position? Bradley would appear to agree with Bartley and to state the
problem more explicitly when he saysj "We are fastened to a chain, and
we wish to know if we are really secure. What ought we to do? Is it
of much use to say, 'This link we are tied to is certainly solid, and
it is fast to the next, which seems very strong and holds firmly to the
next; beyond this we can not see more than a certain moderate distance,
but/
but, so far as we know, it all hangs together?* The practical man
would first of all ask, 'Where can I find the last link of my chain?
When I know that it is fast, and not hung in the air, it is time enough
to inspect the connection ' But the chain is such that every link begets,
as soon as w* come to it, a new onej and, ascending in our search, at
each remove we are no nearer the last link of all, on which everything
depends. The series of phenomena is so infected with relativity, that,
while it is itself, it can never be made absolute. Its existence
refers itself to what is beyond, and did it not do so, it would cease
to exist. A last fact, a final link, is not merely a thing which we
cannot know, but a thing which could not possibly be real. Our chain
by its nature cannot have a support. Its essence excludes a fastening
at the end. We do not merely fear that it hangs in the air, but we
know it must be so. And when the end is unsupported, all the rest is
40
unsupported". The question is whether or not this is the function
and role of the infinite regress argument. Bartley merely states that
one is in a regress and that there is and can be no solution to it.^
But Bartley has not carried his analysis far enough. He has stated
that there is no way to stop the regress but has not asked whether or
not we need to stop the regress. In other words, is the question of
the regress of justification, not better understood by comparing the
process/
40. Bradley, Principles of Logic.p.100
41. R.C.p.p.90ff.
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process with that of defining by means of a dictionary? Must we and
do we, in faot, continually question the dictionary definition to try
to reach the absolutely basic meaning? Bambrough comments that "every
word whose meaning is explained in the dictionary is explained in words
whose meanings are also explained in the dictionary. The whole process
of learning the meanings of English words from the dictionary is non-
I p
viciously circular} regressive, but not viciously regressive".
Bartley shows us that there is a regress, but fails to analyse whether
or not, and to what degree this is a vicious regress. Bambrough holds
that "there need not be, are not, could not be, any ultimate^v
of definition, explanation and demonstration", and that "to recognise
this is to weaken one of the most powerful motives for the generation
43
of transcendent substances and ultimate foundations". Bambrough's
position is based on the realisation that only what is articulable
and intelligible, can enter into logical relations. In other words,
he wishes to stress the various informal modes of reasoning and the
internal variety of the concepts of reason and truth. He stresses the
importance of understanding that explanation is multiform: "Besides
causal explanation there is also the distinct sense of explanation in
which we explain (or expound, or explicate - unfold) a proof, an
44
argument, a play, a picture". There is also mention of gestalt
theory/
42. Bambrough, Reason. Truth, and God, p.94
43. Bambrough, ibid, p.95
44. Bambrough, ibid, p.96
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theory and the Platonic doctrine of reminisoenoe• Bambrough offers
us the view that we need not regard the regress as being vicious, and
that the sting of the argument can be drawn by examining the variety of
45
informal modes of reasoning and justification that are in fact practised.
Not only is it doubtful if the regress s ( is necessarily
vicious, but it must also be doubted whether the regress argument
proves what Bartley claims that it does, i.e. the insolubility of the
46
problem of rationality on these terms. It might be suggested, rather,
that what the regress argument offers is to bring "home to us the fact
that the intelligibility the philosopher is seeking is not to be found
by going further along the path he has begun to treadj having failed
to achieve it by introducing a single form in the situation, he is not
i "7
going to do any better by introducing still more forms." In other
words, it is not so much that rationality as such has been misused, but
rather that the notion of explanation and justification - the demand
for a single form of these - is misplaced. This leads back to
Bambrough's notion of a variety of modes and means of explanation and
the centrality of informal concepts in adequate explanation and
justification. One may attempt to avoid the regress by arguing that
there is no need for explanation. One might also claim piivilege for
the first step in the regress, against which the arguer must show that
there/
45. Bambrough, ibiu. p.p.118-9,157; G.Ryle, "Formal and Informal Logio"
Dilemmas.
46. R.C.p.p.90-95.
47. J. Passmore, "The Infinite Regress", Philosophical Reasoning.p.p.21-2.
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there is no good reason for such a privilege-claim# Bartley fails
to examine either of these attempts to avoid the regress, or to clarify
49the distinction between an infinite regress and an infinite series.
This is especially odd as he himself argues that the nature of
Comprehensively Critical Rationalism is that of a never-ending process
of examination; yet he finds no difficulty in this regress, because he
50
claims that justification has been abandoned. But this doe3 not
excuse him from explanation and definition, and if so, he needs to give
good reasons why his own view can be aocepted, while that of the traditional
rationalist cannot. Bartley, therefore, requires a closer account of
whether or not the regress argument is or need be necessarily vicious,
what tools can be used to deal with it, and why his own final position
is so different, specifically from the demand for explanation and
definition, and being different, why we might aocept a privilege claim
in one oase and not in the other.
There need not be, then, the spectre of a vicious infinite
regress to frighten the rationalist into changing his theory of ration¬
ality, unless Bartley can offer a more detailed analysis of the nature
and function of the infinite regress argument and also evaluates
modem attempts at thwarting its viciousness. But, if it is allowed,
that Bartley has made his case for the problem of regress, :'S i^ the
case that the commitment involved is arbitrary? The relativist
position/
48. Passmore, ibid, p.p.24,27-8
49* Passmore, ibid. p.p.28ff.
50. Passmore, ibid, p.p.30ff} Q.p.271j RvR.p.p.28-9.
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position derives muoh of its strength from this note of arbitrariness,
but perhaps the ooncept "arbitrariness" is itself seldom clarified,
hartley is not, however, without his supporters, for M. Cowling argues:
"Fundamental assumptions, because they are fundamental, cannot be
51
scrutinised, and are involved in the most extensive arbitrariness of all,"
Cowling also suggests that the demand for reasons is itself an arbitrary
52
preference. What is meant by "arbitrary" can perhaps best be seen
by examining Hare's refutation of such a oharge in the field of morals.
The context is that of choosing to aocept a way of life or not, and Hare
states: "If he accepts it, then we can proceed to justify the decisions
that are based upon it; if he does not accept it, then let him aooept
some other, and try to live by it..... To describe such ultimate deoisions
as arbitrary, because ex hypothesi everything that could be used to
justify them has already been included in the decision, would be like
saying that a complete description of the universe was utterly unfounded,
because no further faot could be called upon in corroboration of it.
This is not how we use the words "arbitrary" and 'unfounded*. Far
from being arbitrary, such a decision would be the most well-founded
of deoisions, because it would be based upon a consideration of
53
everything upon which it could possibly be founded." Hare suggests
that the word "arbitrary" must be inappropriate to the description of
suoly'
51. M. Cowling, Mill and Liberalism, p.p.155-6
52. Cowling, ibid, p.156
53* Hare, Language of Morals, p.58
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such a choice, and this can apply too, to the notion of a rationalist
choosing his rationality. It need not be an arbitrary action, if in
making the choice, the rationalist can offer a total background, both
of motivation and thought, and most of all the backing of a life lived
in accordance with his basic precepts, as evidence. Hare shows the
strength of his position by offering the example of a man who is
clairvoyant and can see everything that will result from his actions
and choices. Hare raises the question of whether or not such a man
can choose, and if so, whether this choice is arbitrary. "It would
seem beyond doubt that he could choose between two courses: it would
be strange, even to call such a choice necessarily arbitrary or
ungrounded; for if a man knows to "ehe last detail exactly what he is
doing, and what he might otherwise have done, his choice is not arbitrary
in the sense in which a choice would be arbitrary if made by the toss of
54
a coin without any consideration of the effeots"• The term "arbitrary"
55
suggests something that is merely chance, but as was seen of Pascal,
there is an important difference between drawing lots though even a
limited number of lots to be arawn may significantly affect the decision
and be held to be a less than arbitrary factor, and making a choice,
56
regardless of whether or not one is able to give reasons for that choice.
The language of "deciding", evaluating", and "choosing" seems to contain
the notion of better and worse, preferable, and desirable. These
characteristics are not arbitrary in the sense of capricious. "Abritrary"
can/
54. Hare Ibid. p»58
55* See above p.p.U lj{-
56. See above p. footnote % see below, chapter four, p»£6S
can bs opposed to "necessary" and in that sense is "without basis"•
But surely Bartley does not wish to claim that the traditional
rationality made decisions without any basis. There is, and must be
a difference between an adequate basis and no basis at all. When we
say that there is nothing to choose between two things, or two men for
a job, we do not mean that the choice is then arbitrary, but rather
that our preferences and psychological make-up are to be the deciding
factors, rather than the more obviously "objective" factors in the
situation. Bartley offers no examination of the meaning and scope of
"arbitrary", and it can be seen that this term, if taken literally,
is inappropriate to the human practice of choosing, whether it be in
respect of a new hat, or a new morality.
Bartley's analysis of the infinite regress and the arbitrariness
of the commitment needed to call a halt to the regress has been shown
to be overbrief and inadequate, but so also is the pioture he offers
of the step of oommitment. Again Bartley may be c itic oed on
the grounds that he does not examine what is meant by "commitment",
whether or not there are different sorts, and to what degree these may
be more or loss acceptable. One wonders if it is necessary to escape
commitment, if it is possible to do so, and whether Bartley's is the
best way to escape from such oommitment. If, as he does, he presents
the value of his approach as that of removing the demand for
57
justification, then it seems that he is in danger of offering this
58
positive gain Itself as a justification for adopting his position.
If/
57• See above p.i^c-
58. See below p. ICS
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If there is no contradiction in such justification, albeit at a
different level, does hartley's view not ultimately reduce itself
to a form of commitment to criticism? That is, why should we adopt
criticism rather than commitment? Why should we adopt consistent
rationality, rather than mitigated or academic scepticism? This seems
an appropriate question because Bartley offers little in the way of
evidence for the value of eritioisability, except as a retreat from
commitment. Can we, then, escape from commitment, and need we?
Bartley himself discusses the basic categories of logic and recognises
that these are presuppositions which are absolute and to which "we
are committed not as human being3, because of our biology, psychology,
59
or sociology, but as arguers about the world." However, this is,
60
he claims, no commitment to logic, but, he still describes these
6X
absolute presuppositions as something to which we are "committed".
If Bartley can allow that there are certain absolute presuppositions
to which we are committed, then it is surely appropriate for him to
analyse out what these are, and our attitude towards them. Collingwood
states thatj "We do not acquire absolute presuppositions by arguing;
on tho contrary, unless we have them already arguing is impossible to
us. Nor can we change them by arguing; unless they remain constant
all our arguments would fall to pieces. We cannot confirm ourselves
in them by "proving" them; it is proof that depends on them, not they
on proof. The only attitude towards them that can enable us to enjoy
what they have to give us (and that means science and civilisation,






We must accept them and hold firmly to them; we must insist on
presupposing them in all our thinking without asking why they should
62 '
be thus accepted." Collingwood stresses that we cannot question
these, for even to examine them is to use them. These absolute
presuppositions seem to have much in common with Kant's categories,^
and, if this is the case, Bartley ought to make much clearer the
difference between this sort of commitment from the sort that he attacks,
Gdven the analysis of "arbitrary" over the last few pages, it may be
argued that there is little difference. Unless Bartley can show this
difference, there seems little point to his attack on commitment.
However, a closer look is required at what sort of commitment
this is. There is a sense in which every science, and every claim
to knowledge, on the part of a human being is involved in taking
something for granted. For example, "The activity of scientific
investigation, which ever presupposes what it can never prove,
namely the ultimate rationality of the universe which it sets itself
64
to explore". These presuppositions are of the form of commitments,
for they govern the activity of the scientist and have far-reaching
implications. "The commitments that govern normal science specify
not only what sorDS of entities the universe does contain, but also,
by implication, those that it does not.... scientific fact and theory
are not categorically separable .... that is why the unexpected
discovery is not simply factual in its import and why the scientist's
world is qualitatively transformed as well as quantitatively enriched
by/
62. R. Collingwood, Essay on Metaphysics, p. 173
63* 4. Mink, Mind. History and Dialectics Donnagan, Ihe hater
Philosophy of Collingwood.




by fundamental novelties of either fact <r theory"• What then is
the status of this presupposition, which takes the form of a commitment
to the view that "what we know is accessible to rational enquiry, that
it is somehow inherently intelligible or rational. If it were not,
there oould be no knowledge, let alone any science."^*" Bartley does
not say, Polany- however, attempts to analyse more fully the notion
of such commitment, and states that it "might be said -co express a
beliefj where there is purposive striving, there is belief in success.
Certainly no one can be said truly to believe in anything unless he
is prepared to commit himself on the strength of his belief. We
conclude that the holding of a belief is a commitment of which human
beings are capable, and which bears close analogy to the commitment
in which animals universally and quite inevitably engage when embarking
on a purposive course of behaviour."*5'' Part of what it means then to
commit oneself, is that it relates to belief rather than knowledge.
That is to say, a Knowledge claim or demand must be inappropriate
to these ideas, theories, or views. It is also part of the "nature
of a belief that at the moment of its being held it cannot be fully
justified, since it is inherent in all commitments that at the time
68
we engage upon them their outcome is still uncertain." Thus
commitment relates to belief and incompleteness of evidence, coupled
with the need for action. The centrality of the theme of action and
its relation to commitment stems from the fact that "there is ultimately
no spectator viewpoint which is wholly independent of actor, nor actor
viewpoint/
65. T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. p.7j W.O.
Quine, "Ontological Relativity", Ontological Relativity and Other
Essays.
66. T.f. Torrance, G-ou and Rationality, p.p.93-4
67. M. Polanyi, The bogie of Liberty, p.p.23-4
68. Polanyi, ibid, p.24
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viewpoint which is wholly independent of spectator", but also from
the fact that the traditional notion of "detachment" is impossible.
Torranoe states that "our psychology insists that detachment is not
the sign of rationality, but of open-mouthed imbecility",^ and Polanyi
that "detachment in the rigorous sense of the word can only be achieved
in a state of complete imbecility well below the normal animal's level.
In all states of mind above that, we are inevitably committed, and
usually we are committed to an approach which excludes other approaches.,
detachment in the ordinary and true sense always means commitment to
a particular approach whioh we deem to be proper to the occasion and
disengagement from other points of view whioh for the time being are
inadmissible. To hold the balance between our alternative possible
71
approaches is our ultimate commitment, the most fundamental of all."
Thus in commitment we have the themes of background presuppositions,
belief, and action. Part of hartley's problem, and indeed of muoh of
modern philosophy, is the over-oharacterising of what this commitment
entails. Modern existentialism has influenced both theology and
philosophy, especially ethics, into an unreflective stress on decision
and commitment. What is needed, and is happening, is the realisation
that most of what we would characterise as basic commitments or absolute
presupposition stems from our heritage. "Humanity is an inherited
72
deposit taken on trust". "Our civilization is deeply committed to
certain/
69. Coulson, "Christianity in an Age of Soienoe" kidaell Memorial
Lecture, p.28
70. Torranoe, &od and Rationality, p.8.
71. Polanyi, ibid, p.25
72. Farrer, "Revelation", p.87, Faith and Logic, B. Mitchell (ed.)j
K. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, p.p.27,122.
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certain beliefs about the nature of things; beliefs which are
different, for example, from those to which the early Egyptian or the
73
Azteo civilizations were committed." These beliefs are imparted
usually by education, or through professional training, and from all aspects
of literature and informal personal contacts we have, and "these
beliefs form far-reaching systems, and though each of us is directly
affected only oy one limited part of them, we are committed by
74
implication to the whole pattern of which this is a part." Given
that muoh of our moral, metaphysical, scientific, and personal outlook
75
is imbued into us socially and culturally, we can realise that commitment
is something much leas existential, isolated, and common, thafl we are
normally led to believe. Rather it tends to be acquiescing in the
76onoioas of others, unless the situation is a novel one, or has
special features. On this basis, hartley's analysis of what
commitment is, is radically undermined both on the grounus that he has
failed to analyse some of tne notions relatau to and involved in
commitment, and to weigh the importance of these features, but also
because he may have been misled by modern literature on tne vheme of
commitment, inco overstating the occasions and tne nature ol the act
*»*
of commitment. Perhaps, rather the need is to stress the basic back¬
ground against which and in light of which all our thinking anu reasoning,
evaluating,/
73. Polanyi, ibid. p.p.27-bj Evans-Pritcnard, ' Levy-Bruhl1 s .theory
of Primitive Mentality", Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts.
University of Egypt 1934.
74. Polanyi, ibid, o.26
75* walsh, "Pride, bhama, and Responsibility", Philosophy. VolXLV 1970
76. J. Mabbott, "Punishment", The Philosophy of Punishment H. Acton
(ed.) p.J?l
evaluating and deoision-making, is carried out. If Bartley wishes
to olaia that the commitment to rationality is different from this
sort of background, he needs to argue his case,
hartley's view of the arbitrary commitment to call a halt to the
infinite regress, has not stood up to analysis. The criticism has
been based on analysing the three notions of infinite regress,
arbitrariness, and commitment, and seeing that Bartley does not examine
what is involved in these concepts, and in the practice of them, and
whether they lend themselves to the problem of rationality which
Bartley claims they do. Without a clearer account of the rationalist
dilemma by means of conceptual clarification of regress, arbitrariness,
and commitment, there seems not to be the problem that Bartley thinks
there is and provides a solution to. But it may he responded, that
one is still left with irrationalism, and that this must always pose a
threat to rationalism. The question has been raised as to whether
the irrationalist can make use of the rational excuse for irrationalism,
77
which Bartley thinks is open to him. But is irrationalism so olearout
as Bartley claims, and are the views which he designates as "irrational"
genuinely so? The basic problem is that Bartley fails adequately to
describe the differences between being within and being outside a system,
H.A. Hodges has examined this problem and comments:- "Such systems are
logically watertight; if you take up your position firmly within one
of them, you can turn the edge of any objection that may be brought
against it. There is a Christian interpretation of any facts or
alleged/
77. See above p,^-3
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alleged facts which may be brought as evidenoe against Christianity;
just as there are several non-christian interpretations of those
facts or alleged facts which are brought forward as evidence in
support of Christianity. To one who is a christian, his own
interpretations are bound to seem the natural and obvious ones, and the
others will appear forced and unreasonable; while to one who is not
a christian the reverse will appear to the the case. For this reason,
argument between adherents of such conflicting systems is usually a
mere beating of the air. Each participant remains at the end where he
was at the beginning, only marvelling at the unreasonableness of his
78
opponent." T.S. Kuhn has also examined the notion of system and the
idea that within a system there are built-in standards, "paradigms",
which are ao epted and used for all true/false, adequate/inadequate,
79useful/useless conflicts. The differences between systems and
beliefs, and how one can move from one view to another needs to be
further examined, but what is important is that Bartley appears to
assume that the irrationalists fail to come up to some standard.^
But to the so-called irrationalist, safely within his own system, his
own view may appear perfectly logical and rational. Bartley has failed
to note the importance of and the causes of conflict and change within
and between various systems, and seems unaware of the dynamics of such
situations. This is an example of Bartley failing to take seriously
enough the role that criticism plays and discussion of a view with
someone who holds a different view. He seems to understand discussion
and criticism in terms that there is one sort of argument and standard
of argument which all discussion and argument conform to. Thus it
can/
78 H. Hodges, "Languages, Standpoints, and Attitudes", p.p.57-8; see
above chapter one, p.7
79 T.S. Kuhn, The structure of Scientific Revolutions.
80 Q.p.96a.
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can be better understood when he comes to present his own view why he
leaves no room for genuine criticism and discussion, by failing to
realise the variety of types and style of argument and the importance
of different presuppositions as they affect the way in which people
actually argue and present their material for consideration. For there
to be such consideration th presentation of a view must allow room for
the critic to express his opinion and criticism,
Hartley allows no room for a possible third category between
"rational" and "irrational", that of "non-rational". It cannot be
assumed without argument that if something does not come up to a standard
of rationality that it is automatically irrational. As was seen with
the notion "arbitrary", there was definitely a category of non-capricious
explanations, which might not conform to a strict rationality, yet was
necessarily informal, and none the worse for that. This category would
allow the response to a demand for a rational basis, that the epithet
"rational" could not and did not apply.
This section has been devoted to examining Bartley's account of
the sceptical-fideist position and the threat it is supposed to
constitute. It has been shown that his analysis is faulty, his
treatment inadequate, his statement of the problem too brief, and that
he fails to take account of important and relevant features especially
in relation to the other limits of rationality. We have tried to
dissolve the problem both at the level of the rational excuse for
irrationalism, and the dilemma of ultimate commitment, and thus argue
that/
that no aatter what solution Bartley offers, it is beside the point,
until and unless he is able to constitute his view dearly. There
seems no genuine problem on Bartley's terms, hence the approach and
solution are unnecessary.
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2. Hartley's Approach to Rationality.
Bartley's problem is not what he thought it was and he fails to
make out a case for it. Tie overlooks what is important both in
relation to the variety of limits of rationality and in the failure
to give a thoroughgoing account of the sceptic-fideist problem and
the rationalist dilemma in terms of infinite regress, arbitrariness,
and commitment. He omits what ought not to be omitted. The basic
criticism against Bartley rested on three grounds. The first has
been examined i.e. his failure to examine the notion of limits and
his failure to give an adequate examination to the central, notions
involved in rationality. Attention is now centred on the sec nd
ground of criticism, i.e. that Burtley's own account is not in itself
valid. Even if he has not successfully argued for the problem of
rationality, his approach must still be examined and weighed up on
the assumption, for the meantime, that he has clearly stated the
problem and that it is as stated. G-i en this assumption, what is the
adequacy of Bartley's approach and methodology? The approach is
intimately bound up with the way that the problem is set. Bartley
delineates the dilemma as the inability of the traditional rationalist
to live up to his own standard of rationality."'" Is there here a
genuine problem': Bartley suggests that the rationalist is in a crisis
2
of integrity because he fails to live up to his ideal of rationality.
Bartley/
1. See above p.p.Xk
2. See above p.p.27
Bertley fails to draw any distinction "between failure to live up to
one's ideals and having no ideals at all. That is it to have an ideal?
It is an empirical notion which involves, as it were, a necessary falling
short. Would one continue to have an ideal if one achieved the ideal
3
all the time or even regularly? Rather, it would commonly he said
that an ideal is something out of reaoh, which is aimed for and which
is used as an absolute standard or guideline; 3'ot which is not regularly,
or porhaps even ever, achieved. The ideal, woman, ideal job, ideal
teacher, and ideal rationality are none the worse for the failing to
obtain eny of these things, and are nonetheless real. An ideal
involves the notion of a standard which can be kept or failed to bo kept
Yot our ,ideal3 have exceptions, as scientific laws have exceptions,
and indeed legal systems too. Language is not so rigid and logical
as hartley seems to assume, for it allows for the "falling short" of
an ideal. There is a whole gamut of exceptions, mitigating circumstances,
allowances, mistakes, cheats, and pretenders built into talk of ideals
and standards. It is the nature of both people and society to allow
4
for failure. Since this is the case, there is no serious problem
for the rationalist vis a vis integrity. It need not be part and
parcel of his exposition of rationality that one must always come up
to the perfect standard. This is surely the point of Hume's critique
of Rationalism; to show that reason itself is not and cannot be enough.
Because/
3. See below, chapter four, p.p. . For a similar point see
J. Urmson's discussion of supererogation in "Saints and Heroes",
Moral Concepts. J. Feinberg (ed.)
4. Hare, Language of Morals; S. Hampshire, Thought and Action.
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Because one is not always totally rational, need not give one qualms
about trying to be rational. It is not so much a condemnation of
one's theory of rationality as a comment about the way the world is.
By failing to examine the notion of standarus and exceptions to
such standards, hartley rails to discuss alternative solutions, or
rather dissolutions of his problem. The problem might well be
described as a "straw man", for Bartley seems to assume some notion
of "choosing" or "not choosing" one's rationality. The way he
presents the crises of identity and integrity is such that one can
either opt for or against rationality. Even after his solution, he
5
allows that one can still choose to be irrational. hartley seems to
be working with the confusion between keeping a law or standard and
6
choosing one, and the different nature of justification that is
required in each case. As has been already mentioned in the passage
on commitment, there is a distinction betv?een entering a tradition
and upholding it, and , rarely, if ever, do we genuinely enter
into a viewpoint in some isolated, existential fashion. Bather me
7
grov. up within a tradition and continue to uphold it. There may
be some point at which choice to reaffirm the basic tenets of the
position is made, rather than to continue to uphold it blindly, but
this is still different in kind from choosing a viewpoint from scratch,
nationality is entered into - if indeed that makes sense - as a going
concerry'
p. Q.p.p.326-/.
6. J. Rawls, "Two Concepts of Rules"; J. Mabbot, "Punishment";
J. Urmson, "On Grading", Boric and Language, A. ^lew (ed.)
Second series.
7. See above p.p. tiff; see below, chapter four, section two, part three.
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concern, and one wonders whet sense one can attach to the notion of
choosing a rationality or rationality itself. How could this choice
or its alternative be framed? How could it be thought at all? This
failure to separate justification of practice or position, from an
individual aotion or part of either, leads only to confusion, and part
of the importance of moral and political philosophy as well as
philosophy of religion, is to put this in the proper p rspective.
Bartley has fallen victim to the same tendency to confuse the two, and
as a result, creates an unreal problem.
The basic oddity of hartley's critique is best seen by comparing
8
the dilemma he presents - can one be rational about one's rationality? -
with other similar questions. Is logic logical? Is beauty beautiful?
Is good good? The striking thing about such questions is their extreme
oddity, and the feeling of unease they elicit. An inappropriateness
about them is felt, which, though it may be hard to delineate, is
nonetheless real. The fear is that these are nonsense questions, and
this fear is strengthened by the fact that a response is not
forthcoming. w0f course", one wishes to say "logic is perfectly
logical"j yet this conclusion seems to have been arrived at by logio
itself. Bartley does not examine what it is to ask this sort of
question and systematic ambiguity implicit in all such questions. As
ittgenstein's example of the standard yard length and his question
whether or not it is a yard long reveals, there is a point at which
9
questioning mut stop, This point may vary and we may stop where
we/
8. Q.p.p.44-5i AvR.p.Bj see below, chapter four p.p.2>7°
9. Vlttgensteln, Philosophical Investigations, \ 50.
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we are unable to respond to the question, either when the question
has defeated us and we must change our view, or when we nevertheless
retain our view with the response that someday we will have an answer
to the question. One may also stop the questioning, when it is a
nonsense question or invites a nonsense answer. But there is also
the point at which it is unreasonable to ask for further evidence.
For example, the wife who keeps asking her husband whether he loves
her, though in all that he does and says he is revealing his love.
The husband has marrie d his rdfe, gives her a generous allowance,
helps in the home, takes her out regularly, brings her flowers and
chocolates, never forgets birthdays or anniversaries, and constantly
expresses his affection in word and action, at the same time giving
no ground or suggestion for the belief that he is not a faithful,
thoughtful, loving husband. To such a man, the question, "Do you
really love me? " must seem unreal and unanswerable in any other way
than has already been done. Such a question must come to an end.
What needs to be clarified is whether or not any of these stopping
points has been reached, and therefore whether refusing to answer
is justified. There is also the need to separate clearly choosing
a standard and abiding by that standard.Thus we are hack to the
previous paragraphs, and the discussion of entering or upholding a
tradition. There seems little sense that we can attach to the idea
of using rationality to somehow reach that rationality.
Again we are confronted with Bartley*s failure to clarify his
conception of what rationality is. In the last section, some
alternative/
10. Urmson, "On (trading".
72
alternative views of rationality were examined and specifio features
which were considered to be important. There are many such features
such as universality, generality, universal validity, but one central
one is the connection of rationality with the ability and the practice
of argument. Bartley himself claims to offer arguments for his
position and to approach the theory of rationality, as that in which
11
people seek to learn more by the process of critical argument. But
what is this process of argument, and why is no analysis of this offered
by Bartley?
This seotion is devoted to examination of the adequacy of Bartley's
approach to the problem he claims to present. My criticism rests on
the ground that he has failed to give an account which is in itself
His account is also inadequate to the complexity of rationality.
Without an aocount of the role of ideals and standards, the notions
of exceptions to standards, the choice of standards over and against
the choice on the basis of such standards, Bartley's case is weakened
and his position is not valid as it stands. This oriticism may again
be assooiated with that from an earlier section: that hartley omits
important limits by concentrating on the limit of logic alone.
Bartley relates that his approach is concentrated solely on the
logical problem for the rationalist! yet his approach is characterised
12
by psychological terminology. He talks of crises of identity and
integrity, and draws his description of these from psychology. It is
unolear whether Bartley is offering a conceptual or a contextual
clarification./
11. R.^.p.viii.
12. See above p.17 see Catkins' discussion part four below.
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clarification. The logical limitation is crucial, Bartley claims,
because it rules out rationality from the very start, if successful.
We have seen that the logical problem is misconstrued, and that there
are considerable other limitations of rationality. The preference
for the logical limitations rather than the verbal, epistemological,
social, and conceptual limitations is not a clear-out distinction, and
one is left wondering if Bartley is trying to give an account of some
feature of the world, or of some feature of human beings. One wonders
whether we do not, in practice, know these limits, and we would better
benefit from an account of how far understanding of the logical limits
would take one, and why this supposed logical accouryt is veiled in
psychological jargon. Even if he is justified in selecting the
logical problem of limits and has proved his case, he has then provided
no more than a necessary condition for rationality, but certainly not
a sufficient one. Thus he needs to supplement his account, given its
success, with an account of the factual, physical, psychological, and
13
practical limits and possibilities of rationality.
A feature of Bartley's approach is the "common structure to failure"
shared by rationalist positions."^ For this, Bartley lumps together
Descartes and Hume - the rationalist and empiricist schools - stressing
that both views beg authoritarian questions and answers. While there
is much to sympathise with in this view that there is a basic underlying
authoritarian structure, one wonders to what extent Bartley is justified
in sliding over the very basic differences between reason and experience,
and/
13. Chapter four, section two.
14. &.C.p.11OffI RvR.p.p.llff.
and the varying attitudes these two views have towards them. Is there
such a common structure as Bartiey claims, and is this common structure
integral to rationality? Further, is this "retreat", if it be such,
to authority, as irrational and unsavoury as Bartiey and Popper seem to
think. There is at least room for argument on the point. C.K. G-rant
suggests that "the decision to believe an authority is not irrational
so long as the statements at issue are subject to the appropriate kinds
of testj whether I could make the tests or understand them is irrelevant.
The essential point is that the choice of an authority is not necessarily
an arbitrary fiat of the will; I do not have to be an astronomer, even
an amateur one, to have good reasons for taking Professor Hoyle's word
about the stars rather than that of Mme, Zora. There are different
sorts of evidence that can justify, and so make rational, an empirical
15
belief." Bartiey needs to argue the point, not just assume it.
Bartiey is muddled, for though he talks of rationality as opposed to
theory of rationality, one is still unclear whether it is epistemology
which is the heart of his position, or rather the precursor of any
epistemology in terms of features either of the world, of man, or of
the structure of the reasoning faculties.
The critioism against Bartiey in this section has been against
his statement of the problem of rationality as the failure to live up
to that standard and the attendant difficulties this raises. He has
oversimplified the situation by talk of standards and ideals without
analysis of what is involved in having suoh standards and ideals, how
exceptions/
15« C.K. G-rant, "Belief and Action", Inaugural Lecture. University
of Durham, 1%0 p.16.
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exceptions affect them, and the difference between choosing a standard
and abiding by anJLready accepted standard. Hartley fails to take
acoount of these ooncepts and how they relate to actual argument, and
discussion. His account is not in itself adequate and also concentrates
on one limit to the exclusion of others which are equally important if
rationality is to be understood. In the next section his alternative
theory will be examined with a view to criticism on the grounds that
his solution is in faot not adequate either to his own needs or to the
complexity of rationality as it is found in actual argument and
discussion. 'i'he new insights which Bartley claims that Popper has
brought to rationality will be examined. It is claimed that Bartley
has in fact failed to make out his case and that his approach is faulty,
but for the sake of understanding his position and its dangers as well
as for the sake of argument it will be assumed that his method is
impeccable and attention turned to his solution to test its adequacy.
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3. An Alternative Theory of Rationality
There are two key terms in the solution of the problem of
rationality, as Hartley outlines it. These are "criticism" and
"justification". Bartley's new philosophy, or rather his v ersion of
Popper's old one, is called the "nonjustificational philosophy of
criticism"
These key notions will be examined in turn, before a more general
criticism of his solution is offered.
Nietzsche commented that "efforts to justify smack of indecent
2
exposure". It would appear that Bartley would agree. He defines
3
justification as the giving of good reason. A rational defence is
the giving of good reasons to justify. This same view is characterised
by A. Flew, where he asserts that "the use of 'justification' (is) a
L
near synonym for 'reason forr. There are two points at issue. Is
justification the giving of reasons, and is it the giving of good
reasons? These are not the same, and because Bartley slurs them
together, it is unclear which he favours. It is certainly not
sufficient to state that justification is the same as giving reasons
for. There are at least three basic differences. 1. "I can explain
my aotion only by giving the reason vshich actually motivated me, and
not by giving some reason which might have motivated me but did not...
an act may be justified by pointing out any reason in its favour,
5
whether that reason motivated the agent or not." 2. "I can explain
my act, by giving my reasons to anyone who is curiousj but it makes
sense/
1. See above p.p. 31
2. Nietssche, The will to Power.
3. Q.p*3j RvR^X
4. A.Plew's essay, The Philosophy of Punishment. H. Acton (ed.)p.88.
5. J. Rachels, "Wants, Reasons, and Justification", Philosophical
Quarterly. 18, 1968, p.p.306-7.
sense to justify my act only in the faoe of prima facie reason why I
shouldn't do it. If there is no reason why I should not do A, then
a justification of A is not called for." 3» "Not every act done for
a reason is justifiable ... There is no difference between justifying
an aot and successfully justifying an act. When I fail to justify
my aot because the reasons I give won't wash, I do not give a bad
7
justification: I have not justified it at all." Justification is
not equivalent to giving reasons for.
Bartley regards justification however, as the giving of good
reasons. But this is in error, as is shown by the fact that any
reason cannot count as a justification. Bartley offers no clue as to
what is to count as good or bad reasons, whether in general or in a
particular situation, nor what it is to justify adequately as opposed
to inadequate attempts at justifying. Our "good reasons" can be
dismissed by the other party as in fact "poor" reasons. But our excellent
justification does not become a poor justification, rather it is, tk
no justification at all. Part of this problem again lies in Bartley's
failure to examine what the main features of justification are. We
have already seen that "justification" differs from "giving reasons".
Justification usually tends to be baokward looking. Calley kills
the Vietnamese, and is brought to trial to justify his actions.
Justification tends to be of something which has already occurred.
There are exceptions to thi3, where one might justify a course of
action prior to embarking on it, or an attitude that one is about to
adopt/
6. Rachels, ibid, p.307
7. Rachels, ibid, p.307
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adopt, tout even in these oases the action or opinion in question is
one that is readily identifiable by both parties. Part of the
success of justification depends on this basic agreement in description
of the act or opinion to be justified. Necessarily there oust also
be agreement as to what is to count as "having justified" something,
and of what "failing to justify" consists. Justification is appropriate
in response to a question or ciriticism. That is to say that there
must be genuine alternatives open to the person. As Flew puts it:-
"That there must be at least one alternative is brought out by considering
that 'There is no alternative* is always either a sufficient justification
or a sufficient reason for saying that the question of justification does
g
not arise." A,p. Griffiths also remarks that "When it is suggested
that there is a reason for acting in one way rather than another, the
suggestion requires justification, in the absence of whioh the suggestion
9
may be reasonably ignored." There can be no criticism or questioning
if one is in a situation where there is no alternative or choice. This
also entails that where there is no criticism, no question, or no
alternative, there can be no demand for justification or need to justify.
One responds that the justification demand is inappropriate.
Wittgenstein commented that justifications must come to an end somewhere.^*'
There have, however, been a variety of stopping-points for justification,
quinton in his Encyclopaedia article on "Knowledge and Belief" sayss-
"Philosophers/
8. flew, ibid, p. 89
9. "Ultimate Moral Principles! Their Justification", Encyclopaedia
of Fhilosophy, Vol.8, p. 181
10. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 217, 485» P» Winch,
The Idea of a Social Science, p.39.
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"Philosophers have fastened on two forms of intuitive knowledge which,
by standing as the uninferred first premises of all inference, can
terminate the regress of justification. First there are self-evident
necessary truths, and, second, there are basic contingent statements,
immediately justified by the experiences they report and not dependent
on the support of any further statable items of knowledge."^1 Mabbott
points out that in Flew's analysis of punishment he talks only of
justifying "something as an alternative to something else or against
a counter-charge, and these two justifications might well differ.
Flew adds that we may also justify something by roference to principles
12
and persons." More basically we can see that part of this notion
of justification reaching an end, must be seen in light of recognising
that in fact we do vary our justification attempts according to
circumstances, the object in question, the person who is making the
justification demand, the strength of that demand, and its nature, as
well as according to our own view of the propriety of justification.
For example, "a sufficient justification for inferring a conclusion from
a set of premises is to see that the conclusion does in fact follow.
To insist on any further justification is not to be extra cautious;
it is to display a misunderstanding of what inference is. Learning
to infer is not just a matter of being taught about explicit logical
relations between propositions; it is learning jbo do something.
Also on the notion of justifying induction, "It appears upon examination
that/
11. Quirt ton, "Knowledge and Belief", Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.
Vol. 4«p*34b.
12. J. Mabbott, "Professor Flew on Punishment", The Philosophy of
Punishment. H. Acton /Ed./ p.119.
13. V<inch, The idea of a Social Science, p.57.
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that the task of the logical justification of induction, as classically
conceived, is framed so as to he a priori impossible of solution. If
induction is by definition nondeductive and if the demand for justification
is, at bottom,that induction be shown to satisfy the conditions of
correctness appropriate only to deduction, then the task is certainly
hopeless. But to conclude, for this reason, that induction is
basically invalid or that a belief based upon inductive grounds can
never be reasonable is to transfer, in a manner all too enticing,
oriteria of evaluation from one domain to another domain, in which they
14
are inappropriate." Justification varies according to the object
in question, and according to the person. "What would serve as
justification against one charge and for a Roman Catholic could be
simply irrelevant against another and for an atheist humanist... In
any one context (i.e. where the same values are given to all the
variables) there may be two logically separate acceptable justifications
both independently sufficient. And surely this is not merely possible
but likely. For the fields of human causation, motivation, and
justification are precisely those in which overdetermination is most
common. (An action is said to be overdeterainod when at least two
motives were at work to produce it, either of which alone could have
been sufficiently strong to do so separately. The concept, mutatis
mutandis, obviously can and should also be applied to matters of
15
causation and justification." Bartlett comments that:- "There are
two/
14. M. Black, "Induction", Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Vol 4. p.177
15. Flew in essay in The Philosophy of Punishment, Acton (ed.) p.89
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two types of justification. One, properly called verification,
consist in discovering steps which are connected in a chain of cause
and effect, or of reason and consequent, from the evidence as it has
been presented to whatever completion has been believed. The details,
items, or events in this chain are all treated as having properties in
no way different from those of the items of the initial evidence.
The other type of justification is by results and in action on the
part of the believers. The first kind disposes of belief, replacing
it by scientifically or intellectually attested understanding. The
second kind seeks to make the belief stronger and more clearly necessary."
Bartlett himself favours the latter believing that "the only available
decisive justification is in terms of results. Anyone who rejeots this
....must either fall back upon a purely intuitive position, saying that
a belief's justification is exactly the same thing as a belief's
acceptance, or murvt tiy to rest a case on internal consistency within
17
a belief system."
Bartley fails to analyse out this notion of justification, and to
olarify both conceptual and contextual justification. He is concerned
with justifying rationality as a whole, but draws no distinction
between justifying one particular rational action or belief and the
holistic justification he seeks. This orucial distinction between
justification of an aot and of a practice, has already figured largely
18
in this account, but Bartley must give some analysis of the need to
justify/
16. Sir Frederick Bartlett, "Religion as Experience, Belief, Action",
Riddell Memorial heoture. p.p6
17. Bartlettt ibid, p.p.26-7
18. See above p.p Gciff and footnote G p.p.Mff ^ J. Rawls, "Two
Concepts of Rules" Philosophical Review, Vol. LXIV, 1955, P»32.
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justify the practice as a whole, given that the rationalist is able to
make genuinely rational decisions and to hold more or less rational
views in practice. Part of the systematic ambiguity of "justification"
is that it can refer either to aotions or opinions and views, but
nowhere does Bartley comment on this distinction or analyse its
importance. It is surely better to clarify exactly what concepts we
are seeking to understand and replace before we try to replace them to
solve a problem which may be conceptually or contextually d. ssolved.
Bartley seeks to rid us of justification, but it is unclear what
this is. If taken literally, one might no longer be required to
justify one's actions or views. What would then hapoeii to our
understanding of "Justifiable homicide" or "justifiable criticism"?
Justification seems to be an essential feature in response to criticism,
given the appropriate conditions. Unmitigated criticism is not an
explication of the way we live, and Bartley must show more clearly that
justification inevitably breaks down. This he has not done. Thus
there is a good deal more to justification than Bartley seems to think
and his account is faulty because of failing to note the necessary point
and strength of justification in practice.
Turning from "justification" to the other key term "criticism",
this concept will be examined, and then, in light of this, Bartley's
position evaluated and his failure to examine criticism and its role
in argument will be noted while seeking to present the very features
Bartley overlooks. In other words, the complaint against Bartley at
this/
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this point is that his own account is internally invalid because of
his failures to examine both the concepts of "justification" and'criticism",
and that an adequate approach to rationality must not only raise the
question of the nature of criticism and its relation to rationality, but
seek to analyse "criticism"' to clarify the natura of rationality.
Bartley presents the correct issue but does not deal with it successfully
nor adequately. He gives a good example of the important features of
rationality which require to be grasped to apply it successfully to
argument, while himself failing to go far enough.
Some of the basic features of "criticism" are as follows? criticism
requires standards. By this is meant that one needs to know -what is
to count as criticism, as tfell as its means and modes.
It will be seen that there are different kinds and types of criticism,
and, this being the case, the need for definition of standards of and
for criticism becomes all the more essential, Criticism itself need
not be so destructive as Bartley seems to imply. Criticism, in
essence, ought to be based on neutrality, allowing for both positive
and negative criticisms. "To criticise is always to judge, but in
popular speech there is oft n the additional sug estion that the judgment
is adverse .... but criticism can also be favourable, and more generally
it can refer to the whole process of evaluation, whether its conclusions
19
are favourable or unfavourable." Criticism also presupposes that one
is acqu&5.nted in some way with the object of criticism. "A necessary
condition of holding the right to criticise cannot, then, be direct
experience/
19. R.S. Downie, "The Right to Criticise", Philosophy, Vol.XLIV,
1969, p.116.
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experience of what we are criticising, but may, mor8 generally, be
knowledge of itj we must be correctly informed about the facts (if
we have not ourselves experienced them) otherwise our right to oriticise
can be blocked, as when we say, '¥ou don't know all the facts, so you
20
have no right to criticise'." The occasion of criticism most generally
results when something goes wrong. When there is some failure or error,
criticism in order to bring about change or improvement, or to eliminate
error is appropriate. Acton comments that:- "Criticism, oven when
21
directed on statements or theories, is an attempt to seoure correction'.'
That is, there is little occasion for criticism, if everything is
satisfactory. This, however, is not strictly correct, for one might
criticise on the basis of tightening up particular conceptual weaknesses,
or in order to bring "into fuller light the truth expressed in a
22
doctrine or the value of an institution." Thus criticism may be
apposite to clarification, explanation, and understanding, as well as
the removal or mitigation of error. If this is the case, then Hartley's
attack on the "tu quoque" is weakened, because even within an arbitrary
commitment, few, if any irrationalist, would wish to claim that there
is no room for criticism based on descriptive and explicative terms.
The "tu quoque" is not the end of all criticism. Criticism also implies
that one has appropriate backing for the criticism. "One way of denying
that a person has that right (i.e. to criticise) is to deny that he can
provide the appropriate backing for his criticism ... The attempt to
criticise may be blocked before the question of backing can arise at
all."25/
20. Downie, ibid, p.117
21. Aoton's introduction, The Philosophy of Punishment. Acton (ed.)p.35#
22. Sorley, "Tradition", p.2ii-.
23# Downie, ibid, p.116.
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23all." This backing may be in the form of evidence, or authority.
Understanding and intelligence are also presupposed, in that it is
assumed that there is the capacity to follow the criticism and see the
point of it. Thi3 leads naturally to the capacity to adapt in light
of criticism, or to meet the criticism in soma other way. One must
have, therefore, the opportunity to answer the criticism either oy
counter argument or by the ability to benefit from it in practice.
Downie comments that criticism, specifically, is usually of "people,
their actions or their artefacts" and this "may be either moral or non-
24
moral'. This is important. ..'e would not criticise a child unless
he was able to appreciate the criticism and benefit from it - at least,
we would not criticise to any point, unless this were so. If one is
confronted with a compulsive alcoholic, physically and psychologically,
criticism would seem out of place in light of is problem. Mors
especially, if one were confronted with a situation where one could
criticise an old lady for what she had done, but the effect cf that
criticism would be to drive her to suicide, one would be aware of the
need to judge whether or not it was appropriate to criticise, regardless
of the consequences and morality of the action.
In general, it has become clear that criticism can be more or les3
appropriate, and that inevitably criticism must vary with circumstances,
the personal relation one bears to the person criticised, the object
criticised, and one's viow of the object or belief. It is crucial that
the/
23. Downie, ibid, p.116
24• Downie, ibid, p.116
86
the diversity of objects of criticism and that the appropriateness of
different sorts of criticism be understood. One might criticise ideas,
traditions, institutions, values, morals, people, and states of affairs.
These vary in the type and nature of criticism 'which is appropriate.
One might offer theoretical, practical, psychological, psychoanalytic,
moral, or religious criticisms. The standards and modes cf approach
in each case must vary considerably. So, too, there are different
levels of criticism, in the sense of the holistic approach, or the
analytic, or perhaps some other free-form, abstract criticism. Polanyi
makes this point by use of the illustration of a pianist and his playing
a sonata, then analysing the musical phrases, finger by finger, so that
25
he loses the capacity properly to play the sonata as a whole.
This is a crucial point, which Polanyi describes as a distinction
26
between proximal and distal. This applies too to criticism. One
may try to criticise the individual brushstrokes or the sett3.ng of the
characters in a picture. These require different modes and standards.
Even Popper realises that anything, but specifically the analysis of
the problem of change, is "in danger of being completely buried under
27
the mounting heap of the minutiae of textual criticism." That is,
that excessive detailed criticism can destroy the appreciation of the
whole, and vice versa.
Bartley ought to have offered a similar analysis of what is
involved/
25. M. Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, p.19
26. M. Polani, "Tacit Knowing", The Tacit Dimension
27• K. Popper, "Back to the Pre-Socratios", Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society. Vol. LIX, 1958-9* p.p.5-10.
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involved in criticism, rather than merely stating that what is necessary
is the nonjustificational philosophy of criticism. The point is whether
or noi hartley's position is adequate to the complexity of rationality
without such a closer analysis of such central features as "criticism"
and the role they play in the practical effect of rationality in all
typos of argument. Can criticism, S3 it has been analysed, fulfil the
role that hartley has, by virtue of his philosophical predilection,
carved out for it? hartley suggests that everything is to be held
28
open to criticism, and that this criticism is infinite, yet not
regressive. The regress has already been commented on, so now
concentration centres on this idea of leaving everything open to
criticism. It is not po sible to hold everything open to criticism
29
at once, as hartley himself recognises, for we need, as Urnson outs
30
it, " a fixed point to move the world with one's lever". The
problem is, however, that it is unclear as to the basis on which the
choice of a standpoint, from which to criticise all else, ought to be
made. Everything cannot be held under the microscope at once, but
are we as free as Bartley suggests to hold everything in turn under
the microscope? It is not possible or desirable to hold everything
open to criticism. There are certain very basic things which it is
impossible to imagine ever doubting. Can it prop erly ever be doubted




30. Uricson, "On Grading", Logic and Language, A. Flew (ed.) p.409
31. See below "Recent discussion of Bartley".
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time and space are somehow ''given", or that person predicates are
central to our humanity, and that machines are machines? There are,
I believe, basic beliefs which cannot aver be questioned appropriately
or even the form that such a questioning would take imagined. Bartley
himself seems to agree with this poiiiu when he talks of logic Doing
y?
basic, and not open to revision in its primary form. But if this
is the case, Bartley is surely contradicting the notion of holding
everything open to criticism, especially if this is either impossible
or unnecessary. If Bartley allows that certain things hole good by
virtue of our role as "arguers about the world", how much more ao certain
33
things hold by virtue of being human? One need not hold things open
to criticism unless there is the occasion or n>ed for criticism or
34
response. It is, as Kuhn stresses, appropriate only in time of crisis.
Also it is necessary that there be the opportunity to resolve the
criticism, or else it is irrelevant and inappropriate. Kuhn suggests
the notion of a "crucial experiment" by which one is able to judge
35
between two views. It is not possible or necessary to hold everything
open to criticism.
But this notion of "holding everything open to criticism", is
itself puzzling. Attention has already been drawn to the different
sorts of criticism and the need for standards. "hat is necessary
is the delineation of a standard for this test ou critioism, for the




34. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p.p.82-4
35. Kuhn, ibid.
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tnat tnere are oasio differences between criticism of a philosophy
essay ana a mathematical protn. • night/wrong, true/false, adequate/
inadequate, pass/fail, are all very different dichotomies, and
properly to unaerstana the kind of criticism Hartley wishes to commend,
we neea a thorough account of what sort of standard and test hartley's
view of oritioism entails.
•there are also various moves by which one might seek to end
criticism. home of these were examined in the section on "justification".
One might respond to criticism stating that it is not in order, i.e.
criticism is "besiae the point. the grounds of this statement might be
one of the following. Criticism is beside the point because it is
irrelevant, in the sense that it is inappropriate to the object or
belief under discussion. it may be beside the point in the sense
that, even if it is true, it is as nothing compared with the belief
or theory held. ihat is to say that one might accept the force of the
criticism, yet i*ejeot the result of the criticism. i'his is in line
with Job's comment concerning his faith in Cod, "Yea, though he slay
**£\
me, yet 1 will trust him.""'" 'fhis involves a value-judgement, but
hartley needs to show that this is inappropriate in light of the
criticism offered. Another manoeuvre would be to respond to the
criticism by suggesting that there is some tiling wrong with it, though
at the moment, one is not certain what is wrong. One is saying that
one will someday, somehow, prove that the criticism is wrong. More
basically,/
36. Job, oh&pier xiii, v.13
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basxcai^y, one night simply claim that for the time being, the view
or belief must be held beyond criticism, because it is essential to the
methodology that one is following, or the experiment oiie is conducting.
More simply yet, one may simply answer the criticisms and thus dissolve
them. One ne-.-.d not, without a goou aeai of argument, retreat to
acceptance of commitment, as hartley assumes.
hartley's view of criticism is laoicing in detailed analysis, and
his claim to hold everything open to criticism is stated without
examining tne alternative steps avaiiaoie. However, hartley's position
has more speoific problems. It will be seen tnat hartley's view is
overlogical, ana accordingly too narrow, when his presentation of the
various checks, which he claims are central to criticism is examined,
what is the basis of criticism which hartley suggests is necessary?
Is it reason or experience? Or is it the case that one takes the data
■r>
from anywhere and everywhere. If this is the case, and this appears
implicit in hartley * s account, some standard is still needed to judge
the adequacy and success of the criticism. i'o do this properly one
needs to know and evaluate the bases of criticism. hartley seems to
presuppose that criticism is worth doing, rather than to inaulge in
description or preaching. 'i'his involves a value juugement, whether
or not the irrationalist argument holds, for hartley stresses the
importance of risking error boldly to learn more about the world; but
why should anyone adopt this stress rather than one of seeking, at all
costs, to avoid error and maintain only what can be absolutely known?
In a sense, Bartley's position seems to result from the fact that our
rationality/
51
rationality is limited, and criticism enables us to e. cape from such
limitations. The judgement that criticism must be used, must also be
limited. Burtley makes no mention of this problem, and no attempt to
respond to it. The problem i parallel to the theological statement
of the fallenness of man, which itself muse be a fallen statement.
37
Similarly, Bartley claim.:, th t criticism xs unlimited. We might
wonder if this is unlimited practically or theoretically or both. If
i!; is possible to have all knowledge as a result of criticism, then
total rationality is possible. This would seem unlikely, but Bartley
offers no reason to accept proximate explanation over and against
38
ultimate explanation. Bartley states that his view of criticism
is itself up for revision and criticism, but no means are given by
w: ioh to criticise criticism, and Watkins analyses the very basic
35
problem that this creates for Bartley.
The basic problem is that it leaves t2ie critic no ground to stand
on. This is part of the puzzle of hartley's view, He fir3t of all
suggests that everything is o, en to criticism and that therefore,
every kind of criticism must be accepted. But is this not ultimately
to weaken the effect of criticism, by the inability to separate out what
is important from the unimportant and the relevant from the irrelevant?
For there to be genuine argument it is not sufficient merely to know
what is to count as a valid argument, but also what is invalid. If
all and every criticism is by definition allowed, then there can be no
real/
37. q.p.271; RvR.o.p.28-9
38. R. Hepburn, Christianity and Paradox.
39. See below, section, "Recent Discussion on Bartley."
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real criticism for nothing is irrelevant and nothing unimportant. Part
of the nature of criticism and argument rests on the fact that not all
criticism is relevant or important so that one concentrates on what is
important and relevant in order to appreciate better the nature of what
one is discussing. It is like the faculty of memory. We do not and
oannot reoall everything we have seen and done, and if we did, as has
been the case in certain notable cases, then there is the constant danger
of breakdown, duo to what can only be called overloading, where there is
no selection taking place of the things which are important and relevant
to reoall and those which aro useless and even positively harmful to our
oapaclty to function successfully as human beings coping prop rly with
our environment. atkins takes this a step further and suggests that
not only in effect but in its very nature Hartley'3 account runs into
difficulties because it leaves no room for the critic to stand. This
is in fact the third ground of criticism which is the background of the
critique of Bartley. Firstly, the omission of other limits of rationality
and central features of rationality was noted. Then it was argued that
Bartley'3 own account was not in itself adequate for his own demands, nor
was it adequate to the complexity of rationality. In other words, a
fuller account of rationality is required. '^he final general ground
of criticism has now emerged within the content of criticising hartley
in a fashion parallel t his own presentation. This is the unacceptable
conclusion his position leads to. This is that the critic has no ground
to stand on. This is the case from seeing the kind of account of
criticism Bartlay presents, but it is also the oase from the very statement
of Hartley*s own thesis, as Watkins also has discovered.
An/
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An attempt has been made to show the unclarity of Bartley's view
and how it must break down in the face of closer analysis of what
criticism is and how it is practised. But if it is assumed that Bartley
is correct, it may be considered whether or not his view makes any
genuine difference. The danger is that Bartley's view reduces to the
idea that one will always be able to make some criticism against any
view. This notion that some criticism will always be relevant, i.e.
that there is always something to be said against a view, is singularly
unhelpful. It trivialises criticism and reduces the position to a mere
platitude. Yet until Bartley clarifies the difference between this
trivial view and his own analysis of criticism, we are left with the
situation where his view is unworkable in light of what criticism is,
40
and thus must be in danger of reducing to a mere platitude.
Bartley suggests that what is of true importance is that we ought
to learn about the world by critical argument.^ This is achieved
by two main tools - testability and refutability. In other words the
42
main stress is on criticism with a view to trying to falsify. The
rationality of a belief is its ability to withstand criticism, and any
"position may be held rationally regardless of justification provided
43
it can be and is held open to criticism and survives severe testing".
There are a cluster of problems here. Is criticism and survival of
testing the same thing? What are the standards for testing and
adequate passing or failing of the test? What is the relation of these
views/
40. J. Watkinp, "Comprehensively Critical Rationalism", Philosophy,
XLIV, 1%9, p.58
41. R.C.p.vii, and below p.p. "3>3 and footnote 46.
42. R.C.p.p.147-8, 152, Q.p.97.
43. Q.p.93| 274-5| RvR p.28j see above p.31, footnote 35.
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views to truth and error? Bartley tells us that views will and can
be held only provisionally, for there might be successful refutation
I c
sometime. But that there is no establishment of truth or error.
That is, even if a view is refuted by criticism, it may still be correct,
and if a view survives testing and criticism, it may still, one day, be
shown to be false. This is the standard with which Bartley and Popper
wish to replace our traditional views. This inevitably conflicts with
our views of right and wrong, true and false. There are some things
whioh are just known to be true, and whioh can never be envisaged or
conceptualised an changing. This must therefore, lead to the threat
46
of relativism which Bartley seeks to avoid. The position is similar
to that of the Coherence theorists, who rejected absolute truth, and
held that "rejection is provisional",^ as was acceptance, i.e. truth
48
had degrees of reality. We normally believe that we have sufficient
evidence to count many things as true, and we cannot easily believe that
these ought to be held open to criticism, far less trying to give an
account of what criticism could be appropriate to this theme. Bartley
and Popper have been misled concerning the nature of truth, falsity and
error by trying to fit these terms into a philosophy of science mould,
derived from examination of scientific change, Popper comments:- "A
false theory may be as great an achievement as a true one. And many
false theories have been more helpful in our search for truth than some
less interesting theories which are still accepted. For false theories
cary'
44. Q.p.p.274-5; K. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery. p.50
45. RvR.p.p.28-9.
46. R.C.p.viii.
47. B.Bosanquet, Lo.ic; Implication and Linear Inference: Bradley,
Principles of Logic; Appearance and Reality.
48. Bradley, ibid, p.p.197, 236ff•
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can be helpful in many ways! they may suggest some more or less radical
L9
modifications, and they may stimulate criticism." ' All that may be
true, but it does not change the fact that the theory is false and in
general, we are more concerned with truth, in some sort of universal,
general, enduring sense.
This criticism must also apply to Bartley's view that we can learn
50
about the world by critical argument. It was commented that his view
of criticism was too narrow and overlogical. ®hat is meant by this is
that there is more to criticism than argument and logic. Rationality
is not equivalent to logic, validity, or true premisses. Criticism,
as has been seen, is relevant in psychological, moral, religious, and
practical terms as well as in logical. Hartley fails to give an account
of how his logical picture of testability and refutability, as features
of criticism, compares and contrasts and is relevant to the many other
kinds of criticism, which are more readily identifiable in our everyday
living. Bambrough comments on such informal modes of explanation, giving
two examples:- "One consists in the perception of hitherto unrecognised
patterns in the otherwise bewildering and variegrated details of facts
that are themselves well known but imperfectly understood in their
relations to one another. The other is the striving, no less rational
for being also imaginative, to achieve a vivid realisation of the truth
51
of what are already recognised as truths", and also refers to "occasions
when we can achieve and convey knowledge and understanding by seeing
and/
50. R.C.p.viiij and see above p.p.33
51. R. Bambrough, Reason, Truth and God, p.l53»
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and showing a pattern of relationships between a set of items in which
each separate item is already available for inspection, where no item
is hidden and no further data are called for, and where nevertheless,
the process of exhibiting the pattern is not one of performing formal
52
deductive transformations of the existing date or premises." There
is a whole language of insight, amotion, feeling, intuition, empathy,
sympathy, and general gestalt theoiy, which is appropriate to much of
our moral and religious, as well as political and practioal living.
We are given no rationale for ignoring it, in favour of the adoption
of logico-scientific criticisms. Bartley appears to leave little or
no room for experience, faith, revelation, and insight, whether or not
in the religious sense. He needs to of.er a fuller appreciation of
the informal characteristics which are the mark of much of our thinking
and appreciation in art, religion, and even in some views of scientific
progress. We learn more about the world informally by the means suggested,
than by any process of critical argument. A more detailed presentation
of the various limits of rationality would help obviate this criticism,
but leads back to one of the three general attacks on Bartley, in this
case, that he omits important features of rationality and the limits of
rationality.
Bartley does offer some analysis of what he thinks is appropriate
as an adequate basis of criticism. This is the four checks of logic,
53
sense-observation, scientific theory, and the problem. Bartley
states that these are in descending order of importance, but he fails
to tell us what is to be done if conflict arises between the various
checks,/
52. Barabrough, ibid, p.59
53. Q.p.273J R.C.p.p.158-9
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checks, and what value is to be put on them, given considerable variation
in the applicability of each. In other words, a calculus is required
of applicability and value. hartley begins with logic. Consistency
is necessary only if strictly logical standards are required. For
example, allowances are made for people who behave inconsistently, and
people still continue to have dealings with them despite their illogical
behaviour. Logic tells us only if the relation between premise and
conclusion is valid. Unfortunately, if it is not, we do not know
wherein the breakdown lies, e.g. which premise is at fault. Logic is
severely limited in this respect, and can only deal with formal structures.
Civen this, how is it to be used and compared with the check of sense-
observation? The object of our sense-observation is to seek an empirical
54
refutation, according to hartley. But surely sense-experience is
also used in a more positive sense, to offer a proof of a position.
Sense-observation can, hov;ever, lead astray, but logio may be no safeguard
against this, witness the Flat Earth Society. Bartley has the check
of scientific hypothesis. The problem here is the bewildering variety
of opposing theories, which are still sub judice, awaiting further
evidence. What is the standard for choice between these theories?
Bartley then lists the check of the problem and asks whether the theory
solves the problem it is intended to. Bartley has limited the object
of criticism to theories, without examining whether or not these are the
sole objects of criticism. In short hartley's four checks of oriticism
are neither adequately presented nor themselves easily integrated into




entails and how each check relates to the others.
However, it is to this assumption of theories being designed to
solve specific problems and indeed \.he more general assumption which he
is making that knowledge is problem-based, that attention is turned.
The problem is that the concept of "problem-based" knowledge fails to
dictate what the problem is and whence it has arisen. Is it logical,
conceptual, contextual, or social? This is relevant, for the approach
and solution to each problem may vary considerably along a right/wrong,
adequate/inadequate, better/worse soale. Mathematical problems have
little in common with moral and metaphysical problems. Definitions of
problems and of solutions must inevitably vary. The theologian may
have a problem about the love of God and the presence of evil in the
world: the politician of believing all men to be equal, yet by political
necessity voting for an opposite view. The lover may have the problem
of how to prove his love# The statements of, and solutions to these
problems must vary in context and description, according to appropriateness
to the problem concerned and according to the relevant limit of rationality
involved, which Bartley does not deal with. More crucially, it is not
always possible to know why a problem i3 solved and yet to have solved it.
All knowledge is not problem-based and cannot be expounded in that mould.
"Love not me for comely grace
For iqy pleasing eye or face,
Nor for any outward part
No, nor for my constant heart:
For these may fail or turn to ill,
So thou and I shall sever.
Keep,/
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Keep, therefore, a true woman's eye,
55
And love me still, but know not why****''
The knowledge that we are in love, like this painting, believe in
Sod, reoognise the equality of all men, and that promise-breaking is bad,
is not based on any problem situation. A person may not be able to
expound why he knows, but that is not to say that he does not know.
There is some element of skill, appreciation, sympathy, and mastery
which is basic to much of knowing how as well as knowing that. The
question of the problem to be solved is not always appropriate, and
without a closer account of the interrelation of these checks, which
hartley offers, it may be doubted whether he has established his case.
The argument has tried to show that Bartley's solution is faulty
because of his failure to clarify and substantiate, his claims for
justification, criticism, error, and the critical checks he offers.
But if it were allowed that Bartley's view was valid and coherent, the
problem is still left of what the status of the view is. What exaotly
is he tiylng to do? To offer an account of human or of methodological
limitations, of some feature of the world, or about humans in relation
to the world? One wishes to know how Bartley arrived at his view, for
at times he talks as if it were revelationary. Is Bartley seeking to
examine rationality itself, or the presuppositions of rationality, or
the preconuitions of rationality? The basic need is for some cashing
out of his view by offering concrete examples of criticism at work.
It/
35* Wilbye's Second Set of Madrigals. Pageant of English Verse, p,35
56. RvR.p.20
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It would be particularly helpful if a clear aooount were given of the
difference between being in or out of a 3ystem and what it is to adopt,
to adapt, and to reject a system or theory of belief#
The danger which arises from hartley's failure to give such a
description is that on his own account there is no room for the critic
to attaok Bartley's view or anyone else's in a meaningful way. This
arises from the points which have been made concerning the openness of
C.C.R, to eveiy criticism, Bartley's failure to distinguish between
winning and losing an argument, and that error counts, in hartley*s view,
for as much as truth. What this moans is that in the actual situation
of argument anything and everything is going to count, yet this must
reduce the effectiveness of making the relevant and important points
affect the situation by reducing them to the level of everything which
is irrelevant and unimportant, Without having a standard for winning
or losing an argument there can be no room for the critic because his
position cannot stand over a d against that of his opponent Bartley,
i'or all that the oritic may know he may be supporting Bartley, and
indeed this is what Bartley tends to suggest when he talks about the
need for others to criticise his view, but, of course, the more that
they criticise the more will hi3 case be proved to be correct. The
problem is that if this is true and if as, he also suggests that error
is as important and relevant as truth, then the critic can never win, there
can be no conclusion to the argument or discussion except that which will
favour Bartley, and t is surely is the death of discussion and argument
between opponents. There can in fact be no real opposition to Bartley
for/
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for in the very aot of criticising or attacking him, one is simply
proving his case. In argument between opposing views it is at least
possible usually for the one to persuade the other and vice versa, but
if this is no longer true, it must be questioned whether or not there is
real argument and discussion. And if it is not real argument and
discussion it suggests that there is something fatally wrong with
Bartley's aocount.
The oriticism of hartley may be most generally summed up as the
complaint of the failure on his part to clarify what he is doing, and to
examine closely enough the concepts involved. As has been Argued
shown, the result of these failures has been to undermine the position of
Bartley. The criticism has been based on his own account, yet has had
three basic grounds behind it. It has been complained that he omits
important limits and features of rationality, that his account is in
itself inadequate as seen by the lack of details concerning justification
and criticism, the difficulty of holding everything open to criticism,
the oddity of seeking to falsify, and the inadequacy of the four checks
offered by Bartley. This has been the particular stress in this section
but with it, the final ground of criticism has also emerged, that of
Bartley's exclusion of the possibility of criticism and attack against
his view, A brief account o the little literature that has followed
Bartley's work i3 now presented before evaluating Bartley's own evaluation
of his work. Bartley's position concerns a basic view of what philosophy
is: yet he ignores modern stresses in philosophy, e.g. linguistic and
conceptual analysis, in favour of criticism. This needs evidence and
support, as well as refutation of opposing views of philosophy.
xuc
4. Recent Discussion of Bartley
J.W.N. Watkins briefly outlines Bartley's Comprehensively Critical
Rationalism as fulfilling the demand that it be rational according to
its own account of rationality."1' Once a supporter, Watkins claims
that it will not do on the grounds that it is "a perfect example of what
2
Dr. J. G-iedymin calls a dictatorial strategy". This means that C.C.R.
(WatkinS* abbreviation) is uncritioisable, whereas, for its integrity, it
must be criticisable. G-iedymin stresses that it should not be permitted
that a chosen player may win the game, however it may go, and Watkins
claims that this is exactly the position of the defender of C.C.R.
Watkins analyses Bartley's position into two parts. *1. A rationalist
3
can and should hold all his oositions open to criticism", and "2, That
a rationalist can and should hold all his positions open to criticism is
a position that he can and should hold (so long as it withstands criticism
This leads to "3. That a rationalist can and should hold all his positions
open to criticism is itself a position that he can and should hold open
5
to criticism." Watkins then discusses Bartley's own attempts to show
that C.C.R. is not a position that can be held open to criticism.
Watkins stresses that by "criticism" must be meant something non-trivial.
He states:- "If no restriction were placed on *criticisable', a
challenge to show that C.C.R. is not criticisable could not possibly be
met: it would be 'dictatorial strategy' in G-iedymin's sense.Watkins
claims that even in a restricted and non-trivial sense of "criticisable",
Bartley's view is still a "dictatorial strategy".
Watkins/
1. J. Watkins, "Comprehensively Critical Rationalism", Philosophy
XLIV, 1%9, p. 57
2. Watkins, ibid, p.57| J* G-iedymin, "A generalization of the Refutability
Postulate", Btudia Lo/dca, 10, I960.
3. Watkins, ibid, p.58; R.C. p.146.
4. Watkins, ibiu. p.58
5. Watkins.ibid, p. 58.
6. Watkins, ibid, p.58.
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Watkins examines Bartley's view of what counts as criticism. He
notes the problem of arguing that one's own view is critioisable without
over or underdoing that. Mere assertion is not enough, but conclusive
proof rebuts the position. Bartley's line is that what is neoessary
would be "an argument showing that at least some of the unjustified and
unjustifiable critical standards necessarily used by a comprehensively
critical rationalist were criticisable to boot,"'' This is not a genuine
possibility, Watkins argues, for "no opponent could show that some
standard used by a comprehensively critical rationalist is uncriticisable
in the sense that it is not open to adverse comment of any kind.
Suppose, however, that he produces a cogent argument purporting to show
that it is not open to anything that Bartley counts as genuine criticism.
Then that would constitute a highly damaging criticism of the standard
in question, in view of the C.C.R. itself, which requires a rationalist
to hold all his positions open to criticism. Hence it is impossible
for a critic to show that a critical standard necessarily used by a
8
comprehensively critical rationalist is uncriticisable," The anti-
Bart ley must show, on Bartley's account, that a standard is necessarily
used by the comprehensively critical rationalist, and this is what
Watkins claims is impossible because cf the discursive nature of Bartley's
account.
C.C.R. is not and cannot claim to he criticisable and be such,
b8causV
7. .atkins, ibid, p.59
8. Watkins, ibid, p.59
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because there is no risk that this will happen. This results from
the relation of 1,2, and 3 above, so that any attempt to show the falsity
of 3» uiust also be an argument for the falsity of 2 and 1, and, if proved,
would show that C.C.R. is criticisable, thus proving that 3 is true.
;'In support of the claim that C.C.R, is criticisable we are challenged
to criticise it in a certain way - namely, by trying to show that it is
9uncriticisablet" Thus, "if the critic comes nowhere near to meeting
the challenge, Bartley wins; and if the critic does come near to
meeting the challenge, the critic loses, since his nearly successful
criticism establishes criticisebility. hartley's anti-lustiflcationism
means that there is no onus on him to justify C.C.R.; the onus is on
his critics to rebut it; but it is assured in advance that they cannot
do what they are challenged to do. It seems a perfect exarrple of
G-iedymin's 'dictatorial strategy'.""^ hartley's response would appear
to be that this at least shows that C.C.-R. is criticisable, but that we
might separate out levels of criticism. Watkins replies that this
"criticism" is merely "Pickwickian", and that the status of C.C.R. is
basically faulty. Thus I atkins claims that the rationalist problem is
still with us. His own solution is that the rationalist "should try to
be as rational as he can about the beliefs and opinions he holds,
This can be held on moral grounds rather than rational, es raping any
self-/
$>. 'Watkins, ibid, p»60
10, Watkins, ibid. p,60
11, Watkins, ibid. p.6l
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self-defeating position. The irrationalist cannot taunt that such a
rationalist holds his fundamental beliefs in the same way as the
irrationalist.
Agassi, Jarvie, and Settle reply to Catkins critique suggesting
that he uses an "idea quite alien to hartley's view, the idea, namely,
that if a theory emerges from criticism, unharmed, then it emerges
12
victorious." Bartley, they claim, has no such maxim as, "endorse
13
a victorious view". B&rtley specifies only conditions for defeat,
not for victory. "it does not follow that Bartley or Watkins or any
other rationally inclined person has to embraoa doctrines which have
been successfully criticised."'1""4' Agassi, Jarvi, and Settle then
draw the distinction between a doctrine and a doctrine about doctrines,
and argue that "as a doctrine it can be retained or given up whether or
15
not it conforms to its own doctrine. Criticisability can be shown
only after the event, and this ' does not show that C.C.A. (or any other
theory) has, will be, or should be, given up.""*"^ Watkills, it is
claimed, confuses criticisability with consistency, and "the vulnerab-
:iiity of C.C.^. to attack is .... independent of the fact that every
17
attack establishes the criticisability of the program as a whole."
X8
This defence, however, "does not show that C.C.R. should be embraced."
This is still an open question. Two brief appendices follow examining
various/
12. Agassi, Jarvie, Settle, "The Grounds of Reason", Philosophy.
XLVI, January, 1971# P«44«
13. agaasi, Jarvie, Settle, ibid, p.44
14. Agassi, Jarvie, Settle, ibid, p.45
15. Agassi, Jarvie, Settle, ibid, p.45
1 . Agassi, Jarvie, Settle, ibid, p.45
17, Agassi, Jarvie, Settle, ibid, p.46
18. Agassi, Jarvie, Settle, ibid, p.46
various types of dogmatisms and the logic of openness to criticism and
levels of criticisability. I'hese are dependent on the success of the
main argument.
If Agassi, Jarvie and Settle are correct and we do not need to
give up any view which has "beer, successfully criticised, then this seems
to remove the whole point of criticism. If the criticism and severe
testing make no difference to our embracing a doctrine, then arbitrar-
19
tiness and irrationality must win the day. If C.C.R.*s success is
irrelevant to its acceptance, then it is not Bartley*s view, and the
psychological question is relevant, if C.C.R. is to solve the integrity
20
problem. if C.C.R. is successfully refuted and yet we are not foroed
to give up the doctrine, then this is again not Bartley's view, and
21
it removes all point to refutation. Bartley stresses that a view
must be out to the test, implying surely that the test matters and will
lead to no irrationalist leap. We cannot separate the doctrine of C.C.R.
from its own status as a doctrine, and the self-referring category of
genuine uncriticisability must be taken more seriously, than merely
stating the different meta-levels. If it is still an open question as
to the acceptance or rejection of C.C.R., then Bartley must have failed
and we still need a leap to allow us psychologically to accept any view.
If so, Bartlsy was doomed from the start, having misunderstood the loous
of/
19. RvR. p.30; R.C.p.147-8
20. RvR.p.p.cJ-9} R.u.p.p.3,10,i?8.
21. RvR.O.p.27,30-31; R.C.p.p.146-7; Q.p.p.97-8,319.
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of the irrationalist attack.
Richmom comments that if Watkins is correct, then it is logically
impossible for a critical rationalist to be rational about his rationalism,
thus "it is irrational for him to attempt to be rational about his
rationalism."^
So, in not being rational about rationalism, the comprehensive
and the comprehensively critical rationalist are being rational"
This escape, however, is not open to Rartloy as he claims that it is
23
possible to be rational about one's rationalism. Kakes concentrates
on Watkins* alternative and points out that the moral excuse is open
2jL
equally to th irrationalist, that Watkins lays too much stress on
a psychological rather than a logical account, and that he fails to
distinguish rational belief from being a rational person.
Watkins socks to respond to all three articles by first of all
tightening up his formulation of C.C.R. The psychological influence
25
is to the fore because of hartley's own psychologistic account.
The main thesis of C.C.R, now becomes, "All non-analytio and rationally
26
acceptable statements are criticisable". He returns to the point
that the value of C.C.R. on hartley's analysis is that it "may get
refuted", For this to be true it cannot be analytic. "atkins
isolates the self-referring nature of C.C.R., showing that the main
th8sis is either analytic or false, and that neither or these is
satisfactory./
22. Richmond, "Can a Rationalist Be Rational About His Rational!am?",
Philosophy, XLVI, Jan. 1971* P«p»54-5»
23. See above,' p.p. Xif-/2.1y.
24. J. Kelces, "Watkins on Rationalism", Philosophy. XLVI, Jan. 1971»P*P,51""3
25. .ratkins. "C.C.h, a Refutation". Philosophy. XLVI, Jan. 1971. p.p.54ff
see above p.p.1M$ ,^6. latkins, 'U.u.R. A Refutation", p.56
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satisfactory. "If the main constituents of C.C.R. are all analytic
or false, it is not so surprising that C.C.R, has been aocused of
emptiness and unoriiioisability and defended against suoh accusations
27
with the claim that it may be false." Agassi, Jarvi, and Settle's
technique of analysing C.C.R. by meta-language statements is no more
successful, as it ultimately reduces to Critical Rationalism. watkins
sums up with the remark that "anyone can say that he holds all his
beliefs open to criticism$ but for my part I know very well that it
is psychologically impossible for me to hold all my beliefs genuinely
23
open to criticism." This moans that " a good critical rationalist
will try not to be more uncritical than he need be; but he will turn
into a pseudo-ralionalist if he pretends to be more critical than he
29
can be."
Watkins refutation has three main strengths. It reveals the
oddity of the self-referring nature of hartley's position, as if one
were trying to justify it by saying that one has been unable to refute
it. If this last statement is not a justification, then it is not
clear what its status is, and "&tkins is correct in showing that it
destroys the "integrity" of Hartley's solution. It draws out the
confusion between and concerning "criticism" and "criticisability",
and this is crucial to destroying hartley's thesis. r,,inally, it
reveals the impossibility of doing what C.C.R, Demands of us -
critising/
27. Watkins, "C.C.^.: A Refutation", p.59, Kekes, ibid, p.51, Xekes
suggests that Falsity will not do as a replacement far cfcitioisability
because Bartley sets the problem in terms of oritioisability.
28. Watkins, "C.C.R.t A Refutation", p.6l.
29. Watkins, "C.C.R.s A Refutation", p.61.
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criticising everything, We cannot and ought not to try to do that.
Watkins then brings out the damaging effect which results from
Bartley's failure to leave room for the critic both in the death of
all possible discussion and argument, but also in the basic doubt whioh
31
it raises against hartley* 3 position as a whole. It again shows
that there is something seriously wrong with hartley's account of
rationality and with the practical effects of his view, No view of
rationality which excludes the possibility of criticism or improvement
of that view can be held with a view whioh realises the importance of
rationality in argument and discussion, whioh depend on and are geared
to develop and deal with criticism and improvement or justification
and defence of views.
30. See above p.
31. See above, p.2.°ff.
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5. The Value of the Alternative Theory
Before attention is turned to discussion of the value of Bartley's
th oiy as he himself presents it a summazy of what has been done is
necessary. At the outset the attack on Bartley was desoribed as resting
on three grounds. It has been shown that he is guilty of important
ommissions especially in relation to the other limits of rationality.
Of course, Bartley is aware that there are other limits of rationality,
but he chooses to concentrate on what he regards as central. This is
not the case and the very ommission of these other features weakens the
rest of his view. A fuller account is needed of the complexity of the
limits of rationality. But regardless of what Bartley omits, fault may
still be found wit i his account as it stands. In particular his failure
to look oarefully at the ideas of arbitrariness, justification and
criticism, and his overstressing of commitment all lead him into internal
difficulties whioh make his aocount unacceptable as an adequate theory
of rationality. An attempt is made to overcome this by seeking to make
easier the kind of specification of a whole way of life which Hare was
arguing for to overcome arbitrariness and b looking more closely at
the ideas of justification and criticism as they relate to the limits
of rationality. '^he imbalance of commitment is corrected by examining
the social limits of rationality. But th final area of divergence
from Bartley concerns the failure on his account to allow genuine
oriticism to take place. Without allowing for and encouraging
discussion and argument and analysing the relation of rationality to
these central features of what is tended to be considered a rational man,
then one would be guilty as Bartley is of failing to do justice to
rationality/
Ill
rationality and to the integrity of the person who not only disagrees,
but who is able to offer a reasonable case for his disagreement, and
prepared to discuss and argue the alternative merits of the differing
views.
While these three grounds of criticism form the background of the
critique, the presentation has been based on Bartley's own account of
the problem, its solution, and its benefit. In the areas of problem
and solution Bartley's account has both shown important issues concerning
rationality which has introduced the subject, but also has negatively
shown the inadequacies of his position and the necessity for conceptual
clarification and the introduction of other themes. What has been done
for the problem and solution must now be done in terms of the value
hartley claims for his view. Regardless of the success or otherwise
of his delineation of the problem and solution to rationality and its
dilemma, the value of hi theory may be considered.
Bartley expresses the desire that his thesis may be judged on the
basis of whether or not he has solved the problem of rationality.1
He has sought to prove that it is possible to be a consistent liberal
rationalist, and to shift the emphasis in rational discussion from
2
justification to nonjustificational oriticism. In the doctoral
dissertation he invites critical discussion of the following points,
which will be commented on to assess whether or not his approach is as
valuable as he hopes and claims. His first concern is with the value
of his approach in its ability to solve the roblem and as a guide for





he fails to make clear exactly what the problem is and then adequately
to analyse the notions inherent in the problem. His approach is
inadequate, and his solution does not fulfil the claims that he makes
for it. It cannot, therefore be a guide for future philosophical
research in quite the way that he hopes. Nevertheless, it does show
the need for careful analysis of some of the conoepts and questions he
has raised, and in that sense, it benefits philosophy.
He inquires also about the correctness of his description of the
problem of rationality and of the arguments of the fideist and sceptic,
as well as h_s solution to the problem and his distinction between
3
justification and criticism. He fails to describe correctly the
rationalist problem in that he fails adequately to examine the notion
of rationality and other possible theories of rationality. Coupled
with this, his presentation of scepticism and fideism lacks sufficient
detail and slides over significant differences which are crucial to a
true irrationalist assault on reason. His solution to the problem of
rationality is not plausible because it leaves too much unsaid and,
in the last resort, leaves the situation much where it was prior to
his discussion. His separation of justification and criticism
suffers again from overbrief treatment and inadequate detail both in
conceptual and tontextual terms. Without such evidence, his claim
must be accounted! "not proven".
He/
3. Q.p.25k: Q.p.25i
He is also concerned about his observation that traditional
philosophy is authoritarian, and its relation to criticism and logic.''4
There is a great deal of value in this point of the authoritarian
structure, but Bartley does not take it far enough in again failing to
assess the context and concepts involved, and offers little examination
of the role such authority plays in all the variety of situations where
it is appropriate. His desire to renounce this authoritarian stress
is hasty unless supported by more telling evidence in its favour.
His final concern is that Popper's philosophy is a genuine nonjustif-
5
jicational philosophy of criticism. Judgement must be held in
abeyance, until the concepts of justification and criticism have been
more adequately dealt with. There is too much of controversy in
Popper, derived from a slanted view of philosophy of science, to be
accepted until a good deal more argument both at the philosophy of
science level, as well as the relation to error and truth, and the
relation to critical tools in the complexity of moral, political, and
religious life.
Bartley fails to make out his case on grounds of insufficient
evidence and because the analysis he does offer is inadequate and
faulty. Nevertheless, Bartlay still claims a more positive value
for the approach, and that is tolerance, respect, and intellectual
g




6. R.C. p.p.187-223; Q.p.p.327,328-332.
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is a positive gain, Bartley must beware of offering this in any sense
as a justification for adopting the view, or else he will be in a
contradiction. Accordingly, it can only be a description of what
actually will and does happen. If this is the case, it is only by
looking and seeing whether or not it happens, that his claim may be judged.
A growth of tolerance, humility, and respect towards others on the part
of all Popperians is looked for. This may not be so readily forthcoming,
however, because it is difficult to see how Bartley can present his view
as the truth, or better in the sense of an improvement upon traditional
views, and yet retain this nebulous humility, in face of the historical
stupidity of traditional rationalists and even empiricists, both unable
to appreciate the dilemma they are subject to. It would not seem out
of place for Bartley to feel a slight twinge of pride when he writes,
"I have succeeded in solving the problem of rationality"^ But Bartley
retorts that, "Anyone who has grappled with the arguments about ultimate
commitment and the limits of rationality, and who has appreciated what
a strong case the irrationalists have been able to put up, should have
acquired at least one virtue: a measure of tolerance and intellectual
8
humility. 1or rationalists can and very often do make mistakes too."
It is hoped that his solution is no mistake, but it would seem wiser if
the surety of success is so limited to provide as "few hostages to
fortune" as possible and retreat to a mitigated scepticism, speaking
9




9. John, chapter 3» v.11.
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however, able to show respect for people by inviting them to criticise
us and to take these criticisms seriously. This is an apparently odd
account of "respect" made up of taking criticism seriously. More
usually, respect is related to a response to the quality of life and
attitudes which someone displays. Eartley needs to analyse "respect"
and offer a rationale for his suggested change. Bartley's view, he
claims leads to tolerance.But it is difficult to see how taking
criticism seriously is the same as what is regularly meant by "tolerant".
Tolerance in racial affairs, and in moral matters seems harder to come
by than by critical discussion. Hartley's optimism seems to result
from an exaggerated view of the function of critical argument in the
world of thought and discussion. The success of Comprehensively
Critical Rationalism in creating a spirit of tolerance in our racially
unsettled areas of the world must be awaited with interest. Till then
it must be doubted if there is such value in terms of tolei*ance, humility,
and respect engaged solely by Hartley's views.
There is some consolation left for Bartley in his claim to have
11
destroyed the rational excuse for irrationalism. As has already been
pointed out, this rational exc se is of no value to the irrationalist
12
because it leads on his part to a crisis of integrity. Bartley can
still claim that he has shown, however, that the irrationalist will now
13
be seen to be an irrationalist. Bartley assumes that the irrationalists
14




12. See above, p. 4-5
13. RvR.p.31; Q.p.326.
14. See above, p.p.£>4 PiP*SS^/
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considerable room within the system, the so-called irrational!st
upholds, for the use of critical techniques. Description, explanation,
and preaching may still be open to the irrational!st, as long as he
remains within his own presuppositions and terminology. An interesting
aside made by hartley is that "the fact that a view has affective and
irrational origins has no bearing whatsoever on the question of its
15
claims to objective rationality." If this is the case, the theists
who may be unable to express in rational terms their original
acceptance of faith, need not be barred from rational argument thereafter.
16
Thus indeed any "theological statement could in principle be correct,"
over and against any apparently successful scientific refutation of it.
If the origin of one's faith is irrelevant to its objective rationality,
then there may be a new upsurge in apologetics. There need be no
absolute rejection in theology of any apparently outmoded doctrines.
Bartley does argue that theologians need to be more honest about the
critical institutions they accept in principle and to translate this
17
into practice. This is valid and theology would benefit if every
theologian sere to follow through his own critical presuppositions.
But this is merely to be consistent. Nevertheless, the theologian and
the christian ought to be using and creating critical tools appropriate
and useful to confession and proclamation of their faith.
Bartlay has not, perhaps dealt irrationalism the death How he






against the hope of a total rational victory, whether a traditional
or Popperian sort* loo often "the rationalist imagines that a small
dose of reason will be enough to put the world right. In his short¬
sightedness he wants to do justice to all sides, but in the melee of
conflicting forces he gets trampled upon without having achieved the
slightest effect. Disappointed by the irrationality of the world,
he realises at last his futility, retires from the fray, and weakly
X8
surrenders to the winning side." mary writers suggest that there
are basic irrational features which must, in some way, be aocounted for.
"A rationality that can find no place for the intractability of things
is not worthy of the name; for reason is not reason that goes against
fact, and it is a fact that a certain irreducible minimum of irrationality
39
axists." Both Niebuhr anu Brunner argue that "the doctrine of original
sin remains absurd from the standpoint of a pure rationalism, for it
expresses a relation between fate and freedom which cannot be fully
20
rationalised," " and that "only he who understands that sin is in-
21
jexplioable knows what it is." Not only sin, but evil creates a
problem for rationality. "Somehow evil posits itself and cannot be
22
rationalised. Lvil is fundamentally discontinuity." hartley1s
refutation of irrationalisa is not and cannot be successful either
on its own terms, or in general, until he has dealt with these
irrational features, and adequately discussed the full variety of
irrationalist moves.
Bartley/
18. D. Bonhoeffer, Betters and Papers from Prison, p.135
19» J» Faibleman, "On the Connections between the Two Worlds",
Revista Mexicana De Filiosa. Vol.1, No.2.
20. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man. Vol.1, p.278
21. B. Brunner, Man in Revolt, p.494
22. T.F. Torrance, "Faith and Philosophy", p.240; see below, chapter 3>P»
chapter four, p.
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Hartley's claims for the value of his approach are sadly
depleted. His methodology and solution do not fulfil the promise
he claims for them. The virtues of tolerance, humility, and respect
are inadequately examined and not established, and his critique of
irratioaalism leaves much spadework still to be done. On his own
terms, the value of Bartley's thesis is more negative than positive.
More may be learned from his mistakes and inadequacies, than from his
successes.
The specific criticism of hartley has been based on three general
grounds. It has been argued that he omits important features of
rationality and the other limits of rationality which, in practice, are
crucial. He fails to make out his own case. His view as presented
is faulty internally and not sufficient to cope with the complexity of
rationality in relation to argument and discussion. Finally, his
view leads to an unfortunate conclusion that excludes the possibility
of criticism against Bartley's own view, so that it is immune from all
criticism. hartley lias served to introduce rationality, its major
themes, and the state of modern views concerning its nature. Both
positively and negatively hartley contributes to an understanding of
tiie use of rationality in argument of all kinds. On the basis of his
view and the critique presented, it is now necessary to examine a
different account of rationality and the issues it raises, and finally
to offer an account of the nature of rationality which will make good
the deficiencies while learning from his strengths and weaknesses.
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CHARTBii Tffliiai - iUddn.CB ON RATIONALITY
1. Introduction
In the same way as Hartley provided an introduction to the
subject of rationality from the poinu of view of recent metaphysical
writing, T.F. Torrance pi'ovides an example of a theologian who is aware
of the importance of a clear statement of the nature of rationality#
Torrance deals specifically with rationality in the theological sphere
anu also deals with many of the questions and issues which Bartley raises
and examines. Thus by examining Torrance's account a clearer picture
of vhe nature of rationality may be gained as it relates to theological
argument and persuasion. His view will be presented in his own form
rather than a false mould based on the critique I shall offer. This
is to be fair to his own particular emphases and presentation. This
wall deal firstly with a particular essay on theological rationality,
and then oover the theme of rationality by reference to the spectrum
of his work from the last decade.
as was the case with hartley, the criticism will then be presented
in relation to iorranoes own account, but with the same three grounds
in mind as earlier outlined. It Will be argued that Torrance overlooks
important features of rationality particularly concerned with the limits
of rationality which are too important to be ignored. Secondly, it
will be claimed that Torrance's own account is not in itself adequate
either as an account of rationality or to the complexity of the subject.
Finally, it will be shown that Torrance's position has an unfortunate
consequence,/
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consequence, i.e. that any critic of Torranoe has no basis on Torrance's
aooount to make his criticism and complaint against the position.
Without the possibility of critioism, doubt must be cast on the veracity
of the position in terras of a realistic account of rationality. These
criticisms, however, vri.ll be integrated into the structure of Torrance's
account and the parallel critique. His view will not be moulded to
these criticisms, but vice versa. Torrance will instruct both
positively and negatively by the topics he deals with anu the
difficulties encountered in this presentation.
T.F. Torrance's work presents a highly detailed and specialised
approach on the part of a theologian to the question of rationality.
This approach to rationality is not the aim of his theological work,
which may De interpreted rather as an attempt to analyse the intellectual
stricture of our knowledge in view of the problems examined by the
fathers, Medieval Schoolmen, and .Reformers, so that in modern theology
we can distinguish clearly the rational from the irrational, the
properly objeotive from the unwarrantedly subjective, and cut away
1
much of the confusion that has, in his view, infested modern theology.
This involves the desire to reach a clearer view of the proper scientific
2
foundations of theology on its own grounds. It mu. t accordingly be
realised that the bulk of Torranoe's emphasis deals with the relation
of theology to science, especially modern science, and to the basic
questions of epistemology, as these are interpreted in relation to
modern science and hi3torioal periods of flux."^ This is the case,
but/
1. T.F. Torrance, Theological Science, p. xvii. Hereafter "T".
2. T.p.p.xvii, ix, 10-11; T.F. Torrance, Spaoe. Time and Incarnation
p.51. Hereafter "RR."
3. T.p.p.17-18; T.F. Torrance, &od and Rationality, p.p. 30-31^here a. ''5"
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bat it does not alter the fact that explicit in Torrance's view and
work is a reliance upon a notion of rationality, Whion is presented in
some detail. This, of course, is not the ena-in-itself for Torranoe,
but part of the total picture he seeks to present by which theology
can properly be conducted in the twentieth century scientific age.*4"
His work covers a wide scope both in time and subject matter, and
it is therefore necessary to concentrate one's efforts upon the central
issues. Cur speoific concern is with the nature of the account of
rationality he offers. This interest derives from the fact that in
all his work we are presented with an attempt to make theology valid
in the present world, or rather to show the actual validity of theology
5
and the theological method for today. This attempt is couched in the
language of science with references to mouern physics, relativity theory,
6
and quantum mechanics. let it is claimed that what is being said is
not something new, buta presentation of the historical basis of theology
7
through the B&rly Fathers and the Reformation. He thus offers an
account of theology with a view of theological rationality which claims
both historical and modern relevance and support. In seeking to
understand the nature and scope of rationality, attention is focused
on Torrance's view of rationality on the grounds of its being a
theological account,This is therefore relevant to the philosophy of religion
and the general problem of whether rationality is tho sort of thing
which is related to the specific area in which we are working. Is it either
something/
4« T.p.xvii. ' e * °cjsl ^ ^ (-i'ucffi ;
5. T.p.xviij S.p.p.30-31,42,68; MM.p.295: RR.p.69
6. RR.0.65,79,83} S.p.p.7-8,14-15,103} T.p.102.
7. 0.p.p.30-31} T.p.p.17-18} RR.p.p.16-17, 20-21, 23, 12-13.
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something more general and universal, or both, or neither}
claim to have a basis in historical terns, vis a vis the history of
doctrine in the Christian Church, as well as times of theological and
epistemological change and development, especially in scientific termsj
The ideas involved in and related to forranoe's account of
rationality are important in and of themselvesThey are important regardless of
their immediate relevance for specific theological work, as features
whicn must be taken account of in seeking to understand the presupposition
of rationality and its synonyms. it is unusual to find a theological
writer who makes such wide use of words such as "rationality" and
"rational", and this offers the hope that Torrance1s account will be
of speoific value in a better understand.ng of rationality.
Having established the relation of lorranee's work to the thesis
subject of rationality, the problem still confronts of how best to
present the material at hand. Length and relevance rule out any
overall presentation with its inherent risk of vague generality. So
to obviate this problem, the first essay in "Cod and nationality",
which is itself entitled "Theological Rationality" will be presented.
This is chosen both because of its title anu its specific content, which
provide one particular version from Torrance's pen of his ©wn view.
However, this account will be supplemented in relation to the theme of
rationality by reference to his major work over the last six years.
These further sources are not randomly chosen, but are crucially
important in that there are four major works of considerable length and
detail, which inevitably present a total view and position. These
works/
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works are also up-to-date which allows the interpretation oi' the role
and nature of rationality in an modern theological account, as was
attempted for morals and metaphysics in the case of hartley. further
these four major works allow a natural line to be drawn in the scope
of the material to be examined ana presented. Within the bound of
one chapter of a thesis one could not hope adequately to cover the
genesis, development, and final fruition of any view; but with
concentration upon recent major works, one is entitled to claim
relevance to the position as it is at the present time and in the
detail of the present as it is offered to others for understanding
and appreciation. Tori'ance's own essay on theological rationality
will be presented, supplemented by reference to "Theology in heconstruction",
"Theological Science", "^puce, Time and Incarnation", and the other
essays of "God and Rationality", as v/ell as some other short articles.
Only an account of rationality as Torrance sees it will be offered
based on the realisation that criticism of this account may or may not
be relevant to the total position of Torrance. One would sim ly raise
the question as to whether, given considerable difficulty in the account
of rationality, the position can be presented in the terms it is, which
rely upon such a view of rationality, though, of course, not only such
a view. Thus the scope of criticism and evaluation is entirely
related to the problems and nature of rationality rather than to
Torrance's work as a whole, with the aim always in view of seeking




The critique of Torrance will, like that of Bartley, rest on
three grounds of concern. First of all that there are certain
important features of rationality which Torrance overlooks particularly
in connection with the limits of rationality as they are to be found in
the practical situation of argument and discussion. Secondly it will
be shown that even on its own account Torrance's view of rationality is
inadequate in its details and as it is applied to theology in particular.
Finally it will be argued that on9 of the effects of Tor anoe's view of
rationality is to remove the possibility of criticism by removing any
ground which the critic may stand upon. It will here be seen as another
example of the dictatorial strategy already seen in the details of
3
Bartley's view. Torrance destroys the possibility of disagreement,
for any attack on his view may be construed as subjectivism. If you
disagree with Torrance then you have failed to discern the true nature
of the object in que&'on and have adopted an inappropriate mode of
rationality rather than that which is the true one and which, if
followed through correctly, would have brought you into contact with
the reality which is the true basis of all concepts and language.
In contrast to Bartley, who leaves the area for criticism so open
that there is no genuine criticism, Torrance has a system which is too
closed. If Bartley has an open mind, Torrance has a closed one, with
the result that there can be no conception of divergence and disagreement
if one adonis Torrance's account as a whole, bhat is needed is a balance
between/
8. See above, Chapter Two, "Recent Discussion of Bartley".
between the two extremes of Bartley and Torrance, where one in able to
hold one's own. view yet allow the critic the right ard opportunity to
express his opinion and still to be able and willing to enter into
discussion and argument wtich is not predetermined before it commences
but rather is so structured that there can be real conclusions reached,
which may be accepted by one's opponent or oneself.
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2. Torrartoe's "Theological Rationality^
T.F. Torrance describes the harassment of theology "by the
2
iraoorialism of mechanistic concepts", which result from a hang-over
from the Newtonian era. He states that "in reaction some biblical
scholars and theologians have allowed themselves to be driven into
existentialism and phenomenology '''.here they have been caught in the
flight from scientific objeoti\rity, only to founder in the morass of
historical relativism in T#iich Jesus, in spite of desperate attempts
3
to hold on to Him, keeps vanising from their instruments of observation."
Other theologians have turned to cultural expressionism and sociology,
but this leaves a gap between modem culture and historic Christianity.
Thus manjr Christians today are in "the wilderness of irrationality and
confusion".^
Torrance's account of the genesis of this problem is the cleavage
between theology and experience in which the theologian is out of touch
with the reality of Cod and therefore becomes abstract and rationalistio,
so that theology is estranged from its proper object and from the common
5
nan. The Church has developed in turn "pragmatic ideology" and a
sort of "religious technology" in place of theology, and this has led
to revolt against "the establishment". Torrance states that "if
theology without experience is irrelevant and experience without
theology is blind, the Church without theology can be little more than
g
a blind leader of the blind". The real trouble, however, is a rift
between/
1. This section is totally drawn from p.p. 3-25 in Sod and Rationality
2. S.p.3.
3. S.p.p.3,17,37,40-1,61,1071 MM.p.p.231,270-1; RK.p.47-8
4. S.p.p.vii, 4-5,44,185} T.p.xvii; MM.op.270-l}231,69
5. 14M.p.231; S.p.p.42,68; MM.p.259.
6. S.p.4.
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between the spiritual and the physical, and so between thought and life,
reason and behaviour, law and nature. So disjunction results between
theology and the experience of the believer, with theological statements
empty of objective content because of failure to be "grounded in actual
understanding of faith that arises out of man's reciprocal relations with
God"J
This situation, is, however, transitory in a time when the whole
perspective of human thought is on the move. This mutation in
orientation of thought loosens "the relation between the fundamental
data of theological knowledge and the moulds of traditional thought
g
and language in which it has come to be expressed".' This initially
results in confusion, but eventually puts theology back on its proper
foundations to find profounder renewal. This is the situation today,
thus theology is in a critical period. Theology must not seek to take
"cover from the searching light of scientific inquiry". Rather, "if
theology is to survive the crisis of these times, it must move out into
the full light of day, engage in critical revision of its own theoretic
framework, and go on to fresh scientific construction under the pressure
y
and determination of its own object".
This is not to start theology from scratch, but rather, "in so
far as we are now able through prior formulations to apprehend the
objective reality in a greater fulness than they could specify at the
time, the basic concepts and relations they involve will accredit




9. £.p.p.4,43,116-7; MM,p.69; T,p.p.9-10
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belonging to the essential oontent of faith. Far from being
discarded they will be thought out afresh, assimilated in a deeper and
wider understanding of the faith, and thus can be secured as permanent
theological gains",In this way continuity of past and present is
ensured by detachment from obscuring presuppositions. We must; learn
to forget as well as to remember to achieve new understanding and insight.
This is the task of the theologian "who really knows how far
concepts and relations actually match the object of his knowledge", to
engage in h disciplined penetration into the inner intelligibility of
the faith, enabling us to distinguish time-conditioned images and
representations from the substance of the faith, and to determine which
concepts and relations oan be justified and retained"Thus theology,
like Physics, needs its own meta-science of the clarification of basic
concepts to express faith adequately for today. Theology's integrity
depends on "a sustainea integration of theological reflection with its
proper object and a rigorous development of its own field of rational
12
activity'. "This is nothing else than a demand for scientific
theology operating on its own ground, and engaging in active dialogue
with the natural human sciences, in its own distinctness".^" To meet
this demand Torrance presents the need for a more adequate conception
of science, of connection, and a more adequate understanding of conceptuality.
I« V
10. S.p.5.
11. S.p.p.5-6, 51-2, 151; RR.p.90; T.D.xii-xiii, 282; MM.p.53
12. S.p.6.




1. A More Adequate Concaption of Science.
"The notion of science as detached and disinterested is obsolete
with all its stress on the observable and clearly defined"."^ This
is the instrumentalist and mechanistic view of science in which we claim
to know only what we can control and accept as valid only what can pass
the test of our predictions. The object of theological knowledge
cannot be reduced to that form of thought and approaoh, "for He cannot
be brought within the objectifying moulds of our prescriptive structures
15
or netted within the devices of 'our science'". However, science is
not like this as we can see from the change in the structure of modern
science. Perceptibility and predictability are seen to be severely
limited and not the hallmark of all true science. The notion of
scientific detachment today "appears rather pathetic, for our psychology
insists that detachment is not the sign of rationality but of open-mouthed
16
imbecilityI" It stemmed from the Cartesian stress on the self.
The scientist, in contrast to traditional views, "does not doubt the
object of his inquiry, for he i3 committed to a profound belief in its
17
intelligibility". The scientist does, however, "subject to doubt ••••
his own assumptions about the object, and so he allows attachment to the
object to help him detach himself from his own presuppositions. He
directs open questions to the object in order to let it disclose itself
to him in its own reality and nature, and in the light of what he learns
he revises his questions in order that his interrogation may be nearer
the/





the mark, but all this has the effect of calling in question the
18
preconceived ideas of the investigator himself"* The scientist is
thus questioned to the very roots of his being, and is thus "passionately
involved, for what is at stake is the integrity of his own rationality
vis-a-vis the relentless compulsion upon him of the inherent rationality
19
of the universe, i.e. what we call the scientific conscience".
This is what Torrance calls "scientific objectivity", "the
disciplined control of our subjectivities lest they should be imwarrantedly
obtruded upon the object of inquiry and thus allowed to obstruct and
20
distort apprehension of it". This moans that "objective thinking
lays itself open to the nature and raality of the object in order to
21
take its shape from the structure of its own prescription". The
antithesis of this is objectifying thought, in which "we make and mould"
our objects of knowledge out of the stuff of our consciousness. That
is, an inflexible conceptual structure, which is beyond criticism or
22
modification y experience, conditions reality. This leads to
subjectivity in the object, which, unless it is changed to emphasise
the relation of frames cf thought to the object, can lead to no radically
new knowledge.
Theologians need to reject the outmoded scientific views and enter
"into the rational freedom that comes with objectivity and its detachment
23
from arbitrary control by subjective factors". Jor, Torrance tells




xiii, xvi-xvii, 45-6,122,124,168-9,339; MM p.53.
20. S.p.9.
21. S.p.9.
22. IIM.p.67; S.p.p.9-10; T.p.p.35,41,93*
23. 2.p.10.
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science, is achieved through rigorous correlation of thought with its
proper object and the self-renunciation, repentance and change of mind
that it involves"
With Einstein, the theologian must learn that scionce is nothing
more "than the refinement of everyday thinking, for it respects the
fundamental nature of things anu seeks to understand and explain them
25
in their own intelligibility". ' the essence of science is "to bring
together the theoretical and the empirical, and to let empirical relation
to the object determine the mode of rationality we must adopt toward it,
26
in order that we may coordinate and deepen our experience". Scientific
concepts are not prescriptive, for we cannot say precisely how concepts
coordinate with experience. But, "we can engage in science only through
a profound faith in the accessibility of things to rational understanding"•
iinstein says that "the eternal mystery of the world is its comprehens-
xibility" .2^
2. a 'lore Adequate dense of Connection.
"The ability to think can be spoken of as the ability to conneot
tilings up with other things ana to think their interrelations. Hence
it is important for correct thinking to determine the specific mode of
connection or the kind of relation that obtains between the things we
2.S
are contemplating". In light of this, science is the investigation
of "things and events for tie order or regularity they manifest in their
«
inter-/







inter-connections in their attempt to reduce the manifold relations
in the world, or at least in some field of experience, to some kind
of uniformity, and if possible to penetrate down to a unitary logical
basis in our understanding of them through which the whole field of
29
our experience can be xlluminated"' • This relies on the connection
between the theoretxcai and the empirical and requires the clarification
of the kind of connection in each field of inquiry. bcience must
always guard against abstraction and formalisation instead ox' expressing
30
the dynamism of actual events in their connections."
quantum mechanics provides an example ox' this different sort of
connection,.and it is in this area that there is work being uone to
develop a "quantum lo^xc, in oruer to give appropriate and adequate
rational expression to the uxstxnctive kind ox connection oetween the
31
geometrical and dynamic aspects of reality that concern us here."
1± physios has had to develop different kinas of connection, so the
theologian ought to investigate the kinu of connections which arise
out of the realities he deals with. %uite clearly the sort of
connection which theology requires must be more subtle and flexible,
yet no less rational, than those traditionally isolated in the natural
and human sciences, if it is to have the kinu of precision and range
uppropriate to the interaction between sod anu the world, or divine and
human agency, that oolongs to the essential heart of its subject-matter".
What/
u.p.H.
30. MM.p.p.79,9lj s.p.20,104-5; T.p.p.13-14,66,146,150,184,222-3,
226,247,254,257,272.
31« s.p.p.12,103; T.p.102; RR.p.69.
32* x> »p »ip.
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What th8 theologian can learn from science is "the way in which approach
is made to the question of connection, from the actualities of the
objective field".55
The angle of approach to any field is determinative, whether
particular or general, and what is essential is freedom from distortion,
as modern physics has learned to have, and which biology has yet to
develop. Field theoiy reveals to theology that "reality, hidden so
far as our observations are concerned, is open to explanatory inter-
:pretation in essentially differential and functional relations, but
wo have to develop the hind of open axiomatic penetration that will
34
reveal its natural logical structure". This is what the theologian
rauct do, remembering that "adequate explanatory interpretation must
be developed ultimately from the side of the object and out of actual
relations in the objective field, and not mereljr, as in much contemporary
35
theology, from the side of the knowing subject."
3. A More Adequate Understanding of Conceptuality.
"Although scientific knowledge is possible only on the assumption
that nature is inherently intelligible, it is unable to adapt to logical
fixation the relation between concepts and the realities with which
they are co-ordinated, any more than, we can reduce to statements alone
the relation between statements and being, but that does not allow us
to hold that the relation between scientific concepts and reality is
36
non-conceptual or non-rational". We must beware of a false dichotomy




35. s.p.15; *M.p.p.23l,259j s.p.p.42,68.
36. S.p.p.l6,36j MM.p.p.56,72.
"scientific knowledge of the world rests upon a basis of 'primary
concepts' (or 'fundamental relations') which are directly and intuitively
connected with experience and derive their certainty through their
applicability to it, while all other scientific concepts and notions
are connected to this basis by means of theorems. In this way our
scientific knowledge in each field is co-ordinated rationally with the
comprehensibility of the world."... Torrance refers to this as "dogmatic
"57
realism" and seeks to apply this to theology.
In any science wo begin, not from concepts in isolation but with
concents linked together in a field of conceptuality and orderly
intelligible happenings. Primary concepts rise "where thought is
38
already and immediately engaged with reality", and are the medium
"through which reality is disclosed to us in its inner relations and
we on our oart are enabled to grasp it in accordance with its objective
structure and interpret it to others through series of conceptual
39
extensions." Concepts are defined in a relation to a conceptual
field and their meaning stems from co-ordination of field with reality.
Abstraction leads to vagueness and detachment from reality leading to the
40
"prison walls of our own subjectivities." However, we can thus
realise the bi-polar structure of conoepts through correlation with
subject a.nd object. Concepts are rooted "as interrelated forms of life
in a socio-concentual field",so to be understood must be examined in
psychological and social terms. But also "Concepts are grounded in an
objective/
37. Fs.o.16. Tor further discussion of primary concepts see Torrance's
argument in f.p.p.226-6,233-7,240-1; terii.p.p.33-4.
38. S.p.0.16-17.
39• 6.p.17.
40. S.p.17. See also footnote 30 above.
41, S.p.17. A''or further discussion of the importance of the social
influence of specifioallyframes of reference see MM.p.p.9,28-9,63;
S.p.p.197,202-3; T.p.61. T.J?'. Torrance, "faith ana Philosophy"
Hereafter "TP" Hibbert Journal Vol. XLVII No.3.
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objective field of orderly relatione, which means that in order to
understand them we must penetrate ^nto the rational structure of the
L2
reality to which they refer and by which they are determined." Thus
we need to clarify the relation of language and society to the objective
reference of concepts, to guard against "masterful conceptualization"
whioh might smother objective reference. We must guard against the
rigidity of language to allow for "new learning and thinking under the
43
direct thrust of reality."
The relevance of these questions for theology is seen by examining
the relation of concepts and language, especially with reference to
the Bible and understanding and communicating it. Theology needs to
engage in "demanding and carrying through a significant shift in the
meaning of ordinary terms to cope with the new insights and in
oreating new forms of expression apposite to new truths where the
44
adaptation of old forms of speech and thought does not prove adequate".
This involves no veneration of ordinal*;, language but concern with
grasping new truth. But it also means that theological language
becomes caught up with the sooio-oonceptual strucutres in which we
live, and therefore tends to become opaque and obscure. Thus we
require constant revision and reconstruction of concepts for purity
of thought. "This is done by keeping our concepts as close as
possible to the objective source that gave rise to them, for that is
the only way they can be renewed in their original force and rationality".
Coupled with this revision we need to remind ourselves of the





45* 8.p.20. For the importance of primary intuitions see Rfi.p.55-6}
S.p.p.189-90j T.p.p.235-6
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rather than objective definition of concepts, which in turn has led to the
problems of new Protestantism and the new theology in the Roman Church.
"What is required is a more adequate understanding of the polarization of
conceptuality with its objective and its subjective reference, in which
reality seizes our minds and seta up within them the law of its own
rationality".^ True concepts arise in us through direct and intuitive
apprehension of reality, yet our concepts refer to more than they can
ever speoify in explicit forms. For example, "in our knowledge of God
conception takes place under the impact of His Word and Spirit. Through
His Word God confronts us with the inner speech of His divine being and
throu^i His Spirit He evidences Himself to us in the presence of His
reality, in such a way that He creates in us the capacity to hear,
recognise and apprehend Him, and evokes from us the consent and understanding
47
of faith in His self-revelation"•
How/
46. S.p.21,
47 ♦ S.p,21. Torrance's doctrine of God is that God is primary in everything,
particularly in our knowing of Him. (MM.p.9;T.p.44}299) We cannot know
Him apart from His grace in making Himself known to us, and He prescribes
the content and form of all our judgment. (MM.p.p.65;114}T.p.p.46-7,75j
S.p.40) He is Lord, even as an Object of our knowing, for He is far
greater than we can ever know. (T.p.p.131,205*7,297) Nature and the universe
can give no account of themselves, but it is in God we find the source of
their rationality and oomprehensibility. (RR.p.p.10ji.p.46jS.p.p.22,35,183)
He has created rationality in the world, yet we cannot construe God on the
basis of what we know already (T.p.p.26,l88;S.p.p.l23,l84) but only within
a relationship with Christ. (S.p.p,139-40;176,T.p.p.27,44) God is beyond
our formulations of Who he is, yet He must be the centre of our thinking in
order to open us up from our subjectivity, in order that we may know Him oui*
of Himself.(T.p.p.12-13,19,32,131-2,310sS.p.p.49,177) God reveals Himself
in His freedom as a speaking subject in the Word of Christ. (MM.p.l31;T.p.p.
9-10;32-3,39) God can only be spoken of properly by reference to His coming
in human form in the person of Christ. (T.p,p.40,51-2,305jS.p.l37) This is
within the spaoe-time continuum and based in historical fact. (RR.p.p.24,61j
T.p.48;S.p.l88) Yet the doctrine of God is totally one of graoe in which it
is God Himself who makes our Theology possible. (MM.p.p.26-7,32,36,124-5,181,
RR.p.75) Torranoe describes the crucial features of God's action towards us
in terms of accomodation and the creation of reciprocity. (MM.p.p.70,113-4$
RR»p.54}T«P«>P»47,132-3}S.p.l37-8,142,149) God discloses Himself to us (T.p.p.
163-4,3,p.184) reoonciles us to Himself (T.p.p.41,97$S.p.179), and at the
same time, as it were, raises usip beyond our self-understanding to be able to
know Him as He ought to be known (MM.p.p.9-10,70,131}RH»P»P*54-5|T.p.p.46,
47-8,49-50,135-6). Thus God speaks in Christ, but also in Christ we have the
perfect man in the perfect attitude of hearing and responsive obedience.(MM.
p.p.26,l89}T. i.p.32-3}S.p.p,138-40) The task of the Holy Spirit is to open
us up for this bipolar action of God upon us. (S.P. .189,192,; T.p.21.)
How both poles of oonceptuality are related we may wish to regard as
I O
"part of the mystery of the comprehensibility of things", but in
relation to the knowledge of God account must be taken of the
episteraological relevance of the Holy Spirit for an explanation of our
knowledge from the side of the object and in accordance with its
nature
Torrance then offers three considerations to be remembered.
(a) The Patristic distinction between apprehending and comprehending.
We apprehend &od without bringing the totality of &od within the cmpass
of our apprehension. Apprehension "is the form of conception rationally
50
appropriate to His divine nature and majesty". This obviates the
need to give a precise conceptual definition of the reality of God.
51
"We know God only in that we are seized by His reality". This is
called cataleptic apprehending, "in it the Word of God seizes our minds,
sets up within their conceiving the force of its own rationality, and
52
thus opens them to conceptual understanding of God.". (b). Based
48. S.p.p.22,15-16j MM.p.14.
49. There can be no knowledge of God, in Torrance's terms, apart from
the Holy Spirit, who is the action of God. (MM.p.p.93,97, S.p.l65)
He is the personal presence of God (MM.p.97: S.p.p.167,185). The
Spirit is the Agent in God's revelation to man in that he transforms
man to receive this revelation by turning man inside out in order to
be open to God (MM.p.238,S.p.p.l68,173-4,l85,T.p.52.) His work is
pecularily personal in that He confronts us with a Person, and by
this confrontation we are enabled to become persons in the true
sense. (MM.p.250j S.p.p.170-1,173,176,189) The Spirit makes the
work of Christ actual within us and enables us to do the humanly






on Frege - a word without any corresponding inner picture is not for
that reason lacking in content or meaning. The unimaginable is not
necessarily without rational basis. The conceivable is not the
picturable. This applies to our knowledge of the invisible God, with
53
concepts which point beyond the range of the imaginable. (c) Frege -
it is from the sentence as a whole that the words receive their content.
This relates to concepts in that their meaning is to be found in the
field of conceptuality in which they function. "The whole field is
possessed of meaning in so far as it is co-ordinated with experience
54
and directly apprehended". Theorems, which express the relations
between concepts have an indirect relation to experience in their
applicability to what is intuitively apprehended through the primary
concepts. This means that "it is by operating with different levels
of conceptuality that we are able to clarify the logic of the conceptual
fields and determine the fundamental concepts which, through their
objeotive bond with reality, form the basis for the illumination and
55
organisation of all our knowledge in that field".
It is viewed in this light that the analogical relation in our
knowledge of God is simplified by the co-ordination of conceptual levels
by reference to which the individual concepts are defined. This means
that theology must be developed as a dogmatic science to clarify our
basic concepts and penetrate "into their fundamental unity, with all the
56
disclosure of objectivity and enlightenment that brings".
It/
53* For the role of relativity in relation to the observable, see
^.p.p.7-8,14-15J RR.p.p.79,83




It is on the basxs of this essay on theological rationality,
as an introduction, that Torrance goes on to consider theology old
and new, theology and science, Word and Spirit, and theological
persuasion. It must again be stressed that "Theological Rationality"
is merely one expression of Torrance's view, but nevertheless it does
offer the main themes of his work and outlines the sort of procedure
and approach he seeks to commend and develop for theology today.
It also as an essay, presents these themes and approaches in relation
to a view of what rationality is, but it does not do so in the wealth
of detail which an examination of the other major works since nineteen
sixty-five offers. Thus to supplement the view of rationality
presented and utilised as a basis of the argument in "Theological
Rationality' and so into the rest of "God and Rationality", a more
detailed account of what Torrance has to say on the theme of rationality
from all the sources mentioned will be presented.
140
3. Torrance on Rationality.
For Torrance rationality is closely bound up with the capacity
to be objective, that is to be bound by what is objective in contrast
to emphasis on the subjective, which is a form of irrationality.
Torrance in examining modem man's failure to distinguish between
objeotive realities and subjective conditions, which is a mark of
irrational behaviour or mental disorder, states that "we cannot hold
a conception of rationality which obtains for religion and ethios and
art and does not obtain for science. In every sphere of our life, in
reflection, in action, and in worship reason is our capacity for
objectivity" This was one of the great lessons of the Reformation,
which theologians are now being forced to learn again. This is also
seen in modern science where "undue emphasis upon the place of the
human subject leads quickly into an irrational situation, in which it
i3 claimed that man himself imposes patterns of his own upon nature
through his inventions. Not only is man unable to distinguish a given
reality from his own constructions, but even to think of trying to do
so, it is argued, is to fall from the pure ideal of science as complete
technological control of nature. But all this can mean in the end of
the day is that in his scientific activity man is only meeting himself,
fulfilling himself, and that there is no meaning in anything except that
which he puts into it out of himself. And so the real outcome of this





the social life of our •scientific' civilisation". So Torrance
suggests that "Theological and natural science share the same basic
problem: how to refer our thoughts and statements genuinely beyond
ourselves, how to reach knowledge of reality in which we do not
intrude ourselves distortingly into the picture, and yet how to retain
the full and integral place of the human subject in it all"
Torrance in discussion of theological science among the special sciences
states that "in all scientific knowledge, including theology above all,
man is unconditionally bound to his object, for to be bound and
determined by what is objective is the core of rationality. But there
is another side to this .... although he is unconditionally bound to
the object in faithful and authentic knowing of it, man is yet free,
active, and spontaneous in his epistemic relations, while part of his
freedom at least consists in his knowledge of his unconditional relation
to the object, as well as his determination to use his knowledge of the
object".^ In particular in discussing what happens when reason
encountering God or the f*ord of God refuses to subdue God to reason's
own subjectivity, Torrance tells us that one of the two things that
happens is that "reason finds that in order to be rational (to behave
in terms of the Ohjeot) it must suspend its unity-complex, for it
confronts a unique Object to which there is no real analogy, and .vhich






path which cannot honestly be subdued to an ^t .... Here, then, the
reason cannot bring forward any category or capacity of its own with
which to apprehend the Object. Only in the act of acknowledgement
can it receive the capacity to behave in terms of the Object, but must
therefore be prepared for transformation in obedience to its unique
Subject-Object. This means that reason must revise its whole conception
of unity and coherence as well as of objectivity, learning to operate
5
with a profoundar unity and a profounder objectivity".
To be rational, on Torrance's view, is to behave in a manner
appropriate to what is not us. Torrance, in discussing "The Relevance
of the Doctrine of the Spirit for Ecumenical Theology", in seeking to
express the nature of genuine objectivity rather than objeotivism, tells
us that "in the language of Professor John MacMurray reason is our
capacity to behave consciously in terms of the nature of what is not
ourselves, that is to say, the capacity to act in accordance with the
nature of the object. Hence true thoughts are thoughts which refer
properly to reality and which are thought in accordance with the nature
of the object to which they refer. fj-hey are not true if they refer to
certain objects in a mode that is determined by the nature of other and
different objects; they cannot be true, for example, if they refer to
personal beings as if they were merely things. Persons must be treated




Reason is our capacity for objectivity in this sense. To be rational,
therefore, means to behave not in terms of our own nature, but in terms
of our knowledge of the world outside us, of things and persona, in
accordance with their own natures. Clearly this objectivity or
reason cannot be confined to the intellect alone, but characterises
every aspect of our human life and activity as rational persons -
indeed it is the essential characteristic of personal consciousness.
It is what distinguishes rational, personal activity from all inorganic
6
impersonal activity". In discussing worship in 'The Word of G-od and
the Response of Man", Torrance relates worship to language and recalls
"that language is the system of verbal signs which we develop in order
to grasp tilings and present them to ourselves in such a way that we can
stand over against theia and think about them, and allow them to disclose
themselves to us in forms appropriate to them. This applies in
different ways to the world of things and the world of persons, but
in both we are engaged in the rationality of acting in accordance of
what is noi.-ourselves and enlarging our knowledge of it. In the
world of persons, however, it is particularly with inter-personal
transcendence that we are concerned, in which we distinguish ourselves
from eaoh othei* and communicate with eaoh other. This is also the
7
role whicn language plays in our worship of G-od". again, in his





to clarify rationality suggests taking as his guide, if only as a
preliminary definition, John MacMurray* s account of "rationality".
MacMurray states that "reason is the capacity to behave consciously
in terms of what is not ourselves. We can express this briefly by
saying that reason is the capacity to behave in tern3 of the nature
of the object, that is to say, to behave objectively. Reason is thus
8
our capacity for objectivity". Torrance adds that "this is not to
deny that the objective reality may have the nature of a subject, or
9
to question the place of the subject in our human knowing".
To behave in a manner which is appropriate to what is not us is
also to have the capacity to refer properly to reality, Torrance in
examining the nature of scientific activity, deals with the nature of
soience as consisting only of sciences, but comments that "all this
is not to say, however, that there is no such thing as a scientific way
of acting and thinking which is to be pursued in every field of learning
and discovery. This is the way of acting and thinking that is no more
and no less than the rigorous extension of our basic rationality, as we
seek to act towards things in ways appropriate to their natures, to
understand them through letting them shine in their own light, and to
reduce thinking of them into orderly forms on the prescription of their
inherent intelligibility. Scientific activity of this kind is
essentially open and flexible through fidelity to the manifold
character of reality and is universally applicable, but as such it is
the/
8. J. MacMurray, Reason and Emotion. p,19
9. T.p.p.11-12,
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the antithesis of the paranoiac rigidity manifest in every form of
*scientism*"^ Again in his discussion of objectivity in "The
Doctrine of the Spirit and Ecumenical Theology", Torrance suggests
that "it is of the nature of persons to be reasonable, to relate
themselves objectively to the world around them, in action as well
as in reflection, in emotion as well, as in volition. Thus if in
natural science v?e develop a knowledge of things in their objective
.reality by learning to act in accordance with the nature of the world
around us, so in the sphere of the ethical and sooial life we develop
a capacity to act objectively in relation to other persons, by behaving
towards them in accordance with their natures, not in terms of the
nature of things and not in terms of our own subjective determinations.
That is wh„ love occupies such an essential place in these inter¬
personal relations, for the capacity to love objectively is the capacity
in which we live as persons. Indeed it is the ultimate source of our
capacity to behave in terms of the nature of the object. Fence it
would also be irrational to treat things as persons. Strict respect
for the nature of what is other than ourselves is the very core of
11
rationality".
Rationality is characteristic of personal consciousness, yet it
is not just intellectual but must affect every aspect of our life, and





thought and action to objective and intelligible realities. This
is the case, for as we have already seen, "clearly this objectivity or
reason cannot be confined to the intellect alone, but characterises
every aspect of our human life and aotivity as rational persons -
indeed it is the essential characteristic of personal consciousness.
It is what distinguishes rational, personal activity from all inorganio,
12
impersonal activity". In dealing with the problems of logic and
specifically the ways in which the Truth of G-od in Christ iB received
and communicated, Torrance tells us that "true knoviledge of Him is
not isolated or individualist. To a certa n extent that is true of
all knowledge, which is never finally the activity of single individuals.
It arises in community and requires community for its full anu proper
operation, and can never escape from it. The thinking of all of us
is conditioned by history, by previous thinking and the communication
of knowledge already acquired; but it is also conditioned by our
personal relations in the present, for even our basic rationality
13 m
requires the objectivity of other minds". J-orrance particularly
stresses this in regard to the Person of Christ and our knowledge of
Him.
Torrance*s view of rationality is best summed tip in the stress
that what we knew mu x prescribe for us the mode of rationality we are
to adopt towards it. In the preface to "Theological Science" we read





specific mode of rationality that we must adopt toward them, and
prescribe also the form of verification apposite to them, and therefore,
it is a major part of all scientific activity to reach clear convictions
as to the distinctive nature of what ws are seeking to know in order
that we may develop ana operate with the distinctive categories demanded
of us".14 In the section on the "Nature of Truth" we find that
"knowledge is real only as it is in accordance with the nature of the
object, buvthe nature of the object prescribes the mode of rationality
we have to adopt towards it in our knowing and also the nature of the
15
demonstration appropriate tc it". Torrance then rel tes this to
the Object of theology, the Truth of G-od in Jesus. In the essay,
"theology in the Scientific World.", we learn that "in all scientific
knowledge, we let the nature of what we know, prescribe for us the
specific luOue o. rationality we adopt toward it, ^hat is why in
every science we operate with a distinctive form of inquiry proper to
the nature of the object we investigate in it. The kind of inquiry
we develop in our investigation of determinate objects, for example,
takes the form of physical questioning or experiments in which we force
mute nature to answer our questions, or to use Bacon's expression, in
which we have to 'torment* nature in order to elicit a 'yes* or 'no'
in reaction to our stipulations. But when we are concerned to know
personal objects, or subjects, we adopt quite a different form of
inquixy in which physical compulsion is entirely out of place, one





answering, is the appropriate moua of rationality"• In "Ecumenism
and dcience", in the description of science, we read that "there is
only one basic way of human knowing which is found to operate in every
field of human experience, in religious as well as natural knowledge#
Science is the rigorous and disciplined extension of the basic way of
knowing applied in exact, controlled, and organised ways to different
fields of experience# In every field we know something in aecardanoe
with its nature, and so we let its nature determine for us the mode of
rationality we must adopt toward it ana the form of learning or
discovery appropriate to it*'^ this is then related to the different
kinds of object and therefore of modes of rationality to do adopted,
in the same section we go on to disoover that since we must let the
nature of what we know prescribe for ua the mode of rationality wa
adopt toward it, science must take account of the subject of the human
knowsr. In fact, it requires of us, with all its rigour, controlled
adaptation of the subjeot to the object# that is why it is quite
unscientific to transfer from one field to another the distinctive mode
of rationality that develops within it. Thus we oannot assume impersonal,
objectiveat forms of behaviour toward personal subjects, but must assume
persona^, objective mode of behaviour toward them if we are to know them
7 s
in a responsible and rational way"," The same point is made in his
analysis of our psychological resistance in habits of mind requiring






that reason is the slave of passions, Torrance writes that "feeling is
properly a passion, an affection in which we suffer impact or come under
attack from something other than ourselves. We may resist it, and
this makes it more difficult for us, but only if we go along with it
(not necessarily to subscribe to it) may we know and understand it.
This is the side of our rationality in which we let ourselves be
affected by what we seek to know} we let it impose its own self-witness
upon us, and we let ourselves be tdd by it (an all-important element
19
a posteriori knowledge.)"
All science can be interpreted as seeking to bring to view the
inherent rationality which is in nature. Talking of the change in
scientific questioning, Torrance states that "when a scientist lays
bare the anatomical and physiological structure of the human body, he
is not creating and imposing patterns upon it. When you yourself
observe crystal-line formations in the rocks you are not importing into
them geometrioal patterns of your own inventing, you think the
geometrical patterns you find embedded in them already. That is why
our basic statements are formed by way of conceptual assent to what
is there or by way of recognition of an intelligibility inherent in
the nature of things. This is certainly the astonishing thing that
keeps on striking the scientist with wonder and awe, as Einstein used
to say, that there is already embedded in nature an inherent rationality
which it is the task of science to bring to light and express. Apart




equations and even the new geometries we construct are quite
meaningless unless they are applicable to nature, but if they are
applicable to nature they are elaborated expressions of an objective
20
rationality lying in nature itself". In discussion of the relation
of theological knowledge to the objective Word, we read that "the
basic act of knowledge is one in which the reason acts in accordance
with the nature of the given object, that is, acknowledges and
recognises it, so that it attains its essential conceptuality as it
lets its thinking follow the inherent rationality of the given. In
natural science, for example, the reason does not invent geometrical
patterns and impose them upon nature in the form of crystals which it
posits in this way; rather does it follow as closely as it can the
mathematical structure of nature by letting it disclose itself to the
reason in order that it may think in accordance with it and thus
unuerstand it. In this way natural science operates with recognition-
statements arising out of its reflection of the rationality of the
n 21universe".
In order for there to be science or knowing at all we must acoept
this inherent rationality. In "Theolog in the Scientific World", we
learn of something which needs to be emphasised. It is that "in
every soienoe we presuppose that what we know is accessible to rational
inquiry, that it is somehow inherently intelligible or rational. If





in developing verification, 0f\£. probesinto the inner rationality of
the object or field of knowledge$*4into its inner logic. Of course,
if we oannot do that we are entitled to question whether what is claimed
to be knowledge is not just something thought up out of our own
subjectivities and projected out there in an objectified form. But
if we can bring to view the inner rationality of a field of knowledge,
we are convinced that we are in touch with reality, that we are not
inventing but discovering, that we are thinking as we are compelled to
22
think by the essential nature of the realities themselves". In his
discussion of theological persuasion, as a postscript to "G-od and
"Rationality", Torrance, talking of intelligible language and
intelligible subject-matter, states that "the things about which we
speak to one another must be capable of rational apprehension and of
semantic designation. This is something that we assume and operate
with in ordinary experience and in science, without attempting to
explain it. If the nature of things were not somehow inherently
rational they would remain inapprehensible and opaque and indeed we
ourselves would not be able to emerge into rationality. It is because
things are amenable to rational treatment that we can apprehend them
at all, we understand them or get li^it upon them in so far as we can
penetrate into their rationality and develop our grasp of it.
Scientific knowledge is that in which we bring the inherent rationality
of things to light and expression, as we let the realities we
investigate/
22. S.p.p.93-4
investigate disclose themselves to us under our questioning and we
on our part submit our minds to their inherent connections and order.
Let it be granted that scientific activity involves a give-and-take
between subject and object, and that all knowledge is by way of being
a compromise between thought and beingj nevertheless it remains an
awesome fact that if the nature of things were not inherently rational
and apprehensible knowledge couli not arise at all, far less communication"
The same point is made three times in his section on the problems
of logic, firstly in the comparison of natural and scientific language
we read that "our normal scientific language presupposes an inherent
rationality in nature, so that it makes use of basic forms that refer
to states of affairs and patterns of events in the external world, but
the contingent and factual elements in these forms impede strict
theoretic demonstration",^ Secondly, in ^discussing the analogicald
character of existence statements, we can describe our conviction
concerning the valifity of our own theories. At least we can commit
ourselves to their acceptance. This is „ag the applicabillty of
a model to the real world, which in some sciences is empirically
verifiable/
23* S.p.196. It is intere ting to note that this exact passage is
presented in the preface of "Theological Science" p.p.x-xi, with
the following minor changes. Instead of " ....emerge into
rationality..." we read emerge into the light of rationality
instead of submit our minds to their inherent
connections..,.", we " ....submit our minds to their intrinsic
connections...."j instead of " Let it be granted that
scientific activity involves....", we read ".... Scientific
activity certainly involves...."; instead of "... and that all
knowledge...." we read "...while all knowledge..."; and finally,
instead of "if the nature of things were not inherently rational...."
we read '.....if the nature of things were not intelligible..."
24. T.p.224.
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verifiable in determinate ways, or as the persistent relevance of an
analogue to the nature of the reality into which we inquire, as we
experience it or intuit it with increasing understanding through the
analogue, or as the fertility of a theory in throwing li ht upon a
set of stubborn problems and at the same time revealing new facts,
but in whatever form it may be stated it is the discovery of a far-
reaching rationality in the nature of things whioh we are forced to
distinguish from our knowing of it, and to which we give authority
in working our conception of it. It is the discerning of an
objective structure of this kind that so often opens up the way for
the great new advances", Finally in discussing the limited power
of our conception adequate to reality we learn that "knowledge is given
in the interaction of subject and object, and scientific knowledge
cannot escape being a compromise between thought and being. Nevertheless,
although we cannot finally transcend our own selves and limitations, we
use theories, models or analogues as means or instruments through which
we discern and cognise objective reality as far as we may, relying upon
a rationality embedded in the nature of things and independent of our
26
knowing of it, since it is this that makes science possible at all".
On the basis of this inherent rationality, we seek in every sphere
of knowledge to express the objective rationality which is part and
parcel of the object of knowledge. In hi3 discussion of the
similarities of theological science and the special sciences, we learn
that one such similarity is "respect for the objectivity of facts, or,




to the externally given reality. In the methodological procedure of
the soienoes we have just teen discussing active and passive elements
are always involved. The reason is actively at work in constructing
the model or developing the analogue as it puts its questions to
nature and elicits its answers, but throughout the reason submits
itself to the objective realities and seeks to cognise them passively
27
through its theoretic constructions"• ^elating this to theology,
we find that "beoause the Truth of G-od encounters us within the world
of creaturely objects theology is inevitably ooncerned with all sorts
of 'objects* which it must respect, for it cannot otherwise know and
speak of the Truth of God truthfully. But theology is bound to
respect this objectivity in an unprecedented way, precisely because
ultimate Objectivity encounters us within the realm of contingent
objectivity. It is respect for the objectivity of contingent faots
that characterises every authentic empirical science, but theology
2Q
makes that respect a religious as well as a scientific obligation".
The same point is made in a different context, that of the discussion
of the rapidly altering framework of scientific thought, in light of
relativity "axioms are not just a set of logical premises antecedent
to and independent of the results reached, but arise out of the
intrinsic connections of scientific activity, and force themselves
upon us as the necessary structures of thought through which the
intelligible nature of things imposes itself upon our minds. In





physical universe ceases to be an axiomatic deductive science and
becomes a natural science inseparably bound up with physics* The
axioms may indeed be formulated at first through postulation as we
reflect on the way in which the faots are being established, but they
have to be deductively tested (in Popper's sense), and are justified
(in Polanyi's sense) in view of the objective depth and indeterminate
range of rationality that becomes disclosed through them. The special
point for us to note, however is this: Here we have a rigorously
scientific way of thought which is an axiomatic penetration into the
inherent rationality of things beyond all our mental pictures of reality.
a rationality that is itself not phenomenally or causally related to
phenomena or empirical events and which could not be discerned merely
from an observational or empirical approach, but which forces itself
upon us as the ratinnal ground lyin,, behind phenomena or empirical events.
OQ
and without which they could not be what thgy are*"....(My emphasis.)
On the basis of inherent rationality and the aim of knowledge as
expressing the objective and inherent rationality we have three things
to bear in mind. The first is that in theology we must use open concepts,
i.e. open to reformulation in light of the knowledge of the object, in
order to clarify rationality. Open concepts are "concepts which, to
he sure, must be closed on our side, for we have to formulate them as
carefully and exactly as we can, hut which on God's side are open
(and therefore apposite) to the infinite objectivity and inexhaustible
reality of the diving Being. That is to say, the kind of conceptuality
witlV
29* S.p.100; See also S,p,42 and footnote 20 above.
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with which we operate in theology is one in which our acts of cognition
are formed from beyond them by the reality disclosed so that the content
of what i3 revealed constantly bursts through the forms we bring to it
■*0 rri
in order to grasp it". In the next paragraph Torrance oontinues t
"it is important to see that open concepts are not irrational because
they are open, for to be open vis-a-vis the eternal God is the true
mode of their rationality, prescribed for them by the nature of the
divine Object of knowledge - they would in fact be the most imprecise
and inaccurate if they were not open in this way. At the same time,
their openness indicates the limits of our human inquiry beyond which
we cannot rationally go, or the limitation of our powers to put into
words our understanding of the divine rationality which will not be
restricted or confined within our finite formulations. Nevertheless,
within these limits we may and indeed we must probe as deeply as we can
and seek to make clear the rationality which we are given to apprehend.
It is for this purpose that we have to use open concepts which by their
very nature do not describe, delimit or define the Reality we seek to
understand,but which we employ as media through which we allow our
minds to come under the compulsion of the Reality so that we think of
it only as we are forced to, and let them be opened out more and more
in accordance with its richness and range in enlightenment".^
The second thing to bear in mind is that the sort of inquiry
which is truly rational mut itself bring our presuppositions into
question in light of the further revelations of the object, as we





Torrance makes the point both in the preface to "Theological Science"
and in a discussion of rationality in "Theological Persuasion". He
suggests that "as we seek to penetrate into the rationality of something
our inquiry must also cut back into ourselves and our own presuppositions,
for they must be brought into question if we are to be really open to
understand the thing concerned out of itself and in accordance with its
own nature. In these circumstances persuasion must argue for a
reconstruction in our interpretative frame of thought, in order that
alien elements may be eliminated from it and new elements assimilated
32
more appropriate to th nature of things we are speaking about".
We read in Romance's description of theology in a scientific
world that "in a science we know some given reality strictly in
accordance with its nature, and we let its nature determine for us the
form and content of our knowledge of it. We cannot assume that we
already kno\? what its nature is, for we learn what it is only through
inductive questioning in which w8 try to let it declare itself to us
in spite of, and often in contradiction to, what we tell ourselves
about it. This is a process in which we find ourselves being
stripped of our preconceived ideas. Our main difficulty is undoubtedly
with ourselves and our built-in habits of thought which we stubbornly
oarry over from the past or from another area of knowledge into our
inquiries but which can only obstruct and distort our apprehension of




we think we already know be called in question, so that as far as
possible we may know the given reality out of itself and in accordance
with its own nature. "We know natural processes, for example, not out
of a priori assumptions, but by exploring natural processes alone, and
by thinking of them only in terms of natural processes and through
forms of thought which we develop un.er the pressure of what they
actually are. In scientific activity of this kind we try to ground
our knowledge of the given reality squarely upon the reality itself
and articulate what we know out of a compelling and exclusive relation
with it. Ihis means that we must distinguish what we know from our
subjective states and conditions and that in proportion as we know
something in accordance with its own nature we allow our presuppositions
to be suspended or set aside. But it also means that we must learn to
distinguish what we know from our knowing of it, so that we may not
confuse our forms of knowledge with the realities we apprehend through
them. what all this adds up to is the principle of scientific
objectivity, which is simply an extension of our fundamental rationality
33
in which we think ana act in accordance with what is the case."
The third thing is that if we fail to understand something as
rational, it is our own fault, for we have forced it into an alien
framework, which is inappropriate. In discussion of the conjoint
apprehension of things with other minus we read that "if something is




is our fault and not that of the thing itself if we fail to understand
its we have probably overlaid it with some form of unreality by bringing
to its apprehension preconceived ideas that are not appropriate or are
34
wrongly extrapolated from another field of experience."
The clearest example to date of the sort of thing th.t Torrance
has in mind for theology can be seen in the field of physics, which is
a model of natural soience in that by mathematical representation it
seeks to penetrate into the innfcr rationality of things and bring this
rationality to view. In the chapter on "The Nature of Scientific
Activity", we read that "there is an important sense in which physics
has played an exemplary rale, and may still be allowed to stand as a
model of pure science, when its intrinsically developed methods are
shown to be determined by the nature of its own special subject-matter,
for then it may erve to show us how basio rationality when rigorously
extended in appropriate ways to some particular field may yield quite
startling results. Appropriate, howsver, is the operative term here,
for pure science can yield results only when the method and the matter
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are purely matched". More generally in discussing theological
soience among special sciences we read that "what the soientist does
in any field is to seek to aohieve an orderly understanding of events
in which he can grasp them as a connected and intelligible whole and
so be able to penetrate into their inner rationality. He does not
invent that rationality hut discovers it, even though he must aot
with imagination and insight in detecting and developing the right





through which he can discern the basic rationality and let his thinking
fall under its direction as he offers even a desoriptive account of
the events .... In so far as he can reduce to consistent and rational
expression the ways in which his knowledge is related to the grounds
upon which it is based he is convinced that he has come to grips with
the inherent rationality of things and convinced of the truth of his
reconstructions - hence the crucial importance in natural science of
achieving wherever possible mathematical representation of our
understanding of things for it is in that way that we bring the objective
rationality to view. Yet, as we have seen, we may treat this
representation only as a disclosure-model through which we apprehend
the reality we are investigating and not as a descriptive formula or
as the equivalent of some ontic structure in the reality itself".-^
As this last quotation also shows, rationality is not an invention on
the part of the physicist, hut rather a discovery of what is there.
So all scientists are seeking to come to grips with reality in order
to bring basic rationality to view.
The inherent rationality of the universe, however, is not self-
explanatory and thus it calls for some explanation of its source
and ground. In discussioncf the difference between theological science
and the other sciences we find that "the natural and human soienoes,
however, operate only within the finite if unbounded universe, and
thus within the limits of what is rationally accessible to us in




rationalities of nature and are oontent to occupy themselves with
fields of rationality that are not ultimately self-explanatory,
refraining from asking the question as to the ultimate rational ground
that lies behind every field of knowledge." In contrast, "theology,
on the other hand, is he soiaice that is unable to halt at the limits
that must satisfy natural SGienoe, for it is ooncerned above all to
■a
penetrate into transcendent and fontal rationality, the ultimate source
of all that is intelligible to man and which is presupposed in the
createa rationalities of nature explored through natural sciences.
There is something analogous to this transcendent rationality in the
37
transcendent element that presses itself upon us in every science".
However, Torrance goes on to say that "if there is to be real science
at all there must be cataloptic control of our human intellectual
constructions by something that ii itself not constructed, but received,
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a rationality that seizes us from above and beyond ourselves".
Yet "this transcendent element in the sciences of nature is not of
course to be identified with God, for it comes at us out of the immanent
rationality of nature, but it does cry aloud for God if only because
the immanent rationality in nature does not provide us with any
explanation of itself".
Even to attempt to formulate the question of inherent rationality
as regards the universe and its ground raises problems, for even to
question where such rationality comes from is itself to be forced to
use/
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use rationality. In examining the problem of Incarnation in space
and time and how we can speak of the Incarnation as an act of 0-od
v/ithout illegitimate projection of our croaturely time into God,
Torrance suggests that we come up against an ultimate boundary in
thought, which he parallels with "one of those ultimate boundaries
in thought such as we reach when we a3k a question as to the
rationality of the universe: not only do we have to assume that
rationality in order to answer the question but we have to assume it
in order to ask the question in the first place. We cannot meaning¬
fully ask a question that calls in question that which it needs in
order to be the question that is being asked. We cannot step outside
the relationship to the rationality of the universe in which we find
ourselves without stepping outside of rationality altogether. Before
the question as to the relation between our knowing and ultimate
rationality we cannot but stand in awe and acknowledgement, and can
ask our questions rightly only within the actuality of that relationship.
Torrance suggests that we can only make ultimate sense of immanent
rationality by following it through to its ground in the transcendent
rationality of God. This is based on Origen* s work, for "it was
Origen who was first to discern the philosophical significance of this
reversal of Aristotelian and Stoic concepts, in establishing the
connection between the transcendence of God and the rationality of





futility of being unable to offer any explanation of its own rationality".
This typified the work of the Church fathers. "Hence instead of
thinking of God in accordance with the determinate features of the
finite cosmos the theologians of the early Church thought of Him a3
the source of all rationality who, by maintaining the universe as the
object of His creative knowledge and power, structures and limits it,
making it determinate and comprehensible". Talk of the transcendent
rationality of God, however, in "theology is often so baffling to those
who are absorbed in the natural or human sciences with oreated or
seoond-order rationalities which all require the support of one another,
for in theological science we must presuppose the ultimate rationality
into which we inquire in order to inquire rationally of God and we are
unable to contend for Him on any lower ground than that which He is.
It i3 all very well in the other sciences to bracket off the question
a3 to ultimate rationality, that is, to be methodologically agnostic
in understanding nature out of itself alone, but when we take away
those brackets and ask the question as to ultimate rationality, to be
agnostic would be an act of sheer irrationality, for it would mean
that our reason was being loosed from its bond with the source of
rational being. Conversely stated, knowledge of the ultimate rationality
of God is reached at the point where our human reason becomes enlightened
from beyond the limits of created rationality and -where an infinite
extension of intelligibility beyond ourselves is disclosed, but all
this in such a way that the ultimate rationality sets up its law in the
depth of our human rationality and is recognized and respected as the
43






God creates rationality in the universe in His creation out of
nothing, as well as creating the structures of space and time, which
are the created forms of rationality. In discussing the relation of
the Reformation to modem theology, Torrance describes the releasing of
nature for empirical investigation out of itself as a reversion to "the
Patristic insight that the rationality inherent in the world is
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conferred upon it by God's creation of the world out of nothing".
This is then related in "The Incarnation in Space and Time" to the fact
that "the Christian doctrine of Creation asserts that God in His
transcendent freedom made the universe out of nothing, and that in
giving it a reality distinct from His own but dependent on it He
endowed the universe with an immanent rationality making it determinate
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and knowable". This view relates to the idea, which is quoted with
approval, from Patristic thought, Anselm, Guns Scotus, Pascal and Karl
Barth, that "the structures of space and time are created forms of
rationality to be distinguished from the eternal rationality of God.
In creating and knowing them God remains free from any necessity in
the relationship, although they remain grounded in the Supreme Truth
L.6
of His Being". The prime example Torrance gives of this at work
is the Incarnation and the mode of understanding which is appropriate
to the incarnation, interpreted in light of field theory, so that "we






the transcendent rationality of God in which the latter is recognized
not as an intrusion into the former but rather as their affirming and
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establishing on their true and ultimata ground".
Torrance analyses created rationality into two basic forms of
word and number in terms of personal and impersonal being. He tells
us that "we must be careful to distinguish clearly the kind of rationality
inherent in historical avsnts from that inherent in natural events.
7/hen we presume that nature is inherently intelligible we presume that
our understanding of its processes and states can be given some form
of mathematical presentation, for it is in that way, as we have noted,
that we believe its rationality can come most clearly to view ..... In
historical events we operate with a different kind of rationality which
we have described as intention or purpose, rationality in its personal
rati).er than in its impersonal form..... If we may speak of the rationality
embedded in nature as number, we may speak of the rationality embedded in
history as logos. for in history we are concerned with giving a different
kind of account ( Xc-yav ov*> ) of things from that we give of
natural processes, and it is therefore a different kind of 3tory that
I Q
we have to tell". Again the point is made in "The Word of God and
the Word of Han", in discussion of the Incarnation as the entering
into created rationality, we are told that "this created rationality
takes two main forms, number and word, corresponding to imp rsonal





man, in the interrelation and inseparability of his physical and
spiritual existence in space and tine, and they operate together in
th8 emergence of the universe as it is explored and scientifically
built up through man*3 interaction with nature and as its inherent
rationality is broujbt to co-ordinate expression in mathematical and
verbal language. Number is the rationality of the creation in its
form as determinate event, the rationality of immanence and necessity
which is aute in itself but which may be brought to articulation through
man in so far a3 he thinks it under the compulsion of the physical
nature of things. Word is the rationality of the creation in which
it roaches beyond its fixed and mute condition, the rationality of
transcendence and freedom in which man as the crown and priest of
creation has the function of shaping formal instruments through which
he may bring being to disclose itself in accordance with its manifold
nature. Both forms of rationality are needed, but it is in and
through man alone that they emerge into the open, so that it is by
man's grasp and handling of them that the creation, including man,
I Q
attains to its full being".
A3 w« see from the last paragraph and the last sentence, both
number and word rationality ara necessary, yet they function at
different levels and are dependent on the transcendent rationality
inherent ^.n the Logos of God for their own role as rational forms.
In the same discussion of rationality we learn that "number cannot
come/
49. S.p.14-0. ?or the importance of the inherent differences between
number and word as forms of rationality see T.p.2^1.
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come to expression apart from word, that is, without the acquisition
of language through which aan can stand over against his etjvironment,
designating its features and prescribing them to himself as objects
for reflexion and computation in order that he may organize and
enlarge his knowledge of the world. On the ether hand, word cannot
fulfil this role apart from number, that is, without the realm of
the determinate and immutable which in virtue of its inherent
rationality supplies the fixed medium for the development of intelligible
systems of representation and at the same time acts as the external
control required for consistency and universality in communication.
Thus number and word find articulation in two co-ordinated levels of
rationality in which each requires the other but in which word is the
formal means by which the creation is delivered from being trapped in
itself and is made open to what is above and beyond it. In this
context the inherent rationality of the physical creation is seen not
to be self-contained but to call for a transcendent rationality for
50
its explanation and meaning".
This dependence on transcendent rationality is evan more crucial,
for without such transcendent rationality there can be no pure soienoe,
for rationality grasps us from beyond ourselves and we must conform to
it to be fully rational. In his description of theology in the
scientific world, we read that "the passion of the scientist is aroused
by the intuitive apprehension of a reality that is not constructed or
controlled by man but that waits to be discovered. And so he develops
a science, the final shape of which does not lie within his own
competence to determine. He glimpses its possibilities but they reaoh
out far beyond him. As Michael Polanyi has put it, he is caught up
V
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in the pursuit of a reality that is only partially disclosed but that
has an indeterminate range of rationality still unrevealed, for he is
convinced that it has an independence and power for manifesting itself
in unthought-of ways in the future. His scientific conscience is
the counterpart or echo in himself of that transcendent element,
a logic beyond his own mind, that thrusts itself unrelentingly and
compulsively upon him. That is why, as Polanyi has so often insisted,
there can be no pure science pursued freely for its own sake without
dedicated service to a transcendent rationality. If there is to be
real science at all there must be cataleptic control of our human
intellectual constructions by something that is itself not constructed,
but received, a rationality that seizes us from above and beyond
ourselves.
This transoendent element in the sciences of nature is not of
course to be identified with Sod, for it comes at us out of the immanent
rationality of nature, but it does cry aloud for &od if only because the
immanent rationality in nature does not provide us with any explanation
of itself".51
When me seek to discover what this account of rationality means
in practice for us, we must be aware of our specific problem in the
very nature of our humanity. Man is unable of himself oroperly to
be rational, for his reason seeks to be autonomous and to conform what
is there to the configuration reason brings to reality. In a footnote




"autonomous reason"; it "is of course a diseased form of rationality
for it is the reason turned in upon itself, and claiming as inherent
in itself the forma which it can derive only in relation to the objective
52
world upon which it reasons"♦ This is amplified in an early article
on "Faith ana philosophy"• "it is impossible to think without having
some tiling to think about. kelson cannot operate without substantia,
'therefore the autonomous reason, by its very nature and by definition
cut off from ana unable to grasp its proper relation to the objective
world immediately, is forced to feed upon itself as if it were its own
substantia. fresumably this autonomous reason ha* already attained
a certain more or le^s permanent configuration in conformity with the
material world, but it has come to imagine that this configuration
belongs to its essential being, that it is substantial to it, or to
use Kantian language, that in view of the categories of its own
understanding, it can understand any object to which it nay direct its
attention. fhis has been taken to be true to such an extent that
it nas become an axiom for the reason to accept as rational only that
whioh fits in with the forma of its own autonomous activity. It
refuses to recognise anything outside the oh&rmed circle of its own
self-sufficiency except what can be understood by tne norms immanent
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to reason." i'his being the case, "as a rule, when the autonomous
reason comes across the unknown, it subdues the unknown to the forms





y-hat Is known already. It oannot conceive an absolute unlikeness
except in terms of itself, for it allows no break in the circle of
its own autonomy (Kierkegaard)"This results in the situation
that, "as he is, man is unable to behave in terms of the Truth,
therefore unable to be rational. He must be changed, as St. Paul
said, by the renewing of his mind until he is conformed to the image
of God in Christ. To behave in terms of Christ who is the express
image and reality of God is to have faith in God. That is what it
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means for reason to be rational, to have the true objectivity of faith."
Reason*s autonomy is most clearly seen when man is confronted
by God and oannot by reasoning reduce God to merely human, categories.
"Autonomous reason can only try to understand God in terms of itself,
presupposi-ng an ontic continuity between itself and God, and so we
can only 'hold down the truth in the form of a lie? as St. Paul said,
'worshipping the creature instead of the Creator*. A fully fledged
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autonomy is bent on self-deification". "The urge of reason to
complete itself in a foreclosed unity corresponding to the charmed
circle of the autonomous reason is so ineradicable a habit of mind,
and 30 irresistible, that only when reason is prised open from above
through faith, and kept open, can the reason be restrained from
betraying the facts of existence in an artificial unity. In faith,
the monologue of reason is invaded by a Word from without, and
instead of monologue there is dialogue. Faith is reason engaged in
dialogue and by dialogue faith prevents the reason from closing in
upon itself alone and therefore from offering a foreclosed rational¬






situation: that is the moment of faith# Faith is reason acknowledging
something transcendent of itself, and behaving in accordance vdth it,
In this situation to have faith is the only rational thing that reason
can do"#*^
In light of man's situation as regards his autonomous reason and
confronted as he is with the inherent rationality of the universe and
of &od, man can merely submit to the inherent rationality of both the
universe and God and seek to communicate this by persuading others to
submit to the same rationality, and thus we discover that community is
essential for proper understanding of the rationality of all things#
In the preface of "Theological Science", we read that "soientifio
knowledge is that in which we bring the inherent rationality of things
to light and expression, as we let the realities we investigate disclose
themselves to us under our questioning and we on our part submit our
minds to their intrinsic connections.•••••We oommunioate with others
only when we get them to submit their thought to the same rationality
in things that we experience# Thus communication from the very start
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involves an element of persuasion# The implications of this are more
dearly drawn in "Theological Persuasion"# We find that "in theological
persuasion, we seek to bring others to the point where they submit their
minds to the inherent rationality of the divine revelation# There they
must think only as they are compelled to think by the nature of the
divine realities themselves, and there they must engage in a oritical
judgment in whioh they test the persuasive statements in the light of
thai/
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58# T.p.xi. Torrance states the same thing in the same words in S.p.196.
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that to which they refer, and tost their own preconceptions to see
whether they are importing into what is apprehended something that is
not really there or whether they are preventing the apprehension of
what is really there hut quite new and altogether beyond them. This
kind of persuasion cannot achieve its end fully with single individuals,
for if God is not merely what I have thought up and projected out there,
He is objectively real and universally knowable by others (that is in
so far as they are prepared to Icnow Him in accordance with His own
59nature)" Parallel to this we find that "in natural science we
build up knowledge through casting ourselves upon the rationality of
the given, and we test the reality and objectivity of our knowledge
through the development of its inherent patterns of rationality in a
way that not only transcend' our experience in the present but proves
to be progressively fertile in the light it throws upon other problems
and questions. Bu this testing requires a whole community of
verifiers all over the world, for science moves and advances as one,
with its internal self-scrutiny and self-criticism, and its own
rigorous conscience aroused in it by the compelling claims of reality.
60




4-. Critique of Torrance's Account of Rationality
As outlined in the Introduction to this chapter, Torrance provides
an example of a modem theological writer who is aware of the necessity
for an examination of rationality. His view has been presented in some
detail to ensure that the line of Torrance's own position is preserved
and that it is evident why his position leads to the difficulties
presented and why his view as a whole must be considered inadequate
to the complexity of rationality as well as in its own form subject
to considerable problems and the need for further explication.
Within the critique will be developed the positive gains to be had on
the basis of the issues and points which Torrance makes, as will the
negative gains in terms of the weaknesses of his account and the areas
in which these may be improved. The critique will take the form whioh
the positive treatment of Torrance's position has followed. Each
step in the argument for rationality presented in sections two and
three will be commented on and some relevant criticism made either
positively or negatively. In this way, Torrance's account will be
allowed to stand or fall on its own merits, rather than forced to
serve some ulterior purpose of criticism.
The areas covered in criticism of Torrance will be first of all
that his account is overbrief and leaves the limits of rationality
largely ignored. Concentrating on the theme of rationality, it will
be asked whether there is too great a variety of topics referred to
under Torrance's scheme, and specific questions raised as to the nature
of the rationality of the universe, and of God, as well as the
dependence/
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dependence of Torrance on a particular christian emphasis. Then
his account of objeotivity and its relation to subjectivity will be
dealt with and the way that it is impossible to rid his view of
subjective features even though his position seems to require just
such a removal. Criticism will then be levelled against his view
of the "object", in terms of the differences between objects, the
difficulty of defining actual objects, and the particular problems
with examples, such as "mind", historical events, scientific objects,
and Cod.
With the critique of the view of the object will be presented the
danger of overpersonalisation and preoategorisation, and certain
problems with intuition and the use of figurative language. The
critique then moves to consider the phrase "mode of rationality"
and to ask what "mode" means, whether there is the kind of difference
in approach which Torrance seems to suggest, what practical effect
his view has, and the meaning of adoption in connection with the notion
of rationality which rather seems to be concerned with something people
already have.
Torrance's failure to exclude what ought to he excluded will be
shown in terms of false views such as alchemy and astrology, other
christian views, and other world religions. Coupled with this will
be criticism of his failure to be true to the complexity of rationality
in terms of different attitudes, detailed analyses, and different
kinds of understanding. Then his notions of inherent, created, and
transcendent rationality will be considered, along with the idea of
awe/
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aw© and mystery as well as the positive benefits of false theories.
Then immanence, revelation, openness of concepts will be dealt with
before attention is turned to the role of community in Tor ance's
account and the difficulties this creates for free will, actual
discussion, argument and communication in general.
However behind this form of criticism which is geared to Torrance's
own presentation and emphasis there will be a general background of
criticism which will be the basis from which the criticism of Torrance
is launched and that which will serve as the ground for development
of my own positive view.
This general criticism of Torrance's view will concentrate on
three areas. Some of the omissions which Torrance makes will be
examined as regards the nature of rationality, and the importance of
this centres on his failure to examine the limits of rationality
\
especially as they are to be understood from the actual practice of
argument and discussion. Seoondly Torrance's account will be
discussed on its own merits to see whether or not it stands up as a
sufficient account of what rationality is, and it will be shown in
what way Torrance fails to make out his case, and the details of this
failure will be presented in the body of the text. Finally it will
be shown that one of the effects of Torrance's account is that it
leaves no room for the critic to stand upon. It will be seen that
his discussion of intuition, his failure to exclude the false-
astrology, alchemy, faiiy-lore and boojums- his position against
other christians and other religions, his account of revelation, his
doctrine of the Holy Spirit, and Torrance's inability to question his
own/
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own system all are part and parcel of the way he excludes the critic
from being able to express dissatisfaction with his view and offer an
alternative.
The presentation of the criticism shall, however, be based not
on moulding Torrance's material to suit my own ends but by taking his
position as he has it outlined in his own account and with the sorts
of emphases which he makes. In this way I shall seek to be fair,
while at the same time seeking to isolate particular points for ray
own use in the description of an account of rationality which is both
adequate to the complexity of the subjeot and which also allows genuine
discussion and argument. The first general ground of criticism, then,
against Torrance is his failure to examine the limits of rationality
and his omission of important features of rationality. Then doubt is
set against the application of the epithet "rational" to so great a
variety of things 3uch as persons and inanimate objects. Then two
examples of such rationality, that of the universe and God, are tested
for adequacy. Than attention is drawn to the reliance of Torrance's
view of rationality on a particular christian emphasis and position.
In view of the detail and scope of Torrance's account of rationality,
it seems illegitimate to suggest that his account is in fact too brief.
It is, however, overbrief in that it is at a considerable tangent to
the bulk of present discussion of the nature and scope of rationality.
This criticism would have little relevance, but for the fact that
Torrance's view of theological science has integral to it a view of
rationality which is basic to the description both of natural science
as practised today as well as to theology as he seeks to practise and
comment
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commend such a practice. Torrance's account, on hi3 own admission,
is in the tradition of the Early Fathers, the Reformation, and what
he describes as modern scienoej yet the concept of rationality is
historically related to the work of the Rationalists throughout the
ages, and there is little account taken of the nature of such a view
in its historical aspect, apart from references to the problems
created by Cartesian dualism. This is also the case with the lack
of relation to the hulk of modern discussion on the theme of
rationality. Modern discussions such as those of W.W. Bartley III,
J. Bennett, R. Sdgley, and B. Wilson are without mention or analysis,
whereas they offer alternative views of the nature and scope of
rationality, and need therefore to be argued against and to be
contrasted with his own account. In the specific detail of Torrance's
account and approach to the nature of rationality, one is left without
sufficient discussion of a whole variety of features of rationality,
which any account of adequacy must at least put into some perspective
and offer understanding of. The relationship of rationality with
reason, and the uses of "reas nable" and "unreasonable" in the wide
variety of contexts are not specifically considered or examined.
There is no account given of the logical, practical, scientific, or
experiential limits of rationality, which are the crucial features
of rationality in argument and discussion. There is no aocount of
the relation of rationality to such ideas as justification, evidence,
and criticism. Nor does Torrance discuss the traditional antitheses
of/
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of reason over and against faith or against experience, by examination
of the generally accepted anti-theses involved. Torrance does not
compare and contrast rationality in human spheres with animal behaviour
and claims to rationality. There is no analysis of these various
concepts, which seem, prima faoie. so essential in understanding what
rationality is, and how best to give an adequate account of such
rationality especially as it relates to theology in any claim to
scientific method and integrity.
It is, of course, easy to complain about the failure to analyse
cognate concepts of rationality which seem crucial in any adequate
account of its nature. But this needs to be coupled with a careful
critique of exactly what Torrance does say, even if that in itself is
not a complete explanation of rationality. Torrance states that
rationality is a feature of many and various things. He talks of
12 3
the rationality of the universe, things, nature, in the nature of
4 5 6 7 8 9
things, world, existence, theology, scientists, creation, and
God."*"0 Some of these will be examined in greater detail, but it is
doubtful if one can talk of the rationality of things, of the universe
and of God, as if rationality in each case was one and the same sort
of thing. The rationality of objects and the rationality of the
universe are surely different levels of statements and of organisation.
They/
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They refer to different sorts of things. It is prima facie false
that the rationality of any particular object is at the same sort of
level and can be construed in the same sort of way as the rationality
of the universe, Torrance seeks to present rationality as the adoption
of modes, but to clarify this a definition of nature of the universe
is required over and against particular objects, with explicit in any
such definition the relation of rationality to the different things
and levels of things, involved. The rationality of my big toe, or
indeed of all big toes, is different from and is worthy of different
sorts of considerations, from the rationality of the universe and all
nature. To call the universe or nature rational seems to be the making
of some statement concerning organisation or principles by which
organisation can be seen and understood of a massive and intricate
system. It can at least be imagined what it would be like to draw
up such principles in order to reduce the complexity of any system, or
to put it even more neutrally, any grasp of phenomena like the universe,
to a more simple level by clarification of the interconnections and
interrelations of the parts in what can then be seen to be a whole.
To talk of the rationality of the universe is to view it as a system
which can be appreciated and grasped, even if this appreciation and
grasping is an ideal which is never attained. In comparison to talk
of the rationality of a big toe, or a desk, or any thin;, must surely
be at a ifferent sort of level. It may be that it still is a reference
to a principle of organisation and the capacity to reduce a complex to
a more simplified systematic account and this to facilitate understanding,
but/
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but the point is that to use in both this context and that of the
universe and nature, the term "rationality" without some qualification
or explication, leaves no wiser than when started.
As will be considered, one is also confronted with the difficulty
of interpreting nature, the universe, desks, G-od, etc., as objects.
This will be related to the specific definition of rationality, but for
the moment, it may bo seen that by talking of the variety of things
and the reference of rationality as being applicable to all these
different sorts of things, there is a danger of smuggling in implicity
the doctrine of objects, which are to be approached with the proper
mode of rationality. But the universe is not an object in the same
way as my big toe, if the universe is in any sense an object. Against
it is the setting together of different levels of things, and different
sorts of terms, and suggesting by the use of the term "rationality"
that there is some sort of common ground to be understood, or rather
in the way of on-erstanding each and all ox them. The rationality of
scientists is totally different from the rationality of the universe,
yet no examination is offered and delineation of the way that the term
"rationality" is being used, in the one case, as a characteristic of
human beings, and in the other case, some sort of principle of
organisation or understanding open to humans to grasp, if but approached
correctly.
If one of the notions Is examined which Torrance mentions, that of
the rationality of the universe, or of nature, or that of the rationality
in the nature of things, (one is again unclear whether these are all the
same thing or three different things), it can he seen that there is a
problem/
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problem to be taken account of. The presence of evil in the world
must count against the apparent rationality of nature, and in turn,
of the universe, for evil is apparently discontinuity. Torrance
himself talks of the problem of evil in "Faith and Philosophy", where
he says that "where evil is not regarded as relative, but as radical,
apy philosophy which attempts a unitary interpretation of existence is
confronted by shipwreck .... modern philosophy ... realises •••• the
surd-character of evil. somahow evil posits itself and cannot be
11
rationalised.....Evil is Fundamentally discontinuity". However this
is countered by the fact that "faith insists on taking the discontinuity
and contradictions in human life seriously and honestly and challenges
the superficiality of the philosopher who thinks that by dialectic he
can reach a coherent interpretation of existence in which the gaps of
12
evil and sin and pain are healed by the activity of reason alone".
The only other reference to the problem of evil in the four major works
dealt with comes in "Theological Science" in his discussion of the
problems of logic. He says that in "religious experience and knowledge
we work with the problem of the faithfulness of God, and we live and
plan our lives accordingly. But we k ep meeting evil and suffering
which rise up before us as manifestations of disconnection and disorder
in the nature of things and we are shocked at their deformity, i.e.
their contradiction of rational form. And so we are driven to meditate
upon/
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upon them more profoundly for even disorder argues for order, seeking
to reduce our understanding of experience to fullerintelligibility.
We still believe that God is reliable and faithful, and that for®
and order belong to the fabric of the universe, and that behind creation
and fall there remains G-od eternally and infinitely loving and
wise. Prom the point of view of logical form there is a grave
disconnection between the goodness and power of God and the facts
of evil and suffering in the oreation; for faith this element of
incoherence is a problem only vis-a-vis ultimate coherence, faith
insists in asking whether this is not to work with a superficial
notion of uniformity, in which our formalization of things has been
allowed to run ahead of the faots and to impose a false and illusory
unity on them, e.g. by deriving a notion of 'omnipotence* through a
logical construction out of the kind of power that we find in nature,
brute force, formalizing &<, abstract possibility to the nth
degree, and then setting beside it a notion of 'infinite goodness'
derived in a similar way through logical construction and projection
out of our common human ideas, only to find that they contradict each
other in the face of the evil and suffering of our world. It isathe
Cross of Christ, however, that faith penetrates deeply into its
understanding of the faithfulness of God, for there He is found at
work in the depth of measureless evil and the unappeasable agony of
mankind overcoming contradiction, achieving reconciliation and bringing
13




fullest and only account given in the major works selected for study,
and well typifies the line which Torrance takes on this question,
"/hat is offered in his remarks from "Faith and Philosophy" and
"Theological Science" is not a clear-cut account of the relation of
the surd-like quality of evil to the inherent intelligibility of the
universe and the world, Rather he suggests that the problem of evil
arises because of a simplistic uni-level approaoh to what is complex
and multi-levelled. There is a tension in the remarks, for, on the
one side, there is the willingness to admit the genuine nature of evil,
the "surd character", "deformity", and with this the tacit admission
that evil is a problem, for it is something that in spite of which we
"still believe that &od is reliable and faithlul". (My emphasis),^
But on the other hand, evil is only an "element of incoherence", which
results from working with a "superficial notion of uniformity , as
well as apparently from a false construction of "omnipotence", at
least that is the given example. The problem of evil seems, however,
more of a problem than is allowed for in this setting. If its
"surd-character" is taken seriously jMfc must be asked whether this
"surd character" results from a faulty analysis of a systematic whole,
or else is itself genuinely and really surd. If it merely results
from a faulty analysis, it seems to be coming round to say that evil
only appears to oe evil, given a particular understanding which is
limited and imposes a false unity. If, on the ether hanu, it is




claim of rationality for the world, nature and the universe. If
it is taken seriously, it must lead to serious problems of the soope
of rationality, when applied to the world and the universe. If it
is not taken seriously, then racinnality is saved, but at the cost of
belittling the reality of evil and its irrational appearance,
Torrance's account needs to be further understood in two aspects.
He stages that in being confronted with evil in the nature of things
we are "driven to meditate upon them more profoundly for oven disorder
argues for order, seeking to reduce our understanding of experience
to fuller intelligibility". (My emphasis). To suggest that disorder
argues for order is difficult to allow without argument. If one tries
to reduce things in an orderly fashion, then certainly when confronted
with a disordered set of tilings, one will try to reduoe the disorder
to order, but that reduction of order from disorder results not from
the disorder in the things themselves, but rather the ordering drive
in oneself. It is just not the case that when confronted with a
disorder, automatically and immediately it is thought that it is order
gone wrong, out of hand, or about to be corrected. The clothes strewn
* w
around the teenager's room certainly to the mind of the tidy parent
argues for a kind of order, but to the teenager it does not. Paint
slapped on to canvas by means of a rotary spray-gun may well appear
to the would-be avantgarae art critic the order of a new form of art,
but it is still also just disordered paint blobs. Evil and disorder
need not necessarily lead to saying "Ah, order gone wrong herel" of
"'we need order here". It may, but it need not. It may, for instance,
givery'
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given the other aspect of Torrance's account* In dealing with the
problem of evil the presuppositione at work in Torrance's view are
seen very clearly* He makes no apology for such presuppositions in
15
"Theologioal Science", but in the discussion of evil, it is first
of all set in the framework of the faithfulness of God, creation and
the fall, and i3 finally to be solved in the mystery of the atonement
in the cro s of Christ. There is no necessity to discuss the details
of how evil is related to such a view, but rather to make the point
that for Torrance, the problem of evil is integrally bound up with a
view of God, His relation to the world, and His work in and through
the Person of Christ* What is difficult is not so much the making
sense of the problem of evil in such a religious context, hut rather
that in a discussion of rationality and in the relation of rationality
as it refers to the universe, and of the world, such a religious thesis
for the nature of the problem of ovil is only one possible account
and explanation, but certainly no■ the only or necessarily the correct
one. Evil is a problem in any claim that nature is rational, and
that the universe is rational, but if its correct understanding is
possible only in and through the religious thesis, this thesis must be
shown to be superior to all others, and the faults, weaknesses, and
failure on the part of the other views or accounts of evil pointed
out, and the positions argued for. Torrance's solution to the problem
may or may not be another solution, but it needs careful comparison
with other accounts successfully to make out its case.
Torrance * s/
15* See Preface of Theological Science.
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Torrance's statement of the rationality of nature, things, and
the universe must, therefore, be further explicated particularly vis-a
-vis the problem of evil and his view of God's providence and goodness,
before his case can be accepted. Attention is turned now to one of
the other terms of which, or of whom, Torrance tells us rationality is
a feature. What sense can oe made of talk of the rationality of God?.
Later the relation of God's rationality to other rationalities will be
examined but now concentration is on what the notion of the rationality
of Gou can mean. "national", "reasonable", and the other synonyms,
3eem to have a close relation with the notion of persons. People are
rational, or irrational, and they have or fail to have rational
understanding. a.s has been seen in Torrance's account, it is people,
things, the unive se, and God which are all rational, or all have
rationality, but this cannot be in the same sense for all. first of
all, in what sense is God like a person who is rational? There are
so many things whioh make sense when referred to persons and their
qualities, which are difficult to relate to God. hoes Goa have
intentions ana purposes, and are these rational. It can be imagined
tnat people will fail to behave as rationally as they might, but God
could not fail to be rational, if He is the ail perfect One. It seems
odd to imagine that Goa has intentions or purposes which He thinks of,
thinks over, examines, and then executes and awaits the results. God
is not rational in the same sense as human beings are rational. His
rationality would and must be unlimited ana perfect, and His expression
of rationality must be in different moaes. for instance, it is
claimed that to be rational is to behave in a fashion appropriate to
the/
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the object, and to adopt a mode of rationality appropriate to that
object. But what sense can be had of God's behaving or not behaving?
Behaviour requires a body and certain physical characteristics. What
could it mean for God to adopt or not to adopt a moae of rationality,
setting aside the problem of what this might mean in itself, and
concentrating on the idea that God has to do something, as if He is
not in the situation of it always and only being done as it ought to
be done? In other words, as in all talk of God, there are considerable
difficulties bound up with the concept of God and any expression of it.
How this is not at all to suggest that by careful consideration, these
difficulties c cannot be surmounted, ;h, but rather that in the context
of talk of the rationality of God, these problems are exacerbated and
require all the more careful treatment. But Torrance is not so
simplistic as may appear to be suggested, for he has two lines of
approach open and he utilises both. He centres on the Person of
Christ in the Incarnation, and thus seeks to show God entering into
spaoe and time, into created form, and thus hoping to aeal with the
problems of the gap between God and man in the atonement on the cross
and in the veiy life and Person of Christ. This may be the case or
not, but it is beside the oint, for the objection rests upon the
belief in God from eternity to eternity, not as the God-man, but as
the God of heavenand earth and all that is therein. Of course, for
Torrance, God cannot adequately be grasped apart from Christ, but there
still remain difficulties within the concept of God, which the living
reality of Christ and the revelation He brings cannot dissolve for they
are related to the understanding of God as God, and it is in this
context/
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context that the question of the rationality of God is raised.
However, Torrance does suggest that the rationality of God is
very different from the rationality which we grasp in the created
order, and what is required is the stretching of concepts. The
danger with stretching concepts to cover or bridge the gap of
transcendent to created rationality lies just in the extent of the
uifference, and the problem not of overstretching, but of annihilating
our concepts. To talk of God adopting rationality, or behaving
rationally makes little sense, and would appear to leave only some
sort of definitional axiom that God is rational. If an example is
taken of a rational man who is confronted with a need to choose betweBn
two courses of action, it can be seen that to talk of God in relation
to behaving rationally is difficult. The rational man confronted
with a decision is in the situation where he can see the problem and
how it arose. lie can see the alternatives before him, or can work
them out, and then think through what will happen if he does one thing
rather than the other. The rational man can see the consequences
and then decide which of these consequences are acceptable and which
are not, than that person will take the action necessary to begin the
chain of consequences which leads to the desired effect. He then
can look back ana see the initial action and its consequences and
and measure the success or failure of his planning and action.
In contrast, the God Y.ho is not in time can have nc process of planning,
working out of consequences, weighing up alternatives, deciding to act,
acting, and then evaluating the action and its effects. The God of
Christianity is usually conceived of as "seeing" things si ml stant -
all at once - with no attached problems of action or time sequences.
To/
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To predicate rationality of God without careful delineation of
difference from rationality in man, only leads to internal difficulties
in any view of rationality. What meaning this can have in terms
of significance and importance is di ficult to see, and it tends towards
a reduction of God to rationality. To predicate rationality properly
of God, the understanding and definition of rationality would have to
be transcended so that one could never formulate far less grasp what
this was. This leads to Torrance*s doctrine of the work and Person
of the Holy Spirit. This, of course, presupposes the Christian view
of man and the bulk of Christian doctrinf. but it also typifies a
tension in Torrance between the subjective and the objective, for if
appreciation of rationality can only come by the work of the Holy
Spirit, then man's freedom to be rational and to make rational choices,
runs the risk of disappearing in the action of a grace which not only
gives, but also gives the capacity to receive. The rational man is
usually accounted to be the free man who can withstand all outside
pressures and can understand and choose for himself regardless of what
others say, and do, but in Torrance's work the freedom of man becomes
interpreted as proper freedom only when the Holy Spirit totally
influences and guides man to appreciate the truth both by revealing
the truth to him and giving him the capacity to receive the truth and
see that it is true. Meynell presents the problem with such
religious assumptions as Torrance holds to be necessary when he states,
"Given that Christian theology is an intellectual discipline by means
of which one can apprehend the truth at all, given that God the creator
really does reveal himself to man through Jesus Christ and the
Scriptures, Torrance's method is admirably conceived. But the premises
may be questioned; it may be asked what evidence exists that there
is/
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is a God, that he ha3 revealed himself to men at all, or that he has
revealed himself in Jesus Christ - apart from the subjective oonviction
15a
of the believers that these things are so". Is it the case that
God has presented Himself in a particular way which shows that He is
of a particular nature, or is this Torrance's own construction of
n
particular events. How is it known
that God is thus and not so? "Jesus Christ shows us"., comes the reply.
How can it be accepted that Jesus Christ shows that God is thus and not
so? This is an illegitimate question, for it seeks, Torrance states,
to step outside of the actual revelation of God. This leads to the
view that all theology is to be called in question by the Truth, but
tliat Truth is in fact a very specific theology centred in Jesus Christ.
One still feels that it is very much to the point to ask whether 'Torrance
is entitled to assume that Gou is i-ational, that God is truly the
Creator of man, and that revelation is thus rather than so. It must
be asked how it can be known that God is rational, that He has saved
our rationality, or that lie can do so, and that the object and our
apprehension of it coincide by the grace of God, for though these
questions aro illegitimate to Torrance, they are the foundations of
his systematic view and unless the foundations are sure and secure,
the superstructure cannot properly be supported.
Some doubts have been raised as to the presentation of rationality
as a feature of many things which are so varied and essentially
different/
15&* Philo ophical Quarterly July 1970, p.313-6, Review of Torrance.
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different in kind, and the appropriateness of the one tern to cover
the nature of all these things queried. Two specific examples of
Torrance's have been taken and some basic questions raised as to the
rationality of the universe and of nature in relation to the problem
of evil, arid then as to what meaning can be attached to the rationality
of G-od. Attention is turned now from these general problems of
approach and detail of approach to the detail of Torrance's account.
The outline of the details of his view will be followed as earlier
presented in order to preserve coherence and order in seeking to
grasp the nature and role of rationality as part of Torrance's view.
This next section of criticism will concentrate of Torrance's view of
objectivity and its relation to subjectivity. The limited effect of
his thesis will be shown and the way t-.is affects his own view. The
differences between verification in science and theology will be
examined especially in relation to the continuing presence of
subjective factors not merely contingently, but necessarily.
The main therae of Torrance's account of rationality is its
close relation with objectivity and therefore the stress he puts on
the idea that to bo rational is to adopt a mode of rationality
16
appropriate to the nature of the object." At the very outset it was
seen that this was the necessary corrective to the irra^ionaliani and
subjectivity which has influenced modern theology. The problem of
today is the flight from objectivity in religious beliefs and doctrines
17
into irrationality. This irrationality is characterised by
subjectivity,"*"^ phenomenalism,"*""^ personalisa,^ and egoeentrioity
Mary'







Man is the measure of all things and his religious views are merely
the modes of a particular kind of self-expression and self-understanding.
23Man's view of himself and his reason is out of proper proportion.
2» 25 26
Thus man is involved in mechanism, subjectivism, abstraction, and
the false separation of the physical from the spiritual, thought from
27
life, and God from the world. Religion becomes merely phenomenology
28
or sociology, or else a form of existentialism as characterised
29
particularly by Bultmann. Torrance suggests that man is diseased
with the obsession of self-understanding,and that religious folk
are autistic and aphatic."^1 As was seen this subjectivity leads to
irrational behaviour, man's imposition of his own patterns, man's
inability to distinguish himself over and against reality, and finally
into raeaninglessness and futility. The same is true in the working
of autonomous reason. The cure for all this is attachment to the
object and so the adoption of the correct mode of rationality as
32
prescribed by the nature of the object. This is all well and
good, there will be an examination of what this return to objectivity
means on its own grounds, but it is only part of what Torrance says,
though the stress in his work is constantly on this aspect. There
exists however, a tension between this objectivity and a return to
true rationality and the very subjectivity Torrance seeks to avoid and
cure. This tension is to be found in his own work and it must be
considered
22. MM.p.p.279-1,263,231} RR.p.o.vii,47-8? S.pp.55,69-70.











considered whether or not it is a happy tension. Torrance sums up
the problem as how to "refer thoughts and statements genuinely beyond
ourselves, how to reach knowledge of reality in which we do not obtrude
ourselves distortingly into the picture, and yet how to retain the full
33
and integral place of the human subjeot in it all". Can, on Torrance's
own acoount, a full place be given to both these emphases? Undoubtedly
there is a greater emphasis on the objective sides upon the reality
being allowed to disclose itself, but the subjective cannot be totally
overcome. Torrance stresses that "A. Eddington, M. Polanyi, and von
Weizsacker in their different ways have successfully shown how the
personal factor inevitably enters into scientific knowledge for the
very fact of our knowing explicitly enters into what we know. It is
t -erefore unscientific to pretend that the subjective element is
eliminated when it cannot be.Soientific thinking must operate with a
severly self-critical and controlled subjectivity, for we can only
advance to new knowledge by rigorous re-interpretation, and sometimes
34 / \
only by renunciation of previous modes of knowing". (My emphasis).
In relation to von Weizsacker and Heisenberg one learns that "in so far
as our scientific propositions are of stages in nature whioh we help to
produce, they are statements about what we can do as well as statements
about nature itself. Hence scientific laws are expressions of our
modes of cognition as well as of realities in themselves. Thus the





completely between things-iri-themselves and our ways of knowing and speaking
of them"» (My emphasis)
What is thus entailed for soience by the aocount of the subjective
factors that Torrance is now including is that "if the knowledge of
nature is inescapably bound up with the human subject, if it is his
knowledge, then it is finite and limited, not only because practically
he is limited and finite, but because knowledge is limited by the fact
that his knowing is inescapably a part of it, limited therefore at its
very root which it can never transcend without ceasing altogether.
Experimental science can never transcend its starting-point, or its own
limited instruments and therefore attain to God's knowledge, i.e. from
an absolute point where it transcends all anthropomorphism", (my emphasis
except "his")^ This means that "what we do in science is to reduce
to knowledge the relation between ourselves and the external world,
relations that are active on our part as well as passive. We 3o not
describe the realities we know as they are merely in themselves, for
we cannot separate them entirely by themselves apart from the processes
in our knowing of them but if so this does not allow us to argue that it
is finally we who impose form and order upon things and that we have no
really objeotive knowledge of them in accordance with their own nature
and rationality. What it does teach us is that the rigorous formal¬
izations of our knowledge are not to be treated like transcripts of
reality but preoisely as scientific instruments and demonstrative





know, so that by their nature they are engaged in the relentless
service of objectivity. The relativity of our knowledge to external
reality and its objeotivity are but the obverse of each other". (My
emphasis)."^
What Torrance now appears to be saying is that there will always
be personal factors involved in all knowing so that we are only in a
position of controlled subjectivity. The aspect of personal judgment
is a necessary part of the assessment of evidence, thus one can never
attain fixed categories or ultimate truth. Reality can never be
totally captured, for it outruns what can be specified and we are unable
to eliminate the noetic structure of thought and language in the attempt
to be true to the ontic structure of things, What this in turn means
for Torrance's main emphasis on the flight from such subjectivity and
the oure of objectivity and rationality, is that such a cure is limited
and endless in its application. Instead of some brave new way in
philosophy and theology and science (or rather the old but forgotten way)
where the object is everything and we are nothing, it seems that we are
going to be something and that something is constantly going to have to
be dealt with. It seems that we are left much in the place we were
before we started with the object and the subject, but perhaps even worse
for Torrance, for if the subjective always intrudes, it would seem that
it has necessarily intruded into even his presentation of the cure for
subjectivity,/
37. T.p.p.295-6? S.p.p.45*113: T.p.p.84,91 Footnote,93,94-5,100,291,296.
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subjectivity, so also his view must be subjected to revision and critical
testing and retesting. Certainly the dramatic effect of his thesis is
cast into a much more modified belief when the full implications of the
continuing role of the subjective in all science are realised. Whether
in natural science or theological science it is not the case that
"science (can) detach itself from the humanity that is involved in it,
cutting off knowledge of the object from the fact that it is knowledge
by a human subject, and since in each case it is only too easy for us
to impose masterful fo ms of thought upon the realities we seek to
investigate, we must constantly engage in acts of fundamental reorientation
? O
in which our concepts and terms are matched with their material content".
It means too that in verification, for natural science, there is required
in the last resort "a personal judgment in assessment of the evidence.
No theoretical demonstration will ever give formal certainty ji the realm
of the empirical, so that the scientist must judge whether he will commit
39
himself to the pressure of the facts upon him". In theology this
means that "for verification we can only cast ourselves ultimately upon
the justifying grace of God, since in the last resort verification of
our knowledge of G-od must come to us from without from God Himself"
The problem with this last point concerning the nature of
theological verification is that what it appears to suggest is a basic
difference between verification in natural science and in theology.
In the one case we judge and commit ourselves, in the other, frod does
it by His grace. There is a danger that what this essentially amounts
to/
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to is that theology is not really a science at all for the subjective
factors are dealt with sufficiently distinctively enough to ensure true
objectivity^in the one but not in the other, but so another tension
remains. If it is accepted that Torrance is permitted to hold a tension
between the subjective and the objeotive as he appears to require, if
this is then applied to theology and the other sciences, is he to say
that theology is exactly the same (given the difference of the object,
of course), or is it different? If theology is the same then the
universal and authoritative statement of t-od*s work and our relation to
frod must be cast in doubt, as all scientific theories are till proven
true, regardless of whether by proof we mean inductive success or
fertility in casting light on other problems. If theology is different,
in as much as the Object studied is of such a nature that the subjective
is totally controlled and we do have contact with the truly objective,
then it seems to amount to a radical disjunction between theology as a
42
science and all other sciences. This problem, however, only arises
if it is allowed that Torrance can hold the two factors of the subjective
and the objective. This is more difficult for there seems a need for
considerable modification in presentation and exposition of the view he
offers, for lie appears to offer a cure for subjectivity and irrationality
by attachment to the object, then, as it were in the small print,
certainly as it compares in the spaoe devoted to the objective side and
how that deals with subjectivity, it is discovered that, of course, we
are still conditioned by the subjectivl factors, but what is to be done is
to/
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to use open concepts and field theory to worm a way into the interior
logic of things, so that the subjectivity is properly controlled by
attachment to the object. There is, then, in Torrance's account a
tension, which is uneasy in relation to the claims he makes for his own
view, which is to end "the romantic irrationality and bloated subjectivity
43
of modern theology", and in its place to return to theological rationality.
The subjeotivity may be deflated, but it is not exorcised.
Attention has been centred on the notion of objectivity and the
difficulties which are related to the inability to dispense with
subjective features in all knowing whether this is in science or theology.
Now a positive value is mentioned, that of the integration of the
intellectual with the rest of life and knowledge. Consideration is then
given to the notion of "object" on Torrance's account, in particular
questioning the degree of differences between objects, the definition of
objects, and certain candidates for the status of "objeot", such as
"mind", historical events, scientific objects, and Cod. Then the
problems attached to pracategorisation, over personalising, intuition,
and the use of figurative language will be raised and analysed.
Before returning to consider the stress on objectivity in Torrance,
in the capacity to refer to what is not ourselves, his view must be
commended that rationality is not just intellectual but must affect every
aspect of life. One of the dangers facing any account of the nature
and scope of rationality is to limit it to the power of the mind and
thus overlook the integral relation with behaviour. Whatever rationality
may be seen to be, it is surely complex and affects every facet of our




separation of knowing and doing in moral philosophy without due attention
to the notion of "akrasia", weakness of will. In philosophy, in
general terms, there is a danger of over-intellectualising - perhaps it
is just against this that ordinary language philosophy became so much
in vogue but oertainly if we seek to explicate the notion of rationality
and what it is to be reasonable, it is necessary to consider man's life
in all its moral, aesthetic, and social aspects as well as in its
scientific and intellectual ones. ^orrance is right to draw attention
to the importance of rational activity in every aspect of human life.
It is essential to come to grips with the heart of Torrance's view
and this can only be summed up in the stress that what we know, the
objeot, must prescribe for us the mode of rationality we are to adopt
towards it.^ An attempt has been made to draw out from Torrance's
work the centrality of this notion in his presentation, but lest it be
thought that the examples given are highly selective, and to impress
the centrality of this notion in his view. I list some of the explicit
references in the work under consideration, with risk of pedantry, but
the importance of the doctrine for his work cannot be overstated.





rationality with human knowing and in particular the objective way that
eaoh objeot must presoribe the mode of rationality which we adopt towards
it./
44. See above, p.p.
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it. If every object, from the universe to Sod Almighty, is not known
by this definition of rational behaviour, then Torrance's thesis must be
in doubt. There is an implicit tension in Torrance's account. On the
one hand, he presents the one basic human way of knowing, the scientific
way, the rational way of all knowledge. So one looks for this one
method which will solve all epistemological problems if it is followed
through rigorously, but it is discovered, on the othor hand, that there
are as many different ways of knowing as there are objects. Every
ooject prescribes the mode of rationality we are to adopt towards it:
all our knowing is to be conditioned by the nature of the object, and
objects are very different. Is tnere then any benefit to be gained
from the thesis of the object determining the mode of rationality adopted?
The unitariness involved in describing such as the one basic way of
knowing is a strangely tenuous unity, which is united only by the degree
of generality which such a remark must rest on, given, as we are given,
that every objeot is different and we must not apply the categories
from one sphere of knowing to another. hoes not the degree cf
diversity of objects and, therefore, of ways of knowing, detraot from a
stress of the unity of all sciences to such an extent that it may beoome
merely a truism parallel to the Aristotelian notion that we can only
have the degree of exactitude which is appropriate to the objeots of each
science, which is true, but makes no inroads into the approach to the
objects or to the degree of exaotitude we are able to reach and actually
do reach. PJverything is, as it were, left as it is. The unity of




Given, however, that Torrance is not propounding a truism at
least to his own way of thinking, it must be inquired what sense can be
made of his thesis# The first problem must be whether or not it is
possible easily to separate out each object and each field of inquiry*
and thus the different modes of rationality required for appropriateness#
An example may be taken from the subject of one of the Gifford Lecture series,
45
"The Phenomenon of Mind"# Let it be granted for the sake of argument
that "mind" is in some sense an object, if only in the sense that it
has meaning within a specific field of discourse. The composition of
the Gifford Lecture team shows very clearly the inability to separate
the various fields of inquiry into the respective objects without being
in danger of failing t do justice to the complexity and nature of the
object. Is "mind" the province of psychology, neuro-physiology, or
philosophy, of all three, of more than three, or of none at all?
There is a very basic problem in suggesting that rationality centres on
the nature of the object and the path it prescribes for its proper
understanding. Again, if we take an historical event, which in some
sense is an object, e.g. the French Revolution. This can be seen in
social, economic, historical, phychological, political, and religious
terms as well as a combination of all these and more. To say that the
object determines the mode of rationality we are to adopt helps not one
whit to reduce the complexity of a full and proper understanding of the
"object", unless it merely states the obvious. To grasp properly the
object a highly complicated amalgam<f the different rationalities which
derive from the different fields of study is required. But this se ns
fhr from what Torr nee is saying.
But/
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But the problem is more severe, lor it must be inquired what sense
can be attached to the notion of "object". Torrance states that every
objeot is to prescribe the mode of rationality to be adopted, and this is
presented as the truly scientific method of approach to everything.
This is what rationality is and, if we are to be rational, we must follow
it. But while desks and people are obviously "objects^'for all the
world to come into contact with, it is less clear that "mind" or the
".French devolution" are "objects". What kind of object is the mind?
Is it a physical, a spiritual, a psychological, a neuro-physiological
object, is it one thing, or many different sorts of things? There seems
no one thing, no one objeot which is mind, hence the Gdffora Lectures
and the wealth of modern literature on the nature of mind both from
psychological and philosophical sources. In reading the variety of
accounts, one is conscious that whatever "mind" in fact is, the different
writers oertainly regard it in very different ways and their descriptions
seem to have little or no overlap. The only genuinely obvious common
ground is the fact of linguistic usage and the common "term", but this
is of no value to Torrance's account of the way the world actually is.
So too it is difficult to understand what sort of "object" the French
Revolution is. It is an event, and it is past, but then the problems
begin. When did it begin and when did it end? bid it begin with the
Oath of the Tennis Court, the execution of Louis, or was it much further
b ick with the harvest failures, or the influence of the American War of
Independence, and did it end with the rise of Napoleon, the fall of
Napoleon, or is it still going on? What is the "object" that historians
and/
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and novelists 3eek to portray?. Is it an object at all, in even the
\
most attentuated sense of thwvcrd? Or is the response to these
questions that it is just in all the complexity of such notions and
events that one finds the need to be fixed on the object for the proper
mode of rationality. Torrance himself raises the question of the
relevance of Historical Science, though at the general level and
L6
specifically in relation to Christ• It is inappropriate to examine
this in detail, but two points may be considered related to the
difficulties raised. Talking of historical science and the data from
eye witnesses in documentary form and oral tradition, Torrance states
that "so we try to determine what was directly observed and what actually
happened. This is not a simple but a complicated procedure in which we
seek both to bring to light the grounds upon which our historical knowledge
is based and to establish it evidentially upon those grounds in such a
way that we exhibit a thoroughgoing consistency between our reconstruction
of the events as they really happened and the facts themselves, but in
a measured degree it is the rationality and coherence of our reconstruction
that enables us to discriminate the real facts from accretions and
47
fictions". Torrance here talks as if it is possible to get through
the data of history to the actual event itself or the actual facts of
the situation. It is difficult for us to rid our own questions and
48
approach in interpreting the historical events, but how much more
difficult it is to make sense of ridding the subjective interpretations






matter. Of course it is possible to go some sort of way towards this,
e.g. that Caesar's "Gallic Wars" will be considerably different from a
Gaul's account of the same wars, but even given that there are two
opposing sources, which is rarely the case, it is hard to see that v?e
could ever come to say that this and not that was the actual event or
course of events, and even less likely, that we could then claim it to
be the truth. Torrance also talks in this same section of "what the
scientist does in any field is to seek to achieve an orderly understanding
of events in which he can grasp them as a connected and intelligible
whole and so be able to penetrate into their inner rationality. He does
not invent that rationality but discovers it, even though he must act
with imagination and insight in detecting and developing the right clues
and act creatively in constructing forms of thought and knowledge through
which ho can discern the basic rationality and let his thinking fall under
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its direction as he offers even a descriptive account of the events."
If we couple this with the fact that "in historical events we operate
with a different kind of rationality which we have described as intention
59
or purpose, rationality in its personal rather than its impersonal form",
it must then be wondered what sense can be made of, and what coherent,
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intelligible picture may be presented of actions which fail in intention
and purpose, actions which lack intention and purpose, the frenzies of a
madman, and the quirks of fate, e.g. the storm that blew the Spanish ships
round the West of England and Scotland after Drakes' victory, rather than






history to be confident that there is an inherent intelligibility in
historical events and processes, and that it is possible to construct a
rational account of history based on intention and purpose. Some
philosophers have problems enough with the intentions of those they can
see.
What sense can be made of the notion of "objects" in Torrance's
account? Problems have been shown with "mind" and with history, but
even in science there must be questions raised as to the implications
of the word "object". Do scientists work with "objects", and do they
regard what they work with as "objects"? normally, scientists are
thought of as working in the field of phenomena, and it is difficult
to interpret photons and neutrons as objects, rather than as manifestations
of phenomenal occurences. The sorts of experiments that scientists use
seem to concentrate on the phenomena in a vast variety of conditions
rather than on specific "objects". Are forces and fields "objects"
and in what sense do they "exist"? Are the waves and particles which
now offer a fuller explanation of the nature of light than was previously
possible, "objects" or are they "constructs", "hypothetical constructions",
or disclosure models for a more adequate account of what is involved in
light, but without any claim as an ontologi-al basis? The main "Object"
for Torrance is, of course, G-od, "who is to prescribe for us the mode of
rationality which is appropriate to Hj.s nature. Torrance lays great
stress on the uniqueness of this Object, and therefore of the danger of
seeking to apply understanding from any one sphere to the sphere of the
knowledge/
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knowledge of God, but the problem may not so much be the application of
foreign moulds to knowledge of God, but rather the very uniqueness of the
religious Object. It first of all creates tension for the notion that
all objects are subject to the one basic mode of knowing, but, more
crucially, it also puts strain on the nature of "objects". Can there
be talk in the same sense, and in relation to the same method of
epistemology, of the "object" desk and the "Object" God, without meaning
something so totally different by "object" and in method of epistemological
approach, that there is no helpful parallelism between what is done in the
one case and what is done in the other. The problem is not relieved by
stressing that God is not just "Object", but also "Subject", therefore
we must look for proper parallels in the realm of human personal relations.
This is not to suggest in the least that Torrance is extrapolating from
human relations to relations with God, but rather thaD the sense of
knowing God is best paralleled by the human knowing of other persons,
but whether this is sufficiently illiminating as a parallel given the
necessary differences between God as Person and man as person, remains
to be seen.
The basic problem with Torrance's account is what sense can be
attached to his notion of "object". Some of the specific examples h»ve
been examined to try to show that these create difficulties and tension
within his account, such that the notion of "object" is unclear and that
without the capacity to state the object and to know what the object is,
it is impossible on Torrance's account, to be truly rational, for we would
have no prescription concerning the mode of rationality to be adopted.
There/
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There i3, in this position, however, a subtle problem, which it is
easy to slide over# An attempt has been made to show that there are
problems in clarifying the notion of "object" in Torrance, When his own
examples are taken - a desk, a person - we are told that we adopt modes
of rationality which these different sorts of things prescribefbr us#
However, before we adopt a mode of rationality we must know what the
object is, but to know what the object is is already to have categorised
it, and thus to have in some sense adopted a mode of rationality whioh is
appropriate. Some judgment is made that this is a particular kind of
object, a particular example of an object, and so it is treated as all
other such objects are treated. Rut this prejudgment is what delimits
the mode of rationality we are to adopt. It is because we describe x
as an x that we treat it as we treat all other x's and behave in a manner
appropriate to it. The difficulty for Torrance*s account is how one
may allow the object to determine for us the mode of rationality we are
to adopt, if we have to categorise it as such and such an object rather
than some other kind. Torrance*s kind of response to this would be that
we must rid ourselves of the subjeotive notions we bring to the object,
by submitting to the object. However, this means that it must be possible
to discover that our categorisation of the object is not fully appropriate
to that object, and one wonders the extent to which thi3 is possible, and
further, the extent to which we oan rid ourselves of such subjective
factors. Torrance himself has stressed the necessity for s,J^jective
factors in knowing, and the question is merely whether or not this basic
categorisation of x as an x may not be one of the necessary subjective




A slightly different version of the same point centres around the
different kinds of objects which Torrance delineates. He talks of "mute"
objects to which we are to put questions, and "speaking" objects and
Objects, which address us and to which we listen. The problem is,
however, how it is possible to differentiate the presence of a mute object
from one which is capable of self-expression. To know whether or not an
object is mute or capable of self-expression is already to have adopted
a mode appropriate to that object. But the danger is surely of failing
to discern between a mute object and a speaking reality who is reduced
to silence because of my asking the wrong questions in the wrong way.
Some standard of differentiation is required between objects and of the
nature of the objects involved. This is all the more crucial, when we
are told that every object is to prescribe the mode of rationality which
is appropriate for us to adopt towards it. The problem i3 a specific
and general one, for it is specific in relation to the doctrine of objects
prescribing for us the mode of rationality to be adopted, and it is general
for it recur3 in Torrance's language. The sort of thing that Torrance
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says is that "in authentic knowledge being shows through". "there is
a disclosure of being", "a rationality that seizes us from above and
53 54
beyond ourselves", "axioms ....force themselves upon us", "a
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rationality....which forces itself upon us".' Torrance talks of the







these concepts. How do we know that being can disolose itself, or that
it can disclose itself successfully? We may imbue objects with qualities
they do not in fact possess. The sense of "disclosure" is somewhat
attentuated, as is the sense of the objeot's "prescription" of modes of
rationality. How do we know this, how is it done, how do we differentiate
correct over and against incorrect disclosures and prescriptions? Torrance
does realise the point of these questions, for he states that 'when we
speak of the 'self-disclosure' of realities we are aware that this must
often be a figure of speech - i.e. when we are concerned with impersonal,
dumb, and dead things, for we have to force them to react to our probes
in a 'yes' and 'no' way and so yield the answers to our questions.
But xn so far as we interrogate personal realities actual self-disclosure
comes more into play, anu we have to acquire more and more a disciplined
56
readiness to listen so that we may really understand them out ox themselves".
Here is uhe admission of the dangers of over-p rsonalisation and of the
r
figurative fashion of part of his account, out if the figure is reduced
to reality is it any more than an evocative picture? The part we play
in putting and framing questions is only modified, if with Torrance it
is possible to take tne step of fa^th that the object is aDle to disclose
itself if properly questioned anu approached, and that given long enough
anu sufficient skill in questioning, the objective state of affairs will
eventually be reached that is that our adopted mode of rationality will
be appropriate to the nature of the object. fthat is not clear in this
faith is how one could judge when it is false and when correct,
ultimately/
56. T.p.331j Times Literary supplement 25.12.69.
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Ultimately Torrance comes down to ''intuition". One of the main
problems with intuition or a retreat to a statement that that is the way
things are, may be seen from a description of a situation in which X
seeks to point Y to a particular object. X tells Y that he must rid
himself of all subjective overtones in order to be faithful to the object.
Y must allow the reality to break through upon him. Y follows X's
suggestions and tries to do exactly as X has told him, but fails to intuit
the object. Y angrily denies the existence of any object. X hotly
denies that Y has properly conducted the test. If you properly conduct
the test, then you will see the object, but you did not see it, therefore
you did not properly conduot the test. Heads I win and tails you lose.
This is another example of the dictatorial s.rategy which was drawn
58
attention to in the discussion of repent writing on hartley's view.'
This means that the critic has no ground to stand on and can do nothing
at all to present any alternative to what is held. Like the person
betting on the tail-side of a double-headed ^enny, the critic is bound
to lose. Yet the idea of argument and uiaoussion seems to leave the
outcome to some extent open according to the strengths and weaknesses of
the particular positions under discussion and the arguments which are
used in support and attack on these positions. On Torrance's account,
the critic not only has no ground to stand on, but no genuine argument
is possible, for there can be no area of agreement or disagreement drawn
over and against Torrance, and the critic can not have common terms with
Torrance without being obliged to share his whole view. Torrance's
•y
intuition rules out all criticism and alternative intuition and this is
part of the general complaint against his position that the critic has
no ground tc stand on.
This/
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58. Chapter Two "Recent Discussion of Bartley".
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This situation urgently requires some criteria for conducting the
test or failing to do so, other than the intuition of the object# If
there can be no such test, then a much more detailed account is required
of what exactly this intuition is and how to succeed in obtaining it.
The fear is that Torrance's talk in terms of figures of speech and models
pointing to a reality which discloses itself, entails that there can be
no argument but only looking and seeing. This is counter-intuitive#
We can and do arg-ae about pointers, models, looking and failing to see,
or seeing, and the successes of all those, but mora detail is necessary
on which to conduct such an argument.
In concentrating upon the role of "object" in Tolerance's account
difficulties have been raised concerning the ability to separate out
each object from aveiy field of inquiry, what sense can be attached to
the notion of"object", and in this context "mind" the "French devolution",
scientific "objects", and G-od were examined. Then there was an
examination of the notion of categorising objects and the threat of over-
personalization, with Torrance's response in terms of the use of figurative
language, and the danger this leads to of too great stretching of concepts
and the need for some sort of check on suoh use. Attention is now
turned to the other part of the formula in which the object is to
prescribe for us the mode of rationality which we are to adopt .
There are two sorts of things involved of which no differentiation is
offered# There is rationality in tho sense of the inherent rationality
of the universe, of objects, anu of G-od, and there is a aoue of rationality
which we are to adopt. Presumably one is the structure whioh can be
grasped, the other the capacity or method by which to grasp that structure#
But/
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But what is a mode of rationality? The dictionary defines "mode" as
59
the form, fashion, or manner; Rationality it seems has as many forms
as there are objects to be known. But rationality is normally considered
to be a feature of man and perhaps of animals rather than of inanimate
objects, like things and the universe. Torrance seems to equate
rationality both with intelligibility in the sense of understandable,
and in the sense of having the capacity to understand. The intelligibility
of people relates to their intentions and purposes and to their
behaviour, but acorns and universes do not behave in any genuinely
similar sense. Can it be conceived and admitted that there are as
many different approaches or modes of approach as there are objects?
If Torrance is to be taken seriously, this must be accepted, but again
it reduces to the problem of definition of "object" in order to delineate
the mode of rationality to be adopted. The danger is that the definition
of rationality as being conditioned by the nature of the object may
reduoe to li tie more than a slogan unless it can be cashed out to east
light on how to deal with complex things suoh as "mind" and the "French
Revolution". If it does not, it reduces to something trivial and self-
evident, but it may also be false. It suggests that it is not possible
to use the same method or mode of rationality in the study of different
things, even though this may be highly successful. Torrance is, of
course, at pains to preserve the sui generis character of the Object of
theology from any infiltration of notions from other spheres of knowledge,
though he does allow that the approaches can give insist. There seems
to/
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to be too strong a separation between fields of knowledge in which the
expert in one field may say to the expert in another field, "Thus and
no further", But the methods appropriate in one field are often
appropriate to those in another. Is it not the case that, in fact,
Torrance's attempt to marry theology with science relies on just this
olaim to fruitfulness in the application of the ideas of, for example,
field theory, complementarity, disclosure modds, and relativity to
1
theological spheres. Torrance seems to want to have his cake at the
same time as eating it. The object may prescribe the mode of
rationality we are to adopt, but the extent of the differences is
usually much more limited than is suggested. In the study of mind, as
has already been noted, one would wish to suggest that it is at least a
psychological, neuro-physiological, and philosophical construct and
requires for true and proper understanding approaches from all these
angles and more, and some blend of these. Now if Torrance is only
saying just this very thing, it seems that his novelty is much less than
was at first suspected, and he is leaving everything as it is and merely
bringing to our notice what we in fact do. But his claim seems much
stronger in that he is offering the path to true rational understanding
and an esoape from subjectivity and irrationality. In a sense, the
difficulty rests in the way that one would describe and cash out in
practice what is involved in the "appropriateness" of the mode of
rationality we are to adopt. This would ultimately hinge on the
capacity of that mode to lead to enlightenment as regards the true nature
of the object. This in turn in Torrance's aocount comes to a dootrine
of the fertility of the theoiy and apprehension of the inherent
rationality of the thing and of all things. It could thus appear that
in/
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in the last analysis Torrance's thesis as to the nature of rationality
reduces to a pragmatic account. If you do this and this, this will
result. If this does not result, you have not done it properly. As
regards the theological outlook it is unclear what sort of pragiaatio
test would be appropriate, what counts as having done the test or failed
to do it, and what counts as having passed or failed the test; and then,
as regards the level of the thesis itself, whether one can step outwith
the pragmatic test and actual practice to present the way that it is all
done without that itself being subject to pragmatic testing in turn.
Torrance tells us that the object, is to prescribe for us the mode
of rationality we are to adopt. But is rationality the sort of thing
that can be adopted or not adopted, , that can be chosen or rejected,
that can be changed or not changed as the fancy or the object strikes us?
The rationality or mode of rationality which can be chosen is crucially
different from the generally accepted view of rationality as part of man's
being a rational animal able to reason out things for himself, and able
to act on that basis and to act in accordance with these reasons.
Rationality is usually understood to be something which we have, rather
than something which we can ohoose or refuse to choose to acquire.
This can perhaps best be understood by stressing the close relation of
the understanding of what is rational with particular reference to what
counts as rational behaviour in a particular context. If men held
firmly to the belief that they ought to walk on their hands and always
and only on their hands, it would be totally rational of them to walk on
their hands, given their system of beliefs. Rationality in behaviour
refers to the consistency of behaviour with regard to belief rather than
to/
to a right belief about the faots, though of oourse, the two are usually
interconnected. In most talk of rationality it seems to be assumed
that this is something men have in virtue of being men, rather than
something which can be adopted or not adopted. What seems to be
overlooked is a distinction between being rational in a particular
context and being rational in a more absolute and universal sense.
These are very different levels ad this will be returned to in the
account of rationality in the last chapter. Torrance seems to move
from the one level to the other without signposting his movement, but
in this section, of course, his concern is with rationality in a
particular context, or as he puts it, with the mode of rationality to
be adopted on the basis of the prescription of the objects. But talk
of adoption puts too strong an emphasis on a kind of decisionism, which
is in strange contrast to the implacibility of the object breaking through
our forms and disclosing itself to us. If the picture of the object,
which Torrance gives is correct, it would seem inappropriate for us to
think of adopting or not adopting the appropriate mode of rationality,
for it would be foroed upon us. But again there is tension between the
subjective and the objective, which Torrance's account leaves us with
and offers no radically new solution of this tension.
Attention is turned now from the role of the modes of rationality
which we are to adopt, to consider the general implications of Torrance's
view that the object prescribes for us the mode of rationality we are
to adopt. If it is allowed for the sake of argument that some clear
sense can be attached to the notion of the object and the notion of the
mode of rationality to be adopted in light of that object, Torrance appears
to have proved too much. It is not possible on this basis to debar
astrology,/
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astrology, alchemy, or fairy-lore from their claims to be proper sciences
each with a methodology conditioned by the very specific nature of their
particular objects. If one specific example is taken that of astrology.
The astrologer may say that we cannot understand the influence of the
stars unless and until we ourselves are under the influence of the stars,
believing in their power to guide and direct our lives, and recognising
and admitting that this is so. The nature of the influence of the
stars is such that properly to appreciate it, you must follow every day
exactly what it says in your horoscope in the "Morning Star". If you
doubt the reality of the influence of the stars, it is because you have
not been properly open to the object and have tried to rationalise it
away in terms of your own subjectivity that self-evident influence as if
it were a series of coincidental freaks instead of part of the nature
of things. Astrology is a special soience whose object is totally
different from all other objects, but, of course, it is still a science
for it is subject to the same basic human way of knowing in which we
allow the object to prescribe for us the mode of rationality we are to
adopt towards it. This means that unless you approach astrology and
your fate in the stars in the proper fashion, believing that it is there
and that there is inherent intelligibility involved such that when you
frame questions and put them to the stars, you yourself and your questions
will be modified, until you grasp the true object. Unless you do these
things you will be trapped in your own subjectivities and fall into
meaninglessness. The object, of course, is totally different from all
other objects, but this merely serves to show the importance of not
i
seeking to apply a mode of rationality from one sphere to another sphere
where/
where it is totally inappropriate. It is only if one is in a living
relationship with the stars and aware of their influence in one's own
life, that is to say, it is only within the knowing relation, that basic
epistemological questions may be raised. All this is more than vaguely-
reminiscent of Nowell-Smith, when he describes a man who says that "certain
events in the past were caused by boojumsj but I cannot tell you on
what principles boojuras operate or what they will do in the futurej my
60
hypothesis inevitably involves thiB consequence". The problem with
the influence of the stars and boojums, as well as alchemy and fairy
stories, is that the majority of the population would wish to deny the
reality of the objects involved and certainly to with ..raw the name of a
full-blooded soience from theBj, and in the place of both of these offer
some sort of psychological or oultural account in terms of man's basic
needs and the variety of means he takes to fulfil them. But apart from
Torrance's position it is difficult to see how these views could ever
be rejected, if confronted with a "scientific" astrologer, alohamist and
so on, who were to say that the object determines the mode of rationality
which is appropriate to the nature of the object and that their particular
object is such that only if we follow their methodology are we being
truly rational, that is, only thus are we properly able to overcome the
subjective tendencies of our autonomous reason, and only if we agree
with their conclusions have we grasped the inherent intelligibility of
the object in all its fulness and reality. In other words, genuine
argument and discussion are ruled out by Torrance's account of rationality.
The/
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The astrologist, alchemist, and believer in fairy-lore cannot be
criticised and offer no room for the critic, and this position is
derived from Torrance's own immunity from criticism. To any and all
attempts at criticism all these listed can simply respond that the critio
ha3 failed to get himself properly in touch with the appropriate object.
Their views can never be rejected because there is no ground from which
to criticise, there is no ground from which there can be any final
dealing with an opposing view, and there is no basis on which discussion
can take place. Real argument and discussion on the other hand allow
both views to present their details and to offer some hope of the one
view overcoming the other by strength of argument where the inadequacies
of the opposing view can be seen and the increased benefits from the
other view clearly presented. This is another example of the basis of
our general criticism of Torrance in terms of his failure to examine
important features and limits of rationality, the inadequacy of the
Torranoe view in terms of dealing with the complexity of the topic of
rationality on his own grounds , and finally the unacceptable conclusion
of excluding the critic from any attack on or query against Torranoe.
Torrance's view fails to exolude what requires to be exoluded, and so
there is a need to grasp the tests to satisfy whether or not there in
fact is an object and whether or not the object is of the type and nature
that is suggested. Where we cannot differentiate the false theory and
object, we oannot likewise know the truth.
The problem of exclusion of what ought to be excluded may also be
seen in relation to ether possible religious views. Torranoe*s picture
of/
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of theology is not the only one current and acceptable to most avowed
religionists; yet we are offered a moae of rationality which is
appropriate to the nature of the Object, God. Hod's uniqueness lies
in the fact that in coming into a relation with &od not only is He
known by us, but we receive the capacity to know Him properly. He is
•ultimate rationality and so in relation to Him we disoover (or rather
it is revealed to us) what rationality truly is. However, using the
same motif of tae Object determining the mode of rationality, the
Roman Oath ^lio might argue that what is given, or revealed, or disclosed
by the Object, Got, is a theology which is much more centred on the Pope
and the Virgin Mazy, and that any theology which does not give these
their full and proper place, has allowed subjectivity to blind it from
the appropriate mode of rationality w iich the Object prescribes and
through which is revealed what others have found to be revealed. The
problem reduces to a question of interpretation of the Christ event and
the work and Person of Christ, and it is difficult to allow that on the
basis of the general dogma, that the Object prescribes for us the mode
of rationality which we are to adopt, Torrance is entitled to claim
that this Object is of such a nature, unless he is able at the same time
to rebut similar but contrary claims on similar grounds from other views
of the nature of the Object e.g. Catholic views. The same sort of
point is made rather more harshly by basil Mitchell, who suggests that
we are presented "with a fully developed doctrinal scheme based not on
simply Christian theology, but on a highly determinate Calvanistio form
of/
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of Christian theology. Assuming throughout tho truth of this theology
he (.Toi-rance) develops in terms of it a thesis about the way in which
alone Cod can be know, viz. only in so far as ho reveals himself in Christ,"
and by John Hick who almost viciously parodies Torrance's view as the
words of a "modern Parson Thwaekum: When I say scientific theology I
mean Christian theology; and not only Christian theology but Reformed
theology; and not only Reformed theology but the theology of Karl Barth
62
as interpreted by Edinburgh"•
Torrance'3 account of the Object runs into problems by its failure
to exclude things like astrology and alchemy, because it is in itself
unable to deal with the counter claims of Catholic views, made allegodly
on the same basis, but also because its uniqueness may be queried by other
world religions. The Buddhist or the Bahai makes very specific claims
about the object of their religious belief and would wish proper
understanding of that belief to be controlled by a maimer of approach
which was appropriate to that object. They can equally claim the
necessity to be true to the proper object and in relation to that, grasping
the inherent intelligibility of all things coupled with the fact that
verification only makes sense within an actual relation to the object,
and that failure to appreciate the object as it in fact i3 only proves
the inability of the subject to take the appropriate mode of
rationality. This type of response on the part of the upholder of the
different world-religions or indeed from an opposing Catholic or
Protestant view again illustrates the weakness in Torrance's account
with/
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62. J. Hick, The Expository Times Nov. 1969, p.35« It is of course,
easy to underestimate the degree of difference between Torrance's
view and Bartley and this requires muoh more oareful treatment than
Hick could hope for in a review.
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with regard to the ground which a critic may occupy. If ^'orrance is
immune from criticism, so also is the Bahai, Buddhist and Catholic.
The critic of each and all of these views can always be reduced to
silence by the retreat of the devotfce to the uniqueness of their
particular object of worship and the absolute necessity to approach
the object only in the way which they prescribe. To attempt to do
anything else necessarily leads to the wrong conclusions of the critic.
In other words, the critic is debarred from the very start of making any
judgment, offering any alternative, and even entering into discussion on
the basis of any doubts he may have, for all doubt is excluded. One
sees as the believer sees or one can say nothing, for one has not
grasped the reality in a manner which is appropriate to it. This is
another example based on the general grounds of criticism against Torrance.
The acceptance of such counter-views to Torrance's cannot be simply
judged on the basis of the maxim that the object prescribes the mode of
rationality which is to be adopted, for it can be claimed by both sides
a3 an account of what in fact they are doing. The crux of Torrance's
theology and the tost for its truth or falsity lies not in the reliance
on the general theme which he propounds, but rather within the detail
and context of its application in the realm of theology. Torranoe's
account of rationality fails to exclude theories and views which mostly
would be held to be false, other and opposing religious interpretations
of the unique Object he claims for his view, and other religious objects
which may be the subject of similar claims on the part of their devotees.
In regarding Torrance's thesis at the general level, he not only
fails to exclude things which seem to be required to be excluded, but
he also fails to do justice to the complexity of rationality. This
refers/
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refers back to the first and seooxid grounds of criticism against
'dorranee in terms of his failure to do justice to the limits of rationality
arid important features of it, as well as the inadequacy of his own account
on its own terms, and in terms of the complexity of the problem. His
stock example of what is involved in his thesis is that desks and people
are different sorts of objects, therefore different rationalities are
appropriate to the knowing of and behaving in light of them. Yet this
leaves a great deal unsaid. If one takes any object of art, painting,
a piece of sculpture, or a piece of music, then it can be seen that there
is a different approach to these objects from that of the approach to
trees or a thunderstorm, and yet that remark has said little or nothing
about appreciation or the lack of it as regards specific modes of art.
If another example, is taken for example, animals, it is difficult to
ally the approach of the pet-lover and the anti-viviaeotionist with that
of the huntsman and the socially-minded physiologist and to reduce these
together into the over-simple model of rationality which lorrance offers.
Mentally diseased people may be like cabbages, but is then the proper
mode of rationality which is appropriate to them that of the doctor, who
wishes to preserve all life regardless of its quality, or of the parent
who wishes to b9 relieved of the agony and responsibility of the deformed
child, or of the psychiatrist, who finds the phenomenon interesting and
worthy of study, or of the Hitlerian, who experiments on the basis of
eagerness to produce a master race? ^osae of these attitudes may be
vicious, but they are not inappropriate or unscientific according to
a particular background and view of the nature of the object. So
with/
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with the object of art, for the painting may be to one an excellent
example of what true art is, to another a degenerate form of what art
ought to be, and to a third a meaningless splurge of paint which is only
reminiscent of a dog*s breakfast. If such an object of art is due to
be sold abroad and a large sum of money is required to keep it for the
nation in a particular country, whose advice of the three is to be
followed, and who has the approach which is appropriate to the nature
of the object, in other words, which is the rational approach? Torrance's
thesis gives no advice or guidance on how to deal with such specific
problems on the basis of his general thesis, which is too simple to cope
with the actual complexity of such situations and there seems to be
something much more to say in these examles than that they are all
rational given a particular view of what the object in question is and
how that object discloses itself. The something more to be said would
involve a much more detailed account of the nature of the situation in
which the object is seen as an object. In such a total description of
the situation, greater stress could be put on the cultural and social
aspects, the background, the bases of appreciation, and the relation
and influence of all these on the object and the individuals or groups
who seek to grasp what the object is and to describe it. It is again
a return to a differentiation between rationality in some general sense,
<X(\cl rationality as it refers to a specific context and the actions and
understanding which is appropriate to that situation in all its complexity,
A fuller account is required of the complexity of "objects" and the
situations in which it makes sense to talk of rational behaviour and
attitudes, rationality needs to be imagined along a much less formalised,
simplistic/
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simplistic structure as perhaps on a sliding-scale in which more and
less, and degrees of sat15Coviness and unsatisfactoriness are appropriate
on the basis of some kind of preference-order. With this elucidation
of the complexity of rational behaviour in any given situation, a much
closer analysis is needed of the relation of the object and our view of
the object against the background of a particular world-view, or set of
experiences.
In examining the central notion involved in Torrance's account of
rationality as the object prescribing the mode of rationality which is
appropriate for us to adopt, questions have been raised concerning the
relation of each object and the various fields of inquiry, the sense of
"object" in relation to the examples of "mind", the "French Revolution",
scientific "objects", and G-ou. The criticism then turned to the
categorisation of the objects, the overpersonalising tendency in Torrance,
which is mitigated by stress on the figurative use of language, which in
turn raised problems of the over-stretohing of language and the need for
some sort of check. The critique then concentrated on the theme of the
mode of rationality to be adopted and raised queries concerning different
levels of rationality, what such modes were, and whether or not the same
mode might be employed in relation to different objects with a good degree
of success. Examination was made of appropriateness,pragmatic tests,
and the notion of adopting or failing to adopt rationality and the
attendant peculiarities. The emphasis then moved from the particular
thesis to its general implications specifically that it proved too much
in failing to exclude other fields of study such as astrology and alchemy,
and it offered no grounds in itself for acceptance over and against a
different/
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different Christian interpretation, e.g. Catholicism, or against non-
Christian claims to revelation. Torrance's account, it was argued,
fails to do justice, to the complexity of rationality and the different
contexts in which the term is applied and of which we seek to understand
on a rational basis.
He also makes discussion and argument impossible by excluding the
possibility of any criticism. Unfortunately this has a boomerang effect,
for not only is his own position immune from criticism, because of the
riposte that one is guilty of subjectivity and failure to allow the
object to prescribe the appropriate mode of rationality which must be
adopted to grasp the reality involved, but so are all other views, even
those he must wish to exclude and t ose which are in direct opposition
to his own such as the Catholic or the Buddhist. The;/ can use the same
attack on the critic, so that no criticism is possible, and so no
discussion, argument, change, adaptation and development of any view,
for one either sees it or one does not, and if one does not one can only
try to get into the correct position to receive the message of reality
loudly and clearly. In general, then Torrance's view is not in itself
adequate as an account of rationality because of internal difficulties.
It omits features and detailed analysis of these in terras of rationality
which are important, and his account excludes the possibility of genuine
criticism of any view whether it is his own or some contrary one.
Torrance's account of rationality, though based on the doctrine
of relatin modes of rationality to their objects, also includes an




rationality ana transcendent rationality# * there will be an examination
oi' his presentation of these factors ana comment on them in turn. All
science, he states is the bringing to view of the inherent rationality in
nature. He gives examples of the sort of thing he means oy this wnen
he aesoribes the anatomist or physiologist laying bare the structure of
tne body, or the examination of crystalline formations in rocks, for in
both cases, it is claimed, there is no creation or imposition of patterns
of one's own invention, but rather the discovery of and the thinking of
the patterns which are found embedded in the structure of things. In
other words, the laying bare of the rationality which is inherent in the
nature of things. The examples sound convincing in as much as there is
certainly a measure of given material which can oe seen by all. Ihere
are muscles and nerves, or lines and oircles in the rocks, but is this
sufficient to talk of the inherent intelligibility of tilings. firstly,
is one to describe this particular internal tissue as muscle or nerve
for in the way that it is described, some aocount of what it is and its
function will be offered? Is the pineal gland the seat of the soul as
Bescartees thought, or has it to do with the pituitaries and metabolism?
The gland, in and of itself, cannot tell us, but what is crucial is the
interpretation. There is shape in the rook formations it looks like
a duck, but to the other observer it looks like a rabbit. Both are
asked to draw what they see and both draw the same thing, but one calls
it a duck-shape, the other a rabbit-shape, and cannot see it as what the
other suggests.
Often/
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Often there is involved in the seeing of something, or more
generally, the appreciation of something a high degree of interpretation.
It is not clear that even on a minimal account there oan be agreement
as to what is seen, and so there cannot thus be the basis for extrapol¬
ation to inherent intelligibility, or at the veiy most, even if there
were agreement as to the rationality inherent in the thing, it would be
entirely different inherent rationalities which were being considered
and agreed to. The artist looks at the picture and sees the colour,
the style, the placing, all with the eye of the expert, while the
disinterested passer-by sees the general effect. Do both see the same
thing? The concern here is not to try to show that one sees what is
really there, but rather to stress the different things seen and the
different accounts of what is seen, so that it would result in a very
different picture of inherent rationality. Looking at the crystalline
formation, or the physiological structure does not mean that all will
see the same, and this leads again back to the problem of categorisation,
which was raised earlier, for to see it as an "object", or as a "nerve",
or as a formation at all, is already to have nterpreted it in a crucial
way. It may be that one can produce a minimal picture which is devoid
of all interpretation, but whether this will support an account of
inherent rationality is a different matter* It may even be doubted
whether there will be suoh a minimal picture, for some experiments with
Iskimoes, suggest that they do r.ot differentiate walls and doors in walls
either in their language or in what they see, If this is the case, then
there could not even be agreement as to what was taken to be there.
Quine/
Quine raises the same sort of problem at a different level in his article,
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"Ontological Relativity", and if difficulties are found at the level
of physical objects, how much more difficult it is to talk of inherent
intelligibility in the fields of psychology and psycho-analysis, or in
the areas where the basic beliefs of people are related to ontological
claims which are exclusive of other equally basic beliefs about the same
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phenomena. Bambrough raises the same sort of question in relation to
a sea-storm, where the ancient f-reek says, "Poseidon is angry", and
modern man says "What a see storm". Of course, there is a sense in
which what is being talked of is the same thing, but it is certainly
not described as the same, and to a large extent it might be claimed
that the accounts given of the object were mutually exclusive. Certainly,
they cannot be the basis for claims about inherent intelligibility and
rationality in he structure of things themselves, so that we look and
we necessarily see. This may be the way the world ought to be, but
it is not the way the world is.
Torrance goes on from this point of the inherent rationality in
nature to outline the appropriate attitude to this state of affairs,
that of awe at the mystery. By this he refers to Einstein* s picture
of such awe.^ This means that all mathematical equations and new
geometries which are constructed are meaningless unless they are
applicable to nature. We are to follow the mathematical structure of
nature/
64. W.O.V. Quine, "Ontological Relativity", Ontological Relativity and
Other Bssays.
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nature to allow it to disolose itself to us. One wonders how easily
an account of awe and mystery, and perhaps eventually apophaticism, may
be married with the stress of inherent rationality and the capacity of
the object to break through upon us and disolose itself to us. If, as
will be shown, &od is the ground of all such rationality, and if He has
revealed Himself to us, then surely this rationally may be appreciated
without recourse to "awe" and "mystery". It is the setting together
of "rationality" and "awe" and "mystery" which is puzzling, for they
normally seem to be somewhat exclusive of each other. Torrance, of
course, is saying that what rationality is really about involves a
proper conception of "mystery" and "awe", and part of this is to ensure
always the application of new theories to nature, or else their falling
into meaninglessness. It does not seem to be necessary to equate with
meaninglessness the non-aoplicability to reality in the sense of true to
reality. Of course, if definitionally one is to say that to be meaningful
is to be true to reality the point must be accepted, but it is possible
to argue over the definition. But it does not appear to be definitionally,
so it must appear doubtful. One can recall some false theories which
have been instrumental in the discovery of new ideas and formulae, and
which, though eventually not at all appropriate to the nature of the
object, were the means of advance and progress in knowledge. Of course,
there are equally many, if not more, false theories which have hindered
advance, but one exception is sufficient to make the point. Marconi's
experiments with radio were based on false assumptions, and even the
first broadoast was achieved on the basis of factors quite outwith
Marooni's understanding and belief. False theories even if not useful,
are still not meaningless, for it is possible to grasp, appreciate,
argue/
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argue for and against, and finally reject them. This cannot be done
with meaningless terms. The danger is of smuggling in part of the theory
within specialised use of "meaningless", which needs to be argued for.
false theories and false beliefs must be taken account of in history and
psycholo^, and there is perhaps a Pickwiokian sense cf "national" which
may be applied to them and their results. They are certainly influental
thoug . they are wrong. Columbus discovered America, and Marconi radio,
hew theories ana equations need not thus be applicable to nature to
gain meaning, though, of course, thsy will perhaps (and it is only
perhaps) be of greater value, in general, than false theories in relation
to nature and things in general.
The importance of Torrance's view of inherent rationality is that
67
without it there could be no science at all. In every science it is
presupposed that what is known is accessible to rational inquiry, or el3e
we are trapped in our own subjectivities. Science s eks to bring this
inherent rationality to view and it is thus we are convinced that we are
in touch with reality. If the nature of things was not inherently
rational then they would be inapprehensible and opaque, and we ourselves
would not be able to emerge into rationality. Of course, in the
submission of our minds to the disclosure of realities to us, we are
still involved in the give and take of subject and object. But if
things were not inherently rational, there would be no knowledge and
no communication. The need here is for clarification of what is
involved in being convinoed that we are in touch with reality. What
sort/
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sort of test is this, and can we ever be wrong, and if we are ever wrong,
how could we correct it, or know that we are wrong, if we were tied to
being faithful to the object in the vary way which had led us into error?
Ultimately it would seem to reduce to Torrance's account of intuition,
and, as has been seen, it in turn raises questions. Attention has
already been focused too, on the problem of talking of the realities
disclosing themselves to us and the danger of overpersonalising. But
if Torrance claims that without the nature of things being inherently
rational, we could not emerge into rationality, he is overlooking man's
capacity to force rationality on things. Language is an example of
this sort of thing for man surely decides that this squiggle will stand
for this, and that sqaiggle for something else. The squiggles in
themselves have no rationality, hut we decide to use them in a particular
way and thus impose order upon them. Of course, for most people,
language is already a "going concern", but our relation to language may
be thus construed as reaffirmation of these signs in becoming and
continuing as members of a language-using community. Without inherent
rationality, it may not necessarily mean that man is unable to be
rational. Man may still strive to force order upon disorder, and
meaning upon chaos. In one sense to talk, as Torrance does, of the
"compromise of thought and being" find the "give and take" between
subject and object, is to admit that it is not just the inherent
rationality of things, but man has a role to play. The question
remains whether man's rationality is of the same nature, and derived
from the same source as the rationality allegedly in the nature of things.
Bver/
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Even if all things were in chaos, one might still come to realise this,
to know that there was no inherent rationality and intelligibility and
to oe able to communicate this to eaoh other. But as if far more widely
held, it might be preferred that we cannot know whether or not there is
inherent rationality in the nature of things, but this does not debar
us from knowing anything or communicating at all. Most folk are unaware
of whether or not there is inherent rationality; yet they know a great
deal and communicate it to each other, There are problems then concerning
how a person is convinced that he is in touch with reality and whether
or not inherent rationality is necessary for knowledge and communication,
or whether a person may be successfully agnostic, while still knowing
and communicating that knowledge.
Part of what is involved in the seeking in every sphere of knowledge
to express the objective rati nality that is part and paroel of the
object of knowledge is that reason is at work constructing models or
developing analogues to put nature to the test and elicit answers from
it, while submitting to the realities which shine through its theoretic
constructions. The judgment of the applicability of the model or the
relevance of the analogue relates to the experience or intuition of the
object in increasing understanding through the analogue, or to the fertility
of the theory in casting light on stubborn problems and in revealing
new facts and facilitating new advanoes in the field. There has alraady
been mention of the problem of intuition and the difficulties it raises,
which are all the problems that any account of intuition must fuoe up to,
of false intuitions, and failures to intuit. But fertility is a
different aort of goal. The fertility lies in coping with the stubborn
problems/
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problems and in new advances. Part of the problem here is that seeing
something as a problem and something else as an advance is not necessarily
accepted by all one's colleagues looking at the same data. The
historical changes in perspective which Torrance lays great stress on are
all examples of a few individuals, if even that, seeing something as a
problem and advancing to something new, but they were out of step with
most of their fellow scientists and it is a long and arduous process
before such views are accepted as the nom. So the judgment of the
fertility of a view is not so straightforward as is suggesed. Coupled
with this is the fertility of false theories, which in fact Popper has
structured into a theory of falsiflability, stressing that one of the
crucial ways of learning is to tzy to disprove. Certainly, there is a
need for looking more at the complexity of the situation where claims
to intuition and fertility of theory are made, especially if it is
difficult to see how problems with the old system could arise. The
most crucial example of this could be whether or not it was possible
for & basic question to arise which would call in question not only
Torrance's account of inherent rationality, but also of the relation of
objects to modes of rationality. But it is difficult to see what sense
this question could make for Torrance's view and correspondingly, what
sense can be attached to fertility in dealing with stubborn problems and
leading to new advances. These seem strangely unquantifiab1e but if
Torrance complains that this is what modern science is doing, it is
still the case that modern science is on this basis having a great deal
of pragmatic effect. It is open to the sceptic to question whether
suah/
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such pragmatic effect would be paralleled by the use of similar standards
of fertility or lack of if in relation to theology. Talk of models and
analogues, while certainly in scientific vogue, still leaves the question
of standards for the moaos and bases for the analogy, and so the need
for the characterisation of standards and description of the bases of
such models and analogues and their successful application. Of course,
this could only occur within a specific field of knowledge, but again,
is the difference between a mouel and analogue in scientific discourse,
which deals with created rationalities, not so great as to cast into
doubt any extrapolation to or appreciation of transcendent rationality
from the created, or even from the level if the transcendent to the level
of created rationality.
Inherent rationality is not self-explanatory and in nature one is
confronted only with immanent rationalities and for most sciences this
can be sufficient to x-afrain from asking the question as to t he ultimate
rational ground beyond any ana every field of knowledge. In comparison
with this, theology is concerned to penetrate into transcendent and fontal
rationality which is the ultimate source of alt that is intelligible to
man. Tiiis transcendent element is not identified with dod, but it does
cry for dod to explain it. G-. Moorhouse has commented on this notion
that "the more scientists discover there is rationality about the moon
and eventually about other planets - the greater need to posit transcendent
68
rationality to account for it all". This liaises the problem between
created/
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created and transcendent rationality. One is forced to ask why one
cannot be satisfied with created rationality, if indeed it is necessary
to construe it as created. One might instead hold that the rationality
discovered in the world, given that such a view can be supported was in
itself sufficient. Perhaps it did not offer ultimate explanation, but
one can be oontent with nroximiate explanation. Or one might be
agnostic as to the source of this rationality, but nevertheless be
content and well able to go on one's way without danger of maaninglessness
or fearing that one's knowledge had no ultimate explanation and
accordingly has to be doubted.
There is some tension in Torrance on this point, for on the one
hand he seems to suggest that it is only in theology that we can go on
to ask the ground of all rationality, but the scientist in other fields
may be satisfied at a different level, but he also quotes with approval
Polanyi on the fact that there can be no pure science Tfithout dedicated
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service to transcendent rationality. There is an uneasy balance
between the two, for most scientists would uohold agnosticism as to the
ultimate ground of rationality or set it on a different basis from that
within their own spheres of study, while claiming satisfaction on
rational grounds for their own fields. Is the 3ci ntist being the
true scientist who is faithful to the object of knowledge; and if that
object is a created object, with created rationality imparted to it,
3urely then the true scientist must gc on to discover the true and
total nature of the object, which involves discovery of its ultimate




view of rationality, aid not find it necessary to posit God as the
source of ail rationality, but rather interpreted the universe as a
rational creature. The implication behind, the positing of God's
transoenuent rationality is that there can be no proper knowledge
without an ultimate reference to God. However, rational knowledge and
behaviour do seeia possible without God, certainly in as muoh us Einstein
was able to formulate the rational theory of relativity without such
transcendent reference, and scientists seein well able both to describe
and utilise phenomena in a thoroughly rational fashion without
explicit or implicit reference to transcendent rationality. It is
difficult to see tnat rationality needs to be created, or that one could
erer know whether or not it was created, ana that it does require gl
transcendent rationality to be acceptable as true knowledges ^
Torrance may well be guilty or begging the question in his own favour
by the way he imparts talk of "immanent" and "transcendent". The danger
is that these are smuggling in an implicit theological flavour which
needs to be argued for. If something is immanent it is immanent over
and against something else, and if so what? If something is transcendent,
what does it transcend and how do we discover this 'transcendence? In
the relation of inherent rationality to transcendent, we are aware of the
tension between being satisfied with this-worldly explanation, and that
of going on to other-worldly explanations, of the knowledge of creation,
immanence, transcendence, and the interrelations of these. This
inevitably leads to a doctrine of revelation and the crucial importance
in accepting and working, in Torrance's account of rationality, a
strong/
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strong doctrine of revelation. But tha sources, standards, and use
of such, revelation and its interrelation with the rest of the theory
require therefore to be stressed, and examined.
In the passing Torrance states that even to attempt to formulate
the question of inherent rationality raises problems, for to question
the ground of such rationality is itself to be forced to use it. This
is one of the ultimate boundaries in thought, which reduces man to awe
and demands acknowledgement. This, however, does not prove that such
rationality is objective in the state of things, for it may equally be
taken as a sign of subjective necessity, in that it is impossible to
form categories, think, speak, etc. without assuming such rationality,
but this assumption rests on the nature of mind rather than on the
nature of the universe. Torrance himself may corns nearer to this than
he thinks in his talk of an "ultimate boundary of thought" (Uy emphasis),
and in the admission of the necessity for subjective factors so that our
knowing remains human knowing.
Torrance claims that it is only possible to make ultimate sense
of immanent rationality by following it through to its ground in the
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transcendent rationality of Bod. Buch knowledge of the ultimate
rationality of Gou is reached at the point where our human reason
becomes enlightened from beyonu the limits of created rationality and
where an infinite extension of intelligibility beyond ourselves is
disclosed,/
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uisclosedj but only in viae way that the ultimate rationality sets up
its law in the depth of o r human rationality an^ is recognised ana
respected as the norm and source of our rational illumination. Again
it must be asked why immanent rationality, if what this is can be understood
and what "immanent'' means here, needs &od, rather than a world Spirit,
or merely the realisation that this is the way the world is. Bven if
it was accepted that there was a need for the transoendent to explain
the immanent, why must we then cease there ana not go on to ask what
ground there is for the transcendent rationality? Of course, to
iorrunee, this would be the same as asking "who made the world?" and
then "».ho made dou?"• Presumably we realise that we are confronted
with the ultimate when we are, but iorranee describes this as when "an
infinite extension of mtailigibliity beyond ourselves is disclosed',
and it is difficult to make 3ense of this "disclosure", for what sort
of thing is an "infinite extension of intelligibility" especially one
beyond as? Is it not so far beyond us that we could not grasp what it
was? at the very least it is hard to see howve could know in any
experience of anything that here is something of which the intelligibility
extends infinitely beyonu us, for the limit may be over the horison.
confronted with suoh, but quite another to make out a rational case on
a rational basis, with rational evidence for such a claim.
Torrance records that rationality in the universe is created by
hod out ox nothing anu that space anu time are created forms of




in it is seen the relation between created and trar.3cend.ent rationality
at work in the establishing of one upon the other. The problem is how
to know that it is created rather than uncreated, and this is solved by
revelation. But the problem with revelation is that of standards to
settle between competing revelations, to deal with false x-evelations,
and to explain when one lias or has not had a revelation and any change
in revelation which might take place. without a nuoh clearer outline
of the atandax'd for revelation we ax-e again confronted with the position
where the critic has no ground to stand on. If I claim to Lave had a
revelation and you seek to criticise this, if my retort is that you must
have it for yourself to understand what it really means and anything
olse is just the bloated subjectivity of someone who has not approached
the revelation in the proper manner, ana necessarily has been misled,
then there is no room for argument, discussion, doub.., development, or
communication except on terms which have already predetermined the issue
in question. Again Torrance excludes genuixxe criticism.
It is not clear either why space and time must be construed as
created forms of rationality along Torrance's line, rather than along
the lines of Kant as categorical forms, in tenas of subjective necessities
by virtue of the nature of man and his knowledge. In space and time in
themselves, there is no evidence given one way or the other. So again
it is back to increased fertility or to revelation, with the attendant
problem in both cases.
Created rationality for Torrance is not a simplistic notion, for
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it has two main forms, that of number and word rationality. Historical
72. See above
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events are different from natural events and require therefore different
modes of rationality to exnlioate them. Of course, there is some
interrelation, for the suiritual and physical existence is inseparable,
e.g. in the Incarnation, and. man interacts with nature. These different
levels depend on God Who holds them together in co-ordination. Yet it
is in and through man that hot* forms of rationality emerge into the
ooen so that creation, including man, attains to full being. There
has already been discussion of some aspects of the problem of historical
events, but in this context, it must be inquired whether it is possible
to separate historical events from natural events, or rather, whether
it is not the case that in any historical event, the natural happenings
and the intentions and numoses are so closely intermingled that we
cannot say that historical events require word rationality while natural
events require number rationality. Are these, as ha3 been already asked
such clearly defined kinds and modes of rationality without overlap?
If man is taken as an example, there are in him both physical character¬
istics appropriate to number rationality - "the very hairs of his head
are numbered" - and intention? and puraoscs appropriate to word
rationality, but it would be difficult to separate the two, in fact, to
do so would be to return to the sort of Cftrtesianism which Torrance abhors.
But if it has impossible to separate them, can we clearly distinguish the
one from the other and clarify the relation and interrelation of the one
to the other? Mind affects matter and vice-versa, but precisely how
i? not yet known. But Torrance suggests that these forms of rationality
are at different levels and are co-ordinated together. This leaves the
problem/
problem of the separation of these different levels and the basis for
this separation, anu likewise the need for standards for co-oruinaiing
levels "which show appropriateness ana inappropriateness, and the means
ana sources of such standards.
however, Torrance remains adamant that without transcendent
rationality there con be no true science and that scientific conscience
is a counterpart or echo of the transcendent element of a logic beyond
our own minds, which thrusts itselfunrelentingly upon us. There can be
no purs science pursued freely for its own sake without dedicated servioe
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10 a transcendent rationality. As has already been suggested, there
are many scientists who are engaged in science without reference to
transcendent rationality , and who, if forced in argument, might rather
reject such a transcendent rationality than interpret it as a necessary
part of what they are, in the ultimate analysis, seeking to achieve. It
is difficult to see how we ca ild know that scientific conscience is the
"counterpart" or "echo" of actual events and to see the relation aetween
these. But what this stress on the necessary grounding of science in
the ultimate rationality of God leads to is what Torrance suggests when
he states that it is from the study of Goa that we properly understand
objectivity and indeed the universe itself', for this created rationality
cries out for -.ou's transcendent rationality to explain at. It must
therefore, follow that the man who knows Goa, who is in a proper relation
to God, who has allowed the Object to prescribe for him the mode of
rationality he has adopted, and who is constantly allowing thai Object
to/
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to break through the circle of his subjectivities, must also be the man
best fitted to give the ultimate explanation of any of the natural sciences,
for he alone (or rather in the community of believers) has grasped the
true realities of the situation as they ultimately are and is best able
to give the fullest possible explanation. It is not true that the non-
Christian cannot do properly either physics or any of the physical sciences,
or that without God or belief in God there is no full and adequate
ultimate explanation for those outwith the Christi.au circle of belief as
it is defined by Torrance.
In examining Torranoe» 3 account of rationality there has been
analysis of the question of context, inherence, and created rationality
over against transcendent rationality and its ground in God, as well as
the forms cf rationality Torrance draws our attention to. Thore has
been discussion on the relation of "seeing" to "seeing a3", the benefits
of false theories, the tests and standards for revelation, the exclusion
of the critic from all argument, fertility, models and analogues.
Questions have been raised as to the relation of created to uncreated
rationality and the sense of immanence and transcendence involved in
this relationship. It has been inquired why the line ought to be drawn
at transcendent rationality when it must not be drawn at created rationality.
There has been examination of the kinds of rationality and their forms and
the connections between them, and the presentation of certain difficulties
in all these areas to try to show that Torrance's account raises important
questions which require a tightening ut> and expansion of what is involved
in his thesi;3. His account of rationality is not in itself sufficient
and is not adequate to the complexity of rationality.
Earlier/
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Earlier it was seen that on the "basis of inherent rationality and
the aim of knowledge as an experience of objaotive rationality there
were three things to hear in mind! that we must in theology use open
concepts, that presuppositions must he questioned, and that if vre
74
failed to understand something it was our fault. Open concepts in
theology are open to Sod but cLoeed to men, and are indications of the
human condition. It is just this tension between openness at one and and
closed at the other which is the difficulty in relating the notion of
"open" concepts to theology. If one takes for example, the concept
"God", it is not clear what it would mean to close the concept. If all
this means is that we form a fixed idea and will allow nothing to change
it, this is obviously faulty, but at the tame time one would wonder to
what extent Christians would or could allow certain basic concepts to be
changed and adapted. If Bambrough's picture of the sea is reoalled
he offers an adaptation of the concept of Poseidon's anger, vhicb.
ultimately reduces to a mere metaphor and in which the ontological claim
is squeezed out to allow for the figurative and moralistic use. Such
must be the fear for the Christian, for one can imagine that the Christian
might allow conceptual change in ond direotion, e.g., God. revealing another
facet of His character, but at the same time setting limits to the degree
of conceptual change, for fear that the notion of God becomes, as it has
to Tillich and Robinson, the ground of being, and apparently little else.
Yet unless one is sufficiently open to allow this to happen, has not one
begged the question in one's own favour, that is to say, if Torranoe
would not and could not envisage such a change, is he then prepared to
be,/
74. See above p.p,155ff.
be truly open to allow the reality to do to him what it will? In other
words, openness in practice for Torrance is not possible, and this is
part of the criticism that the critic has no ground to stand on.
The second thing to be borne in mind is the need to question
presuppositions in light of the continuing revelation of the object.
This questioning involves not just ideas but ourselves. The main
difficulty in this process is ourselves and our habits of thought, whioh
leads again to the stress on our fundamental rationality in which we
think and act in accordance with what is the case. This notion of
holding everything open to criticism and questioning, and the questioning
of every question and not only the question but the questioner who must
be questioned and requestioned, sounds admirable in a theologian. To
be rational, it seems, at least involves holding everything open to
question and criticism. The difficulty is, as was seen in relation to
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William Bartley III, whether this makes any sense. Does it make any
better sense in application to Torrance*s work? One does not wish to
suggest that he would be totally unwilling to question his own doctrines
of &od, Christ, the Holy Spirit, Scripture, the Church, and the nature
of knowledge, but it must be doubtful if under any but the most extreme
circumstances Torrance would be willing to set aside any or all of these
doctrines. If he did there would be little relation left to traditional
Christianity. Bather, like Job, Torrance would tend to say "Yea, though
76
He slay me, yet will I trust Him", and even if his views of epistemology
and rationality were to fall to the ground, and tomorrow a totally new
five-dimensional science be discovered which put all of the gains of
four-dimensional science in a different perspective, Torranoe's
theological/
75. See Chapter Two, p.p. $7
76. Job 13, v.15.
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theological belief would remain much the same. One wonders what sense
can be attached to the notion of questioning the whole system of Torrance's
belief by Torrance himself. It may be possible to ask questions, but
unless he can specify at least what sort of changes he would be willing
to make and the circumstances of such changes, as regards the rejection
of apparently basic beliefs, it would seem that such questioning is not
genuine. Torrance without such a description has again excluded the
possibility of criticisms by removing the ground from under the feet of
the critic. The critic can say nothing against Torrance's view, but
with this Torrance is also unable to offer criticism of any other view
which presents itself in exactly the same way as he presents his own
view. He must reap the harvest of his dictatorial strategy. It is
also doubtful if, even if it were possible to be open, in the way that
Torrance suggests, in general, there is such a radical effect in which
we come to know what is different from what is known already.^ Is our
knowing ever so novel in its impact upon us? It may be that the
specialist does undergo some radical shift when he knows something, but
surely, even for him, this must be a comparatively rare event rather
than the norm. One wonders to what extent our presuppositions are
ever changed in so radical a fashion as Torrance suggests by the nature
73
of the object cognised.
The/
77* RR.p.73j T.p.p.44-5j120j147;153-4{184-5.
78. F. O'Collins Heythorp Journal. July, 1966, p.p.344-5* "The claim
that theological statements must be called in question must itself
be called in question and cannot claim to have the truth in itself".
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The third thing to remember is that we are responsible if we fail
to understand something as rational, for we have foroed it into an alien
framework. But the difficulty here is to know when we have something
which is inherently rational which we are obstructing by our subjective
tendencies, or when we have something which is surd-like, and which we
are questioning properly but with no success. If this is related to
interpersonal relations, we can be confronted with someone who desires
to conceal his true motives from us and so be misled although behaving
in a properly rational fashion towards him. His behaviour is not surd¬
like, but rather misleading, and an example of an object, in this case
a subject, who misleads us. Descartes* evil demon is a variation on
the same theme. But there are specific procedures for dealing with
these cases in personal relations and a whole vocabulary to match. It
is not so clear that this can be applied to the world of things and what
sort of sense can be made of such a transposition.
79
Torrance states that Physics is still a model of science today by
its example of determination of its nature by the nature of its own
special subjeot matter. This may be the case, but what is of interest
is the relation between Torrance's account and the other sciences.
One possible interpretation of what Torrance is doing, may be to see it
as sin example of a "tu quoque" argument, except that it is presented in
what can only be called the "ego quoque" form. One might attempt to
describe what Torrance is saying as the move from:- the theologian is
doing the same sort of work as the scientist, i.e. being faithful to the
object of his study, to:- the scientist is no better off than the
theologian in the claims that he can make for his object and method of
science/
79. See above p.p. i b S —
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science and study. What is being suggested is that Torrance's view
is a highly sophisticated form of the "tu quoquel! argument indulging in
special pleading for his own particular field of study, i»s» theology.
The main difference between this form of tho argument ana the more
traditional forms is that it is reversed in order, putting the emphasis
on the parallelism and thus seeking to deny that there is any other basis
for knowledge or for science. The success of this depends on the
successful parallelism between science and theology. What Torrance
requires is to show that the scientist is in exactly the 3ame position
as the theologian, and that there is no alternative solution. Prima
facie, we all do not do the same sort of tiling either in every kind of
science or in every kind of theology, and the difference between the
objects involved is so great that one wonders if there is sufficient
support for the parallelism between theology and soienoe#
Torranoe's account of rationality was finally linked to man and
to the problem of his autonomous reason by which man was unable to be
rational, and so must us changed by the renewing of his mind and
80
confronted to the image of G-od. Man needs to be prized open from
above by faith by a Word from without, and faith then is the only
rational thing that reason can do in acknowledgsment of something
transcendent of itself. This again raises the tension between the
subjective and objective factors in relation to the free will of iaan«
Men without a perceived relationship to frod have given mankind untold
benefits by their scientific discoveries and the quality of their lives
has/
80. See above p.p.163.
248
has certainly been characterised as rational. Their autonomous reason
seems to have paid off dividends. One could hold that faith was a
prizing open from above and necessary for true rationality, only if no
one was able to be truly rational without such faith, and if those who
had such faith were alone truly rational. Unfortunately this does not
appear in either case to be generally typical. The problem is also
that some people who once would have claimed that they were in a
relationship with &od able to believe in what they once termed a
rational fashion, may now claim that such faith is not rational and that
they were wrong. If this is possible in their case, it may also be
possible in Torrance's case. But certainly the difficulty is to make
good such an absolute claim for rationality, which is not prima facie
substantiated.
Torrance's account of man's relation to rationality ends in the
relation to the communication of this rationality to others by persuading
them to submit to the same rationality, and it is only within a community
that this is properly realised. Others must think only as they are
compelled to think by the nature of the divine realities themselves, and
this is only truly possible in community, which acts as the basis of the
81
verification procedures. There has already been mention of one
particular example of communication in the example of discussion of
criteria. Torrance's stress on community is important. However, it
seems that Einstein himself came to form his view, or discover it, outwith
and in marked contradictioh to the community of science, to suoh an
extent/
81. S.p.113*
extent that few, if any understood what he was saying. Of course, it
is the case that the verification of his theory has taken place within
a community of verifiers, "but there may still be a problem as to how
to draw the boundaries of such a community and to describe how one
enters or leaves that community. It would certainly be odd if a man
claimed to discover the truth and died having been unable to convince
anyone else that this was the truth. Though there may be some sort of
parallel with the area of art appreciation in Van Gogh and the Impressionist
School, it was well after most of their deaths that their work was
recognised and appreciated. The prophet only too often is not received
in his own community. But turning to Torrance's stress on assisting
the other to submit to the inherent intelligibility of the Object and
eventually convincing him of the need to do this, it is seen that we have
communicated successfully when they paroeive what we have perceived.
There are three dif erent levels of problem involved here. The.first
is whether, strictly speaking, it makes sense to say that we communicate
God to anyone. The epistemological relevance of the Holy Spirit is that
He opens up the individual in such a way that subjectivity is subordinated
to objectivity, the capacity to appropriate the object in its true
rationality is given, and the actual experience and knowing takes
32
place. If it is the work of the Holy Spirit, can I properly
communicate anything, and may I be blamed for the failure to communicate?
In other words, if the other person does not see, how could it ever be
my fault, provided I have been true to the object? Torrance comments
Q 7
that in personal relations it may be the other person1s fault, but
agaiiy'
82. See above p.p. | 37 and footnote 49.
83. T.p.275
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again one seems left with a failure of the power of the Holy Spirit to
do His work, or success in His work such that man is not genuinely free.
If this is the case then it is even more true of the critic who on
Torrance's account is free neither to believe cor not to believe. The
critic cannot by himself come to an understanding of the true nature of
theology, but is rather dependent on the grace of the Holy Spirit.
But neither can the critic express any disagreement, for not only has
he no ground to stand on, but he is not free and responsible for his
failure to grasp what can only be grasped by the gracious aotivity of
the Spirit. The sort of response Torrance would wish to make would be
to seek to show that man is only properly free and responsible within
a proper relation to God and the Holy Spirit, and this indeed may make
sense within the system of belief. The question is whether or not the
same argument is sufficient in the case of the adoption or rejection of
that whole system.
The second level is to enquire whether or not in the act of
communication of the gospel as described by Torrance, there can be room
for discussion and argument. We are not to preach at people, but to
84
direot their minds to the reality of God. Is normal communication
like this? We are surely able to talk, discuss, and argue without
necessarily feeling that the point and purpose of suoh interrelation
is to direot the other's mind to some reality or other. Thou^i, of
oourse, there may often be this element involved in communication, and
Torranoe is right to draw attention to it. But he seems to suggest
that/
84. MM.p.p.32,91,270; RR.p.viiij S.p.l83j T.p.p.173,177
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that unless this is the case we are not genuinely involved in questioning.
His point that genuine questions must in some way affect the way we live
85
is perfectly correct, but what is more doubtful is whether or not all
communication can be construed as a form of questioning. All discussion
is certainly not conducted in the interrogative mode. The fear behind
these comments is of the kind of hubris in which we, the believers,
point you, the unbelievers, to the reality which you oannot grasp yourselves.
The unbeliever is represented as too passive for this to be construed
as fully human communication. Of course, as Torrance suggests, the
unbeliever is not passive in the sense that he must struggle against
the habits of' mind which falsify objects. This may be true, but it
does not seem an adequate account of communication between humans in all
its variety and richness, with rather the willingness to be modified by
the other person and his views, being necessary on the part of both
parties in the act of communication. On the basis of Torrance's
theological outlook, there seems no room for modification in relation
to someone outwith faith, for this would be to apply inappropriate modes
of rationality from other fields of* study. Again the exclusion of the
critic from all comment against Torrance is obvious.
The third level is to apply this last point of the decision
between believer and unbeliever, to the discussion and communication
between believers. It is most certainly the case that theologians
disagree with Torrance's view of the nature and content of theology.




to see this. The problem thus arises as to whether or not they are
genuinely believers. Torrance may not feel that this is a proper
question for him to answer, but in all his stress upon the role of theology
within a community structure, one must assume that it is possible to
identify members of the community from non-members. One can imagine
the traditional theologian or would-be-theologian seeking to learn
from all different kinds of theological positions and seeking to extract
the seeds of truth from each view to plant in his own garden. To suoh-
minded theologians Torrance's uncompromising stance must come as a shook.
If Torrance is correct, then Robinson and Bultmann are wrong and
irrational. It is essential that it is clear how, on Torrance's
account,to define the theologian from the non-theologian, the believer
from the unbeliever, and how to account for the writing and the theologioal
ideas which Torrance agrees with in the writers he attacks.
There is a great deal of tacit knowledge in what we know, yet may
not offer any claim to know, or even be able to say that we know or
how we know. Understanding is not synonymous with knowledge of the
reality and it is possible to talk of insight and appreciation in ways
which are characteristic of the difficulty of verbalising. There
are specific experiences which are more opaque to verbalising, for
example, experiences of the mysterious or the numinous. Everyone is
not able to verbalise; yet children, deaf mutes, and the mentally-
disturbed may still exercise a great deal of understanding and
appreciation without having the capacity to verbalise. For Torrance
communication is the putting in touch with reality of another person.
Yet/
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Yet we can and do communicate successfully with eaoh other without
directly referring to reality or pointing others to reality. When
we say that we communicate without direct reference to reality, this
does not, of course, mean, that one could not ultimately reduce the
statements in the communication to some relation with reality, hut
rather that communication does not entail explioit pointing to ary
reality to be successful. for example, we do understand what the
members of a tribe are talking about when they refer to their gods,
even though we have no experience of, and perhaps hold that we could
have no experience of, the non-existent. he understand and sympathise
with a person's grief even though we ourselves may have no direct
experience of the reality which it involves. Understanding and
communication are both multi-levelled, and Torrance's model seems to
reduce to over-simplicity the complexity of both.
In general, Torrance's account of communication and the olaims to
rational knowledge involved in thi3, seem in 3trange contrast to the
86
.New Testament ideas of seeing through a glass darkly, having not seen
87 88
and yet believing, and of cue day both seeing and knowing. G-iven
that our knowledge of G-od is limited by sin and human frailty, and that
(*od is greater than our knowing of Him, humility in presenting what we
believe and in olaiming truth, must be the marks appropriate to the
communication and the nature of the object. There are many elements
of wonder, awe, the incomprehensible, the numinous, and the mysterious
which/
86. 1 Corinthians, 13, v.12.
87. Hebrews 1, 1 John 3» John 20.
88. 1 Corinthians, 13.
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which cannot be fathomed or hoped to be. To oall these rational needs
more than a fiat of definition. It is hardly rational that Cod should
love us, or that the secret of greatness is to humble oneself and become
89
as a little child. Faith is something much more at risk. This is
why it is faith, which it is believed will one day give fruit into
knowledge. Man's knowing is only in part and not in full. Torrance's
view of man's part in communication leads to some questions concerning
the nature and role of the community in communication, and the role of
the Holy Spirit, discussion with uhbelieve s and fellow believers, of
understanding and verbalising, and some Hew Testament queries in relation
to knowledge and claims to knowledge. Before summing up the criticisms
of Torrance's view of rationality, a more general question will be
raised which is difficult to understand on Torrance's account. That
is to inquire whether there is any ground for- the critic to stand on
in relation to Torrance's view. It would appear that the critio has
no grounds on which to formulate his argument against Torrance, but this
must raise the question of whether or not Torrance has himself any
ground to stand on. There must be grounds for his view, but can they
be separated from its content? Torrance argues that to tiy to do this
is to be guilty of false reasoning. The positivist responds that we
need to be "persuaded by non-theological reasoning that there was such
a man (as Christ) and that he was of such a character as to warrant the
90
claim that in him we encounter Cod". Torrance lays great stress on
the/
89. Matthew 18, Mark 9, Luke 9.
90. B. Mitchell, The Oriel Record. 1969, p.55
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the openness of concepts and constant questioning of one's questions,
but it is difficult to see how the critic can have any effect on
Torrance's system because of its generality in relation to the object's
prescription of .modes of rationality. The problem is that always the
critic can be reduoed to silence by being told that he is guilty of
subjectivism and that he is not being faithful to the object. One
cannot, of course, expect Torrance to state what would count as the
defeating ©f his view, but there is a need to clarify on what basis the
critic, with a different attitude to epistamology, can criticise
Torrance's account and the effect that such criticism would have.
But it appears on Torrance's account that criticism is impossible,
with no ground for the critic to stand on.
In this section an attempt has been made to come to grips with
Torrance's account of rationality believing that the issues he raises
are important in any account of rationality and that there is important
use to be made of these concepts. It was seen that Torrance's
discussion was not in the main stream of work in the area of rationality
at present and needed 3ome account of relation to ether competing views.
There was then examination of the notion of objectivity in its application
to a wide variety of things, and then concentration on the notion of
"object" in some particular contexts such as "mind", "French Revolution",
and the "universe", specifically in connection with the problem of evil,
and then "Sod". Attention was then turnsu to the account of rationality
which was presented with reference to forranoe's work and looking at the
problem/
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problem of the tension between the subjective and objective factors
in his work, and the correct stress on the relevance of rationality to
every part of our lives. Then consideration was given to the dogma
that what we know is to prescribe for us the mode of rationality which
we are to adopt and the problems that this raised. Prom this analysis
was given the stress on modes of rationality and the difficulties this
raised were presented, for example, his failure to exclude what ought
to he excluded and failing to do justice to the complexity of rationality*
The relations of inherent rationality to transcendent rationality were
examined in light of what Torrance offered and then the questions which
his account gave rise to. In turn then the ideas of open oonoepts,
the questioning of presuppositions, and physics as a model of pure
soience were examined. Finally the role of man and his reasoning in
Torrance's account and its relevance for communication witliin community,
was dealt with, before querying the scope for the critic as regards the
position of Torrance.
In general terms then the criticism of Torrance has paralleled that
of Bartley. First of all it v/es complained that there was the overlooking
of oertain important features of the nature of rationality particularly
related to the limits of rationality as these are understood from actual
argument and discussion. Then criticism of Torrance's own theory of
rationality on its own terms was offered and a variety of criticisms
which were appropriate to the specific content of Torrance's theory
presented. It was found that his account is inadequate and cannot
support any superstructure, though this point does not neoessarily mean
that/
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that Torrance does support his theology in this way, only that his
account of rati nality in itself is not adequate to the complexity
of rationality. Then it was shown within the context of a general
attack on Torrance1s view that one of the unfortunate effects of his
view is the removal of any ground for the critic to stand on to query
Torrance's position and with this the corollary that Torrance himself
has no ground to stand on in criticism of any opposing view which
presents its material in the sane sort of -way that he does with its
special claims for intuition, revelation, and objectivity. Examples
were seen of the use of the dictatorial strategy as outlined in the
Bartley chapter, the inability to exclude views which were in sharp
disagreement with Torrance both in respect of differing theologies
and also in terms of astrology and alchemy which he would reject as
false pseudo-sciences. It wa3 seen that in tarns of intuition,
revelation, the work of the Holy Spirit and in outlining possible
room for criticism, Torrance's thesis led to the impossibility of
discussion and argument from a critic, and the total immunity of any
view which might be presented on the same terms as Torrance presents
his own view. This is not adequate to any account of therationality
which finds its expression in the processos of rational argument and
discussion, and it is necessary therefore to go on to offer an account
of Nationality which allows this while at the same time being true to
the complexity of rationality in practice.
While the general basis of the criticism offered against Torrance
has been on the three grounds outlined above and at the commencement of
this/
this chapter, the actual form that the criticism has heen presented in
has followed the form in which Torrance has presented his own material
rather than attempting to draw his position into line with the general
areas of oriticism. Thus the specific complaints concerning his
omissions, the unfortunate conclusion his view leads to, and more
obviously, the failure of his own account to do what he claims it can
do on its o.;n terms as well as its failure to measure up to what must
be required of an account of rationality which will cover the oomplexLty
of the subject-matter. The effect of the criticism is cumulative,
yet related directly to the specific points and the order of these
points made by Torrance and as set down in sections two and three of
this chapter.
Some of the problems which Torrance's account gives rise to
have been presented, because the central idea of his acoount is
striking in its apparent simplicity and the far-reaching consequences
"claimed for it. In light of the degree and extent of the difficulties
over Torrance's account of rationality, it is difficult to see that
his thesis in its present form is either an adequate account of
rationality or sufficient to play the central role it appears to do
in his theological system. This is not, it must be stressed, to
deny the content of that theological position, but merely the ground of
it as it seems to be given.
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!, The Value of the Theory
The criticism of Torrance has not been intended to defeat hi3 view,
or to cast doubt on the theological insights which he offers. It i3
my belief that his theological doctrine is not dependent on the account
of science which he appears to think essential. Thus the criticism has
centred rather on the prolegomena to a theologioal science, and I have
tried to show that in this area his account runs into considerable
difficulties specifically as to his theory of objectivity and rationality.
What is important in his work for theology in general is his desir#
to rid theology of subjectivism and to base theology on firm ground,
The direction he takes may not succeed, but it is certainly the right
direction. He wishes to clarify what God means for a scientific age.
As he makes clear there is a need for theology to examine its language,
logic, and concepts and to make these appropriate. The work here can
hardly be said even to have begun. His view of the status of natural
theology is a return to Anselm's "fides quaerens intellectum", which
needs to be filled out.
However the choice of Torrance was not for his theological insight,
but for the questions he raises and the account he gives of rationality.
The major points of importance will be listed with a view to integrating
some of them in the final chapter to form an account of the nature and
scope of rationality.
1. Torrance*s writing on the subject of knowledge is important.
There is a need to examine the different kinds of knowledge and the
different objects of knowledge. His stress on the community aspects
of knowledge are useful, as is his stress on the faot that knowledge
must/
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must affect both what we do and what we are. This has relevance
especially in discussion and argument. There must also be account
taken of knowing only within the knowledge relation and what this
entails for communication.
2. What there is and how it relates to what we know and how we
know is essential in a full discussion of rationality.
3. Torrance provides a useful corrective to subjectivism with
his stress on objeotivity. He also offers a oorreotive to exgreme
empiricism in his constant reference to the variety of objects and of
the approaches to them.
4. The idea of different levels of rationality is important,
though Torrance's model is too simple to be adequate and what is needed
in particular is a closer look at the limits of rationality as they are
to be discovered in the actual process of argument and discussion.
5. The interrelation of all knowledge is important, but again the
basic unity of a single form of knowing is not sufficient.
6. In his account of knowledge, he mentions the importance of
personal, social and psychological factors. These must all be taken
account of.
7. The role of criticism, though difficult on Torrance's view,
must still be clarified in its relation to rationality.
8. His accomt of communication and genuine questioning is
ihelpfult.- -» The nain difficulty is that on Torrance's own account
it is difficult to see how this can take place, for there seems no
point from which a seeker after truth or an unpleasant critic can
launch/
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launch their attacks and queries. Nevertheless, he does mention our
inbuilt aversion to change and this will be examined under the psychological
and social limits of rationality, and this relates too to his notion of
living within different frames of reference. Part of this is also, as
he sees correctly, that the way that we ask questions conditions the
kind of answers that we will receive.
9. Torrance*b account of language and particularly the central
role of reference and the openness of concepts is of note.
10. Torrance places a great deal of stress on the influence and
essential role of the community, but he does not develop this sufficiently,
and an attempt is made to rectify this in the discussion of the limits
of rationality.
11. Torrance's aim is the reintegration of man in his spiritual
and physical parts. Certainly too many theories of rationality and
the nature of man have too limited a view of the complexity of man and
his needs and capacities.
In toto, both positively and negatively, it is possible to learn
from Torranoe what form an adequate account of rationality must take
to ensure that the limits of rationality are properly defined, that
the acoount is valid in and of itself as well as equal to the complexity
of the subject matter, and, finally, that there is room for the oritio
so that genuine discussion and argument may take place in the best
tradition of rational thought and action.
1. See below, section two, "The Limits of Rationality"•
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CHAPTER FOUR - THE USE OF RATIONALITY IN
RELIGIOUS AND METAPHYSICAL ARGUMENT
Section 1. - The Senses oi' Rationality
1> Two Senses of "Rationality"
At the outset I presented the thinking which lead to the examination
of Bartley and Torrance as centring upon the Breakdown of argument and
disoussion in the fields of morals, metaphysics and religion. It was
the contention that accounts of rationality and their failure, and the
more general failure to appreciate certain basic features of the nature
of rationality led into difficulties in discussion and the feeling that
one*s opponent was arguing at total cross purposes to oneself and was
guilty of irrelevancy and inability to see what was genuinely important.
I then went on to examine two accounts of rationality on the part of
a metaphysician and a theologian and found that there were in both cases
three areas of disagreement which were clearly definable. These were,
first of all, that while to some extent there was an appreciation of the
fact that rationality was subject to certain limits there was a failure
to draw the lines of such limitations and to spell out what these limits
were especially in the practical situation of discussion and argument.
I then looked at the particular theories of rationality which Bartley
and Torrance offered and found that these accounts were faulty in their
own terms and not sufficient to the wealth and complexity of the concept
of rationality as it is used and generally understood. Then a detailed
examination and criticism of their views was offered along the lines that
the men had themselves drawn in an attempt to show the failure of the
account/
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acoount on its own terms. In the midst of this criticism attention
was constantly drawn to one of the effeots that both accounts had though
in different ways and for different reasons. This was the removal of
the possibility of criticism and discussion by the removal of any ground
for the critic or the questioner to stand on. This dictatorial
strategy meant that there was no possibility that either Torrance or
Bartley could be wrong and anyone else right. There seemed to be no
room even for debate of the issue and it is my contention that any
account of rationality which removes all possibility of argument and
discussion is an inadequate one, and must on that ground alone be
rejected. Of course, I also hold that there are other grounds for
the rejection of Torrance and Bartley and these are the failure to give
an adequate account of the limits of rationality and the internal
difficulties of each account.
It is now my task to do what I have claimed that Bartley and
Torrance have failed to dot that is to offer an adequate account of
rationality in relation to the limits of rationality and also to ensure
that genuine discussion is possible on the basis of that acoount of
rationality. This shall be done in two parts reversing the order.
I shall attempt to show that discussion and argument are possible and
pave the way for such by giving the critic ground on which to stand and
showing that the critio can have a basis for argument and this will be
done by removing the charge of irrationality, unreasonableness and
unintelligibility. This will be done by showing that there are two
senses of rationality bound up in these words which it is easy to
overlook, and such oversight leads to the breakdown of disoussion for
the/
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the critic has no basis for argument if he is irrational, totally
unreasonable, and unintelligible. I shall show that there is a basic
distinction and attempt to draw it in relation to rationality, irrationality,
persons and beliefs, reason and reasons, and intelligibility. Then
attention will be turned to the area of the limits of rationality and on
the basis of the distinction drawn, I shall try to put flesh and blood on
the bone structure of the two senses of rationality. This will be a
presentation of the limits of rationality which is in fact a description
of what we understand by rationality in the practice of argument and
discussion. An argument will be offered which will not only leave room
for the critic to take up his position, but will be in itself a description
of how such disoussion and argument may take plaoe in the hope of genuine
communication and change. The natural, situational, social, and psychological
limits of rationality will be examined.
The importance of this sort of conceptual clarification - for this
is what it is - rests on the divergence of views which consists in the
subjects of morals, metaphysics, and religion. Divergence is not in
and of itself a bad thing, but it is the scope and intensity of the
divergence which is puzzling, particularly as it has led to a common
belief that philosophy, moral3 and religion are all in a state of flux
and that these ultimately reduce to a form of cultural relativism.
With this sort of man-in-the-street attitude there is also the idea
that those who are professionally involved in these areas are totally
unrelated to real life and the real issues of the day, as well as being
unable to reach any sort of agreement or final conolusion on anything
that genuinely is important. Important questions as to the value and
point/
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point of philosophy, ethics and political study, as well as religion,
thus underlie the present aporia.
By seeking to present some of the necessary features of rationality
for the purposes of genuine argument and discussion, it is intended to
draw more clearly the way in which any discussion of a particular view,
belief, action or piece of behaviour is to be conducted especially in
the reference to such behaviour and beliefs as rational, irrational, or
non-rational. Earlier there was examination of two examples of the
sort of divergence which causes concern as neither side seems able to
appreciate what the other is saying nor their reason for saying it.1
There is extreme divergence as to what constitutes the facts of the
situation and the accusation that the other has overlooked what is in
fact essential for a true grasp of what is in question.
With this sort of accusation in philosophy, it is often difficult
for the person outside the dispute, and perhaps those in it also, to
see what sort of dispute it is and what is expeoted of each side by
the other. Rather than believing that this is an essential feature of
philosophy, it seems that it is rather the occupational hazard and can
and must be avoided by clearly drawing the basic features of what it is
to be rational. I shall first of all examine the referring of rationality
to oneself by way of introduction of a basic distinction between two
senses of rationality. But it may be helpful to offer an outline of
what is meant by rationality in the two senses, before going on to argue
the case, though the details of the description rest on the argument
offered/
1. Chapter One, p.p.
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offered and not vice versa. When mention is made here of rationality,
as has been throughout the work, it is in the sense of what is ascribed
to human beings in terms of a oapacity or ability to do something or to
come up to a particular standard. It is that which separates man from
the ape or the amoeba as well as from the computer, and in this sense
it is a characteristic of human beings in terms of their capacity and
ability.
Sense one of "ratio;lality" is concerned with part of the definition
of what it is to be a man. It is an overall, total, basic description
which says something about all and every man in light of which he may
be called a man. It is not an absolute; yet it rules out the
possibility of being irrational unless the rights and privileges of
society are withdrawn and one is either put in prison or in a mental
hospital. It is only applied when a very basic question of security
or total immorality arises and the threat of the withdrawal of basic
human rights and responsibilities is in doubt. It refers to the
capacity to reason, to appreciate the facts of a situation and the
necessity of evidenoe for beliefs and the appropriateness of demands
for justification and explanation when one is queried as to one's
behaviour. It is the ability to appreciate the need for justification
and explanation and to go at least some way in trying to provide it,
by appropriate and adequate means. It will be seen that it is also
related to action and goal-directed behaviour. In oontrast, the sense
two of "rationality" deals with what relates to highly specific contexts.
It varies according to the context, and its nature will be more easily
and clearly seen in oontrast to sense one as it is described in the
detailecl/
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detailed argument. This basic distinction is drawn as it relates to
rationality then to irrationality. It is then applied to talk and
description of persons and beliefs. Then it is applied to reason and
reasons looking at explanation, aotion and wishing, and finally,
intelligibility is examined. If this distinction is genuine then it
makes it possible for the critic to have a position from which he can
question or argue and then the limits of rationality will be looked at
seeing the form of such argument and discussion. But a start will be
made with the notion of the reference of rationality to oneself.
I wish to suggest that there is more than oddity involved in the
idea of referring to oneself as rational and that such a reference is
neither necessary nor sufficient to the claim for rationality. It is
not necessary to be able to refer to oneself as being rational. This
is the case for it is possible to act rationally and yet to be unable
2
to say that it is rational. This may be either beoause the person
does not know what "rational" means or that it is not appropriate to
apply such a term. One may also act rationally and yet be unable to
give an explanation for it. For example, one may imagine a novice
skier sweeping down the slopes of Glenshee straight towards a tree.
This novice has not yet learned how to stop or even how to turn. He
sits down and stops. The instructor is delighted and inquires how he
knew to do that, because most people just fall flat on their faces and
stop somewhat painfully. The skier can only confess that he just did
it. Yet the behaviour is rational given an understanding of skiing and
time/
2. See above, p.p.41
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time to consider the mechanics involved. But this particular novice
has no grasp of the refinements or even the basics, yet has shown
natural ability and aptitude of the same sort as the small boy in the
laboratory who makes ingenious suggestions which are useful and which
actually work. One may behave in a way which is called rational and
seem to be rational, but be unable to say why one has done it and to
3
have a total lack of appreciation of the effects of one's action.
The necessity of being able to describe in rational terms one*3
actions or beliefs is even more doubtful if we consider the example of
an individual who may have faith in a person without what most folk
would oall good reasons for such faith. In fact, this faith in, for
example, the habitual criminal, may run contrary to all appearances and
all facts in the context; yet despite this, the faith in the individual,
the willingness to trust far beyond the point of apparent common sense,
the defence against any and all criticism no matter how justified, are
all held strongly, but without necessarily the ability to express the
grounds of such faith or any reason for the attitude. Or perhaps there
are some grounds offered, but these are totally inadequate to support the
degree and extent of the faith involved and the actions which follow
such faith. In parallel fashion, one may be very much in love with an
individual, or out of love, and yet be unable to express the reason for
one's state of mind, or indeed confess that there are no reasons while
strongly believing and affirming that it is still the case that you feel
what you feel, and know what you know. The poet expresses it thus
"1/
3. P. Alexander, "Rational Behaviour and Psychoanalytic Explanation",
p.331.
269
"I do not love you, Dr. Fell.
But why I cannot tell.
But this I know full well,
4
I do not love you, Dr. Feil."
This may be an example of the heart laving its reasons which the
mind cannot grasp, or it may rather point to the need to regard
rationality, not as a narrow feature of mental operations, but as
more integrated in the whole of man in all his variety of thought, will,
and emotions.
It is not only not necessary to refer rationality to oneself, but
it is also not sufficient. One can give to others what is to oneself
a totally rational explanation of one's behaviour, but they might regard
it as irrational. The de ranged person when asked why he is sticking
mousetraps on the wall may reply that they are to catch the pink rats
which are running up and down the walls, but this is not usually held
to be rational behaviour. VShan we behave in what to us is a perfectly
sensible way, we are puzzled and annoyed when others fail to see why we
did something, and even after explanation, still regard us askance.
Rationality is not only insufficient in reference to oneself, but
may point to a much more important aspect, that of rationality itself
never being totally sufficient. Hume's attack on rationalism is designed
to show that reason itself is not and by the nature of the case cannot be
5
sufficient in itself. One is not and cannot be totally rational. This
releases us from trying to live up to an impossible standard of rationality,
w
4. See above, Chapter two, p.p.41
5. In relation to morals, D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature Book iii,
Part I Section I, p.455J "Of Scepticism with regard to Reason",
Book I, Part IV Section I, p.p. 180ff, (ed.) Selby-Bigge.
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in the sort of way that Hartley has in mind a propos the rationalist
6
orisis of integrity . Hume is trying to Taring attention to oertain
basio faots which he regards as limiting the role that reason plays and
can play in metaphysics and morals. What is crucial in this is that
when we talk of "rational" and "reasonable" with all other synonyms, we
are not meaning these in any absolute sense, but always and only in a
relative sense. That is to say that there is not and cannot be a
totally rational man for he would no longer be a man but an automaton
or a divinity. And parallel with this, there cannot be a totally
irrational man, for he too would lose his right to be called a man or
treated as a man.
Individual self-reference of rationality is neither necessary nor
sufficient. But more importantly, it is odd to refer ever to oneself
a3 being rational. In what sort of circumstances can one make sense of
the self-ascription of rationality? There is the need to characterise
this sort of occasion, for in the normal course of events we would be
extremely puzzled to hear someone proclaiming his rationality to one and
all. One wotild say that one is rational or that one's behaviour is
rational only in the context in which some question arises as to the
rationality of action. This is not, except in the cases of dementia,
a question as to the total irrationality of the action or person
involved, but rather expressing that the person is not as one would
expect him to be or that his action is not in keeping with the usual
pattern of behaviour which he exhibits.
The oddity of the self-reference of rationality is the back^fownd
against which it can be seen that there are two basic senses of "rational"
which must be clearly separated, and the confusion of the two in argument
and/
6. Bartley, R.C., Chapter lj See above Chapter Two p.p.2/7
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and judgment avoided# The first and most basic meaning of "rational"
is included in the idea that all men are rational# It is in this sense
that Popper and Watkins have recently written of the "Rationality
Principle".^ This rationality is taken as part of the definition of
what it is to be a man. It is an overall, total, basic description
which says something about all ana every man in light of which he is
what he is# This is what entitles a man to be called a man, the fact
that he is rational.
what is meant by "rational" in this basic and overall sense, is
not however, something absolute. It does not and cannot imply total
perfection. An attempt will be made to draw out the reasons why
rationality is not absolute but rather relative in aotual situational
terms. But here it can be seen that conceptually to be totally
rational or totally irrational must inevitably involve the removal of
a large area of crucial discourse of willing, failing, sinning, guilt,
responsibility, punishment and the cluster of notions around these terms.
a Being rational must imply neither
the capaoity to be totally rational nor the capacity to be totally
irrationalJ
7. J.W.N. Watkins, "Imperfect Rationality"; K. Popper, "Rationality and
the Status of the Rationality Principle".
8. S. Hampshire makes a similar point in relation to freewill and determinism
in Thought and Action, especially chapter two. 5. Warnock, The Object
of Morality, p.p.143-4
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irrational. If one was always and only rational, then the sense of
"rational" would be nearly Pickwickian. Thus, if one was only and
always irrational, the sense of "irrational'• would lose its meaning
over and against all the varying degrees of success and failure in the
enterprise. The man who can only be rational is no longer a man but a
computer-like machine. The man who can only be irrational is no longer
a man but a psychopath.
Popper suggests that at this level the rationality principle is
9
trivial and false but is nevertheless essential. I shall not enter
into discussion as to whether or not his description is adequate but
shall ooncentrate on the level which Popper fails to distinguish from
the level of the rationality principle, and which is different in kind
and scope and has lead to much of the confusion between differing views
as to what is rational in belief and behaviour.
The second basic sense of "rational" is that which is directly
related to man's behaviour and beliefs. It is what a rational man
actually does and believes, but this in xhe context that he could have
done differently, but did not."^ It is in this sense that it is
possible to see the cruoial difference between the two senses, for in
the first sense, that of man as rational, it is impossible for man to be
irrational. This is not to say that there are not totally iirational
men, but that those who are totally irrational lose the right to be called
men, and more importantly, to be treated us men, so they are put in mental
hospitals/
9. Popper, "Rationality and the Status of the Rationality Principle."
10. This type of argument relates closely to discussion of "can" and
"could". See M. hyers, The Refutation of Determinism, particularly
in relation to the idea that free will involves the capacity to do
otherwise.
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hospitals or prison and the basic rights as individuals which the rest
of society enjoys are withdrawn from them. In sense two of "rational"
it is possible to behave irrationally and to hold irrational ideas and
beliefs. But this can only be done on occasions and in particular
contexts and situations. These situations limit the nature of the
description of the irrationality that can be given.
In sense one of "rational" one is always fully rational for to
fall short in this sense is to be in need of hospitalisation. However,
in sense two there is the assumption that one is not and need not be fully
rational. This sense allows room for falling short. The same point
has been made in different places. For example, in parallel with rule-
guided behaviour. "The notion of following a rule is logically
inseparable from the notion of making a mistake. If it is possible to
say of someone that he is following a rule that means that one can ask
11
whether he is doing what he does correctly or not". The same thing
applies to "rational" in sense two, that there is neoessarily room for
falling short. Bennett comments that "having an ability to carry out
some kind of intellectual task entails having an ability to know when
IP
one has done it wrongly." * This in turn entails the possibility that
one can do it wrongly.
There has already been stress on the importance of context for
the second sense of "rational". This importance can be similarly seen
from two other sources. S. Lukes comments on discussion of the context-
dependent/
11. P. Vwinch, the Idea of a Social Science, p.32
12. J. Bennett, Rationality, p.92} See also his discussion of Bees
and rule-guided behaviour in p.p. 17-18, ibid
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dependent nature of some features of rationality, that, "There are
(obviously) contextually-provided criteria of meaning. Again there
are contextually-provided criteria which make particular beliefs
aopropriate in particular circumstances. There are also contextually-
provided criteria which specify the best way to arrive at and hold
beliefs. In general, these are oontextually-provided criteria for
deciding what counts as a 'good reason' for holding a belief
It is just this sense of having good reasons for a belief or for a
course of action which is central to the second sense of "rational".
The same sort of point is made in a discussion of Freudian explanation.
"Similarly, it may be rational to behave in a particular way given the
beliefs I have about certain matters of fact hut these beliefs may be
irrational because they conflict vdLth the evidence I have or evidence
I could easily get. or are based on careless or mistaken reasoning.
But if I believe that w is the case and that in consequence, I ought
to aim to produce y then, behaviour that tends to produce y may be
rational, within the narrower context, no matter how wrong is my
14
belief about w. The rationality of behaviour is relative to context."
It is my contention that this is certainly the case for sense two of
"rational", but not so for sense one, which lays stress on the universal
and absolute qualities of rationality in relation to the nature of man.
Both senses of "rational" have, however, a limiting oase. This
is the point at which one would withdraw the epithet "rational". Here
the/
13. 2. Lukes, "Seme Problems about Rationality", B. Wilson (ed)
Rationality, p. 211.
lzf. P. Alexander, ibid, p. 332.
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the two senses must run into each other. In sense two of "rational",
if a man continually did things which were seen to be irrational in
all and every situation and contest, this would inevitably lead us to
consider whether he was "rational" in sense one, that of all men being
rational. It is the mad man, the totally criminal, or the totally
immoral man who causalus to withdraw even this basic sense and to lock
up the person in question on the grounds of the safety and well-being
of society and of the individual himself. At this point, however,
there has developed a counter-move to the withdrawal of rationality.
Freudian theory has presented us with explanations of the most
apparently irrational and pointless pieces of behaviour. Slips of the
tongue, lapses of memory, behaviour habits, all can be made xo fit into
a general view of what the individual concerned has experienced,
particularly in early childhood. Not only can an explanation be given
of th8 behaviour as a result of Freudian analysis, but the individual
concerned can himself come to reoognise the truth of what is said though
this6often a long and painful process. It can, it is claimed, eventually
lead to tha successful treatment and disappearance of the neurosis in
question. Behaviour which onee appeared to be totally irrational, can
be seen to be rational by virtue of the Freudian analysis.
If a specific example of irrational behaviour is taken which can
be interpreted on Freudian terms as rational, one becomes aware of the
subtle shift in the meaning of "rational" and "irrational". A prominent
jeweller suddenly begins to wash floors, each floor over and over again.
The/
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The mood passes, but in three months time, he begins again scrubbing
the same floors over and over. This is an example of irrational
action. The Freudian seeks to analyse the patient, and to probe into
his subconscious. He discovers that as a child the jev?eller had seen
his mother forced to sorub floors by his father if she in some way
failed to please him. He had forgotten this. On each occasion he
had begun himself to wash floors he had had a tiff with his wife of a
very minor nature, but this, however, the Freudian states, was sufficient
to elicit from him the necessity of making appeasement in the most
primitive and basic form that he knew, which was to wash floors. The
"irrational" action oan thus be seen to be infact perfectly rational
given all the knowledge of the facts and the background of the situation.
On this type of account, the sadist is not behaving irrationally, but
quite rationally, whan he beats his sexual partner because given his
outlook, desires, tastes, and background, he is right in the sense of
"rational" to behave as he does.
The problem with these aocounts is that there is the feeling on
the one hand that they make a genuine point and give some sort of
explanation, while at the same time an uneasy feeling in describing of
the behaviour of the jeweller or the sadist as "rational". Both
instincts are correct. It must be admitted that there is a sense in
which a Freudian analysis explains what is difficult to understand.
It may be only one sort of explanation and it may not be a sufficient
explanation - to discover the extent of its success leads into the realms
of/
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of psychology and psychiatry, as well as psycho-analysis. But at
the very least it does offer some kind of explanation. This is not
to say that if offers a total explanation, or that it qualifies the
ascription of "rational" tc any and all odd behaviour which can be
subjected to this account. If it is "rational", it is "rational"
within a very peculiar context in which actions and slips of the tongue
and memory have gained an unwarranted significance and esercise and
unreasonable control. It is "rational" only from the viewpoint of the
Freudian, hence the need for psycho-analysis by a Freudian, who has
himself been psycho-analysed and the convincing of the patient, not
only of the relation of his behaviour to pieces of past experience,
but at the same time, the propounding of the particular theory which
needs to be accented before the pattern of connection of behaviour and
past can itself be accepted. When the Freudian claims to cure the
patient, the patient must become a Freudian to appreciate and experience
that cure. What is important, then, is that in this context the word
"rational" is not being used in a normal sort of way, especially in
regard to the lower limit of irrationality. It lias sense only in an
highly selective context and with reference to a narrow view of man
and behaviour. The Freudian explanation is no-c what is normally
accepted as explanation, for it is a different sort of thing altogether.
It explains within a particular sphere, but it does not make explicable
to any and every man who but looks to see. The mad man, the sadist,
the poor jeweller, are not rational simply because their actions can be
construed in a particular light and seen to make some sort of sense therein.
They/
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They are still irrational, and they require treatment and care#
When they are cured, when they no longer require treatment and care,
when their behaviour conforms to societal norms and explicable patterns,
then and only then oan they be regarded as rational again.
It may be that when the Freudian offers a "rational" explanation,
what he means by "rational" is much less rigid than has been suggested.
Some might wish to claim that the explained behaviour was still
irrational both to the patient and to the therapist, but that this
"irrationality" lay in the fact that the action is unsuitable. The
meaning of "unsuitable" is complex in this level of response, for it
may refer to the fact that the act is unsuitable to the end desired or
it may mean that it is ineffective. Action may be inappropriate in
that one does not know the aim and purpose behind the action, in
contrast to the situation where one is fully conscious and aware of
what one is doing. In this case, "rational" will refer to actions
which were teleologically apt, and "irrational" to actions which were
"blind", that is to say, inappropriate to the purpose. The patient in
realising that his action is "blind", e.g. the washing of floors, may
come to see some kind of sense in the aotion in that he realises that
it is inappropriate, certainly as it is not dear what the aim behind
such action is. He realises the inappropriateness, but does not
necessarily classify the action as "rational", when he or the therapist
clarifies what it involves. The action of washing the floor is also
ineffective, in that it does not meet the particular need he actually
has. One merely expends lots of energy without realising the reasons
for/
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for it or it bearing fruit. The behaviour is not fitting to deal
with the problem. Even after explanation of the action has been
given the inefficiency still remains. In this case the "rational"
aotion is the aotion which achieves the end in view in the most
effective way, while "irrational" action is that which may be
intelligible, yet is ineffective in expense of energy and inappropriate
to meeting the need involved. If this is the position of the
Freudian account of rationality there is much to agree with, but it
does not appear to be the emphasis offered. Nevertheless, the
importance of this sort of acoount is that it highlights the importance
of knowing what one is doing, of being in full possession of one's
wits, or, in other words, having a certain capacity to act in an
appropriate fashion to the situation. This is crucial in
understanding rational behaviour, but it must also be linked with an
aooount of disposition in relation to one's attitude to both the
situation and others in the situation as regards the flexibility or
rigidity of one's approach in the particular context and in regard to
the differing consequences. Cne must be open to "rational"
considerations, as well as having the capacity to act appropriately in
the sense of fulfilling one's aim and purpose by suitable behaviour.
The danger of tho Freudian attack on irrational behaviour is that
it endangers the understanding of what is rational, reasonable, and
explicable, and reduces these to something trivial, in the sense that
any belief or action at all may be understood if one has a particular
context or outlook. This kind of position is paralleled by the danger
of/
of cultural relativism, which denies any absolute standards of behaviour
right and wrong, good or evil, and instead suggests that all these
things are relative to a particular time, place, kind of person, and
practical situation, and that it is not possible to generalise in this
area, but rather one needs to indulge in description of the context and
of the standards within that context. what is rational is rational
only within a particular context and at one time within that oontext,
and at one plaoe, or at least within a highly specifiable location.
Thus one must beware of imagining that our standards of truth, right
and wrong, are in any way superior or inferior to any others, but
rather to accept the faot of the differences and indulge merely in
description of such differences without passing hasty or considered
judgments. We oannot judge, for we shall then ourselves be judged
and found just as wanting. This is a very subtle approach and
statement of what is a genuine problem. Much rail be found to
sympathise with in it as regards sense two of "rationality" and
its relation to specific contexts. But it will be argued that
while there is a great deal to relativism, it is in itself not sufficient
for it ignores sense one of "rationality"• Relativism tends to
overstress the degree of differences between ourselves and others,
between cultures and groups, and to talk as if these differences were
absolute and totally inexplicable on any other terms but their own.
This is not the case. There are certain basic similarities and
structures. There is a great deal of common consent and understanding
and all this may be typified at the level of "rationality" in sense one.
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I shall in due course seek to delineate the different sorts of features
which are related to the different senses of rationality and to propound
them in the proper perspective as regards their implication for man as
a member of particular groups, a non-member of others, and as a seeker
and arguer on the basis of reasons and grounds rather than on shifting
sand«
An attempt has been made to delineate a confusion between two
senses of "rational", "Rational" in sense one applies to man in
general - to all and every man; whereas "rational" in sense two refers
to either man or his behaviour and beliefs in light of a particular
situation and context where actions and beliefs are appropriate,
reasonable, proper, or inappropriate, improper, and unreasonable.
To apply sense one of "rationality" to oneself is neither necessary
nor sufficient. To apply sense one to other people makes sense only
when a very basic question of security and total immorality is
concerned, where the withdrawal of the epithet "rational" implies the
withdrawal of certain basic human rights and responsibilities. In
contrast, the application of "rational" in sense two makes sense in a
situation where oneself or another is threatened, questioned, or
criticised, and where justification is appropriate. In other words,
this is to try to separate two levels of the application of "rational'^
the one as being at the level of a regulative principle, which may be
trivial and even false, and the other the level of contextual action,
behaviour and belief. In some sense this is parallel to the distinction




falls within the principle.
There will be an examination of what is involved in the notion
of "rationality" in both senses and what are the important features of
these senses. The relevance of this question is to help to clarify
what it is we are doing when we state what we believe and behave in
accordance with that, and what we are doing when we question what
someone else believes and hi3 behaviour in accordance with that belief.
What 3ort of thing is involved in this, what are the standards, if any,
involved, and what is implied by both of these? As a result of the
responses to these questions, it is hoped to clarify how the rational
man can be rational about his behaviour, his beliefs, and his rationality,
and how genuine argument and disoussion become possible when the methods
and form of criticism and justification are drawn in light of the
distinction between the two Benses of "rational".
15« J.Rawls, "Two Conoepts of Rules", Philosophical Review. Vol. LXIV,
1955; "Justloe as Fairness". Philosophical Review. Vol. LXVII, 1958.
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2. Two Senses of "Irrationality"
In sub-section one, an attempt has been made to delineate a
distinction between two senses of "rationality". The first is with
referenoe to the general capacity of all mankind, and is part and
paroel of what would normally be aocounted to be human. The seoond
sense is related to more spaoifio contexts in which, in light of
particular presuppositions or attitudes which one has adopted, a
particular way of life, or series of propositions is held to follow
rationally. In this latter sense, it is more akin to a kind of
consistency, though the need for argument and the nature of the reasons
involved in adopting any such view must also be taken account of in
clarifying the sense of "rational" in sense two. One way of seeking
to understand what rationality involves is, of course, by seeking to
» »
understand irrationality and what it involves. There seem to be three
important aspects of irrationality which need to be examined to
understand rationality and to see the relation of irrationality to the
senses of "rationality" already outlined. "Irrationality" in senses
one and two in opposition to senses one and two of "rationality" will
be examined while recognising that the importance of irrationality in
the present situation is seen in the specifio doctrine of "irrationalism",
and what is involved in suoh a doctrine.
Hare, in Freedom and Reason, makes the point that, "It is very
important to distinguish between things which it would be ridiculous,
inapposite, or even misleading to say, and things which would be false
or incomprehensible or inconsistent. It is only when it would be
false or incomprehensible or inconsistent to say something that
philosophers/
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philosophers should he professionally interested"• While disagreeing
with his limitation of the philosopher's professional interest and
noting that the central point Hare makes need not he limited only to
what is said, but is relevant also to what is believed (and perhaps
never said) and to what is done, it must be agreed that Hare makes the
germ of a distinction between the two senses of "irrational" which
parallel senses one and two of "rational". Before expanding the
distinction it is admitted that the total separation of the senses of
"irrational" may in practice be impossible, but this is not to say that
the distinction is not a valid one, or that it is not necessary in
theory to be clear about what the different senses involve, particularly
with reference to discussion and argument. Rather the senses will
be seen to be related on a sliding scale in which the movement is from
an absolute, total, and general level, to the more particular, specific
and relative.
If one were to apply the epithet "irrational" in sense one to a
person or belief, action, or any feature of a person or group to which
such a judgement were appropriate, one would gather the following sort
of pioture. The individual or group would act without reference to
any form of reasoning, or evidence in the sense that the facts of the
situation would be unappreciated by the ignoring of such facts or the
failure to recognise that there were any such facts at all. This
involves/
1, R.Hare, Freedom and Reason. p»58.
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involves both the inability to recognise for oneself in the speoifio
situation what the facts are and what reasons there are in favour or
against one acting in a particular way, and that when questioned or
challenged with referenoe to one's behaviour, the person concerned
would make no attempt at justification or explanation and offer no
reason at all for his behaviour, failing to discern either the need
for such reasons or failing to grasp what reasons there might be in
the situation. There would be no sense (literally "nonsense")
involved in what he did and said. His actions and words would servo
no purpose and have no reason behind them. The sort of situation in
mind is that of the "mindless" - note the common use of such description
in these oases - behaviour of "mods" and "rockers" on the rampage in
the sea-side resorts, subjecting people and property to vicious violence
without any apparent purpose and without any reason which is recognisable
as such. To suggest that they did it for fun, or that they enjoyed
doing it, makes the absence of a genuine reason all the more terrifying,
in that we are at a loss what to say in response to such admissions.
The class of actions and persons subsumed under the heading of
"irrational" in sense one, are those neurotics and psychotics, infants,
or the criminally insane, who are not only not responsible for their
actions and words, but are incapable of describing before, during, or
after a particular action what they are doing, why they are doing it,
and what is involved in their action and its results. It is not th®
case of the abandoning of logio, reasoning, explanation, or justification,
but rather a complete inability to appreciate the relevance of any and
all/
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all of these to oneself and one's actions to the extent that one is no
longer entitled to either the rights or privileges, far less the
responsibilities of being accounted a person, or rather a rational
human being. The "irrational" man in sense one is one who has no
full encounter with reality and thus no proper relation to reality.
In this sense "reality" means the relation of cause and effect and
action to purpose. Persistence in contradiction in what one 3ays and
in what one does destroys all hope of communication and understanding,
and therefore of cooperation.
In some ways, sense two of "irrational" is merely a variation on
the same theme, but what is important is the degree of variation and
what this implies in respect of possible improvement, modification, and
change. In sense two, the "irrational" man or group acts against the
apparent evidence, or on too few facts, or on the basis of facts which
are not properly appreciated. Often they cannot explain their actions
and the demand far explanation or justification leads to the adducement
of facts which are not obviously relevant to the question under
examination. The interpretation of situations and people is odd to
the point of perversity and thqy are ready and willing to dispute over
whether or not what most would agree is a reason for something is in
actual faet a reason at all, or whether some totally irrelevant
feature ought to be considered carefully as integral to any judgment in
the situation. Their reasoning is without an adequate basis, and they depart
from the accepted norms of reasoning, explanation and justification.
All together they seem unreasonable, perverse, foolish, or "thick in
2
the head", and, contrary to Warnock'o disclaimer# such people do often
appear/
2. Gr.ffarnook. The Object of Morality.
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appear "irrational", though it is in sense two, whioh is to say that
they are irrational from a particular point of view. The crucial
difference between the two senses as outlined is the divergence over
the eshewing of logic, argument, reasoning, or justification. In
sense one, questions of faot, justification, or evidence appear not to
arise and to make no sense at all to the "irrational" man or group,
whereas in sense two, these questions may at least be allowed, but the
type and level of response i3 far removed from what is normally expected
or sought in the asking of such a question. The kinds of reasons,
justification and evidence offered in sense two are not apparently
totally relevant to the problem at large and the mode of activity is
peculiar, while still being recognisable a3 a form of reasoning,
justification, and activity,
S,Lukes, in a discussion of some problems of rationality, offers
an account of the irrationality of beliefs on the grounds of various
inadequacies. These will be related to the delineation of levels one
and two of "irrationality" seeking to illustrate the difference, Lukes
suggests that beliefs are irrationals "1. if they are illogical,e.g.
inconsistent or (self-)contradictory, consisting of or relying on
invalid inferences eto,..".3 A propos sense one, this would be true
only if this referred to total illogioality in which all and every form
of logic was set aside regularly and completely, and that the belief or
the individual wa3 regularly and always inconsistent and self-contradictory,
IV
3, S.Lukes, "Some Problems of Rationality", B.Wilson (ed.) Rationality.
pp,194ff* My views on "irrationality" were already formed when I
came across Lukes' account, but I draw on this to illustrate both
similarities and differences#
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It is loss clear that Lukes' last point is valid, far a belief may be
a true belief yet rely, in the mind of the individual who holds it, on
a false premiss or inference, which is, of course, not recognised to be
false by the individual concerned. But a belief could be "irrational*
in sense two, inasmuch as it had certain illogical features, or in that
it appeared inconsistent or even self-contradictory, but the person who
held suoh a belief was willing and able to go some way in arguing over
the questions of logic and consistency, and able to offer some
alternative definitions. Perhaps even this last point of being able
to offer some alternative definition is not essential, but rather it
is sufficient if the person is in a situation of unease or aporia,
admitting that apparently the argument against him shows his belief
to be irrational, but yet being unwilling to accept this, while still
being unable to deal with the argument or to offer an alternative account.
There would have to be certain limitations on this, e.g. is the doubt
on the part of the believer serious, does he in the future attempt to
meet the doubt, does he re-examine his position in light of the argument?
"Irrationality" in sense two, here refers to the departure of a belief
from the established norm for beliefs and the argument and discussion
of beliefs, perhaps without any clear notion of the new basis being
offered for the "irrational" belief. An example here would be the
Copernican thesis of the earth revolving round the sun. This was, and
still is, prima i'uoie "irrational" to the ordinary observer, yet it is
not the case that Copernicus and his supporters eschewed logic or
justification, but rather set about over a long period of time to




S.Lukes* second point on the inadequacy of irrational beliefs is
"if they are partially or wholly false".1"' One wonders whence is
derived the standpoint to make such a judgment of falsity, but as it
relates to sense one of "irrational", such beliefs or people would
al ays be false without hope of correction or even awareness of the
need for correction: while in sense two of "irrational" the upholder
of the belief might wish to argue over the truth and falsity, and
certainly the degree of falsity, in order to seek to preserve the belief,
though making use of apparently irrelevant or unrelated evidence.
"3. If they are nonsensical (though it may be questioned whther they
would then qualify as propositions and thus as beliefs)".^ In sense
one of "irrational", for a belief to be nonsensical would mean that it
could not be stated or propounded with the support of any evidenoe at
all, whereas in sense two of "irrational", a belief might well be
nonsensical given the prevailing views of mankind and the cultural
outlook, yet the believer would try to explain what he meant and to
offer alternative definitions, or perhaps rather express, though
unknowingly, the necessity for such alternative definition. The
difference seems rather that a belief is "irrational" in sense one at
this point if it is nonsensical from all and every viewpoint, and
nonsensical in sense two if it is "irrational" from most or some points
of view, but not necessarily all.
Lukes/
4. Lukes, ibid, pp.194ff»
5. Lukes, ibid.
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Lukes* fourth point is more diffioult to grasp. It is that
beliefs are irrational "if they are situationally specific or ad hoc.
6
i.e. not universalized because bound to particular occasions". One
sees no reason why anyone, rational or not, should not hold beliefs which
are relevant and non-universalizable in that they refer only to a very
speoific situation. For example, one might believe that when one is
confronted with a red and black cabbage which sings "Mary, Maiy, Quite
Contrary", one ought to respond by singing "Baa, Baa, Black Sheep".
Of course, this is universalizable in the sense that it is relevant to
all and every confrontation of a singing red and black oabbage, when
the tune is appropriate, but it is also bound to particular occasions
which are highly specific and exceedingly rare. The irrationality
perhaps arises in that, for the "irrational" belief in sense one, there
is no relation of this belief to anything else whether it be other
beliefs or other situations. The belief which is "irrational" in sense
two is that because it is not the sort of belief which relates to anything
obviously, but given a fuller account of the crucial nature of red and
black singing cabbages, there might be some mitigation against outright
and total rejection of the belief,
Luke's fifth and final example is the most detailed and crucial.
Beliefs are irrational "if the ways in which they come to be held or
the manner in which they are held are seen as deficient in some respeot.
For example: (a) the beliefs may be based, partially or wholly, on
irrelevant considerations; (b) they may be based on insufficient
evidence; (c) they may be held uncritically, i.e. not held open to




held unreflectively, without consoious consideration of their assumptions
and implications, relations to other beliefs etc."'' To be understood
as "irrational" in sense one, one would need to change the wording of
Lukes' initial description tos "if the ways in which they oome to be
held or the manner in which they are held are seen as deficient in every
respect", whereas "irrational" in sense two would read as originally
presented with the emphasis falling on "••••deficient in some respect".
If each of the four subseotions is taken in turn, the differences
between "irrational" in sense one and two must lie in the degree of
irrelevance and the basis of such a judgement,the separation of no
evidence at all being offered, or evidence which is not evidence at all,
from evidence which is evidence but i3 not convinoing as it stands, the
nature of the uncritical holding of the belief, in other words, why one
holds the belief to be beyond refutation or modification and whether or
not one says any more than the mere statement of its non-refutability
or non-modiflability, or whether one seeks to explain that in light of
X,Y, and 2, then there can he no refutation, and finally, whether the
holding of beliefs unrefleotingly means the holding of a belief without
any reason at all, or rather the holding of a belief without being
consoious of why one holds it, but still having the capacity to inquire
into the nature and grounds of one's belief, given that the need for
suoh clarification is made clear. It is nscessaiy to relate the holding
of belief in an uncritical and unrefleotive fashion to the concept of
Q
"dissonance". fcfhat is meant by dissonance may be clarified by reference
to a social science investigation called "When Prophecy Fails". The
author/
7. Lukes, ibid.
8. Festinger, Rieoken^ oohachter, ..hen Prophecy Fails, p.27.
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authors of this investigation of a sect, who prophesied catastrophe
for the world on a specific date and their own departure before the
disaster culminated, examined the reaction of the believers after
disconfirmation, and outlined the central notion of dissonance as
follows: "Two opinions, or beliefs, or items of knowledge are dissonant
with each other if they do not fit together - that is, if they are
inconsistent, or if, considering only the two particular items, one
does not follow from the other. for example, a cigarette smoker who
believes that smoking is bad for his health has an opinion that is
dissonant with the knowledge that he is continuing to smoke. He may
have many other opinions, beliefs, or items of knowledge that are
consonant with continuing to smoke but the dissonance nevertheless
9
exists too". The test for irrationality as outlined by Lukes with
reference to uncritical and unrefleotive holding of beliefs needs to
be modified in relation to dissonance, in that, if there is no dissonant
evidenoe, belief or situation, then it is difficult to hold that one
must still exercise criticism and reflection on all and every one of
one's beliefs. Rather the pattern seems to be that whenever our
beliefs come into conflict, or some new fact arises whioh casts doubt
on an old belief, in other words, when dissonance arises, then and only
then do we undergo the kaid of critical reflection which Lukes outlines.
It is possible that one might hold such critical reflection to be one's
methodological presupposition in one's work, e.g. a scientist seeking
to disprove his own theories, but the point is that it is impossible to
do this all the time for everything, and that to do this requires the
uncritical/
9. Festinger, Riecken, Sohachter, ibid, p.p.25-6.
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uncritical and unreflective holding of some other beliefs in order to
be critically reflective on the probi era in hand.1^
Most often it would seem to be the case that the manifestation of
dissonance leads to some critical reflection on one*s belief in the
following manner, "Dissonance produces discomfort and, correspondingly,
there will arise pressures to reduce or eliminate the dissonance.
Attempts to reduce dissonance represent the observable manifestations
that dissonance exists. Such attempts may take any or all of three
forms. The person may try to change one or more of the beliefs, opinions,
or behaviour involved in the dissonance; to acquire new information or
beliefs that will increase the existing consonance and thus cause the
total dissonance to be reduced; or to forget or reduce the importance
of these cognitions that are in a dissonant relationship.
If any of the above attempts are to be successful, they must meet
with the support from either the physical or the social environment.
In the absence of such support, the most determined efforts to reduce
dissonance may be unsuccessful",^
Without dissonance, the attempt to overcome it whioh may be
defined as some form of critical reflection, is neither necessary not
to the point. The importance of this concept will be returned to and
its role in argument and discussion, when the pattern of change involved
in one set of beliefs giving place to another, or in the giving up of
particular beliefs is examined.
The/
10, See above, Chapter Two. p.p. ^ 7
11, Pastinger, Rieckcn, Schachtar, ibid. p,26.
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The differences in senses one and two of "irrationality" relate
to the degree and kind of irrationality involved in illogicality, falsity
the genesis and continued upholding of a belief, and in relation to
evidence and uncritical reflection or lack of it. Sense one refers to
the total setting aside of all logic, sense, and meaning, without the
awareness of what is involved in this. One doubts what cannot (logioally
possibly) be doubted, and is certain of what cannot (logioally possibly)
be held to be true. Sense two refers to the conscious setting aside of
the accepted norms of logic, proof and sense, either in some general way
on the basis of other considerations, or only in one particular and
definite instance again based on considerations. In the latter case
one is willing to continue the argument, and is aware of the need and
point of such an argument, without necessarily having the capacity to
engage in such argumentation. One doubts what normally cannot (physically
and/or psychologically possibly) be doubted, and is certain of what
cannot (physically and/or psychologically) be held to be true as far as
most people are concerned. The last phrase is the most difficult, for
one must allow room for a new Einstein, who will fly in the face of all
generally accepted truth with apparent incomprehensible nonsense,
which in the end of the day will be shown to be correct and meaningful,
while at the same time protecting society and clarifying the nature of
that protection from insane cranks. This is why the difference between
senses one and two appears to be based on some sort of sliding scale
from the particular to the absolute, the exceptional to the totally
impossible/
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impossible (and that in all senses)• It may well be that some sort of
time faotor is the dividing line between ingenious invention and crazed
delusion, in as much as if no one else ever was convinced of the truth
of one's theory it would be difficult to allow that the theory had any
truth other than the merely logically possible, but in practice it may
be literally thousands of years after the inital idea, belief, or
experiment that the truth is finally upheld, and "common-sense" refuted.
It, therefore, seems rather informal in detailed separation, yet hopefully
clear in the intent and the basis of the distinction.
Another possible way of expressing what is in mind may be derived
from T.F. ^'orrance's account of irrationality. Torrance states that
"In modern science undue emphasis upon the place of the human subject
leads quickly into an irrational situation in which it is claimed that
man himself imposes patterns of his own upon nature through his own
inventions. Not only is man unable to distinguish a given reality
from his own constructions, but even to think of trying to do so, is to
fall from the pure ideal of soience as complete technological control
12
of nature". What Torrance means by irrationality is defined as the
"ultimately irrational failure to distinguish the objective reality from
the subjective states of our own consciousness, or to distinguish what
13
is not ourselves from ourselves." In practice, this means for
Torrance that, "I cognise this table and typewriter truly when I let
myself be compelled by what is there, and think accordingly. When I





irrational when I think that the table is a car and the typewriter is
a steering-wheel" Torrance, in these examples, is referring to a
detachment from reality, specifically in concentration upon the subject
himself rather than the object, but what he does not mean is the total
detachment from reality in which there is nothing at all of the objective,
but rather only the situation where there is insufficient of the
objective to be satisfactory. He talks of "bloated selfhood", and
15
"undue emphasis", rather than of something totally subjective with no
objective relation at all. Thu3 Torrance Ls outlining something of
what is meant by sense two of "irrational" in whioh there is a departure
from the norm and ideal, though I have already tried to show that
Torrance's account of this departure does not solve the problem as he
requires it to be solved.^'" Nevertheless, his account does offer
another example of the distinction between senses one and two of
"irrational", in which Torrance's picture of irrationality is that of
sense two, with Torrance's own view that man can be corrected and the
problem solved by the controlling of subjectivity. In contrast, sense
one of "irrationality" would seem to be incurable along the lines of
Torrance's approaoh, and it is this realm of insanity which is pointed
to. Torrance only suggests that man is too self-centred, not that he
is totally insane. Cne may argue and gesticulate towards the truth
with the self-centred person, but one is wasting one's time in that




16. See above, Chapter Three, p.p.H"5
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Not all agree, however, that one need dismiss ar^rone as insane
and we have already discussed one attempt to reduce the sense one of
"irrational" in the examination of Freudian theory and what exactly it
has to show about irrational behaviour. The argument may be summed up
in that oontext by reference to P. Alexander's article on "Rational
Behaviour and Psychoanalytic Explanation", where he expresses the point
as follows?- "If we say that our irrational behaviour has been shown to
be "really rational" we allow "rational* to be used only in contrast to
"non-rational". It is not very instructive merely to distinguish our
faintings and unavoidable accidents from all the rest of our behaviour,
and to make no further distinctions. In making moral judgements,
ascribing responsibility, assessing intelligence, cleverness, reliability
and a host of other activities it is essential to make finer distinctions.
Moreover, the problems in which psychoanalysis originated depend upon
this distinction. The meaning of "rational" in such contexts involves
the contrast with both "irrational" and "non-rational*. If this is so,
to assert that our irrational behaviour has been shown to be rational is
to use 'rational* in an unfamiliar and new sense while pretending to use
it in the familiar sense, for it leaves us no behaviour which can be said
to be, either consciously or unconsciously, irrational.""5"' If, as has
been shown, the Freudian theory is unsuccessful if it is claiming to make
"rational" what is "irrational" because of a subtle yet real shift in
the meaning of "rational" then there is totally irrational action as in
sense one, where no amountof causal explanation can make any difference,
but/
17. P. Alexander "Rational Behaviour and Psychoanalytic Explanation",
P-335.
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but rather reinforce our attitude of withdrawal of ordinary human and
personal status and rights, in favour of some form of treatment or
internment, rather than argument and reasoning which would still be
appropriate to behaviour and beliefs in sense two of "irrational"•
However, even if Freudian theory does not, except by its shortcomings
oast light on irrational behaviour, there is still a movement which
claims to uphold irrationalism. This tends to he associated in the
minds of philosophers vdth religious theorists or apologists, though,
it is just as relevant in the moral and political realm# What sense
then can be made of thoroughgoing irrationalism as a doctrine?
That there is a doctrine of irrationaliso is testified to by
Bambrough, as he examines some of the conflicting views in theology.
He states that, "Neither piety nor unbelief could ever give good grounds
for the irrationalisia which infects so many partisans of all parties
in so many theological disputes. Neither in theology nor anywhere
else is there any question which is, in the parrot-phrase of the
irrationalist, 'beyond argument*. Wherever there is a question there
is scope for reasoning} wherever there is a dispute, there is something
to be said that is relevant to the termination of that dispute. There
is always soope for argument wherever there is disagreement.""" What
Bambrough is saying of the irrationalist philosophy is that it entails
the setting of a limit to argument and the processes of reasoning.
In other words, it says that this is Southing which reason oarmot
grasp, which argument cannot prove and, which therefore, must be achieved
accepted/
18. R. Barabrough, Reason. Truth and G-od. p.p.46-7
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accepted, "believed, or adopted "by some other means. HJL. Hodges,
however, wishes to clarify still further what is meant. Hodges*
concern is in the query he makes, "When people raise the "bogey of
*irrationalism* or a *flight from reason*, what do they mean by *reason*
39
and why should be be so eager to safeguard it?" Hodges;goes on to
attempt to answer his own question.
He asks what "irrational!sm" means, and whether what is being
suggested is that discursive reasoning needs to be replaced by something
like "intuition", "feeling", or something similar. Hodges maintains
that this is not the case for he holds that reasoning is not a primary
source of truth, because to reason at all requires the acceptance of
facts and principles. He holds therefore that "will" is prior to
reason and makes it possible. To be "irrational" on Hodges* terms
is to fail to take account of this. But Hodges is still in danger
of failing to come to grips with the threat of "irrationalisin", as it
exists in at least the minds of Bambrough and Bartley. However,
he also asks whether "irrationalism" means rather that anyone can
j
believe whatever he likes or chooses, and that all beliefs are accordingly
"arbitrary". This is analysed into two parts. Hodges argues that
people cannot think what they like simply by choice. The possibilities
of choice in this area are very limited, and particularly so with reference
to consistency on the part of any person. Yet the fact remains that
people do make different choices, so Hodges asks whether or not there are
criteria/
19. H. Hodges, "Languages, Standpoints, adtd Attitudes", Riddell
Memorial Lecture. 1953# p»6i.
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criteria by which to judge the correctness or otherwise of these choioes.
Ha states that unless there is a conception of "reasonable" which can
make some olaim to general acceptance, there can be no reasoned judgement
on attitudes, standpoints and beliefs, no normative discussion of them,
and metaphysics thus reduces to type-psychology,
"Irrationalisra" is then, not merely a putting a stop to argument
by the claim that at such and such a point reason and argument are of no
20
use, but seems also to involve the threat of arbitrariness in opinions.
The case for "irrational!sm" is usually presented, like the case for moral
relativism, by first stressing the extent of the variety and the degree of
difference in opinions which men actually hold, and then showing that no
argument is sufficient to change a man's views or to convince someone
of the truth or falsity of an opinion. Thus reason and argument can
have no part to play. But that is merely one form of the argument, for
within the religious framework, the first premiss is rather the nature
of the subject to hand. If one is dealing with the ineffable, the
incomprehensible, the totally other, then there is no room and no role
for the effable, comprehensible power of reasoning and argument. This
is, of course, to overstate grossly the fideist view, but it typifies,
in the last analysis, the problem as far as the rationalist oritios are
concerned./
20. Leoky makes the same point in The History of Rationalism, in his
dlsoussion of Montaigne. "Montaigne, looking with an impartial eye
on the immense variety of opinions that were maintained with equal
confidence by men of equal ability, and judging all subjects by a
keen, worldly, and somewhat superficial common sense, arrived at the
conclusion that it was hopeless seeking to ascertain what is truej
that such a task transcended the limits of human power; and that it
was the part of a wise man to remain poised with an indifferent mind
between opposing sects." Vol. II, p.p.57-8.
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concerned. Hartley's critique of fideism was based on the grounds
21
that the "tu quoque" provided a "rational excuse"for irrationalisa".
He views his success as follows "My argument does not force anyone to be
a rationalist; it only destroys the rational or logical excuse for being
22
an irrationalist". This is certainly the cause for unease on the part
of rationalistic critics: the logical presentation of the irrationalist
view. As has been shown, Bartley's account is not in itself sufficient
to deal with tb problem, but before attempting to do that, it must be
inquired how this account of 'irrationalism' can be related to the
different senses of "rational" and "irrational"*
hen Barabrough presents the picture of "irrationalism", he is
referring to sense one of "irrational", while fiodges seems nearer to
sense two. To offer a philosophy in sense one of "irrationalism" is
to attempt to say that there is no scope for reasoning at all.
Argument, discussion, and reasoning in all and every form are inappropriate
because they are useless. This kind of irrationalisfc if there be such,
is attempting to abandon the practice of argument in itself, perhaps
because he regards reason's powers as inadequate to the problem. Of
course, there is a further problem for the irrationalist as was seen in
the Hartley chapter. The .question arises whether or not the irrationalist
can even express his irrationalism without contradicting himself by
23
rationally expressing the irrational. So it would seem that the
irrationalist in sense one is not so much the person who eschews reason
but/
21. See above, Chapter Two, p.p.2-V
22. Q.p.326.
23. See above, Chapter Two, p.p. if-3
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"but one who cannot oven use language and be irrational in sense one.
If a person is unable to rocognisc the implicit reasoning in language,
then the epithet of "rational" raay be withdrawn from him. Cense two of
"irrationalism" is rather in relation to the fidaistic claim that here
is something special which is beyond or above argument.. This is not
at all to seek to abandon argument either in every case or even in this
particular case, but rather to state that when argument and the powers
of reasoning aro confronted by this oase, they oannot hope to solve it.
It soeras that there are two very different types of problem involved.
Sense one of "rationalism" is an attempt to undermine the whole process
of argument and reasoning and to replace it in toto. Collingwood had
something of this in mind in offering his "raison d'etre" for the "Essay-
on Metaphysics". "Prominent among these is the conviction on the part
of eduoated persons, including both the class of professional thinkers
and the class of persons who, though not thinkers by vocation, are
qualified by training and inclination to undorstand what tho thinkers
by vocation are doing, that truth is suapramely worth pursuing and that
scientific thinking must at all costs go on. If this conviction holds,
tho epidemic of irrationalism will be stayed. But if educated parsons
commit themselves to the view that truth is not worth pursuing and this
is what they do commit themselves to, knowingly or unknowingly, if they
decide that metaphysics is impossible, they will surrender their faith
in science, and thus remove what may prove the only serious obstacle to
21•
the overthrow of European civilisation." It is this abandonment of the
"pursuit/
2if» E.G. CaLlingweod, .3say on Metaphysics, p.23k
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"pursuit of truth" or thn belief in argument and reasoning, that is the
hallmark of "irrationalism" in sense one.
In contrast, "irrationalism" in sense two, is not motivated by the
desire to set aside the normal processes of reasoning but rather to
abandon argument at a particular point in a particular instance.
"Irrationalism" in sense one puts its position beyond argument from the
vary start, while "irrationalism" in sense two seeks to put its position
beyond argument only at the point at which argument is of no further
avail, because of the nature of the subject-matter under question. What
is important here is whether or not the claim for speoial privilege oan
be made good for this particular subject-matter over and against the
usual prooessess of reason. The "irrationalist" in sense two, rather
than set aside all forms of reasoning, would offer a new sort of account
of what form of reasoning trould be appropriate, though this would be
different in nature from the normally accepted modes of reasoning.
The type of situation where one might label the other as "irrationalist"
in sense two is seen in the oomnon oocurenoe of two different
interpretations,e.g., "To one who is a christian, hi3 own interpretations
are bound to seem the natural and obvious ones, and the others will
appear forced and unreasonable! while to one who is not a ohristian the
reverse will appear to b the Gase. For this reason, argument between
adherents of such conflicting systems is usually a mere beating of the
air. ^aoh participant remains at the end where he was at the beginning,
25
only marvelling at the unreasonableness of his opponent".
Perhaps/
25« H. Hodges, ibid p.p.57-3
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Perhaps the best example of the difference between senses one
and two of "irrational!sm" may be seen from Gardiner's article on
"Irraticnalism"." "It might be said for instance, that to describe
a writer as an irrationalist is to speak of him as denying the authority
of reason. But how is the notion of 'reason' itself to be understood
and in what respects is its authority supposed to be flouted? It would
scarcely be sufficient to reply that denial of reason consists in
illogicality or confusion of thought, or that it manifests itself in a
tendency to arrive at unaccepted conclusions; for this could apply to
the work of many thinkers to whom the label •irrationalist* is clearly
inapplicable..,. It is only insofar as he maintains some specific
doctrine concerning such things as the status and role of reason, or
the relevance of rational standards within various domains of experience
or inquiry that he can be called an irrationalist .... Attention is
focused not on an unwitting failure to conform to norms of generally
recognised validity, but on the explicit repudiation, or putting into
question of such nomas in the light of certain considerations or in
27
relation to certain contexts," Where Gardiner needs to go further
is in the realisation that opponents do term as "irrational" those
whose views are marked by illogicality, confusion of thought and
unacceptable claims, and also that "irrational" in 3ense one is not so
much the explicit repudiation of the norms only in regard to certain
contexts, but in regard to every and all situations.
Given/
26. Gardiner, "Irrationalism" Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Vol,l|.»P«213«
27, Gardiner, ibid, p.213,
b-j.v en that one is confronted with two aifferent senses of "irrationalism"
what sense can oe muue of them in and of themselves, and what approach may
be adoptea to deal with them'r hartley holds that it is still possible to
be an "irratxonalist" in sense one, as is seen, where he states, "Anyone
who wishes or who is personally aoie to do so, may remain an irrationalist.
And it may oe difficult indeed to argue with any such person, for he will
have acandonea argument. ho one, for instance, can expect to convince
a neurotic that he is ill if he cannot or will not aoeept the diagnosis.
a person who fervently believes that one is equal to zero need never
admit that two and two equal four. One cannot easily convince a man
like Hitler that murder is wrong. and one hardly knows where to begin
arguing with a person like the Anglican Canon who announced in 1958
„28
tnat mental patients are not ill but are really possessed by evil spirits."
hartley is wrong on two counts. She first is that he has failed to
distinguish between "irrational" in senses one and two, with reference to
toe different kinds of cases he offers. She contention is that the
neurotic, the believer in one's equality with zero, and Hitler and those
like him are "irrational'1 in sense one; the sense in which it would be
wished to withdraw from them the rights to which they are entitled as
human ueings, because of their inability to relate properly to the world
as a whole, ana to the processes of reasoning in particular. There is
no place for argument with them. Hut the Angiioan clergyman is not
'irrational" in the same way but in sense two. Hartley is surely in
error when he suggests that we do not Know where to begin argument with the




possessed by evil spirits. Why he believed that in mental illness it
was evil spirits who were involved? One could imagine tests of exorcism.
Laying on of hands, and the evaluation of the evidence in favour of his
4
view both historically and anthropologically, as well as from experiential
work in specific instances. At the end of all this, of course, neither
the canon nor his opponent might have succeeded in convincing the other,
but they would agree hopefully, that there was at least scope for
presenting the differences of view and for the description of the views,
and perhaps even for testing the view for final confirmation or
disconfirmation. But they do at least know how to begin the argument,
if they do not know necessarily how to conclude it. But hartley's
other error is more relevant to sense one of "irrational". It is not
so mnoh that it is "difficult" to argue with an upholder of "irrationalina"
in sense onej rather it is impossible. This is why it is so important
to stress the difference with the case of the oanon, where argument is
appropriate, and obvious, rather than the situation where there is
nothing that can be said,
"Persistence in contradiction is the death of rational discussion
29
and investigation". A* Maclntyre makes a similar point that, "The
difficulty with all irration&lism is that the abandonment of the
criterion of rationality leaves us defenceless before the most morally
30
outrageous appeals to emotion".
The/
29. P. Nidditoh, "The Intellectual Virtues", Inaugural Lecture,
University of Sheffield, 1970,
30. A. Mclntyre, "Myth", "incyolopaedia of Philosophy. Vol.5, p.437*
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The "irrationalist" in sense one is not even able to state his
position without contradiction. One cannot rationally give an account
of one's irrationality, without in some sense suggesting that irrationality
is itself rational. The parallel problem is the attempt by logic to
prove that IcyLc is inappropriate. There can be no rational mode of
presentation of the thesis o? irrationalism in sense one without the
very crisis of integrity, which Bartley describes as the mark of the
rationalist. The irrutionalist cannot use language, state in statements,
make propositions, move from premiss to conclusion without aonirradiating
the very position he seeks to uphold. In what sense can he or we even
form the notion of "upholding his "irrationalisn"? The "irrationalist"
in 3o.nse one, is unable to communicate hi3 irrational ism and its nature
to anyone else especially in the form of persuasion or argument without
failing to be properly irrational. The irrutionalist must be ultimately
reduced to silence or gibberish. Ouch an irraiionalist is not to be
argued with, for he cannot bo, rather he is to be treated or locked up.
In contrast with the failure of the doctrine of "irrationalisa"
in sense one, there is the example of the Anglican canon, who, while not
on the same par as the neurotic, most certainly has slrtinge views for
twentieth century man, us is proved by Bartley's faulty use of him as
an example. The .uiglican canon offers an example of "irrationulism"
in sense two. Certainly he appears to be departing from the generally
accepted norms of reasoning and argument. His view is out of step with
that of modem man, but it is not the case that he can say nothing in
defence or support of his view. There is a whole host of manoeuvres
open/
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open to the canon in seeking to prove his thesis as to the role of evil
spirits, and it may well be that at the end of such manoeuvres, he will
oome to say that reason can take you no further here, but one requires
faith, or one merely intuits, or one leaps. There is room within his
^1
position for argument, the use of critical techniques,* and the
description and reclamation of his view. There may be a limitation
set on the power of reasoning and the place of argument In such
presentation, but there is no denial of its, at least limited efficacy
in other areas, and even in this particular context. The case in mind
would be for example, "There is no ground for objecting tc solving a
problem by non-rational methods if no other; arc available, and if some
32
choice has to be made,...."
If it has been established that there are twe different senses of
"irrational" and that one of these refers to our basic capacity to be
considered a person, while the other is ielated to particular contexts,
and that one cannot argue without total contradiction for the position
of "irrationalism" in sense ono, while one may uphold "irrational!a®"
in sense two, one is still left with the problem of how tc deal with
such views. Such dealing cannot be separated from a clear picture of
"rational" in sense two, and so it necessary in time to offer sua
account of what is involved in rational discussion and argument,
particularly between those who uphold radically differing views, and
therefore, what is involved in the changing of such views, the justific¬
ation of opinions, and the effect that attack and defence of our views
ought to have and does have.
31. See above, Chapter Two, p.p.^2
32. T, Penelhum, Religion and Rationality, p.214.
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3. Persons, Beliefs and Theories
An attempt has been made to derive a basic distinction between two
senses of "rational" and "irrational", to clarify what is involved in
ascriptions of rationality or irrationality to a particular person or
belief, and accordingly, how such a person, or belief ought to be approached.
W. Kneale expresses the distinction with reference to the English language,
when he states in "Objectivity in Morals", "For when in English we say
that a man is reasonable, we mean not only that he is oapable of reasoning,
but also that he is willing to consider reasons for modifying his own
preferences"*^" Sense one of "rationality" refers to the "capacity of
reasoning", while sense two is related to the willingness "to consider
reasons for modifying" one's own preferences". Having derived this
distinction, it will be related to modern views as to the nature of
reality, reason, intelligibility, and some of the limitations upon these
features. These different areas will be examined in two spheres:
the relation to persons, and the relation to beliefs, theories, opinions
and views. The epithets "rational", "reasonable" and "reasoning" refer
to both the personal nature of the individual and his actions, as well
as to the specific content of his outlook, in other words, to his belief
2
and opinions themselves. To avoid confusion, these will be separated
in order to clarify the relation of "rational" in senses one and two
in turn to both.
The/
1. W. Kneale, "Objectivity in Morals", Sellars and Hospers (eds)
Readings in Ethical Theory, p. 692
2. Alexander attempts to #ake this distinction, or one very like it, with
reference to rational beliefs and rational behaviour. "It may be rational
or irrational to hold a given belief but given that I hold it, I may act
rationally or irrationally on its basis. If I firmly believe, falsely
and on insufficient evidence, that my neighbour is planning to poison
me, that is irrational. But it is rational, given my firm belief, to
avoid drinking tea in his house and to instiruot my wife not to leave
him alone in our kitchen", "RationaliBehaviour and Psychoanalytic
Explanation", p.328.
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The term "rationality" is used with reference to persons in a
variety of way3 in modem literature. Some of theme ways will be
examined in relation to the emphasis on a person's capacities > of
reasoning, then attention turned to the relation of "rationality" to
belief, and opinion. finally in this section, we will attend to He
emphasis on the humanity involved in the rational person in relation to,
particularly, a moral outlook.
J. Bennett envisages the problem of clarifying what rationality is
3
with reference to the belief that humans are rational. He links this
initially with the difference between the level of intellectual ability
of humans and that of animals, or as he calls them, "other terrestrial
creatures". He states that, "It is commonly believed that this
difference is in some important way one of kind rather than of degree}
that between a genius and a stupid man there is a smooth slide while
between a stupid man and an ape there is a sharp drop, not just in the
sense that there are no creatures intellectually half-way between apes
and stupid men, but in the sense that there could not be such creatures".^"
On his own admission, he is not at paina to draw all the nature of
rationality but is concentrating on those features which elearly separate
man from animals. Bennett says, "I merely restrict my attention to the
oriteria which underlie our everyday belief that human beings indulge in
reasoning processes like honey-bees and earthworms do not, or - what may
be the same belief - that humans are rational while honey-bees and earthworms
are not. These criteria are plainly behavioural in nature, and involve
no/
3. J. Bennett, Rationalit?/.
4. Bennett, ibid. p.p.4-o
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no Cartesian speculations about private mental states. Even where the
notion of privacy seems least problematical, namely in the case of
oneself, one's claim to be rational or to have thought - processes is
5
in the last resort answerable to behavioural criteria".
Bennett's method is to imagine that one particular example of
"lower" life becomes rational and to inquire what it is that allows
us to bridge the gap between man and creature. He describes this as
follows, "My assumption here and throughout the present work is that
there could be rational bees, or little buzzing animals whose use of a
basically apian repertoire of physical movements compelled us to regard
them as rational; and I wish to know what we are saying when we deny
that actual honey-bees are of this kind".^ He therefore seeks to
analyse "beds-talk" in particular in the phenomenon of uee-dances to
inquire at what point we would reckon this form of communication, given
that it is a form of communication, to be the result of rational
creatures. The conclusions of this analysis come to rest on the capacity
to express dated and universal judgements. Why these are important for
rationality is seen when he writes "This is what generalising and talking
about the past have in commonj they are both departures from that which
is present and particular. This common feature is what links them with
rationality. The idea of rationality is that of the ability, given
certain present and particular data, to unite or relate them with other
data in certain appropriate ways. This is the Kantian idea of concepts
as/
5. Bennett, ibid, p.p.10-11.
6. Bennett, ibid, p.ll.
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as unifiers, binders-together, oreators of a multum in parvo. For there
to be a "multum" we must at one time intellectually possess more particular
data than are present to one at that time, and for it to be "in parvo"
one must have rules or universal statements under which the particular
data of which one is possessed can be subsumed. Thusi dated judgements
7
and universal judgements". To have any chance of satisfying the
conditions for rationality, Bennett felt that it was necessary to concentrate
the linguistic context for "only linguistic behaviour can be appropriate
or inappropriate to that which is not both particular and present".
Bennett's point is that to possess a language is not in itself sufficient
for rationality. That is merely the neoessary ground for rationality.
Rather, as a result of analysis of bee-language, Bennett concludes that,
"The expression of dated and universal judgement is both necessary and
HQ
sufficient for rationality ....
Bennett's claim that the central notion of rationality is bound up
with a particular intellectual capacity, that of the ability to express
dated and universal judgements, may be seen as relating to senseone of
"rationality". His concern is to differentiate absolutely between man
and other creatures in relation to intellectual capacity and to examine,
what he holds to be, the correct belief that man is superior. This is
tantamount to stating that anything or anyone who fails to aohieve this
standard of expression of dated and universal judgements and statements
is unable to be human, i.e. is not rational. Suoh a failure of the
capacity/
7. Bennett, ibid, p.85
8. Bennett, ibid, p.p.86-7
9. Bennett, ibid, p.94
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oapacity to make universal and dated judgement relates to the inability
to go beyond one's present experience in either relating it to past
experiences or in using it to assist in future experiences. This is
exactly the type of dislocation which is common among the mentally-ill
in their failure to relate properly to their time sequence of events and
experiences, and likewise their failure to put each particular experience
in an appropriate context. But Bennett's point is 3imply relevant to
sense one of "rationality", and not therefore useful in casting light
upon the more problematic sense two of "rational". Bennett himself
helps make this distinction of relevance for it is Bennett who argues
that we can allow rationality for bees and not the bees themselves who
so argue. There are tried and tested means of discovering whether or
not a person ia insane and certainly part and parcel of that is the way
that they cope with universal and dated judgements, but the problem is
more severe when we are confronted by someone who has these capacities,
but is propounding a view which is to the ngjority of people "nonsense",
or which is apparently based on what is not normally accounted as evidence}
yet this same person argues for and behaves in light of their belief.
When their rationality is questioned it is rather in sense two that such
a questioning is meant to be understood.
Torrance's account of rationality, as has already been outlined,
is that, "To be rational, therefore, means to behave not in terms of our
own nature, but in terms of our knowledge of the world outside of us,




is otherwise expressed as the need to learn to distinguish what we know
from our subjective states and conditions. "This is one way to state
the basic scientific principle of objeotivity. but it is only an extension
of our fundamental mode of rationality. We are rational when we act in
11
accordance with the nature of the objeot". This objectivity means that
"iou know something only in accordance with i-.s nature, and you develop
your knowledge of it as you allow its nature to prescribe for you the mode
of rationality appropriate to it. That is the kind of objectivity we
12
adopt in all rational behaviour whatsoever."
There has already been examination of Torrance's view but what is
seen in his description of the personal aspect of rationality, that is
our ability to behave in terms of other things apart from ourselves
according to their nature, is that this doctrine apparently does not fit
into the classification of "rational" in two senses. Yet what Torrance
is saying, is, on my view, obscured by the failure to make just the
distinction I attempt to outline, for Torrance talks freely of irrationality,
14 15 16
bloated subjectivity, autism, and the need for spiritual psychiatry.
The force of these notions rests on the confusion between senses one
and two of "rational", for when I'orranoe oomolains of the faults of
modern theoloQr he does not literally mean to suggest that his fellow-
theologians, who disagree with him, are insane, though it must be noted,









interpretation. His claim is surely rather that they are guilty of
improper thinking and that the nature of this improper thinking is the
failure to distinguish adequately the subjective from the objective faetors.
This is, as it were the key to the whole matter. It is not that they
fail completely to distinguish any objective factors from the host of
subjective impressions to the extent of "living in a world of their own"
but, in Torrance*s eyes, they do not have the proper balance between the
two aspects of the subjective and the objective, and this imbalance tends
to be slanted towards a concentration upon the subjective nature of
knowledge, thus belittling the objective aspect of all knowing. It is
in sense two of "rational" and "irrational" that Torrance is stressing the
importance of being true to the nature of the object, and not in sense
one, though this is the prima facie reading from the words themselves.
Hartley's view of rationality as it relates to persons has already
as with Torrance's view, been outlined. While Bennett was concerned
to stress the crucial nature of a particular linguistic capacity, and
Torrance to stress the need for a proper relation of subjectivity and
objectivity, Bartley, as it were, provides one of the possible means
for the exercise of such a proper relation by the use of critical
techniques. His initial definition of "rationalism" was that, "the
term may also be used to refer, in the most general way, to the tradition
whose members are dedicated to the task of trying to learn more about
the world through the practice of critical argument.""^"The problem as
Bartley/
16A. See above p.44.
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Bartley seas it, is expressed "oy Kekes:- "Can rationalism be defended
I?
in a rational way?". Hartley analyses this problem into the logical
limits of rationality, and analyses the rationalist orisls of integrity
today in relation to the inability to justify the adoption of rationalism
in itself.
Hartley's problem of being rational about one's rationalism and
his psychological description of the crisis of integrity derived what
impact it has because of a slide between the two senses of "rational".
To demand that one bo rationalatout one's rationalism is parallel to
the demand to be logical about one's logic, and moral about one's
morality. One cannot dismiss logic by means of logical procedures,
nor can one rationally argue for the replacement of rationality
18
altogether." What these refer to is sense one of "rational", that
in which it is a basio feature of mankind, one part of that by which
man is defined as man. One is confronted with the dilemma of what else
one can do but be logical, moral, or rational? We are logical, rational,
and moral, and these in some basic human sense, in as much as we do human
things, that is to say, in that we reason things out, relate effectively
to the world, and are concerned about other people. To imagine that
we can be different is a very different thing from the attempt to use
any of these basic traits to disprove themselves. Winch sums up the
point./
17. J. Kekes, "Watkins on Rationalism", Philosophy. Vol. XLVI,No.l75#P»52
S. Richmond, "Can a Rationalist be Rational about His Rationalism?,
Philosophy. Vol.XLVI, Ho. 175# "A rationalist can only be inconsistent
if he is not rational about what oan logically be rational", p.54«
18. Sea above Chapter Two, p.p.r7d
317
point# "Rationality is not just a concept in a language like any
other} it is this too, for like any other concept it must be circumscribed
by an established use: a use, that is, established in the language
It is a concept necessary to the existence of any language: to say of a
society that it has a language is also to say that it has a concept of
rationality.....Where there is language it must make a difference what
is said and this is only possible where the saying of one thing rules
19
out, on pain of failure to communicate, the saying of something else."
This level of rationality is, of course, a very basic one, and refers to
"rational'' in sense one.
But at the same time Bartley is suggesting that we do experience
what appears to be a choosing of rational procedures, and that this
involves crises of integrity and identity. And he is correct, but
only with reference to "rational" in sense two. When there is talk of
choosing a standard of rationality, we are referring to the problem of
differing standards and viewpoints, and the fact that different people,
or more clearly, groups of people, have at different times adopted not
only different, but contradiotory standards of what is rational, and
descriptions of rational behaviour. This is true, but when we draw
attention to this phenomenon we are not claiming that one group is insane
while the other perfectly normal, but rather seeking to discover how
to approach rationality within a particular oontext. This is sense
two of "rational" which is self-ascriptive and relates to discussion
and/




and argument on the basis of different views. hartley fails to
separate these two senses and therefore makes capital out of the
confusion, to make the problem seem far worse and more severe thay> in
reality it is. He relates the choice of rationality to authority and
the problem is then why we should adopt the authority of reason over
and against other claims to authority. Bartley's cure is that of
Comprehensively Critical Rationalism. "A comprehensively critical
rationalist, like other men, holds countless unexamined presuppositions
and assumptions, many of which may be false. His rationality consists
in his willingness to submit these to critical consideration when he
discovers them or when they are pointed out to him. When one belief
is subjected to criticism, many others have to be taken for granted -
including those with which the criticism is being carx'iea out. The
latter are usee as the basis of criticism, not because they are
themselves justified or beyond criticism, but because they are unprob-
slematical at present: we possess no criticism of them. For the time
being these are, in that sense alone, beyond criticism. And one belief
that is nearly always taken fflr granted when one or another belief is
21
being criticised is the belief in criticism itself". that is involved
in this criticism is, of course, an attempt at falsification, but Bartley's
thesis is in close relation to Popper's doctrine, which is even more
explicit./
20. R.C. Franklin makes a similar point in "Can Philosophers Reaoh
the Truth"? Inaugural Leoture. University of New England, 1968,p.8.
"what philosophers have in caatmoh. is that they are prepared to
stand or fall by the soundness of the arguments they produce. A
philosopher may indeed employ iis reason to ask what the limits of
reason are, and may even, in religious contexts, claim like Kant ^
that he has to 'destroy knowledge* in order to make room for faith'
But he still aims at a rational destruction of knowledge: or , to use
a less suicidal metaphor, at a rational explanation of the bounds of
human reason", (l. Critique of Pure Reason. B.xxx.)
21. R.C. p.p.131-2j K. Popper, "Back to the Pre-Socratics", Proceedings
of the Artlstotelian Society, Vol. LIX, 1958-9, p.p.1-24.
319
explicit. Popper suggests, "assume that we have deliberately made
it our task to live in this unknown world of ours: to adjust ourselves
to it as well as we aanj.,..and to explain it, if possible (we need not
assume that it is) and as far as possible, with help of laws and explan¬
atory theories. If we have made this our task, then there is no more
rational procedure than the method of ... conjecture and refutation:
of boldly proposing theories; of trying our best to show that these
are erroneous, and of accepting them tentatively if our critical efforts
22
are unsuccessful".
The view of rationality is in essence aligned with a view of what
it is to he scientific. This involves a belief in oneself and one's
capacity to reason correctly, to be able to disprove something, and to
be able to aot accordingly and constantly correct what one believes
and the way that one thinks. I have already examined some of the
questions that this raises in detail. But the general philosophy
behind the position is worth drawing attention to. J. Agassi, in a
discussion of whether religion can go beyond reason, isolates the
attitude as follows: "It is this attitude which we call variously reason,
science,humanistic agnosticism, mature self-reliance, rational respons¬
ibility. This attitude embodies a certain contempt towards those who
rely on people whom they cannot or would not question (priest3 or party
leaders) or on ideas the;/ cannot or would not present and examine
critically (the catechism or party-line)•
Is/
22. K, Popper, Conjecture and Refutation, p.51
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Is this self-reliance rationality? Or is it empirical science?
It is hard to tell."2^
Bartley' and Popper's concern is not with "rational" in sense one,
but with sense two. They are more than aware of the problem of
divergent beliefs and opinions and are offering one particular mode of
dealing with the problem by criticism. It was shown that this runs
into major problems, though it does offer interesting insight into the
crucial role which criticism must play in relation to sense two of
"rational", and the approach that must follow in discussion and argument
between those who are conoerned with a particular belief either as
believers or doubters# In this section a development has been shown
\
in theories of rationality a propos persons from a general linguistic
capacity to a means of dealing with beliefs and a style of argument.
An outline has been given of the relation of the basic senses of
rationality as they relate to these views, but there are also certain
modern views derived mostly from sociology and perhaps psychology, whioh
need to be taken account of. J. Rawls gives a definition of "rational"
which will allow the correction of the views exemplified by I. Jarvie
and P. Winch. Rawls writes that, "These persons are rational; They
know their own interests more or less accurately; they are capable of
tracin& out the likely consequences of adopting one practice rather than
another; they are capable of adhering to a course of action once they
have/
23. J. Agassi-, "Can Religion Co Beyond Reason?" Sygon. Vol.4#, No.2.,
1969, p.133.
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have decided upon it; they oan resist present temptations and the
24
enticements of immediate gain...." What Jarvie takes as the crucial
factor in this kind of view of a rational person is expressed as
follows: "We all aoaept that rational action is action direoted to an
end. Objectively speaking, however, we can say that some actions are
more likely to realize their end than are others. Thus we might say
that, given the knowledge and belief of the action, he acts the more
rationally the better suited, from an objective point of view, are his
25
means to the realization of his aims." He puts his own position
even more directly in a parenthesis: "For my part I accept ths idea of
26
goal-directedness as the (my emphasis) criteria of rationality".
Jarvie'3 view begins to slid9 over into P. '"inch's when in
discussing magic with Agassi, they state, "By definition, a rational
action is one based on - against other factors - the action's goals or
27
aims, his present knowledge and beliefs." For what is meant by
talking of the crucial part of goal-direction in relation to rationality
needs to be made mora explicit by reference to the process of determining
whether or not an action is goal-diraoted fond why tixis is Important.
As Lukes suggests, "the fundamental meaning of rationality is essentially
is essentially linked to the phenomenon of systematic, explicit reasoning"
ant/
24. J. Rawls, "Justice as kiirness". Philosophical Review, LXVII, 1958
p.170.
25. I. Jarvie, "Explaining Cargo Cults", B. Wilson (od.) Rationality.p.59
26. Jarvie, ibid, p.p.51-2; S. Lukes, "Some Problems of Rationality",
B. .*ilson(ed.) p.208; P. Alexander, "Rational Behaviour and
Psychoanalytic Explanation", p.p.330-1.
27. Jarvie and Agassi, "The 'roblern of the Rationality of Magic", B.
Wilson (ed.) Rationality, p.179
28. Lukes ibid, p.197 footnote.
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and this is exactly the theme which Peter tinch takes up in linking
the aim of an action or belief with the context of that action. "The
forms in which rationality expresses itself in the culture of a human
society cannot be elucidated simply in terms of the logical coherence
of the rules according to which activities are carried out in that society.
For, as we have seen, there comes a point ?;here we are not even in a
position to determine what isand what is not coherent in such a context
of rules, without raising questions about the point which following
29
those rules has in the society".
From these two sociological positions we see two further emphases
in modern theory of rationality: that of goal directedness in behaviour
and that of context-dependent explanation. These two criteria are
subject to confusion because both are on the same sort of sliding scale
which has been shown in the discussion of the two senses of "irrational".
If confronted with behaviour which is directed to no goal at all - even
in the most extended sense of "goal" and therefore one is unable to
derive any explanation whether within a small context or in the broadest
terms, one is dealing with action in relation to sense one of "rational"
/"irrational", where the withdrawal of rights and priveleges of humans
is concerned. But when confronted with behaviour which follows peculiar
directions and is explicable only by reference to irregular and peculiar
beliefs, one is still entitled to question the "rationality" of such
actions and those who indulge in it. But if they offer explanation
and argument or tiy to, this is not confrontation by insane people, but
rather/
29. P. Mnch, "Understanding a Primitive Society", p.p.93-4; Lukes,
ibid, p.p. 200-6, Both in B. wilson (ed.) Rationality.
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rather with the problem of coping with sense two of "rational", and
that method is still to be fully delineated.
I have shown the relevanoe of our distinction of the two senses
of "rational" with reference to the modern views of "rationality" as
they refer particularly to persons, ana it has been seen that in eaoh
case the distinction clarifies at what level the writer is operating,
and therefore, how to unaerstand the implications of the work. The
relation of "rational" to belief is now examined with the awareness that (h<*-
is not an absolute gap between these aspects of personal behaviour and
belieis^jQ aj_go needs to be aware of the need for clarity in writing
and the way which the shift from the ascription of "rational" to people
from "belief" has been made.
fthen there is the application of the epithet "rational" to a person
it usually relates to their behaviour and actions. V.hen this is the
case it is because the action or behaviour is obviously ajpropriate, or,
to express it slightly differently, it is goal-directed. By this is
meant that any action or piece of behaviour can be seen to fit into a
pattern which is discernible and which has some ultimate aim which is
acceptable in the sense that the point of such a goal and action towards
it may be appreciated, if not necessarily endorsed for oneself. A
person is "rational" then if he acts in a "rational or appropriate,
or goal-direored fashion. But a person is also rational" if his beliefs
are "rational" ones. The application of "rational1 to particular beliefs
seems to rest on whether or not the belief satisfies a standard of
i-easonableness, whether it is based on good, evidence, whether it is
widely held, based on common sense, on facts, or on scientific grounds.
Botly'
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Both these general areas of belief and action are, of course, closely
related to persons and what they do, but they are also bound together
in relation to rationality by the fact that both require justification
if they are to be called "rational' . When an action or belief is called
"rational", then it is possible to give an account oi', on the one hand,
the goal to which the action is directed and how this action will achieve
that goal, and on the other hand, the reasons for a belief, its basis,
the evidence for, and the diffex-enca it makes when believed. These
procedures are relevant to sense two of "rational" in particular and
it is within a particular context that most justification will take
place by reference to other features of the situation. Thus behaviour
and action are linked together by the epithet 'rational", Dy their
reference to justification to show wither the goal-directed nature of
the aotion, or the evidence and ground for a belief,
This justification at level two, relates to what is generally
accepted and therefore, the necessity of making a case for any departure
from such a norm. This analysis of justification will recur in the
30
examination of the various limits of rationality. But it may also
be noted that in the same way as "rational" may be applied to beliefs,
actions, and persons according to the jte tification ofiered, so
"irrational" may be applied by the failure to offer adequate justification.
There will be flexibility as to what constitutes "adequacy", but this
will uepend on the context. This will only slide into 3ense one of
'irrational", when there is the total disregarding of all justification
by/
30, Bee chapter four, section Two, "The Situational Limits .
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by the failure to discern the necessity for such justification, and
the eschewing of goals, aims, evidence, and all that is involved in
justification.
In light of the relevance of the distinction between the senses of
"rational" and "irrational" with reference to rationality in relation
to persons and beliefs, there is one further aspect of personal quality
to be considered in the ascription of "rationality". si/hen Bennett's
view of man's separation from animals was earlier outlined, the stress
31
was on the linguistic aspects, but there i3 also an evaluative flavour
to muoii writing concerning rationality in moral philosophy, which is
again linked to the separation of man from animal. Man is called a
rational animal in contradistinction from animals qua animals, who are
not rational. In light of modern discoveries of the linguistic
capacities of dolphins and such like, the emphasis on mail's rationality
is seen not so much in terms of linguistics or even reasoning, but in
terms of other human qualities. i'his is true more especially whan one
considers the rationaliey of computers, and machinos in general. On
the basis of reasoning capacity these are often far superior to man in
the exercising of such inductive, or deductive powers regardless of
whether or not tiiey req ire to oe first programmed. But what is still
a very good reason fox' the separation of man from computers, a3 well as
man from animals, is man's love of justice, and his moral belief that
disputes ought to oe settled by argument rather than force. fhis is
an evaluative judgement, and bespeaks a whole range of moral qualities
which relate to man's humanity, such as sympathy, kindness, fair play,
honesty/
31. See above p.p.
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honesty end all the truly human traits. This is coming near to the
suggestion that rationality is somehow related to moral principles, and
^amocte makes this very point* "If one &3ks of whom the law, of 3ay
France applies, one good way, I suppose of understanding the question
would be to take it us asking who is liable under French law, or who
can properly be required to comply with its provisionsj similarly in
asking to whom moral principles apply, the question may be who is liable
to be morally 'judged' (in this case, of course, either by himself or
others), or who can properly be required in some sense to comply with
m .ral principles. The unsurprising answer to this question that was
32
briefly suggested earlier was: rational beings".' He suggests that
it is correct to talk of rational beings rather than merely "people"
or "human", to separate out the non-biological elements involved. The
actual definition of rationality which arnock seems to have in mind
relates very closely to the sort of cloture of rationality which has
been drawn especially in relation to sense one of "rational". He defines
what it is to be a rational being as follows," ... that one is able to
achieve some understanding of the situations in which one may be placed,
to envisage alternative courses of action in those situations, to grasp
and weigh considerations for or against these alternatives, and to act
accordingly"•"
32. b. Y.arnock, The Object of Morality, p.143; 4. Earner, "A
Starting-Point for the Philosophical Examination of Theologioal
Belief", B. Titahoil (ed.) Faith ana ho^io; H. Feigl, "Validation
and Vindicationj An Analysis of the Nature and the Limits of Ethioal
Arguments", Bell&rs and Hosp rs (eds.) headings in Fthical Theory.
33« Warnock, ibid, p.144
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accordingly". This is vary near to the sense one of "rational"
already outlined, ana it shows again that when tnera is talk of applying
"rational" to people, there is the need to separate the two levels of
rationality, the one where there is no grasping of the situation whatever,
and the other where there is a grasp, but it is peculiar and defended
in an odd way. Warnock's point relates to the fact that talk of
rationality in relation to parsons and beliefs is tied to humanitarian
ideas and moral qualities, as well as powers of reasoning. One might
add to larnock's account that justification is very much to the point
here and again the relation of rationality to justification of action
and beliefs in terms of the situation and aim - sense two of "rational"
- may be seen.
T*» \X possible, however, to delineate any raora clearly what this
moral element expected of rational persons is? There are some general
features w.iioh may be included in such an account, such as responsibility,
respect, and love. When a young person comes of age, tie re is talk
of hia reaohiag an age of maturity and responsibility. In court, the
debate often centres around whether or not responsibility was impaired.
What is meant by responsibility seems to be in these senses the capacity
to make a rational decision both in the sense that one is able to isaie
up one's own mind and that there are no external restrictions upon that
freedom. it means that anyone else of reasonable intelligence put in
the same situation wu.JLa not more or less in the same way. Respect
seems/
33. V-arnock, ibid, p.144
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seems likewise to have some role to play, because when there is respeot
for a person part of this is the recognition that people ave the right
to make up their own minds, the capacity to do so, and the freedom to
choo3e moral values of their own, even if they differ from one'3 own.
ihere is a limiting case, where the moral values are so repugnant that
they must be fought against, but this is just the point where the withdrawal
of the epithet "rational" comes in. A normal person shows the right
kind of respect as well as the ability 10 discern where respect is no
longer uue, and other action is necessary. These features of
responsibility and respeot are, it seems closely bound up with
rationality, unu show that morality and rationality ooth come together*
34
when persons are described and their liature inveatigaged.
there is a link between rationality and morality but it may be
asked what the point of suoh a link is. Perhaps hare suggests the
sort of key tnat is looked for. !bonetimes instead of 'rational' we
have other expressions, such as 'a morally ueveioped ox* morally educated
35
person' ox* 'a competent ana impartial judge" it is in this sense
tnat morality may be approacnad as a set of commands which ail and every
reasonable man accepts if he has all the necessary information. In
other woraa, morality is entirely separate fx-ua aim personal predilection,
and is what would be aocepted by any impartial spectator, who had the
normal human capacities of mntellmgence and sympathy, anu who was
pi'esentecy
34» xi.L. bownie, nolo a and vaiues, p.p.^6,149} bee aoove Chapter Two,
"The Value of the Alternative Theory".
35* h. Hare, Language of ^ox'als, p.42.
presented with all the facts. The link then between morality and
rationality and the common notion of "persons", is that of impartiality.
This in turn may be linked with idea of justification in that if there
is to be the abandonment of impartiality and in its place someone or
something is to have a special place, then that exception must be
justified, argued for, and its ground and evidence shown. These then
are the two key ideas 7)hich may be seen from persons and beliefs in
relation to rationality? specific moral qualities in rationality, and
the notion of impartiality. Any departure from these standards require
Justification and argument by reference to tho context, or by reference
to the overall description of what a man is, appropriate to senses two
and one respectively.
This distinctive moral flavour has been associated with traditional
rationalism and its impact on society. Nationalism has stood for all
that opposes irrationality, ignoranoe, prejudice, and inhumanity. It
has been instrumental in the Jevolopment of civilisation in raoent
centuries and this may be seen from th ; role that the values stated have
played in intellectual, moral, and social advances and changes. Tho
point is beat stated by Lecky, as he herald3 the triumph of rationalism.
"Certainly, whatever opinion may be held concerning tho general tendencies
of the last three oenturies, it is impossible to deny the extraordinary
diffusion of a truthful 3pirit as manifested both in the increased
intol'J xmoe of what is false and in the increased suspicion of what is
falsa and in the increased suspicion of what is doubtful. This has
been one of the general results of advancing civilisation to which all
intellectual influences have converged, but the improvement may be said
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to date mora especially from the writings of the great secular
philosophers of the seventeenth century. These philosophers destroyed
ihe old moaes of thought, not by the force of diroot polemical discussion,
but by introducing a methoa of inquiry about a standard or excellence
incompatible with them. They taught men to esteem credulity
discreditable, to wage an unsparing war against their prejudices, to
distrust the verdicts of the part, and to analyse with cautious scrutiny
the foundation of their belief. They taught them, above ail, to
oultivate that love of truth for its own sake which is perhaps the
highest attribute of humanity; which alone can emancipate the mind
from tiie countless influences thai enthral it, and guide the steps
through the labyrinth of human systems; which shrinks from the
saorifiee of no cherished uoctrine, and of no anoient rite; and which,
recognising in itseij. the reflex of the deity, finds itself its own
-\C
» „ JOreward."
it seems that modern thought in ethics in particular lays some
stress on the rmportanoe of the rational element in morality and
particularly in relation to impartiality. One again may relate this
along a sliding-soale between senses one ana two of "rational' and
"irrational'. If there is a person wno is incapable of the particular
moral attributes mentioned, e.g. respect, responsibility, and iove, then
this person deserves to nave withdrawn from him the right to be treated
as a fully rational person, but that does not imply that he is morally
irrelevant and can be treated in any way whatsoever. Likewise, the
maa/
36. W. Leoky, The History of Rationalism. Vol. II, p.p.401-2,375j
M. Polanyi, " n the Modern Mind", Encounter, May, 19^5, Vol.XXI V,
No. 5, p.l3«
man who Is unable ewer to be impartial in the sense that he is unable
to separate at all the subjective features from the objective and fails
to grasp need to justify any differences in treatment of similar
oases, becau38 he fails to see that there is any difference; this same
nan must be understood in sense one of "rational" ana "irrational".
But when one turns to sense two of those terns, the reference is rather
to particular cases of a breakdown in a specific instance of what ax-e
normally morally accepted and relevant factors, e.g. respect, responsib¬
ility, and love, but this is no total setting aside of these factors,
nor is it done without some regard for the need of impartial judgement
and that of attempting to justify, or at least, recognising the need
for justification fo ' such action and belief. It is rather the realm
of basic moral and religious disagreement that sense two refers to in
particular contexts.
This ha3 been an examination of the relation of the sense of
"rational" and "irrational" to the basic relation of rationality to
persons and beliefs as found in modem literature on this theme. A
rri.de variety and scope of author has been drawn on but this is not to
take the nlace of original thought, but rather to show the relevance of
utuoh of modern discussion of rationality to the distinction being made
and at the same time to bring unity to that discussion by showing how
these differing accounts may be drawn together in lightof the distinction
between two senses of "rationality". But now the need, is to concentrate
on a further aspect of rationality and the philosophy of rationalism.
"Rationalism/
"Rationalism is that system of philosophical belief which asserts
that human reason unaided is competent to attain ob^eotive truth"•
It must be inquired as to what is the role of the synonym "reason"
in relation to views of rationality.
Jim "-Rationalism", mncyolopaedia hritanniou. 1?62, p.9?l
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4. "Reason" and "Reasons".
As consideration is turned to the role of "reason" in relation
to rationality, it is necessary to be aware that remarkable claims have
been made for it. Two examples are offered of the pretentions which
the rationalist has claimed for the power of "reason". Lecky, in his
"History of Rationalism", describes the spirit of Rationalism as that,
"by which I understand, not any class of definite doctrines or criticisms,
but rather a certain cast of thought, or bias of reasoning, which has
during tire last three centuries gained a marked ascendancy in Europe."
The effect of this is remarkable: "...it leads men on all occasions
to subordinate dogmatic theology to the dictates of reason and of
conscience, and, as a necessary consequence, greatly to restriot its
influence upon life. It predi.poses men, in history to attribute all
kinds of phenomena to natural rather than miraculous causes; in theology,
to esteem succeeding systems the expressions of the wants and aspirations
of that religious sentiment which is planted in all men; and, in ethics,
to regard as duties only those which conscience reveals to be such"."5"
The second example of the role of "reason" comes from a consideration
of Descartes. "The man of mature understanding should, he held, face
the problems of the world and of life for himself, unprejudiced by the
various and conflicting solutions of those problems which have been
handed down to him from past generations. His own reason is adequate
2
for truth and must seek it alone, without help from unreason".
The/
1. Lecky, The History of Rationalism. Vol.2, p.xix.
2. W.R. Sorley, "Tradition", The Herbert Spencer Lecture. 1926,p.5»
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The word "reason" is ambiguous. It may refer either to a
capaoity or faculty on the part of man, i.e. the capaoity to "reason",
or it may refer to the grounds of action, behaviour, or belief. In
the first sense it refers to an intellectual power of thought or some
sort of normative mental faculty which guides or ought to guide the
other human faculties. This is the power to discern truths about
logical illations and is closely related to the cluster of ooncepts
involved in argument, inference, deduction, and thought, in essence,
any form of linguistic or logical rules and procedures. In contrast,
a "reason" is a fact or oircumstance or some statement of these, which
can be presented as a means of justification, proof, disproof,
explanation, response, motive, and other related ideas. These two
concepts are not, of course, unrelated, and the key to their relation
tl
lies in their normative role in connection with aotion. says, It is
in the idea that the faot that p is a reason for or against doing
something (in a broad sense of 'do'), and in the idea that the faot
that p is somebody's reason for doing something, that we have both
the notion of the faoulty of reason and the notion of those faoulties
directed by it, the facilities designated by the categories of verbal
nouns ranged over by the variable 'doing something', namely belief,
3
aotion, and passion". And again on the same page, he states that
"A reason is a fact that hears normatively on what it is a reason for
4
and can explain someone's 'doing' what it is a reason for 'doing'."
w
3. R. Edgley, Reason in Theory and Practice, p.p.133-4,17-19,37-9?
ft. Warnook, "reason", Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Vol.7,p.84j
"Reason", The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary.
4. Edgley, ibid, p.154
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In general, then both the oonoepts of "reason" are linked by
their relation to the notion o action, behaviour, or belief. In
sense one of "rational", I have outlined the strong sense in which one
cannot depart from the results without becoming less than human. This
holds good for the strong sense of "reason", whether this be with
reference to the faculty or to the ground and application of the faculty
in a particular instance. Again Bdgley makes the point "It might be
thought that if reason favours something it is still an open question
whether that thing is to be favoured or preferred? but this would be
5
to misunderstand the idea of reason". He dismisses such misunderstanding
as due to a "psychological" view of reason. He then shows the close
dependence of this strong sense of "rational" and "reason" on the basic
logical procedures and laws for to appraise an inference as valid is
to accept it, and to appraise it as invalid is to reject it. To judge
a belief as one for which there is a conclusive reason is to accept it,
and to judge it as one against which there is conclusive reason is to
reject it.
ldglqyfs point is that "reason" as a faculty, when exercised,
and "reason" as a ground for decision, belief, and action, is not an
arbitrary procedure or ground, but a normative, definitive one. This *'->
true with reference to sense one of "rational" and, in parallel fashion,
with sense one of "reason". But the problem in what is suggested is
the problem of deciding whether "reason" favours something or not,
whether/
5. Edgley, ibid, p.54-5
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whether in appraising an inference, it is or it is not valid, and what
does and what does not constitute a "conclusive reason". "Reason" as
a facility and "reason" as a ground, motive, or explanation, still have
a function to pl^- in these oases, hut that function is not so rigid
as in sense one, for the material content of the situation is different.
In a particular setting and with reference to a particular argument,
two opposing sides may both be using their "reason", and in their
reasoning processes propounding "reasons" for their belief, action,
or behaviour, and yet they may disagree. It is not the case that they
have conclusive evidence ("reasons") one way or the other, but rather
that they cannot agree as to what constitutes "conclusiveness", and
what counts as the correct use of their "reason", i.e. their reasoning
faculty. To clarify this point consideration may be given to just
such a disagreement as outlined by John Hick. In presenting his view
of esohatological verification, he describes "two men travelling along
a road. One man believes the road leads to a celestial city, the
other that it leads nowhere. Neither is able to see beyond the next
corner at any time. They can and will agree about the nature of the
road as they travel it, but will disagree about the ultimate destination
of it. Their disagreement is enou^it to justify different attitudes
and policies here and now, though not enough to justify differences
about the immediate facts. At the end one will turn out to have been
right and the other wrong."0
Setting/
6. T. Penelhum, Religion and Rationality, p.137J J. Hick, Faith and
Knowledge, p.p.150-162; "Theology and Verification", Theology
Today 19, No. 1, 1960,p.p.l2-31; Philosophy of Religion, p.p.94-106.
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Ignoring the question oftlie validity of eschatological verification, the
situation has bean outlined of two men who would offer "reasons", both
claiming to have used their "reason", but with contrary results and
action* Sense one of "reason" would refer to the fact that they would
agree as to the nature of the road e.g. that it was flat, made of
granite and asphalt, and was grass-edged, and this they would agree that
all hut a mad man would accept* But the disagreement as to the
' ultimate destination of the road is rather in the sphere of what has
been outlined to be sense two of "reason". Both offer alternative
descriptions of the road as it develops around the corner, both are
completely convinced of the reasonableness of their description, and
that the other will bs proved wrong when they finally arrive at the
end of the road. In this particular case there seems to be no
conclusive evidence of "reason" to uphold the one view rather than the
other, but that there is still, dissension would be shown by the
continuance of different life-styles in keeping with ons's ultimate
views•
One necessary clarification in the concept of a "reason" is to
separate dearly the oocasions when we use "reason" in the sense of
cause. It is sometimes said correctly, "The reason why I fainted was
that insufficient blood was getting to my brain". But this could not
without oddity be rephrased to suggest, "My reason for fainting was
that insufficient blood was getting to my brain". In the case of
fainting and similar reflex actions, there is not a sequenoe of
discovering the physiological facts involved and then following the
appropriate action. This causal notion of "reason" may be compared
witV
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with the statements, "The reason why I went to Easter Road on Saturday-
was that I wanted to see Hibernian play", and, "My reason for going
to Easter Road on Saturday was that I wanted to sea Hibernian play".
There is obviously some important relation between "reason" and my
7
wants and dislikes and any action based on these. Intention seems
an integral part of the concept of "reason". Bennett makes the same
point in "Rationality". "The idea of 'reasons' for action is
inappropriate when we have to do with simple or rigid patterns of
stimulus and response; but where the patterns are both complex and
modifiable it is possible, while admitting that the patterns are only
patterns of stimulus and response, to speak of them also in terms of
g
aotions and reasons for actions".
Both senses of "reason" either as the faculty or the result of
the use of the faculty and both senses one and two of these are linked
with the notion of explanation. One gives reasons when one seeks to
explain or one is asked to explain one's action or behaviour. One
uses one's "reason" when one is asked why one behaved or acted in a
particular fashion. The difference between senses one and two of these
terms in relation to explanation must refer to the nature of the
explanation demanded and offered. If one offers an explanation which
is binding on all and any man then this is in the area of sense one of
"reason", but if there is obviously relianoe upon a particular setting
and disagreement, with both sides offering "reasons" of their own,
then/
7. P. Alexander, "Rational Behaviour and Psychoanalytic Explanation",
p.334.
8. J. Bennett, Rationality. p.44«
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then the explanation level is related to sense two. However, explan¬
ation is not in and of itself the key to rational behaviour.
Alexander argues:- "In ordinary circumstances 1. we may explain a
piece of behaviour by showing that it was done for a reason or with
a reason in ®ind and showing what that reason was; 2. to explain a
piece of behaviour is not necessarily to show that it was rational;
3. to show that somebody's behaviour was rational it is necessary to
show (a) that the agent had reasons and (b) that the reasons were
9sufficient reasons.". Alexander argues that this rules out psychoanalytic
explanation as a ground of expressing rational behaviour, not in the
sense that thay are not explanations, but that they differ essentially
from the everyday explanations of rational behaviour. The idea which
is involved here relates back to the connection of "reason" with
"wanting". when one talks about doing something for a reason it is
implied that the person involvod must be able to find out that reason
or be able to recognise it whan it is suggested to him as having
influenced his behaviour. If it is to be his reason, then he must be
able to recognise it when it is suggested to him, and at the same time
recognise that other suggested reasons may be good reasons although
these were not his actual reasons.
In other words, any reason at all which can be thought up or
presented is not sufficient to be accounted as a person's actual reason,
unless that person is able to recognise it as his own and olaim
responsibility for it and its effects. Such a reason makes a
difference/
9. Alexander, ibid, p.336
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difference between two courses of actions or beliefs for reasons tend
to favour one side or course rather than another, and, returning to
the notion of "reason" as a faoulty, it must be noted that what reason
favours is to be accepted unless there are some very strong moral
grounds which can affect that conclusion, or unless there is strong
justification for such deliberate ignoring, "Reason" as a faoulty
and "reasons" are related to what is favoured or not, what is wanted
and what is disliked. This is especially true in the field of morals.
Warnock presents em argument for his view that moral reasons are
reasons in the very strong sense. "...A man who will suffer if he
acts in a certain way has a reason for not so aoting, there is a reason
for him not to do so. If, we may say, one points out to him that he
will suffer if he so acts, he may indeed rationally reply 'Yes, but
(and introduce some other reason), but he cannot rationally say 'I don't
see that that has anything to do with it'""^ This kind of response
would be incomprehensible. Suffering and the desire to avoid it,
that is also to say wanting and its opposites, are relevant to
conduct with reference to the giving of explanations.
The importance of "reason" and "reasons" in relation to the two
senses of "rational" hinges, therefore, upon the notion of explanation
and its relation to action, wanting, or wishing. But there is more to
"reason" than this, as may be seen from a closer examination of the
appraisal of reasons as good or bad. In earlier discussion of the goai-
directod nature of behaviour and action, the aim in mind was stressed.
If/
10. G-. Warnock, The Object of Morality. p.p.l63-4j Edgley, ibid,
p.p.54,162-3.
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If this is linked with the attack on psychoanalytic explanations of
behaviour on the grounds of inappropriatenoss, it will be seen that
it is not sufficient to talk of "reason" without qualification. ^
In th3 ascription of rationality to behaviour or action, there must
be evidence of sufficient reason for that behaviour or action. By
sufficient reason is meant a reason actually relevan.. to the
situation in mind, and one which wo-Id be sufficient to prompt anyone
into action of tho same kind, all things being equal. In other words,
this is again the dainand for appropriateness. This appropriateness
or the lack of it is the very ground of rejection of psychoanalytic
explanation, for it i3 not possible for the patient to grasp that such
explanation offers a ''reason" adequate to his behaviour. Suoh
explanation Is not appropriate to the action done.
The case for the 3tress on sufficient reason is not prima facio.
One might rather suggest that a person behaved in a rational manner
if his behaviour had a reason. But if one held that the reason was
a bad one, one would not oall the action "rational" (in sense two
at least). It is possible to do something for a reason without it
being the reasonable thing to do. I may say that "s" wa3 my reason
for doing something, while oonfeasing that "s" i3 not a reason or a
good reason for doing what was done in this particular situation.
The sort of thing in mind here is vfhero, for example, a child on hi3
first day on the farm sees the farmer open a packet of seed3 and plant
them, telling the child that he will have a lot more once they grow.
The/
11. Bee above p.p.2~l 1+
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The child is then given a bag of eggs to take to the farmer's wife,
hearing complaints at the faot that there are not many eggs. The
helpful child immediately rushes off, plants the eggs and announces
that there will soon be lots more eggs. On being shown the hen-house
and the method of egg-arrival, the child admits that he did plant the
eggs because he thought that this would increase the number of eggs,
but, of oourse, he now sees that this was impossible. If having a
reason is not adequate, then perhaps it might be offered instead that
the reason involved was a good reason. However, any reason for doing
something cannot be altogether a bad one and a good reason for doing
something may not necessarily be sufficient, for instance, in the
situation where there are several good reasons for and several more
against doing the same thing. To be a sufficient reason, there must
be a reason, or a group of reasons, which can stand after the process
of comparing the various reasons for and against an action. That is
to say that "a piece of behaviour was rational if it was done for reasons
12
which constitute a sufficient reason".
To be a sufficient reason for behaviour involves that what I do
will achieve or help in the achievement of what I want and so that the
behaviour is appropriate to the intention or to what is wanted, and is
unlikely to lead to undesirable consequences which might outweigh the
consequences of the original intention. To give a "reason" and to
use one's "reason" in this way is linked to explanation in terms of
goal-directed and appropriate action and behaviour. What is therefore,
required/
12. Alexander, ibid, p.p.329-332
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required is to clarify the relation of the different senses of
"rational" to the different goals and therefore appropriate actions
and behaviour involved at both levels.
The importance of intention end "wanting" in relation to "reasons"
was also mentioned. This wag to avoid categorising reflexes and
accidents in the same way as reasons. These would rather fall into
the category of "non-rational*, i.e. behaviour of which it makes no
sense to say that it was or was not done for a reason. This realm
of intention and its relation to "reason" has led some philosophers
to separate out the realm of reason from another realm which has been
characterised in different ways as feeling, imagination, faith, heart.
This has led, on the one side, to the kind of stress found in Pascal,
that the reasons of the heart, as opposed to the head, are equally
viable and certain. On the other side, it has led to an empiricist
13
attack on the rationalistic view of morals.
This is important for it suggests that it is not the case that
human beings are rational, either on a priori grounds or on general
empirical ones, and thus what is required is an empirical investigation
into what will carry conviction to people, and this may not necessarily
be argument, whether good or bad. The attack on rationalism is most
clearly seen in the following passage. "So if many or most moralities
do require rationality of men, and men are not, or not very, rational,
then these moralities are mistaken. In a recent broadcast talk, a
geneticist said, 'If we want a race of angels, we shall need a new
supply of genes; for the present supply contains the material neither
for/
13. A. Ralls, "Rational Morality for Empirical Man", Philosophy.
1969, p.205.
for the wings, nor for the requisite moral perfections * The
importance of this attack is that it has whatever success it a :pears
to have as a result of the confusion of two senses of "rational",
What the writer is referring to is the failure to live up to
"rationality" In sense one, when all that is required is to live up
to the level of "rationality" in sense two* What is crucial i3 that
the picture he draws of the difficulty of morality is exactly correct,
but this need not lead to scepticism, hut rather to the realisation
that such difficulty is logically necessary, if there is to be the
idea of either success or failure in morals. To have reasons means
that there must he good and had reasons, and good and had use of
"reason", so that evaluation is essential, and that evaluation is
linked with explanation based on the appropriateness and goal-directed
nature of the "reasons and "reasoning" involved.
14. A. Ralls, ibid, p.208; J.J. Crow, "evolution, Heredity, and
Eugenics", B.B.C.3., 10th May, 1968.
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5. Senses of "Rationality" and Intelligibility".
In this chapter so far two basic senses of "rationality" and
"Rational" have been delineated and with these, two parallel senses of
"irrationality" and "irrational". Then these distinctions were applied
to tho concepts of "persona", "beliefs", and "reason". Before
concluding the analysis of these distinctions in relation to the various
limits of rationality in both senses, these distinctions will be applied
to the further idea of intelligibility which is closely bound up with,
and often used interchangeably with, rationality.
The Riddeil Lectures have often centred their thinking on the
sphere of religion and philosophy and on the central notion of
intelligibility. C.C^T,. svebb writes about "the activity of scientific
investigation, which ever presupposes what it can never prove, namely
the ultimate rationality of the universe wnieh it sets itself to explore"
and O.C. Quick picks up the same theme when discussing "Philosophy and
the Cross": "A man may spend all his powers in searching into the
origins of the human race ox- of life ox- into the constitution of matter,
and have no preconceived idea whatever of what he will discover. Yet
thx-ough it all he must believe, anu cling to his faith, that in some
sense man anu life arxd matter are veiy wondexl'ul and excellent things,
so that to seek after the knowledge of them is in itself, apart from
the merely practical utility of its results, a fitting arid a fruitful
task for human energy. ne must also believe that the oruer of the
universe/
1. C.C.J. Webb, "Religion end the Thought cf Today", ^? dde11 ??emorial
Lecture. 1929.
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universe is such that the truth is not merely worth discovering, but
2
also discoverable". What both writers are referring to is the
intelligibility of the universe. In other words, the universe is
rational in the sense that it is intelligible; that we oan make sense
of it; and that the sense it is possible to make is translatable into
systematic presentation to others and on its basis we are able to do
things which otherwise we could not, as well as avoiding things which
we could not otherwise appreciate.
This intelligibility of the universe of nature is not an arbitrary
feature of tilings, but a necessary one, and necessary in the sense of
necessary for thought. Its necessity rests on the fact that without
It, it would be impossible to reduce phenomena to intelligibility,^
and thus there would be no science at all. "There is already embedded
in nature an inherent rationality which it is the task of science to
bring to light and express. Apart from it there could be no science
at all. Thus the mathematical equations and even the new geometries
we construct are quite meaningless unless they are applicable to nature,
but if they are applicable to nature, they are elaborated expressions
of an objective rationality lying in nature itself".'" Intelligibility
is necessary for the activity o aoience, and also for the language
of science. "Our normal scientific language presupposes an inherent
rationality in nature, so that it makes use of basic forms that refer
to states of affairs and patterns of events in the external world, but
the/
2. 0.0. Quick, "Philosophy .uid the Cross", memorial nocture. 1931 •
3# T.p.264.
4• S •p •42♦
3*7
the contingent and factual elements in these forms impede strict
5
theoretic demonstration". It is true that subjective elements creep
in,butTorrance's view, these may be dealt with by being more objective
i.e. controlled by the nature of the object.
This intelligibility of which Quick, Weob, and Torrance are
speaking is a necessary feature of the universe, but it has further
peculiarities in that it cannot be questioned. " e are up against
one of those ultimate boundaries in thought such as we reach when we
ask a question as to the rationality of the universe: not only do we
have to assume that rationality in order to answer the question but
we have to assume it in order to ask the question in the first place.
We cannot meaningfully ask a question that calls in question that
which it needs in order to be the question that i3 being asked. We
cannot step outside the relationship to the rationality of the universe
in which we find ourselves without stepping outside of rationality
altogether. Before the question as to the relation between our
knowing and ultimate rationality we cannot but stand In awe and
acknowledgement, and can ask our questions rightly only within the
actuality of that relationship".^ If we try to do the impossible, we
are involved in a contradictory and nonsensical movement of thought,
and in order to avoid this wo rather "....ask questions only within
the circle of the knowing relationship in order to test the nature
and possibility of the rational structures within it.""^ This clash






scientist's imagination or mind, but rather part of the nature of
things, "What the scientist does in any field is to seek to achieve
an orderly understanding of events in which he can grasp them as a
connected and intelligibile whole ana so be able to penetrate into
their inner rationality, Ke does not invent that rationality but
discovers it, even though one must act with imagination and insight
in detecting and developing the right clues and act creatively in
constructing forma of thought and knowledge through which he can
discern the basic rationality and let his thinking fall under its
8
direction as he offers even a descriptive account of the events,H
Sarlier Torrance's further analysis of this intelligibility was
9
outlined. He divides such intelligibility into two areas: number
and word. "If we may speak of the rationality embedded in nature as
number, we may 3peak of the rationality embedded in history as logos,
for in history we are concerned with giving a different kind of
account (Xovoy ) of things from that wo give of natural
processes, arid it is therefore a different kind of story that we have
to toll. Hence while in natural science wo have to direct our'
interrogative methods to the realities being investigated ( :o mensurable
events) with a view to bringing their inner logic to view in mathematical
forma, in virtue of which it i3 made to disclose and explain itself to
us, in historical science we diroot our interrogative method* to the
subJoct-matter of our research (word-events) with a view to bringing
out/
3. '.Ibp,313; See above Chapter Three p.p. 15^
9. See above chapter three, p.p.
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out its latent intentionality, in virtue of which it is made to disclose
and explain itself to us so that we in the present may grasp it in an
"10
intelligible and coherent way even thoughtit is past. It is crucial
in dealing with ail questions of intelligibility, "therefore, to
separate number and word rationality, or else we shall impose an
artificial uniformity on the varied world of experience leading to
11
serious "category-mistakes" in the mould of Kyle.
Intelligibility then for Torrance and for the scientific school
he seeks to portray rests on the attempts to reduce to consistent and
rational expression the ways in which knowledge is related to the grounds
on which it is based, such that the scientist is convinced that he
has come to grips with the inherent rationality of things.
Popper, in a critique of Kuhn*s view of science, outlines the
position being stated. "Kuhn suggests that the rationality of soience
presupposes "Che acceptance o, a common framework. he suggests that
rationality depends upon something like common language and a common
set of assumptions. He suggests that rational discussion, and rational
12
criticism, is only possible if we have agreed on fundamentals." It
is against this basic background of agreed fundamentals that where is
the need to interpret intelligibility. In some sense rationality and
the rules of inference implied by it are fundamental anu universal;
yet there are scientific changes and the progression of views of what
intelligibility relates to and of what is ana what is not rational.
It is necessary, therefore, to give some account of what intelligibility
means in relation to these facts. One must disagree with quick.
"It/
10. T.p.pil; See above Chapter 'three, p.p. I^
11. T.p.251 j G-. Ryle, Concept of Mind.
12. K. Popper, "Normal Science and its bangers", criticusa and the
Growth of Knowledge, Lakatos and Musgrave (eds.) p.56
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"It ought, I think, to be a platitude to say that if, we use words in
their proper sense, every metaphysician must be a rationalist. For
eveiy metaphysician, even if he call himself a pluralist, must seek
in one way or another to Interpret the universe as manifesting
intelligible order, that is to say, as rational. nationality means
order, irrationality means chaos. And in a rational universe the
13
ultimate principle of order must be single". Every metaphysician
is an some sense a rationalist, but there is not only one sort of
rationalist and the principle of oraer need not be single nor merely
one principle.
ihe problem with the account or intelligibility so far considered
is that it moves between the two senses of "rationality" already
outlined. Some times, ana perhaps most often, the writers are dealing
with sense one of 'rationality", or as it may be stated, sense one of
"intelligibility'• By this is meant that they are concerned with what
is acceptable on a universal level. That is, they refer to what oan
and is understood oy any reasonable man in full possession of his
faculties, presented with the material in an appropriate and fair fashion,
fills is the basic level of logic, of truth and falsity, of the
principle of argument, and of facta in the sense of those tilings which
are required by ail for life and accepted without question, because
there is no genuine way or framing anon questions without ending up
in nonsense or madness.
what/
13. quick. Vhiiosophy and tne dross', hiudexi Memorial -gesture 1931
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What these writers fail to do in general, is clearly enough to
distinguish this proper sense of "intelligibility" from another sense,
sense two, at which level there is room for questions, doubt, discussion
and disagreement without the threat of the padded cell or the charge of
gibberish. "Intelligible" in sense two refers to that which is acceptable
within a particular context rather than universally. It is that whioh
is understandable against a particular background. It can be grasped
in a particular context and as a result of particular internal relations,
without such a differentiation oetween the two senses of "intelligibility"
it is difficult to allow for the genuine changes in world-views,
scientific theories, and metaphysical, moral and religious positions
which uo occur. On the "basis of this distinction, the concern must
be to put these changes in the appropriate category and to do this
requires a thoroughgoing account of the limits of rationality.
This section has been examining two senses of "rationality" and
showing that this distinction is appropriate to two senses of
"irrationality", to the say we talk of persons and beliefs, to the
notion of reason anu that of reasons, as well us to the idea of
intelligibility. there was a separation of the contextual from the
universal, the general from the highly specific. I have been trying
tc make out a case for rational discussion to take place. In contrast
to Bax-tley and dorranoe, there is room for the critic and scope for
discussion between radically op. osing views, and the next section will
seek to clarify what is involved in change, justification, attaok, and
defence/
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defence of a particular view. On Bartley's account there was no way
in which the critic could successfully attack hartley's own view, and
if the critic tried to attack iorrance's view then he was met with the
response that he was guilty of subjectivity and the failure to be
faithful to the nature of the object. i'he way that these writers have
presented their case leads to the impossibility of criticism and the
immunity of their positions from all attack. iliis has bean corrected
by drawing out the context of argument and discussion, and looking at
rationality particularly as it relates to linguistic ability, and in
sense two, the capacity to deal with beliefs which are contrary to one's
own and to engage in argument.
Bense one of rationality is partly the willingness ana ability to
resort to argument men it is approprmto, ana to see the importance
of logic ana reasoning. It means that one is prepared to offer some
sort of stanuard of judgement, to give reasons where these are required
to examine seriously criticism, and to attempt to ueal with it by
justification. Ail this can only be possible if if is recognised that
there is room for argument and not everything has been already decided
and predetermined. ihis is, of course, part of the value of what is
truly human, the abhorrence of violence as a means of settling argument
and lisagreernent, but in its piaoe the seeking of justice in dispute,
i'he aim in the account of rationality is not to make argument easy,
out rather to give it a genuine basis ana to make it possible. It
may seem unnecessary for argument does ta.se place, and it woulu be
foolish/
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foolish to deny that. But there my be doubt whether or not it is
genuine argument. By genuine argument is meant argument which leads
or may lead to a change in position, because it takes place in a
situation where there is room for change ana development. If one
were to analyse the sort of argument in the Hare-foot disagreement and
the Murdoch-Hampshire dispute it would bo seen that it becomes vain
repetition where there is no progress because the argument is sat up
in the wrong sort of way. This is the importance of the two senses
of rationality, for they allow the framework to be drawn within which
argument can take place which may have a genuine effect and make a
real difference. It is now neeassazy to turn to filling out that
framework, by exploring the limits of rationality, in four particular
area3 which are met in actual argument and discussion. Those are
the natural, situational, social, and psychological limits of
rationality.
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Section Two - The Limits of Rationality.
Having considered the distinctions of "rationality", "irrationality"
and "intelligibility", and their relation to persons, beliefs and
reason, it is necessary now to place these distinctions in a context
of the limits of rationality. This basic distinction that has been
made aims to show the style and programme for genuine argument and
debate to take plaoe, because at the outset it stresses the need for
the drawing up of standards for the argument and characterises what
is required of both participants in the discussion. It is part of
the corrective against the failure of Torrance and Bartley to allow
room for the critic to attack or even question their views. It is
only part, however, for another of the complaints against them was
that their accounts were overbrief and this was especially true of
their lack of concentration on the limits of rationality as these are
found in the actual practice of argument. It is nesessaiy therefore
to give some account of these limits of rationality not only to make
up for the deficiencies in Bartley and Torrance's accounts, but for a
better understanding of what rationality is and why it is important.
Thus the presentation of the limits of rationality is very closely
related to the basic distinction in the senses of rationality which
haS been drawn, for both these steps are required in assisting the
development of argument which has a proper basis and is conducted in
an appropriate fashion. This will then help to meet the third
criticism levelled against Bartley and Torrance, that of internal
unaoceptability even on their own account. It is hoped that the
description
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description of rationality based on the two senses and the application
of that to various cognates, and the description of the limits of
rationality will provide a picture of rationality which is more adequate
to the complexity and actuality of its role in argument and discussion#
There will be examination of four areas of limits. Under the
heading of the natural limits of rationality there will be an account
of the way in which irrational features of the world and of persons
set limits to rationality. It will be seen how a doctrine of
irrationalism attempts to set limits on rationality. There will be
examination of the necessity for logic, yet the limit of its success
because of subjective factors, and the linking of this with the limited
capacities of human beings in the living out of rational thought.
Finally in this section an account will be given of the variety of
levels of approach which there are in any subject and the limit that
this sets upon rationality.
Having considered the natural limits of rationality attention will
turn to the situational limits. There will be examination of the
notions of belief, criticism, argument, persuasion, explanation,
justification, and finally change. These are all interrelated by
virtue of their connection in the actual practice of argument and
discussion and so may be bound together in the examination of how, in
faot, rationality is limited when argument and discussion is taking
place.
Finally the thesis turns to the social and psychological limits.
In the social limits the importance of social factors on the
presuppositions/
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presuppositions and fundamental attitudes which we have will be seen
and how change tends to come about even at such an absolute level.
Then the thesis looks at the psychological restrictions on suoh change
and the factors which set limits to the effectiveness of rationality
in aotual argument and discussion by our resistance to fundamental
change. In all these accounts there will be drawing on both the material
from hartley and Torrance as well as more general reading on the theme
of rationality. The presentation of the particular points under the
headings of natural, situational, sooial, and psychological limits of
rationality, is the basic novelty here, for it is in this way that the
relevance of the notion of rationality for the aotual practice of
argument and discussion will be better seen.
Throughout the thesis the three basic criticisms have been
developed in harness with particular accounts of rationality, giving
a picture of what has been done and what needs still to be done for
satisfaction. Already I have offered something of the basis of my
view of the use of rationality in argument, but now this view will be
expanded so that an account of rationality, which is adequate in itself,
adequate to the complexity of the subject-matter which deals with the
necessaiy limits of rationality, and whioh not only allows the critic
a role but helps define that role, will be presented. This is no
arbitrary selection of material but one based directly on the account
and criticisms of these accounts, both positive and negative, of Bartley
and Torrance, as well as the more general themes raised by the wide
variety/
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variety of writers mentioned. The unity of the thesis stems from the
notion of "limit*1 in rilation to rationality, which has too often "been
merely noted and then ignored. From the variety of writing it is
possible to see very general points, but these tend to lack specificity.
Thus the original stress in this seotion is the drawing together of
these many and various strands under the general heading of "limit* of
rationality, but more than that, for it is also a division of the
material into speoific headings. These four headings, natural,
situational, social and psychological allow a natural and thoroughgoing
account of rationality and its limits to be given not haphazardly but
methodically, moving from one point to the next. Of course, I draw
on other authors, but am seeking to blend them together with my own
account so that some order is brought into what appears a vague and
ill-defined field of study.
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1, The Natural limits.
Under the heading of the natural limits of rationality there will
be examination of the limit on rationality of irrational features of
the world particularly in the form of the existence of evil and then
of the doctrine of irrationalism as it sets itself up over and against
logic and reasoning. Then the necessity of logic will be seen yet its
limited nature due to the interference of subjective aspects of man.
There will be a description of some of the ways in which rationality
is limited due to the limited nature of certain hunan capacities, and
finally in this section, attention will be drawn to the limit set on
rationality by the necessity for different levels of approach for an
adequate understanding of the subjeot and the role of rationality in
such understanding.
It was earlier argued that there are in existence what may be
described as evil features and this evil counts against the possibility
of a total rational picture or explanation of all that there is.*
Torrance expressed it thus: "Somehow evil posits itself and cannot be
2
rationalised .... Evil is fundamentally discontinuity". Brunner
takes/
1. See above Chapter 3> "The Value of the Approaoh".
2. P.P. p.240. In theological terms the most common stress on
irrational features derives from the concept of sin. H.R.
Mackintosh states "Sin in the last resort is radically unintell-
jifcible; it is incapable of being interpreted in terms of
rational purpose; it is irreduoible to factors which in a moral
sense can be made transparent and self-accrediting. As we
oontemplate the sin we have done, it confronts us as a thoroughly
irrational entity, impervious to light - inexplicable to the mind,
and to the conscience inexcusable". The Christian Experience of
Forgiveness .(l96lf»<fc)Brunner also makes the point. "Sin is
something which we cannot explain something which will not fit into
any reasonable scheme at all. For it is the primal faot of non-
reason". The Mediator. 1934#
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takes the same point a stage further analysing the effeot of such an
admission of evil in the world, "If the admission of the irrational
character of existence excludes any idea of a system - since a system
presupposes, if not rationality, at least the possibility of being
made rational, the ultimate possibility that through thought the
irrational may be overcome - so, only far more, does the admission of
the existence of evil as the primary irrational element in life exclude
any idea of system at all. If we admit that evil exists, we must once
3
for all renounce all hope of conceiving life on eystematic lines".
If it is the case that there be some such ground of discontinuity which
belittles any attempt at total rational explanation, there may still be
room for some view of rationality.
It does seem to be a fact that there is a certain irreducible
minimum of irrationality, but the stress must be on the "minimum" aspect
of such irrationality. What is important here is that the degree of
irrationality lies between the danger of total irrationality or chance
which would lead to the complete abandonment of the possibility of -ic
and anjr possibles grasp of the world and our role in it. There is not,
on the other hand, total rationality which would, allow everything to
be/
3. Brunner, The Mediator p,123» It is interesting to note alternative
means of seeking to express the same kind of point. In the
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy article on "Cohen" we read, '"By no
amount of reasoning", he wrote, "can we altoghether eliminate all
contingency from our world" (Reason and Nature p.142) The universe
is ultimately what it is, and contingency cannot be eliminated. And
by contingency Cohen meant that the world contains an irrational
element in the sense that "all form is the form of something which
cannot be reduced to form alone". (Studies in Fhilosophy and Science
pll.)' Quick writes "Chance is a symbol which stands not merely for
an unknown cause, but for one which is strictly unknowable. To
understand, to explain or acoount for the behaviour of anything in any
way at all, is to see or describe it as not fortuitous". (Fhilosophy
and the Cross",p.24) Regardless of the particular form by which the
point is expressed, what remains obvious is that there is something
which is irreducible to system.
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be understood and explained. Rather there is a tension between what
oan be understood and what oannot be understood, what is reduoible to
rational explanation and what is irreducible.^"
From the time of Aristotle there has been enthusiastic support for
many of the ideas of rationalism, which has led to a spirit of optimism
and a belief in the power of reason to overcome all the difficulties
5
which mankind faces. Bonhoeffer however, offers a corrective against
the unbridled optimism of rationalism which fits in with the point
concerning the way in which certain irrational features of the world
count against an absolute and total aocount of rationality, which
leaves no remainder. "The rationalist imagines that a small dose of
reason '.will he enought to put the world right. In his short-sightedness
he wants to do justice to all sides, but in the melee of conflicting
forces he gets tra pled upon without having achieved the slightest
effect. Disappointed by the irrationality of the world, he realises
at last his futility, retires fiom the fray, and weakly surrenders to
the winning side".^ Need it be the case, however, that the rationalist
must retire from the fray and leave the field to the apparent irrationality
of the world?
It is not necessary to be so pessimistic as some writers appear to
be. What is required is rather a closer analysis of the limitations
of rationality and with that the limits of irrationality. Some
featurea/
4. See above, p.p» ^6^
5. Aristotle, Nichomsan Ethics X, 7J W. Barrett, Irrational Man, p.31
See above p.p. 333-ff
6. D. Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, p.135; see above p.p. I®'
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features of the world and of man are known in an absolute and
universal sense and may confidently be systematise! and aoted on,:
G.C3CGX i .-..t # But equally, there are maiy areas of degree of
doubt and fuzziness both of the way things are and our perception of
this, which must make one extremely cautious as to the delineation of
the nature of what there is and our manipulation both of it and our
expression of it. These are really the two senses of "rationality",
the one the realm of the universal, the other of the particular. The
scientist, like the philosopher must recognise the limits of science
and knowledge, and there ia a need for constant self-correction and the
recognition on the part of the scientist that he is dealing with the
ambiguous and the amoivalent,He thus rejects any claim to express
absolute truth. The very ambiguity and ambivalence of so much in the
different areas of knowledge and science expresses a practical limit
upon rationality as it seeks to reduce to system and order what man is
confronted by in the world. This can be done, but not totally or
finally.
'Shile it seems to be the case that in terms of the human situation
things are liable to go badly, yet not completely so. It is possible
to do a whole variety of things which will help in a situation and will
be a great deal better than, if one did nothing at all. There seems to
be in the nature of tilings a tension between what is totally rational
and what is totally irrational. Between these two extremes there are
both rational and irrational features, and the expression of the nature
of things whether in terms of understanding or characterisation must be
such as to cope with the realities of the situation and express that
reality/
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reality adequately. The limit of irrational!sra in nature and the
world must be held in balance with the limits of rationalism. Things
are neither totally explicable nor inexplicable, and to oope with these
two senses of "rational" and "irrational" are needed. Sense one deals
with what all men must accept and abide by or face the charge of madness
and the withdrawal of basic human rights, and sense two deals with the
realm of the particular and that which is open to debate and discussion
with a view to coming to some conclusion on the evidence and argument
offered against a view which one held.
It is however, not only irrational features in the world and
nature which oreate problems for our understanding and the possibility
of reducing things to a rational form, but irrational aspects of man
himself. Malevolence, folly, confusion, racial hostility, fear and
what can only be described as unreason- the unwillingness to accept
what is true and right - are real enough but need to be interpreted
oorrectly, because it is not enough to characterise as "irrational"
illogicality in one particular instance, or oonfusion of thought, or
even the tendency to arrive at unacceptable conclusions. Rather the
clear separation of the two levels of "irrationality" is required.
Sense one of "irrationality", is illogicality, confusion and the reaching
of unacceptable conclusions all to such a degree, and of such seriousness
that the very sanity of the person involved must be queried. Sense two
on the other hand, must refer to particular situations where writers
have been aware of the novelty and difficulty of their presentation,
yet have continued to offer a case and not sought to abandon argument,
but perhaps rather tc present different kinds of evidence and reasons,
which/
%7j
which, when placed in a fuller context, may be seen to make a great
deal of sense. this is tile level of the particular and highly speoifio.
It nas already been seen that there has been an attempt on the part
of some writers to form a definite doctrine of irrational!sia which casts
doubt on the capacity of reason to do all that ratioxialists claim for it.
1'he problem with any suoh doctrine, if it is taken seriously, is that it
has certain unacceptable features and leads to unacceptable conclusions,
ihe limits set on irrationalism have been drawn to some extent by Lukes
ana I shall use his list of limits, yet argue that he has failed to draw
a crucial distinction between two senses of ' irrational11 which is
important to allow new kinds of criticism to come to the fore and to
permit discussion and argument at even the most basic levels of what
we hold to be true. In "Some Problems about Nationality""'' Lukes offers
among other things a critique against irrationalism on the grounds that
it fails to recognise what is to count as a reason, illogicality,
falsity, nonsense, inability to universalize, deficiency in the genesis
and method of holding a belief. All these are valid enough, but cover
two senses, dense one of "irrationality" not only fails to recognise
a particular reason, but the very necessity for reason at all, or reasons,
'fhere is an attempt to eschew all forms of reasoning and every kind of
reason. The illogicality, falsity, and nonsense involved are to such
an extent and degree that there is no hope of understanding for thex-e
is nothing to be understood. It is perversity in thought for perversity's
sake./
7. S. Lukes, "Some Problems about Rationality", B. Wilson (ed.)
Rationality, p.p. 207 ff.
5^4
sake. The inability to universalize is bcth a failure to see that this
has ary relevance for holding a belief and also an inability to go
through, the mechanics of such universalis:;tion. Hie deficiency of
genesis and method of holding are not unique to one particular instance,
in sense one of "irrationality", but rather are regular occurences, "the
rule rather than the exception, and with this is the lack of awareness
that there is anything at all wrong with what is going on.
In contrast, if sense two of "irrational" is taken and these
headings again examined it is found that the failure to recognise a
reason rests on definite grounds related to a particular reason. It
is the refusal to accept this as a reason in one particular case,
because of definite reasons. So too the illogicality, falsity,
nonsense and inability to universaliae are related to a definite
situation. it is in one particular context that what is said seems
to be illogical, false, and nonsensical. It is in this definite
instance that xhere is the refusal to universalize because this is a
case whore one does not universalize. Thus would the irrationalist
in sense two argue. And the deficiency in genesis and method of
holoing a belief would be both something of which the person involved
was aware and seeking to rectify by presenting different kinds of
evidenoe and standards of relevance, and also an exceptional thing
relevant to a very definite set of oircuastanoes and a limited context.
On this kind of account there is room for two kinds of irrationalist,
and the most important one being related to sense two of "irratio.aalism.
This is the person who in a particular case seeni3 to fly against all
standards of reason, logic, sense and meaning, but he reoognisea this
and attempts to offer grounds for it, as well as this being an exceptional
situatioV
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situation, and not a general rule. This would be the pattern, of the
great scientific revolutions of Newton and Einstein, where what is new
is so new that different standards of sense, logic and reason are required.
This is not at all to reject logic, reason or sense hut to seek to broaden
these.
Irrationalism'in sense one runs into even more severe probiens
than have so far been suggested. Such a rejection of sense, logic,
and reason would leave us defenceless before the most morally outrageous
appeals to emotion. It would he to reject all concern with truth and
fl
argument and in their place to accept contradiction and ixaposters.
Hartley makes the point in two places, without himself recognising that
his own work falls into the same trap as he aoouses the irraiionalist,
but of course for very different reasons. He wi-ites "One gains the
right to he irrational at the expense of losing the right to criticise.
One gains immunity for one*a own commitment by making any criticism
of commitments impossible"! and, "One gains tlio right to ue irrational
oneself at the expense of losing the right to oriticise anyone else for
acting absurdly. One gains immunity from criticism for one's own
commitment by making any criticism of alternative commitments trivially
oasy. One quiokly reaches what R.H, Popkin, in a study of Kierkegaard,
aptly described as'an anarchy of private individual faiths that cannot be
discussed or communicated'
8. A. Maolntyre, "Myth", Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol.5; P.
Nidditoh, "The Intellectual Virtues", p.14; H. Paton, The Modern
Predloament. p.53 F. Ferre, L^n^uage, Logic ana Qod? p.131
9. R.C.p.lOB.
10. W, hartley, Morality and Religion, p.47; R.C.p,p.90-3, see above
Chapter Two p.p.
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In adopting sense one of "irrationality" as a philosophical
doctrine a person abandons argument. Both what is true and what is
false are no longer separated or defined. The person becomes like
the neurotic Tillich describes. "The inability of the neurotic to
have a full enoounter with reality makes his doubts as well as his
certitudes unrealistic. He puts both in the wrong place. He doubts
what is practically above doubt and he is certain where doubt is
adequate. Above all, he does not admit the question of meaning in its
universal and radical sense".^ What is wrong with "irrationalism" in
sense one is the same as is wrong with the neurotic - the total and
complete failure to realise that there are certain basic laws of logio
which it is essential to grasp and to obey.
When one considers the natural limits of rationality by investigating
the limits of irrationalism both as these are found in irrational
features of the world and man and as an attempt to state a philosophical
doctrine, the need has been seen to separate the two senses of
"rationality" and "irrationality" outlined. The first sense of
"irrationalism" deals with the world of nonsense and universal madness,
where debate and argument are not just difficult but meaningless. Over
and against this there is sense two which arises from and deals with the
fact that there are still some genuine questions, problems and disagreements,
and there is still room for debate and discussion about what is rationally
acceptable, but this is always and only within a particular context which
itself requires to be clarified.
It/
11. P. Tillich, The Courage to Be p.p.76-7J PlAlexander "Rational
Behaviour and Psychoanalytic Explanation", p.335# Q.p.p.326-7*
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It has been shown that part of the criticism against a
philosophical doctrine of irrationalism rested upon the necessity of
a basic logic, or to express the same point, the basic necessity of
logic as responsible for leading us into difficulties when we try to
understand apparently contradictory doctrines. hartley has a short
and powerful answer against this. "Now logic has a way of avenging
herself on those who treat her lightly. If wa abandon logic, we lose
the power of argument; for argument consists, in essence, in showing
that two claims are incompatible. And if we abandon logic we also
diminish enormously o -r powers of description: for to say what some
thing is, to describe it, is at the same time to say a great deal about
what it Is not. And if we allow contradictions to be introduced, we
permit all descriptions at once. Thus one defensive move - the
scuttling of logic - forces us step by step down the hierarchy of
linguistic functions. "ife lose the power to argue, we lose the power
12
to describe5 we are left with the powers to express and signal".
Logic is necessary, but there is the need for a further distinction.
It is equally important for my purpose not only to examine the level
of the false and the incomprehensible which logic reveals to us, but
likewise to examine the ridiculous and inapposite, as these correspond
to the two senses of "rationality" and "irrationality" whiah have been
made. M. Hollis, in a discussion of the limits of irrationality, m kes
the/
12. hartley, Morality and Ralitgon. p.33i Q.p.p.277»8,319-20j Hodges,
"Languages, Standpoints and Attitudes", p.62.
the same sort of point. He states that, "We cannot understand the
irrational and to suppose that we can is to run into a vicious circle;
13
"but we can understand the rational in more than one way." To examine
the variety of ways of understanding is crucial for genuine argument
and the development of beliefs and positions. It is necessary to
consider the need for logic in these circumstances and the limits of
such logic. Two of the usual tests of logic are those of consistency
1L
and comprehensiveness, yet even these may run into difficulties.
Consistency is not sufficient as a criterion, for any standpoint or
attitude must be self-consistent if it is to offer an alternative to
any belief or attitude alx-eady accepted. Sufch consistency does not
make the choice between rival candidates any easier. This puts the
two senses of "rationality" in relation to logic in their proper
perspective. There is that logic which is necessary for something, to
bo a candidate at all for anyone's consideration. This is sense one
and Its limits are those of what is and must he universally acceptable.
Cense two is that area of decision and discussion between standpoints
and attitudes which are rival condidates. Their rivalry relates to a
particular context and rests on debatable premisses for which evidence
can and must be given. When there is talk of logic as a check it is
necessary to clarify the difference between the universally true and
false of 3enae one, and the particularly ridiculous and inapposite
within sense two. This delineates part of the natural limit of logic,
though at the same time stressing the necessity of such logic.
Attention/
13. IS. Hollis, B. Wilson (ed.) Rationality, p.220.
14. Q.p.273; R.Hare, Freedom and Reason, p.p.79,135,157; Downie,
.oles ana Values, p.12; Hodges, ibid, p.62.
Attention is now concentrated on some of the limitations of
logic in practice. The general level is dealt with first and then
attention turned to a particular problem expressed in a theological
context, hut which has implications for not only morals and metaphysics,
hut for all sciences. Login cannot solve a dispute between two rival
sets of principles for it offers only an account of how the mechanics
of disputes are to he conducted and does not provide any principle of
interpretation hy which a final decision can he made between two
internally coherent and consistent views. Rather it becomes in this
connection and type of situation a matter of choice and the will to
think in a particular way and accept particular stresses and points
rather than others. But hy saying that it reduces to a choice does
not decrease the importance of rational thought and argument, for with
such a choice must he a full aharaoterication of the basis, grounds and
effeot of that choice. Game theozy ha3 led to the derivation of many
such problems, which reveal the limitations of logic in a practical
setting. The example given sshow3 that there is an absence of one most
rational thing to do. In other terras, logic and rationality cannot
conclude what is the best course of action in this situation and
something else is required. Two prisoners are held in separate cells
hy the sheriff. They have committed a serious crime hut the sheriff
lacks proof. Therefore he tells each prisoner in turn* "If neither
confesses, you will both be convicted of a misdemeanour and receive
very light sentences. If both confess, you will receive very heavy
3/c
sentences, ana if una confess®a and the other does not, the one who
ooufesses wall he freed and the other will receive the heaviest possible
sentence'* Logic alone cannot solve the problem of what to do in a
situation like this*
hare suggests that it is not just in the reala of facts or principles
that logic is limited by its inability to offer a means of decision.
It is language itself which creates problems for the logician. "A
logician cannot do justice to the infinite subtlety of languagej all
he can do is to point out some of the main features of our use of a word,
and thereby put people on their guard against the main ^angers. A full
understanding of the logic of value-terms can only be achieved by
15
continual and sensitive attention to the way we use them." Pert of
the difficulty in this kind of sensitivity and appreciation of the
subiety of language is with those who use language. People are often
dishonest even in the intellectual realm. In religion in particular
■lie basic meaning of words is often stretched beyond all recognition
emptying the ooncept involved of all meaning and reality* People are
often ruled by their emotions rather than by what they can rationally
recognise as a binding course of action* Cue may conduct a person
uown the primrose path of a logical argument anu at the end present
them with the logical conclusion of what they have said which seems
irrefutable, only to have a raspberry-reaction. Likewise it is
possible to be rational arid to have impeccable logic and yet to be a
very/
13. Ii. Hare, Language of ... orals, p.126
v«ry unpleasant person. The ITazl can be consistently logical and
ruthlessly exterminate all Jews on his own premisses, which inevitably
loads to his frightening conclusions. Logic can be used for both good
and harm, and it is possible to argue consistently for the most morally
outrageous conclusions. Against thislogic i3 no safeguard, for logic
ha3 a limited role here as it applies to rationality.
Logic is limited bjr the wickedness of man and the limited nature
of his sympathies, but logic is also limited by the sensitive nature
of situations which sometimes confront men. In "The French Lieutenant's
Toman", an example of this sensitivity is found which is different from
logic and which logic cannot replace or compete with on equal terns,
though this is only to stress the need for different techniques and
not the replacement of one by the other. "Sarah had some sort of
psychological equivalent of the experienced horse-dealer's skill -
the ability to know almost at the first glance the good horse from the
had one; or a3 if, jumping a century, she was bom with a computer in
her heart. I say her heart, since the values she computed belong more
there than in the mind. She could sense the pretensions of a hollow
argument, a false scholarship, a biased logic v#ten she came across them:
but she also saw through people in subtler ways. Without being able
to say how, any more than a computer can explain its own processes, she
saw them as they were and not as they -tried, to seam. It would not be
enough to say that she was a f3.no moral judge of people. Her comprehension
1 jf
was broader than that...." From examples like this it can be seen
that/
16. J. Fowles, The French Lieutenant's Woman. p.57»
that when it cosies to dealing with people and with language much of
what is accepted as true and used iu practice is nothing final and
absolute, but conjectural and open to improvement. Much is never
totally understood, for many things appeal- opaque and irreducible into
clear logical forms and formulae. All these things are true in the
sense that it is impossible to know everything, yet this is not the same
as to say that we know nothing nor that logic is useless. Rather it
is necessary to separate the two senses of logic in relation to the senses
of rationality, and realise the appropriate limitations of each logic;
that of sense one to deal with everything, and that of sense two to
cone to final and universal conclusions. feither of these is possible,
ana the existence of two senses bespeaks the efficacy of such limitations.
It is in the context of the limitations of logic that the difficulty
of changing a person's mind is realised, and such difficulty is an
empirical limit set on logic. Freud was quick to realise this and
express it. "Lince men are so little accessible to reasonable arguments
and are so entirely governed by their instinctual wishes, why should
one set out to deprive them of an instinctual satisfaction and replace
at by reasonable arguments? It is true that men are like this; but
have you asked yourself whether they must be like this, whether their
17
innermost nature necessitates it?" The colour-blind person con know
something of what others mean when they talk of the green grass and the
blue sky, but this is far from knowing what green and blue are really
like/
17. 0. froud, The Future of An Illusion, p.77; 5.p.199; J. Wisdom,
Philosophy and Psychoanalysis p. 258
:?3
like. The person who has never lost a loved one may have some idea
of what bereavement is about, but cannot really understand why it is
such & devastating thing to so many. To appreoiata the point and foroe
of an argument requires more than logic and much of our humanity seems
to act against logic and reason. The same sort of point from the
opposite side can be seen, if one tries to imagine rational beings who
could always reason impeccably and not only that, but act immediately
upon what they had decided without it ever occuring to them that there
was an alternative. In such cases exhortation, persuasion, praise,
condemnation, and blame would be inappropriate. Thera would be no
scope for moral judgment if these people were impassive, invulnerable,
18
■anu totally self-sufficient. 3ut human beings are nons of these things,
but rather subject to feeling, vulnerable, and dependent on others, and
likewise do not always and only do what i3 the result of a logical
argument. This ±3 back to the tension between total rationality and
total irrationality, total explanation of everything and total
inability to express any thing. There are limits of logio both in the
areas to which it may be applied and in those who apply it. Logio in
sense one of "rationality" is limited by the nature of the human situation
and language, while in sense two it is seen that the limits of logic lio
within man's incapacity to convince universally or to execute fully what
one accepts in a particular context. The argument now turns to a
particular problem expressed as an example in theological terms:
subjectivity.
Torrance' 2/
18. G. Warnook, The Object of Morality, p.14
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Torrance's account of objeotivity has already been outlined "Reason
is the oapacity to behave consciously in terms of what is not ourselves«
We can express this briefly by saying that reason is the capacity to
behave in terms of the nature of the object, that is to say, to behave
> 19
objectively. Reason is thus our capacity for objeotivity"« To be
attached to the object meant that one was detached from all false
preconceptions and while this was oruaial for theology it was simply
20
part of the one way of human knowledge* In the attempt to be true
to this way of knowing, we confront the problem of subjectivity, in
which man imposes his own pattersn on nature and what there is, so that
he is unable to distinguish reality from his own ideas and thinks that
21
he himself is responsible for all meaning and understanding. This
problem needs a radical solution according to Torrance and that is a
22
conversion.
Some of the problems of Torrance's account of objectivity and
subjectivity have already been analysed, yet some sort of aooount of
his point must be taken. In the situation of learning, knowing, and
doing, humans are active participants who are making a contribution
such that if a person were not active in observing and interpreting
there would be no learning or knowledge, yet this subjective necessity
23
must be balanced by objeotivity.
By/
19. T.p.p.ll-13i MM.p.232} F.P.p.245; Chapter Three p.p.
20. MM.p.231-2; T.p.p.36,112} S.p.p.82,91-2;197; Chapter Three p.p.
21. T.p.p.xvi-vii,32} S.p.198.
22. F.P.245} T.p.275.
23. Weyl, The Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science p.116}
Hodges ibid, p.52*
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By objectivity is meant an objeotive judgement which is not affected
by idiosyncratic faotore such as special interest, hopes and fears of
a person involved, but a judgement which any reasonable and unbiased
person would make in similar ciroumstances. (This is another stress on
impartiality#) It is again necessary to refer to the two senses of
"rationality", for this is again the situation of tension where complete
objectivity is impossible, and yet total subjectivity is fatal. These
are situations in which people can and do bring universally valid
features and standards to bear and this is limited by the necessary
presence of subjective factors, which can be recognised and allowed for,
and there is the weaker sense of objectivity which is paralleled by sense
two of "rationality". "hen someone accuses another of subjectivity and
lack of objectivity this must be put in its proper relation to the
apposite sense of rationality.
The natural limits of rationality htve now been considered in
relation to irrationalism and logic, and now attention turns to the
general limits of different levels of dealing wiih rationality and the
limits of human capacities. Augustine when asked to define time
complained that he knew perfectly well what time was until he was asked
to define it. He has not the only one to know more than he could say.
Thomas Brown has a verse to express the same point, "I do not love you,
Dr. Fell?
"I do not love you, Dr. Fell,
But why I cannot tell;
But/
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But this I know full well,
I do not love you, Dr. FqII."2^
This inability to express all that is known has been formalised
by Polanyi into a distinction between tacit and explicit knowing, but
this is an essential feature of knowledge. If one considers the
notion of a "sinner" as it is used commonly in theological circles and
discussion, one is confronted with someone who is not totally bad.
A sinner could not be someone who always and only sinned or else there
could be no sense in which there would be sin. Sin is a departure
from a standard, a falling short which inoludes within its sense the
notion of not falling short. In other words, the sinner oan be
neither totally bad nor totally good, neither a saint nor a total
degenerate. To be a sinner implies that one is at some point a saint
or a potential one, and at other times a devil, but neither all the
time. This is the sort of tension expressed already in this chapter
with irrationality and logic. To b8 rational is not to be rational
on all and every occasion with no possibility of being less than rational,
nor is irrationality to be always and only irrational. This is of
course sense two of "rationality", which is the particular and not the
universal level of the features of rationality. The person who argues
rationally in a particular context, is like the sinner, liable to fall
from grace. In sense one of "rational", there is no room for such
falling from grace, for to do so is to be reckoned mad or insane.
Tho/
24. T. Brown, Martial Epigrams, i.32; See below, p.p.
377
The sinner who is finally irredeemable is no longer a sinner, but a
lost soul. There are in rationality particular human limits which
must be borne in mind in the ascription of rational grounds and argument.
These are the limits of knowledge, what we do not knowj the limits of
appreciation, what implications we fail to realise and the subtleties
we fail to appreciate; the limit of will, expressed by the Apostle
Paul as the doing of evil which he wishes to avoid and the failure
to do the good which he wished to do; and the limit of values, in
failing to extend moral values either far enough or consistently enough.25
The limitations of human capacities in the area of rationality
arise from the fact that people are human agents #10 are subject to
weakness of will, subjective involvement, emotional overtones, and
wickedness. People are also unable to offer a totally accurate
prediction of the future and especially of the future of human knowledge
and how it will develop. The description of situations and of reality
is necessarily selective and influenced by our own projections. "Human
beings in general are not just naturally disposed always to do what it
would be best that they should do, even if they see, or are perfeotly
in a position to see, what that is. Even if they are not positively
neurotio or otherwise maladjusted, people are naturally somewhat prone
to be moved by short-run rather than long-run considerations, and often
by the pursuit of more blatant, intense, and obtrusive satisfactions
26
rather than those cooler ones that on balance would really be better".
We/
25. P. Nidditch, ibid, p.10; RVR.P.4; Q.p.35; Hownie, Roles and
Values, p.p.28-9; S. Weil, Gravity and Grace, p.87.
26. G. Warnock, The Object of Morality p.21; Downie Roles and Values
p.p.27-8.
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We are all limited in our rationality by our prejudices, attractions,
fears and suspicions, and the complaint that even in philosophy of
religion some philosophers do not apply the same high analytic standards
that they presumably employ when engaged in symbolic logic or in the
analysis of science rings true when it is remembered that some of the
things which may determine conclusions may come from the desire to
be different, to be thought intellectually superior, a quirk of taste,
the influence of others, and the attraction of the unreachable and the
27
unacceptable.
Human beings are limited both in their capacities and in the
execution of their capacities. Kazantzakis describes one possible
view of our situation in the form of a parable. "Qace upon a time there
was a little village, lost in the desert. All its inhabitants were
blind. A great King passed by followed by his army. He was riding
an enormous elephant. The blind people heard of it. They had heard
a great deal about elephants and were moved by a great desire to touoh
this fabulous animal, to get an idea of what it was. About ten of
them, let's say the notables, sat out. They begged the King for
permission to touch the elephant -• 'I give you permission, touch it!*
said the King. One of them touched its trunk, another its foot, another
its flanks, one was raised up so that he might feel its ear, another
was seated on its back and given a ride. The blind men went back to
their village enchanted. All the other blind people crowded round
them,/
27. VS. Bartley. Morality and Religion, p.lOj hecky. The &ise and
Influence of Rationalism, p.p.xiv-xvj Hodges, ibid, p.65
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them, asking them greedily what sort of thing this fantastio beast,
the elephant was. The first said: 'It is a big pipe that raises
itself alghCily, ourls, and woe to you if it catches youl' Another
saids 'It is a hairy pillar!' Another; 'It is a wall, like a fortress,
and it too is hairy.* Another, the one who had felt the ear: 'It's
not a wall at all; It's a carpet of thick wool coarsely worked, which
moves when you touch it.' And the last cried: 'What's that nonsense
28
you're talking? It's an enorraouB walking mountain"'. It does
appear that as far as human capacities are concerned to some extent
people are blind, and that what is to be known, like the elephant, is
far greater than can be perceived or expressed. But this is only to
describe the condition with reference to sense two of "rationality".
As far as sense one is concerned it may be said that the person who
consistently tries to be reasonable about evil deeds, the robber who
thought it wrong, who knew that the old lady he robbed had no money
or valuables and that he was very fond of her, is not so much in the
wrong by what he did as by the fact that he does not know, value,
appreciate or will appropriately. This leads to the point where it
is necessary to break off ascribing rationality to a person in the oase
of madness or in the oase of animals. This is not so much the failure
to follow through implications and the occasional falling short of a
standard, but the continual failure to appreciate the basic rudiments
of knowledge, value and behaviour. What is debatable is the breaking
off/
28. N. Kazantzaki^ Christ Reorucified. p.180
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off point where the failure to b® rational in sense two becomes the
failure to be rational in sense one, and this can be expressed only
in light of particular contexts and backgrounds, where the universally
acceptable is regularly and easily rejected without the realisation of
the need for argument end replacement.
The natural limits of rationality have been locked at in relation
to irrationalism as it is found in nature and in man as well as a
philosophical doctrine, to logic with its necessity yet limitations,
to human capacities and weaknesses, but finally the account turns to
consider the limits set on rationality due to a variety in levels of
thinking and understanding. By this is meant putting the two senses
of "rationality" against the background of the variety of levels we are
confronted with in knowledge and the system!nation of it. One example
of the problem of variety of levels is presented by Torrance. He
states that, "It is impossible to reduce to thought how thought is
related to being, else all we are left with is mere thought; it is
likewise impossible to state in statements how statements are related
29
to being nevertheless, in authentic knowledge bein/- shows through,"
and "As it is impossible to state in statements the relation of
statements to being, so it is impossible to logical!ze the relation
of different logical levels to actual existences all that linguistic
and logical forms can do is to indicate where they come to an end, to
show their boundary by breaking off the process of formalization in
order that actual existence may be allowed to thrust itself upon our
30






may be seen in two practical examples. James suggests that, "A
Beethoven string-quartet is truly, as someone has iaid, a scraping of
horses' tails on Cat's bowels, and may be exhaustively described in
such terms} but the application of this description in no way precludes
the simultaneous applicability of an entirely different description"
The point about different levels may also be seen int he differenoe
between the way we know the countryside by reference to a map and our
knowledge of it gained by the familiarity which comes from walking about
it regularly. The one is oritical, articulated and can he set down
according to strict rules, while the other is acritical, preverbal,
and instinctive in something of the sane way that reliance on our
senses is instinctive.
Problems arise when there is the failure to take seriously the
distinctions of level. Often traditional forms of logic are too narrow
and restricted to deal with every new discovery of features of reality.
Traditionallogic tends to oversimplify and therefore to distort. In
general the failure to be aware of different levels leads to an impass#.
For example, if the Hare-Foot controversy is recalled and the iraoasse of
that situation and debate, it can ben seen that there is a co.se to be
made for separating the two aooounts to deal with different levels.
Hare is relevant to the level of the form of any and every moral argument,
and his point is that what is involved in a moral argument is universal-
sizability. Foot and her supporters, on the other hand, are at a
totally/
31. W. James, The Will to Believe, p.76.
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totally different level, which Is the content of moral judgement
rather than the form, as in Hare's case. Their point is that in fact
moral judgements always have something to do with what is good for one
and what is harmful to one. The problem with their argument is that
these two levels are not olearly separated. The account which Rawls
gives which has already been, drawn upon is also relevant here, for he
wishes to separate the level of justifying a particular case by
reference to an accepted standard from the justification of a practice
as a whole, which requires different levels of argument. The danger
is that one particular level will be held to be the standard to which
all else must attain, and this is the sort of thing that the seeptio is
guilty of when he trios to make all knowledge) conform to a single simple
pattern in every case.
The solution to the problem of levels is to learn to think on
different levels and on each level to be consistent without mixing up
the levels. Aristotle had the basic idea and it has been taken up by
Polanyi that there are different levels of living beings - the vegetative,
that of muscular action, that of patterns of behaviour, that of
32
intelligence, and that of responsible choice.' G-ddel and Quine have
made the same sort of point though with reference to different things,
the realm of logic, epistemology, and reference. The operation of a
higher level cannot be totally acoounted for by the laws which are
relevant to a lower level, and the queiying of all reference does not
make sense without something relative to which such reference can be
sought/




Theologians often claim that part of the misunderstanding of the
subject-matter of theology results from the failure to realise that
theologian operates with a different interpretative framework and with
distinctive conceptual forms which are appropriate to its own subject
34
matter. This does not neoessarily entail a full-blown Barthian
system, but rather, given tire natural limits of rationality in relation
to tire different levesl of what there is and what we know, we may act
accordingly. he accept the limit of each level as we come to it.
One moves to another level which is appropriate to the matter in hand
end seeks to develop language and concepts which are themselves approp-
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jriate. This is especially important within sense two of "rationality"
where the disputants must always be seeking new ways of expressing what
they disagree about and how to solve that disagreement. This means
too that we must look for an appropriate degree of proof. In other
words, at the level of sense two, there must be no demand or expectation
of having evidence in accordance with sense one of "rational", rather
Aristotle's advice is recalled to look only for the degree of exaotitude
36
and clarity appropriate to tne question at hand.
1W
33. Polasyi, Knoounter. May 1965, P»15, Quine, Qnological Relativity
and Other Essays, p.p.53,54-5.
34. T.p.p.285,326; P.P.p.244; B. Emmei;, The Mature of Metaphysical
Thinking, p.75*
35. S.p.p.19,158j 3. Weil, Gravity and G-raoe. p.p.87-8
36. T. Penelhum, Rallgjon and Pa tonality, p.148
In tooting to examine the natural Iirr.it£ of rationality, an account
has boon given of the limit on rationality which rocults from irrational
features of the world ana of roan. The limits on rationality from the
doctrine of irrational!am and the criticism o. it have been seen.
There has been examination of the way that logic while necessary is
limited by subjectivity, emotion, and wickedness, and then consideration
of the way that human capacities anu different levels of understanding
form a set of limits on rationality which must be worked out aw two
levels. It lias been seen throughout these limits that the basic
distinction of two senses of 'rationality" is relevant and important and
this distinction must be made in all discussion ana argument in relation
to the limits discussed. But further these limits must be applied to
each different argument and discussion situation us they arise and the
effect of the limits of rationality seen in raotice rather than in
theoretical terms. This outline of natural limits, like all sections
on limits, is designed to show not only that argument is possible, but
to offer some means of conducting that argument, and it is my contention
that given the understanding of Hie limits of rationality in natural
terms, such discussion will be clearer from the realisation, that
irrational features must be dealt with yet that same irrationality is
limiteu, that logic is necessary, but is itself limited, that human beings
have varying capacities and weaknesses which must be taken account of, and
that there are different levels of understanding to be discerned, not the
least of which includes the separation of two basic senses of rationality.
But not only that, for by examining the natural limits of rationality a clearer
idea of rationality itself is evident especially as it is used in argument
and discussion.
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2. The Situational Limits*
The account turns now from the consideration of the natural limits
of rationality to an examination of some of the situational limits.
Again this is part of the threefold answer to the threefold attaok on
hartley and Torrance. An attempt is being made to provide a
corrective to the failure of Torrance and hartley to examine the limits
in rationality and especially the situational ones. This is also to
try to make room for the critic to have a genuine basis from which he
may offer criticism. This is done by looking at the aotual situations
of belief, criticism, argument, persuasion, explanation, justification,
and change where it is possible to discern some features of limitation
which are relevant in terms of rationality in specific situations.
Finally, the intention is to put flesh and blood on the basio distinction
of the two senses of "rationality" and thus to offer at the same time an
account of rationality which is more adequate them those earlier critioised.
It will be shown not only that argument is possible on the basis of an
adequate account of the nature of rationality, but also how such argument
may develop and the sort of issues which are important for this. I
shall also be drawing on certain points which have already been argued
for in earlier chapters and bringing these together in relation both to
the situational limits of rationality and the two basio senses of
"rationality" outlined. The examination is of belief, then criticism,
argument, persuasion, explanation, justification and finally change in
order to disoover some of the situational limits of rationality.
Beliefs or a particular belief must make a difference to the person
who accepts it. It may be the case that certain beliefs are related to
particular affections and values, and take the form of some sort of
ultimate/
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ultimate commitment, yet there is always this relation to a difference
in having the belief as opposed to not having it. The man who believes
in Sod will not only look at death in a different light because of his
belief, but it will affect his attitude to many things in the here and
now as well as the hereafter. Belief results in action in the same sort
of way that the acceptance of a rule of morality brings the responsibility
of obeying it given the opportunity. Hare emphasises the close relation
of belief and action when he states that, "if believing something is a
kind of tninking, we can find out what a man believes by studying his
aotions; and likewise, if holding a moral principle, or desiring something,
or having a certain purpose, are in a wide sense kinds of thinking, we
can find out about a man's principles or purposes or desires by studying
his actions" «"*"
However it is stiil the case that beliefs may not rest upon the
sort of grounds that one would like them to, and it may not be possible
to give the sort of evidence that one ought for them. Though this may
be offset by the realisation tnat there seems to be some sort of scaling
of beliefs from those which are open to refutation by direct evidenoe
against them to those which seem to hold a privileged place in our
thinking and are held immune from much criticism because they are
especially important. Hart of such a scale may depend on1he nature of
what is believed, and the way that it is believed. Belief is often the
sort of thing that comes and goes according to what is felt at some
particular time and whac has been happening to adjust the circumstances
of belief. The sort of point which i3 in mind has been drawn by Penelhum
iV
1, R, Hare, "Religion and Morals", B, Mitchell(ed») faith and Logic:
?.P.p.l35:T.p.p.3~4t Wisdom, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis.n.ISO:
Warnock, The Object of Molality, p.138; J, Baillie, The Sense of the
Presence of God. p.p.256-7•
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in his discussion of the rationality of religious belief. He suggests
that, "It makes rough sense; it has a discernable verification structure;
it does n6t defeat itslef by internal contradiction or need not do so;
it can absorb and need not flout soientific knowledge; and it is able
not only to point to myriad evidences of its alleged truth but to absorb
oounterevidence by means of its inclusion of esohatological expectations
and to explain the very fact of unbelief in terms of men's alleged
rebellion against the &od it proclaims. This, then, makes belief an
2
open option for a rational being to ohose". If it is this kind of
rough sense which a ©an claims and offers, then it is important not to
make a strong alalia for knowledge, but rather to be content to describe
what is claimed as known in the language of belief. The danger in
siutations of argument is that on the one side the critic makes too
strong a demand on the defender of a view failing to realise that not
all understanding is at one level. But it is just as likely that the
defender in his eagerness to havs hi3 view accepted overstates his case
and makes claims for it that are not justified. Thus it is important
in a particular situation to decide in terras of belief or knowledge in
the sense of the standard being worked with. It is possible, of course,
only to believe what is thou^it to be true. It would certainly be
paradoxioal for a man to say that something is good but that he does not
approve of it, or that he approves of something but that it is not good,
but the paradox here would be equal to someone saying that something is
ture but that he does not believe it, or that he believes something but,
of course, it is not true. It is hoped that what is believed is true,
but/
2. Penelhum, Religion and Rationality, p.210; R. Bambrough, Reason.
Truth and Sod p.91.
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but oare must be exercised in the knowledge and truth claims made for
a particular belief in light of the evidence actually at hand and nothing
beyond that*
In the realm of belief it must be reoalled that it is not knowledge
in sense one of "rationality" is being dealt with,
though a person does make particular truth claims* But the extent and
nature of these truth-claims are limited in that it is not proof in any
universal and final sense which is being claimed* Brunner makes the
same sort of point, "In the sphere of faith..* there is no 3eourityj
here there are no sensible or mental points of support; hare there is
no calming of the mind; nor any self-assurance; faith is a venture;
it means hanging on a thread, not standing on solid ground; it is an
attitude of complete dependence, and indeed, of dependence upon Another,
and it is therefore the abiding mystery within the revelation. Thi3
does not mean that faith is uncertainty, but that it always has uncertainty
3
on its left hand*" Though Brunner has exaggerated the degree of doubt
involved in faith, for there are many kinds of reasons which may be given
for the decision to believe rather than not to, he ha3 some validity in
that a belief is something that, at the time of holding oannot be fully
justified. This is of vital concern both to the believer as he seeks
to persuade the unbeliever and therefore runs the risk of failing to
realise the limitations of belief as opposed to knowledge, and to the
unbeliever who when faoed with something ho does not understand must
avoic/
3* Brunner, The Mediator, p.p.334,301,^02; Penelhum, Religion and
Rationality, p.217| W. James, The Will to Believe. p*90*
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avoid demanding of it more than it claims, e.g., he must not ask for
final irrefutable proof, when only a firmly accepted hypothesis is
offered. faith means belief in something concerning which doubt is
still theoretically or practically possible. The point is again that
faith and belief, like the idea of "sinner" and rationality and
irrationality, rests on a kind of tension between what is claimed and
what oannot be claimed. The believer must know something yet he
cannot continue to call it belief if he knows everything about it,
hence the tension. This tension is part of the actual situational
limit of rationality as it relates to belief.
These then are some of the limitations of rationality in relation
to belief. They are the tenuous nature of belief in its genesis,
in the evidence held and offered for it, and in its conversion into
action. Sense one of "rationality" is only concerned with belief
as it relates to what all men must believe universally, while most
of what has been examined is really in terms of sense two, where there
is still room for disagreement and argument. When oonfronted with a
statement of belief, it is necessary first of all to inquire which
level of rationality is concerned and to approach the standards and
limits of such beliefs accordingly. Then one must go on to see, in
the very definite situation, the kinds of limits there are on rationality
as it applies to both levels of the senses of rationality as they relate
to belief. While it is possible for the unbeliever to disregard
totally belief, this does not exempt the believer from dealing with
the problems of unbelief. So it is necessary to consider how one
ought to react to criticism of belief. Pascal seemed to believe that
the/
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the best way to deal with such criticism was to keep the right sort
4
of company, as belief appeared to be highly contagious. However,,
the rational examination of critioism may have more to offer than a
retreat to group psychology and sociology.
The question facing the believer is how to deal with the problem
of critioism. This notion has already been analysed and some of its
limits seen. It was argued that criticism ought to be based on
neutrality allowing for both positive and negative oriticism, that
one ought to be aoquainted with the object of criticism to criticise,
that the occasion of criticism was when something went wrong either
due to failure or error. It was also decided that criticism to be
genuine was intended to bring about change, improvement, or elimination
of error, though it was possible to criticise with a view to clarification
and explanation. Criticism must have appropriate backing, in terras of
evidence or authority. It presupposed understanding and intelligence
and the capacity to adapt in light of oriticism as well as the
opportuniiy to respond to criticism, by argument. It was seen how
important it was that the person criticised, when it was a person,
might be able to appreciate the criticism, and that this might be
mitigated by circumstances. In general it wa3 shown that criticism
Could be more or less appropriate, varied with circumstances, one's
relation to the person, objeot, an one's view of the objeot criticised.
Criticism might be theoretical, practical, psychological, moral, or
religious, and that within these fields there were vaiying forms and
standards/
4. Penelhum, Religion and nationality, p.214.
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standards of criticism. It was also seen that not everything might
5
be open to criticism.
All of these points provide a basic technique for the detail of
how to approach and deal with criticism in various situations, but
it must rest on a prior settling of the question of what level of
criticism is being dealt with. In terms of sense one of "rationality"
it can be seen that the question of criticism cannot easily arise
without some extraordinary evidence, while in relation to sense two,
it is seen that both in expressing and dealing with criticism there
is a good deal of room for manoeuvre. This means that in religious,
moral and metaphysical terms there is no need for an immediate retreat
to commitment, but rather the need for olose analysis of the object
of criticism, and the nature and scope of that criticism. Part of
such an inquiry must involve asking questions, and it is necessary
therefore to move from criticism in general to the asking of genuine
questions.
Where there are questions, there is room for argument even if
that argument is solely whether or not there is a question to be asked.
Where there is such a question there is room for reasoning processes,
and there must be at least something that can be said which is relevant
to the dispute. But questions which are asked in the midst of such
disagreement must be real questions in the sense that the answer is
not already knovm to them. Even for there to be recognition that
there/
5. Downie, "The Right To Criticise", p.p.ll6-7j Acton, The Philosophy
Punishment, p,35j Catkins, "C.C.R.s A Refutation", p.61, see above
Chapter Two p.p. "2 "7
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there is a question at stake means that there is Borne ground between
the two sides over what is to count as a question and to some extent
what will therefore tend to count as an answer to it. This is
important in argument, for on Torrance and Bartley*s accounts there
was no room for the critic to take up any position, but this is not
the oase on the view of rationality I sun propounding. It is against
the agreed background of sense one of "rationality" that two disputing
parties may go on to discuss the kinds of standards which they will
accept in particular cases, which are at the level of sense two of
"rationality". It is necessary therefore to ensure that the questions
at issue are real questions which can be answered and to describe what
is going to count as having answered the question. Real questions
must have some sort of effect in that they are the sort of questions
which will be followed up. If an answer is given, that answer will
make a difference, and we shall be affected by what is given in response
to what is asked. In other words, one must move away from purely
academic disputes which have no real effect beoause they are not
questions which matter to the asker or to anyone else. No one will
act upon these sorts of queries, and the person asked, sensing this,
refuses to answer, for he does not wish to play pointless games.
What is being argued for is genuine questioning, which is no game, but
rather a genuine desire to learn, to change, to arrive at fuller and
more true conclusions and beliefs. One of the situational limits of
rationality must relate to an appreciation of what sort of question
is/
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is being asked, its seriousness, and its genuineness. With this will
be some understanding of what is required to answer it and what will
satisfy the query.^
What is required for a better understanding of the situational
limits of rationality is the development of genuine questions which
fulfil the sorts of standards being described. Questions which have
answers still to be learned, and which are appropriate to what is under
consideration. It is essential to devabp appropriate questions,
appropriate both to the proper level of rationality involved, appropriate
to the particular context and subject under review, and appropriate
to the evidence and sources available on which to make response. At
level one of rationality it is difficult to imagine the formulating
of genuine new questions, but at level two it is necessary to concentrate
on deciding whether or not this particular question is appropriate and
genuine according to its particular context and situation.^
There has been examination of belief, its criticism, and the
asking of questions in relation to this criticism and the isolation
of certain limits which it is necessary to be aware of in the actual
situation of argument and discussion where rationality is involved,
and that is of course in every suoh situation. But now attention is
turned to the consideration of the situational limits of argument in
general. In any argument it is first of all important to understand
what the argument is about, to disoover in what respects one disagrees
and the common ground necessary on the basis of which disagreement can
take place. One of the situational limits of being able to describe
the/
6. T.p.1,123-4,130* S.p.p.53-4; Bambrough, Reason. Truth and &od,
p.p.46-7,49,104*
7. G. Warnock, The Objeot of Morality, p.p.121-2; T.p.p.94,124J20-l,
229; S.p.53; M.M.p.123; j« MaoMurray, The Self as Agent, p.21;
Coulson, "Christianity in the Age of Science", p.27.
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the measure of disagreement is that it is possible for two people to
agree on all the facts and still differ on the conclusion, for example,
whether they should say "Jesus is the Christ, the Son of Cod". The
disagreement hare is not so much a factual one as rather a oonflict in
g
attitudes and hence in outlook and action. It may not be possible
in such disputes to offer a crucial experiment to decide between suoh
disagreement, but this need not be to say that there is no correct and
no wrong answer. The same sort of situation arises in legal proceedings
and it is interesting to consider the kinds of argument offered over
such notions as the exercising of reasonable care, and the legal
standing of a bill as a document. In such cases the reasons offered
are like the legs of a chair, rather than consecutive links in a chain.
Thay have a cumulative effect, and must be taken as a whole or lose
their cogency. Similar sorts of judgements take place when a dootor
decides what is wrong from a patient*s symptoms, and when a detective
9
spots the criminal from the available clues. These processes of
argument are not the reaching of arbitrary decisions. Rather the
need to look at the situation as a whole is seen and especially as
regards the particular context, and to determine within that context
what the standards of sense, meaning, and so of argument in general are
to be. The situation and its particular features limit the kind and
degree of argument which may be used, at this level two of "rationality".
When/
8. F. Forre, Language. Logic, and Lou, p.l86j Widsom. Philosophy and
Psychoanalysis, p.250: Bambrough, Reason. Truth and God, p.64;
Maolntyre, B Wilson (ed.) Rationality, p.62.
9. Wisdom, ibid. p.l56-8j Bambrough, ibid. p.64»
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When we are involved in an argument, however, it is necessary
to recognise what would oonnt for and against each of the views which
are in debate. In situations of disagreement, there must be at least
one person wrong, and whore it can be known that someone is wrong there
should he the possibility of discovering who is correct.^ Right
and wrong in argument relate to truth and falsity in logical terms.
As Bartley notes, "The practice of critical argument and logic are
bound together. We can reject logic, but to do so is to reject the
practice of argument. What we cannot do is to go on arguing critically
after we have rejected the idea that true premisses must, in a valid
11
argument, lead tc true conclusions"• Bartley not only makes the
point of the interconnection of logic and argument but in defining
what is to count as criticism, outlines three kinds of argument.
These arej "1. arguments purporting to reveal some internal inconsistency
in the position under attackj 2. arguments for the falsity of the
position} and 3« arguments to the affect that the position is
12
unsatisfactory from a methodological point of view". However, one
needs too to be aware of the whole family of logical relations and
not to limit argument by too narrow a conception of logic. It has
been stated that there are at least two basic senses of logic which
telate to the two basic senses of "rationality". Thus in argument
each side requires to clarify which level it is dealing with - sense
one or two, and then to explicate the standards of that level which will,
of course, be limited by the particular situation and subject-matter.
Argument/
10. Bambrough, Reason. Truth, and God, p.p.53-4,78,101.
11. R.C.p.l71j Q.p.318.
12. Watkins, "C.C.R.s A Refutation", p.59.
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Argument deals not just with the form or content of criticism,
but also with the person argued against and there is the necessity to
come to grips with the personal aspects of attitude in argument, and
not just the meohanics of debate. It is necessary to understand why
a person is attracted to his particular viewpoint, and this may involve
us in a deeply personal exploration, which may involve a frank and
emotionally disturbing discussion. Whatever the difficulty in this,
it is still true that argument does have an effect. There are those
who feel that this can be overstressed and that arguments play but a
minor role. "Definite arguments are the symptoms and pretexts, but
seldom the causes, of the change. Their chief merit is to accelerate
the inevitable crisis. They derive their force and efficacy from
their conformity with the mental habits of those to whom they are
addressed. Reasoning which in one age would make no impression
whatever, in the next is received with enthusiastic applause.""''^
Certainly argument is not everything in such a situation, but if it
is futile to argue with a person with different presuppositions into
one's own position rationally, then if a decision has to be reached,
one can oftly resort to irrational persuasion or force. It is just
this fear of the resort to force which frightons and ought to frighten
all those who attempt to belittle argument. Argument may be limited,
and it is certainly necessary to examine arguments with reference to
their particular background, but nevertheless argument is far better
than force, if human values of life and freedom are to count for anything.
Thus argument is limited in connection with rationality by the particular
situatioiy'
13. Lecky, The Rise and Influence of Rationalism, p.viij R.C.p.220,
R. franklin, "Can Philosophers Reach the Truth?", p.24.
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situation where it occurs. There is the need and the difficulty of
deciding the area of agreement and disagreement, the problem of different
attitudes to the same facts, the nature of certain cumulative types of
argument which need to be related to particular situations and standards
within those situations, and the problem of the way that personal
factors may limit rationality in situations; yet despite all these
there is still the necessity for argument rather than force, and arguers
must clarify what they are about and at which lewel of rationality thoy
are functioning, as well as the standards relative to the particular
context they are concerned with, so that discussion may go on, and
force be rejected as a means of persuasion.
Argument has been examined, but no?; this is taken a step further
to the notion of persuasion. Concentration will be on one particular
example of this, though the points made are equally applicable to
persuasion in moral and metaphysical discussion. Torrance states the
problem of theological persuasion as the inability to communicate G-od
to men directly and therefore the need to refer other minds to something
14
beyond ourselves. The difficulty in such a situation is that there
are two different frames of reference involved. It is essential
somehow to bring others to see and hear the reality we refer to in the
same way as we see and hear it. To do this one needs to furnish
others with an interpretative framework to guide their recognition of
the reality referred to. However it is necessary to be aware of a
possible/
14* T.p.p.x,xi,-xii.
possible dichotomy in such persuasion. "We may persuade people by
convicting their minds and bringing theia to assent to what we say, or
we may persuade them by moving their feelings and evoking from them
the response we desire. In both cases persuasion induoes a belief
and leads to a commitment, but in the former the controlling factor
15
is rational judgement rather than an emotive reaction." If we
manipulate feelings without proper i*egard to the role of the intellect
then persuasion is not related to rationality but to psychological
manipulation.
The danger is of winning the argument but losing the person.
We may succeed in destroying the other person's argument^ but so hurt
Ms feelings that after the argument is apparently over he will be trying
to find new arguments, which will salvage his pride. We need in
persuasion and argument a degree of sympathy which can penetrate
behind observable behaviour and put ourselves in another's situation,
though this may not be easy to do. People are affected by what they
ought not xo be and not affected by what they ought, and when we are
confronted by such we do argue and seek to persuade, because of our
confidence in the power of reason, nevertheless suoh confidence may
l6
only be valid from our particular viewpoint. Persuasion must be
aware of the personal aspects in argument, yet be true to rational
grounds and presentation.
There/
15. S.p.p.l95,198-yt201-3| T.p.p.l65-6j H.M.p.p.28ff.
16. M. Quoist, The Christian Response, p.102, J. Lucas, "The 3oul",
B. Mitchell (ed.) Faith and Logic, p.142; Wisdom, Philosophy and
Psychoanalysis, p.p.160-2.
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There has been examination of argument and persuasion and something
of the limits of both these forms in practice has been seen, but this
must be put against the background of the two sensos of "rationality"
stressed. There are t??o particular levels of argument, one appropriate
to what is logically accepted by all and every man, and the other
referring to what makes rational sense within a particular context and
is logical, given certain premisses, which may themselves be debatable#
So ill persuasion, this means that it does not make sense to persuade
someone of what he must accept, unless there is some total breakdown
of personality. The sort of thing in mind here is seen in the
difference between a general, a businessman, and a judge looking at
their problems over and against a neurotic's examination of his own.
"But the general, the businessman and the judge may consider their
problems very patiently and still be very different from the neurotic.
The neurotic may discuss his problems - he may indeed » but he never
means business; the discussion is not a means to action, to something
other than itself; on the contrary, after a while we get the impression
that in spite of his evident unhappiness and desire to come from
hesitation to decision he also desires the discussion never to end
17
and dreads its ending." The neurotic's failure is symptomatic of
his inability to accept what must bo accepted, and that is of course,
level one of "rationality". In contrast, level two is the area of
persuasion outlined, where there is the attempt to bring the other to
"intuition", or to express sympathetically something new. This does
not/
17. Wisdom, Fhilosophy and Psychoanalysis, p.p.172, 178-9*
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not therefore degenerate into decisionism, hut rather requires arguments
and persuasive techniques to he clearly related to the particular
context and presuppositions involved in that context, and not offered
or rejected as "rational" in sense one rather than in sense two.
Having looked at questions, argument and persuasion, consideration
turns now to the actual situational limitations of rationality as they
relate to explanation. Torrance's complaint against modern
epistemology x*ested on the faulty disjunction of explanation from
18
understanding, each becoming distorted. Explanation may he in
response to a particular demand, query, or attack. It may he an
attempt to convince, e.g., evangelism, or it may he rattier an attempt
at greater understanding for oneself, in other words, an appropriation
on one's own behalf. It was earlier outlined that there are degrees
and kinds of explanation and this was especially -orue of the difference
between saying everything and saying something. There is more than
one kind of explanation. "We may legitimately and usefully explain
a large-scale and complex argument or hook or musical or artistic
composition by an internal process of relating parts to each other,
and to the whole, without necessarily or at every point making reference
19
to other arguments or books or compositions." Explanation as it
relates to sense one must he the bringing out of the implications
already there, and these implications are those accepted by all
reasonable men. Most commonly, however, we explain with reference
to/
18. S.p.l04-5j See chapter Three p.p.'^-°
19. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, p.54} Bambrough, Reason. Truth and
G-od, p.96.
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to sense two of "rationality" where we cannot say everything, hut
rather, something, and that something is in terms of the particular
context, I earlier drew on Rawl*s distinction between justifying a
procedure as a whole, and justifying something by reference to that
20
procedure. The same holds for explanation. In explaining at
level one of "rationality", we appeal to what all can and do accept,
while explanation at level two is with reference to a particular
procedure, set of procedures, or presuppositions, which need to be
described and accepted before the explanation is counted by the other
as sufficient.
There is also a limit on the demand for evidence. While it i3
perfectly reasonable to a3k for evidence for theological statements,
it is not reasonable to demand that such evidence should conform to
canons based on natural science or social science. But once one has
entered into a particular viewpoint, then there is a verd.fication
struoture, hence the importance of being able to describe to the
outsider the standards and framework of what is involved in a particular
setting. Sense two of "rationality" relates to this sort of evidence
which is meaningful yd.thin a particular context, while sense one
relates to that evidence which all and every reasonable man must accept.
At this level t > talk of a reason and evidence is to deal with the
universal aspect, that which counts as a reason In one case must count




William James has suggested a different kind of limit which
applies to evidence for rationality. When we are confronted by what
is rational evidence on Jamas' account we shall be aware of this faot
because of certain subjective marks. He asks, ".hat, then, are the
marks? A strong feeling of ease, peace, rest is one of them. The
transition from a state of puzzle and perplexity to rational comprehension
21
is full of lively relief and pleasure". This sense of "peace" may
not be so tenuous as it first appears, for it may arise as a cure to
a particular feeling on unease. It may happen when the unbeliever
comes to shars the believer's way of looking at things after the
secular explanations of particular phenomena have ceased to satisfy
him and, in their place, religious accounts seem more satisfactory.
If there is a genuine communication of evidence it will be at level
two of "rationality". It is the accepting of proof in the sense that
one comes to feel the same as. One appreciates and values as the
other doo3. We would in this case need to be sure that it was possible
to have this experience. Can we see and hear as the saint, hero,
artist, or critic sees and hears and to what extent? Can e indeed
share the experience of another? The believer says, "Taste and see
that the Lord Is good." But it must be noted that the offering of
such proof may be limited by recalling that if there is scope here
for proof, there is equal scope for disproof.
There are in practice, indeed, changes of belief on the basis of
evidence. "If Christian faith is ever completely lost, it must be
either/
21. James, The >vlll to Believe. p.6p.
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either because certain events are now encountered whose contrary
witness is so overpowering as altogether to undermine our reliance
upon these paradigmatic events, or else because the divine significance
of the paradigmatic events themselves now evaporates from our mind,
whether as a result of further consideration of them or from negligently
ceasing to think of them at all. Either way it may be said that a
man loses Ms faith only if he now sees things differently from how
hehad formerly seen them j and, save that it is a different kind of
seeing which is here in question, it is in this way also that the
physical scientist comes to reject beliefs which he had formerly
'<■22
entertained. Thus disproof may arise from either coming upon an
internal inconsistency or on realization of completely new evidence
so overpowering as to refute earlier beliefs.
In the area of the situational limits of rationality in respect
to evidence the stress has been on the variety of explanation, the
demand for appropriateness, and the verification structure involved
in adopting and living in a particular setting. This was related to
the two levels of "rationality". Now attention turns to justification.
I have already outlined this concept and draw on that account. It
was shown that justification related not just to the giving of reasons,
but the giving of good reasons. Justification is in general terms
backward looking, except when in reference to future plans. It rests
on agreement as to what is to be justified in light of a particular
breakdown. One must take care to analyse such breakdowns to clarify
the/
22. J. Baillie, The Sense of The Presence of Sod, p.p.72,75*
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the nature of the justification asked for. If someone queries an
action of mine by asking why I did it, there are a variety of possible
sense involved. This may be a simple request for information as to
the oausal, psychological, or physiological functions et work. It
may rather be a request for orientation to combat the feeling of lostness
expressed by, "f.Tty on earth did you do that"? Or it may be a request
in anger. "What the hell do you think you are up to?". To justify
requires that there is agreement as to what is to be justified and also
agreement as to what is to oount as having succeeded in justifying or
having failed. Justification is appropriate in response to queries
or criticism only if there are genuine alternatives open to the person
in the particular situation. In other words, one way to deal with the
demand for justification tS by stating that there was no alternative.
All justification must come to an end somewhere, hut it is essential
23
to beware of drawinr that finishing line too soon. Rather, with
Hare, one would say,' "If pressed to justify a decision completely, we
have to give a complete specification of the way of life of which it
is a part. This complete specification it is impossible in praotioe
to give; the nearest attempts are those given by the great religions,
especially those which can point to historical persons who oarried out
the way of life in praetice. If the inquirer still goes on asking
•But why should I live like that?' then there is no further answer to
give him, because we have laready ex hypothesi said everything that
could/
23. P. Winch, The Idea of a Social Soienoe, p.39J Flew, "The




could be included in this further answer." Justification varies
according to circumstances, the object, and the person concerned.
There seem to be two general levels of justification, one by
verification and the other by results and action.
Against this general background of the nature and limits of
justification in rationality, it is necessary to return to the two
levels of "rationality". These are parallel to the two levels of
justification of a whole system and justification of a particular
action by reference to a standard. One justifies in sense one by
referenoe to what is universally aoceptafcle, The uoint may be seen
from the difference between the philosopher (in this case standing for
the reasonable man) and the psychotic and neurotic. "there is a big
difference between the philosopher and both the psychotic and the
obsessional neurotic. It lies in the flow of justificatory talk, of
rationalization, which the philosopher produces when asked why he takes
the extraordinary line he does. It is true that both the psychotic
and neurotic listen to reason and defend themselves. The philosopher
defends himself more elaborately....When we call justifying talk
•rationalization* we hint that we are not impressed by it and do not
expect others to be. But we are impressed by the philosopher's talk,
25
it has a universal effect, reluctantly we are impressed by it."
The occasions when one is called upon to justify a practice in such
an universal fashion are rare exceptions, especially in contrast to
the activity of justification in sense two of "rationality". Such
justification/
24. Hare, The Language of Morals, p.69.
25. Wisdom, fiiiio sophy yuq fsychoaualysis. p.174-5# flew# ibid, p.88.
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justification Is only possible in context, with a certain shared
outlook on life or at least on standards. Ultimately the justification
of a particular action or belief only makes sense when the whole system
is presented, and accepted or rejected. Thus the task of the apologist
must be to draw the objector's attention to the various features of
the system, and the objector must be aware in his attack and demand for
justification of the overlapping connections of support within a
doctrinal field.
Having said all this it is still true that there are changes in
belief and action. One of the things which must undermine most the
extreme rationalist view is that some scientific doctrines are now in
a category of respected as onoe reasonable, but are now superseded.
Changes do occur in social terms as well as individual ones. Eut
such change for the individual does not occur in a vacuum. For the
religious person to become an unbeliever, something must happen suggests
Agassi, "To be drawn to our present discussion, the religious person
must be dissatisfied, disappointed, frustrated. He may, then, look
to reason for consolation. And, taking a small dose of reason to
support his religion, he may indeed, all too easily destroy his religion.
But this alone will not do. He has to be doubly frustrated: Reason
26
destroys his religion and fails to replace it".
In this section of the situational limits of rationality an attempt
has been made to show that some account can be given of the limits of
rationality, that there is room for the critic, and that there is an
account of rationality adequate to the complexity of the subject-matter.
V
26. Agassi, Zygon. p.134; Hodges, "Languages, Standpoints and Attitudes",
p.33» He Bono, The Use of Lateral Thinking. pp.26-7»
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X have been outlining the situational limits of rationality against
the background of the two basic senses of rationality described and
with this showing not only that genuine argument ana discussion can
take place, hut offering some sort of pointer %o the issues which
ought to he dealt with if such discussion is to he fruitful# To
tills end the limits on belief, criticism, argument, persuasion,
justification and change were seen# Specific points of how
rationality is limited in definite situations, stressing the importance
of the clarification of both the situation and the standards involved
when discussion on a rational basis is taking place, were also made#
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3. The Sooial Limits.
In this section as in the others on the limits of rationality the
aim is to do three things. Firstly it is to draw attention to certain
limits which were overlooked in hartley and Torrance * s accounts, then
tc show that there is an aocount of rationality which allows the oritio
a position fi'om where to launch an attack, and finally to offer a more
adequate account of rationality based on the limits in aotual practice.
When looking at the actual situation it is seen that not only has the
critic room to stand, but the nature of the argument mid discussion
which is being carried on and ought to be is also obvious. This is
linked with the two senses of rationality and these are aligneu to the
social emphases and features which serve as limits on rationality in
practice. Eveiy system of thought would appear to relate in some way
to a community, and without such a community the benefit and validity
of any thought or belief would be severly restricted.
Torrance stresses the social nature of thoughts "Our thinking
presupposes the structure of our active inter-personal relations and
taxes place within them. Even the activity of natural science is
inextricably involved in the structure of society, ana would be
impossible without a community of empirical subjects in which mutual
questioning and criticism and communication provide the necessary
conditions for verification and progress in knowledge.""' This
necessary sociability in knowledge and thought is marked in language
and in institutions, and it is important to note that it is through
language/
1. T.p.l6j; rolanyi, The Logio of Elbert;/. p.7p; i:arra. Language. Logic
and G-od.p.94.
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language that thought is hound up with the institutions, patterns and
traditions of the communities we live in, Torrance cont ents, "Because
our thought develops only through language and language e dlsts only
in society, we have to olariiy the relation of our concepts in their
objective context to the language of the society in whieh we live and
speak, and of course to any language which m are using as the medium
2
of our thought, communication or interpretation." In other words,
when one approaches a system of beliefs it is essential to be careful
to put it in its proper context and to realise the oentrolity of
language and common institutions in such a context. There are two
levels in this context, and two levels of language and Institution,
which need to be clarified. The first is the level of what has been
dubbed sense one of "rationality", part of which is the realisation
that the ability to make generalisations depends on the possession of
conoepts. This is the sort of principle and logic which is basio to
all men, Collingwood calls this level, absolute presuppositions.
An absolute presupposition is the yardstick by which experience is
Judged, When on© tries to challenge an absolute presupposition there
is a violent reaction, steaming from the inability to express even
the possibility of its being wrong. These presuppositions are part
of the general attitudes and cultural, social, religious and educational
equipment of mankind, Collingwood does admit that there is the
3
possibility that these may change and develop. My own view is that
such/
2, S,pp,18-19»
3. Collingwood, Kssay on Metaphysics.pp,42-3.48.6Q.195-5: Penelhuo,
Religion and Rationality.p,129,
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suoh ohange Is possible only for level two presuppositions and not at
level one as there are two separate levels of rationality at work, whioh
if oonfused, will lead to even greater confusion. It is neoessary as
human beings to have partioular means of conceptual categorisation.
Suoh principles of categorization and logic cannot and need not be proved
for if you take a given logic to be true then its principles are
undeniable without contradiction and so are necessary. There can be no
proof of the truth of such logic as it would always beg the question.
There is no alternative and no way of expressing an alternative to suoh
basic universal features of rationality. This is part of the definition
of reality and of what is seen,and it is impossible to conceive of how
reality could be anything else or what a different kind of seeing might
4
be. This universal level of sense one of "rationality" is binding on
all men and on each individual. However there is another level of
rationality whioh is equally social in nature, but limited in particular
contexts.
In Antonia Eraser*s pioture of Mary, Queen of Scots, there is
offered a most telling description of what it is to be within a particular
context at level two of "rationality". Talking of Mary, Eraser says,
"As a born Catholic, who had known no other creed, her faith was to her
like her everyday bread, something whioh she took for granted, and yet
whioh was essential to her, and without which she could not imagine her
existence.""*
4. C.Lewis, Mind and the World 0rder.pp.207-210: Horton, (ed) Wilson,
Rationality.p.154i Winch. The Idea of a Sooial Science: Eerre,
Language. Logic and C-od.p.121.
5. A.Eraser. Mary. Queen of Soots, p.145*
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This is a problem for us all for in a particular context, we exist in
a frame of referenoe which is rather like living within a system of co¬
ordinates, which gives meaning to everything. To enter into this
frame of reference is usually to be educated and exposed to supportive
literature, leading to the sharing of criteria, even to the extent that
to argue or reason res is on sharing common assumptions. Though we may
not be affected by every point of a system, nevertheless the system as
a whole does affeot us. Our language and interpretative concepts are
derived from the system. Our concepts and forms of description can
only have meaning if they are in relation to a particular background and
community. ^
Judgments are never simplistic, nor made in isolation. l"hey are
framed in a whole context of beliefs from which criteria of significance,
relevance and meaning all are derived. Authority too is derived from
such systems, particularly with referenoe to the kinds of questions
which may and may not be asked, and the kinds of answers which might
satisfy.^ Not only, however, are there positive features within a
particular context which set social limits to rationality, but there are
partioular negative features also. In discussion of scientific revolutions
Kuhn makes the point that a partioular viewpoint not only specifies what
O
entities a universe contains but also those which it does not. As all
organisation is based on the system of belief, it becomes well nigh
impossible to express any opposite or to alter the struoture radically.
Once/
6. J.Baillie, The Sense of the Presence of God, p.132; Kuhn, The Structure
of Soientiiic ^evolutions, p.46; RvR.p.7; Mitchell. "The Grace of God",
p.151; Hodges, "Languages, Standpoints ana Attitudes",p.72; Hampshire,
"Keeling and Expression",p.19.
7. Mitchell (ed), Faith and Logic.p.169: Hodges, ibid,pp.21-3; Hanson,
Patterns of Discovery.P.26; RvR,p.18; Farrer,"Hevelation",p•88•
8. Kuhn, ibid,p.7; He Bono, The Use of Lateral Thinking. p*31*
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Onoe within a system and adopting its paradigms, one needs no longer to
seek to justify the enterprise, for such justification becomes circular.^
This is not to say that such belief within a system is irrational.
Rather it is "rational" in sense two, which means that it is not irrational
and that its rationality consists in its relation to the rest of the
system, and only within the system, because its nature and man's nature
cannot give to it the universally accepted quality which level one
"rationality" refers to. All this leads to the awareness that to
understand a standpoint one has to learn the appropriate language, and
this may involve entering into the standpoint, which it is not easy to
do. This is to emphasise something of the immensity of change of
beliefs and the nature of criticism. To criticise justly needs not only
awareness of what the other believes within its context but also the
«
realisation that one s own beliefs are held in a oontext too. Both need
to be spelled out before genuine and fruitful communication can begin.
That there is a problem between diverging views is almost universally
agreed. Wisdom offers certain classic examples of such divergence.
10
The two people who look at a garden to discover the gardener. Another
two looking at a picture or natural scene and disagreeing.11 Science
offers many examples: pre- versus post-Co ernious, Newtonian versus
Einsteinian, Kepler versus Brahe, the physicist after university and the
same physicist as a child.12 The problem of being in one particular view
seems to be that people live in their frames of reference, so that
change/
9. Kuhn, ibid.pp.19-20.
10. Wisdom, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis.p.154-5: Brunner, The Mediator,
p.217* note.
11. Wisdom, ibid, pp.158-9.
12. Wisdom, ibid, pp.142-3j Sanson, Patterns of Discovery.pp.5*15»
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change has a tremendous social and personal effect, that one way of
seeing things tends to exclude other ways, that the system of belief is
internally watertight, and that it defines different views as nonsense,
13
or can offer explanation for all that another system propounds.
Having said all this as to the social limits and difficulties of rational
disagreement and discussion, it must still be denied that nothing oan be
said. It is essential to explain why we offer our allegiance to a
particular set of beliefs. Perhaps most of all it is necessary to
remember that "A oritical discussion and a comparison of the various
frameworks is always possible. It is just a dogma • a dangerous dogoa-
that the different frameworks are like mutually untranslatable languages.
The fact is that even totally different languages ( like English and Hopi,
| 4
or Chinese ) are not untranslatable..".
In discussion of the divergences, it is necessary to be aware of
overstating the case. One lesson from European thought is that while
theories come and go, the world of common sense seems to be little ohanged.
People are to a large extent likeminded because they share oommon needs
and ways of satisfying them, common concepts, and intelligence. It is
also the case that because of concepts and language our notion of reality
is one and the saao, at least in description of what belongs to it.'"5
This level is that of the rational man in the sense of the impartial
person who h.s accepted what is universally agreed. But divergence at
level two is equally real, and it oust be examined how we may and can
change ourselves and our views within the social limitations expressed.
Change/
13* M.M.pp.28-9; Sutcliffs, Ea&Le of the Ninth.pp.80-1; Lucas,"The Soul",
p.140; Penelhum, Seligion and Rationality.p ;.106-8.
14. Popper, "Normal Science and its ^angers", pp.56-7•
15- Winoh, The Idea of a Social Science.p.15: V311son,(ed) Rationality.p. 1411
Lewis, flind and the World Order, pp.20-1. 91, 113*
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Change only comes with difficulty "because man functions against a
background of expectation and it is only some breach in expectation or
failure of existing rules that leads to a search for new ones# Such a
search is preceded by a sense of inadequacy on the part of beliefs or
institutions to meet the problems faced# This requires new data and new
interpretations based on realising the nature and extent of the conflict
of ideas# In other words, it is necessary to see alternatives to what
16
is believed before it can be discarded# That is the situation where
one is foroed into change by ciroumstanoes, but need not be so negative
in approach. It is possible to adopt an openness to other views, which
refuses to be bound by the rigidity of what is believed, but rather
explores genuine alternatives to seek to understand them. This is often
associated with attempts at the rearrangement of material in insightful
17
ways.' To execute such insight is part of an imaginative approach to
others and their views, wherein a person attempts to enter imaginatively
into a situation, to think as if it were real and as if it were believed#
No matter how difficult this may be, it is certainly an useful corrective
to moral and religious rigidity# Equally positive, though less startling
than imagination and insight, is the steady development and evolution of
ideas and beliefs. This does happen, though it has also its dangers
which are paralleled by the danger of the mere acquiescing in a particular
belief, rather than thinking it through in all its implications for
oneself. This is part of what it means to be rational* to think something
»
for oneself, ot at least to be able to do so and to be given the opportunity
to/
16# Eewis, ibid,p.269* Kuhn, ibid.pp.65.68,91 * De Bono, Lateral Thinking.p9.
17. T.P.122*H>re. Freedom and Reason.p.197* De Bono, Lateral Thinking.p9.
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to do so, rather than have blind acquiescence#
When change does occur it is often described in dramatic terns*
IS
Kuhn likens it to a scientist putting on inverting lenses. Popper
confesses that "X admit that an intellectual revolution often looks like
a religious conversion. A new insight may strike us like a flash of
lightning. But this does not mean that we cannot evaluate, critically
and rationally, our former views, in the light of new ones." Certainly
there are suggestions of things like,"blinding flashes" and "gestalt
Ho
switches". Such changes result in revision of one's way of thinking,
so that one requires to be educated and to learn and develop a new
language. This is not a simple matter, for suoh changes are not merely
social changes, but perhaps most of all, matters of personal decision
and action. Morality and religion are genuine when they are the subject
of individual ohoice and upholding. To make this sort of choice means
a change, which is the most radical a person can undergo, for it entails
xi
abandoning firmly establish d habits and standards for thought and notion.
In other words, there is a kind of conversion where our minds are
changed and we begin to learn afresh, as in a religious conversion.
The point is that suoh changes as outlined must affeot the whole person
and his life. Essentially this means that any picture of knowledge and
discovery as disinterested and aoademio alone is faulty. The paradigm
is rather that of involvement, what Polanyl calls "dwelling-in" A
change must have its effect and be shown in what is said and done, and
this /
18. Kuhn, ibid,p.121.
19. Popper, "Normal Science and its Bangers",p.57.
20. Bragg, 'Science, The Adventure of Living",p.31J Kuhn, The Structure
of Scientific Hevolutions.p.149.
21. Buttsrfield, The Origins of '"odern Soience.pe.1-2: wisdom, Philosophy
and P3ychoanaly3is.p >.263-4; Collingwood, Essay on ;,1etanhysics.pA3.not9i
T.pp.91,footnote,293*
22. Brunner, ^he Mediator,p.248; Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension,p.18.
416
this means assimilation into a new society* To learn what this truly
means, Polanyi suggests that we become ap rentices to the best available
master. "You cannot criticize religion or scienoe from the outside,nor
do you become an insider by merely endorsing a doctrine; commitment is an
existential affair; one learns the meaning of a commitment by practising
23
it."
These are all the sorts of things which would be looked for in a
level two change of belief. This is to outline the social limits on
rationality in light of the two sense of "rationality". It was shown
that internal problems and imaginative procedures, dramatic or gradual
changes in belief, outlook and action, and inculcation into new social
outlooks and practices all have a part to play in the situation where
rational discussion is talcing place and two sides are in dispute.
These features help settle the particular standards and emphases which
are relevant to successful communication and discussion. It must be
stressed that while it has been argued that there are social limits of
rationality, this is in no way to supplant rationality and it is to deny
that there is only conditioning. Rationality means that man can change
his mind and his environment and ways have been suggested in ?&ich this
does and can happen, so that one may be aware of exactly what is required
to bring about such a change. It was seen that there is room for the
critio and this freedom for criticism stems from a clear separation of
the appropriate senses of "rationality" and the clear delineation of
various social limits in actual practice.
23. Agassi, Zygon.p.162: Wilson (ed), Rationality.p.xviii.
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4* The Psychological Limits*
I hare been analysing the various limits of rationality to improve
upon the accounts of Bartley and Torrance both in content and effects*
I have presented the natural, situational, and social limits and finally
turn to the psyohological. Again these will be interpreted from actual
situations and in light of the basic distinction of two senses of
"rationality".
One of the major problems in the change of beliefs is inbuilt
conservatism and a psychological resistance to change. Obedience and
the desire to conform are deeply engrained in society and there are many
who conform to rules simply because they are rules rather than beoause of
what they do and why they do it* Much of what is accepted in this
unthinking manner may be described as a birthright into which one enters*
"It is formed in him by what he sees and hearsj the actions he has been
taught to do and the language he uses are part of itj it forms the mental
atmosphere which he has breathed long before he began to reflect* For
this reason he is not the unwilling captive of tradition, for in following
it he expresses his own nature". A particular tradition has usually
a particular body of truth as well as a group of persons, or institutions,
which acts as the guardian of the truth. This takes the form of
authority which is recognised as the controlling and guiding force in all
matters pertaining to the truth* This has been described as, "Humanity
is an inherited deposit taken on trust", but this is not to say that it
is necessarily a bad thing, for without such tradition and its support
there/
1. Sorley, "Tradition",pp.10,9; Downie, Roles and Valueafp.T7i "Conservatism"
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Vol.2.p.197*
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there would be no human societyo Sor those within the tradition,
there are particular psychological pressures and limits against change.
These are that one has the feeling that one has no option, no alternative,
and that what one believes is inescapable, "A man with conviction is
a hard man to change. Tell him you disagree and he turns away. Show
him facts and figures and he questions your sources. Appeal to logic
and he fails to see your point.But this refusal, to he fully
effective, is usually hacked up by strong social support. A prime
example of this was seen in the behaviour of the sect after disproof
4
in "When Prophecy Pails". Here were individuals who believed with
their whole hearts and had taken steps to commitIrrevocably on
on the basis oftheir belief. Tet they were presented with unequivocal
and undeniable evidence that their belief was totally wrong.
Nevertheless they emerged not only unshaken, but even more convinced of
the truth of their beliefs than before as could be seen from increased
conversion attempts.
When change does come, it must be remembered that knowledge starts
from given situations with established usages. In this situation the
old clashes with the new, though there is always the effect of the one
on the other. There is no breach of continuity between the old and the
new, for it is often from the old that the new takes its shape, even if
this is only in a negative sense. Thus the continuity of tradition and
of the person involved is ensured. Part of what this means is that one
generation/
2. Sorley, "Tradition", p.p.6-7,8-9j Parrer, "Revelation, p.87«
3. Viamock, .The Object of Morality, p.98j When Prophecy falls, p. 3»
4. "f.'hen Pronhecv '.-,ilsf p.p.229,3j see above p.p.'ZR
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generation may learn from another, though it is also true that each
generation has to question for itself what is given to it as tradition#
This means that our beliefs and actions, though derived from tradition,
are still brought into relation with experience and changing conditions.
The rational man is the one who accepts things for himself, not on trust
or out of blind habit, not in obedience to custom.
This kind of traumatic change often is especially marked in thb
religious realm. A person who has aooepted while a child a theological
outlook in an uncritical manner may find that the dootrine about the
nature of the world is too simple and narrow to be true. Widening
experience and growing knowledge mean the death of such religious
belief. Part of this growth of maturity in the rational person is
the knowledge that it is possible to learn from mistakes. This does
not take place without a struggle both against the commitment of the
past and the understanding of what is new. Perhaps this is why it
is often the veiy young or the comparative newcomer who makes the most
5
impact in changing views. let the rational man who does attempt to
overoome the psychological limits of rationality must also be aware
of his own limitations. He cannot isolate himself from what there is
in terms of societal norms nor wipe the slates totally clean, but he
oan strip himself of all opinions which have simply been handed down
from others, or for which he has insufficient evidence, and ha can
decide to aocept nothing as true except what is absolutely dear to his
own understanding, making doubt seem ridiculous. This is no Cartesian
programme/
5, S.p.203; Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, p.151; he Bono, The Use of
Lateral Thinking p.p.71-2; Kuhn, The Struoture of Solentifio
ftevolutions pip.89-90.
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programme for doubt, but rather the fulfilling of what we are as
rational persons. There is again the tension between being totally
psychologically conditioned and having the capacity to make genuine
choices which even involves certain features of our so-called conditioning.
In the examination of the psychological limits of changes in belief
and knowledge, one must be aware also that people are not pure, bodiless
intellects, but rather people who feel desire and will. This means that
there is always the possibility of a struggle between reason and the
6
affections, will and desires. It is not easy to change our habits of
mind or modify the structure of our thinking, for we ourselves live and
work in these frames of thought and if they change we will have to be
changed with them. Our situation is rather like thist- "There are
doubtless some things which 'in the bottom Of my heart* I know full well
to be true> but whose truth I have never fully acknowledged,'with the top
of my mind* ...There are some things we so much want to be true that we
stifle our doubts concerning them, and other things the acknowledgement
of which would make such unwelcome demands on us, or entail so
inconvenient a readjustment both of our professed outlooks and of our
habitual conduct, that we succeed in suppressing or 'repressing* what
7
would otherwise be a fully assured oonvintion of their truth." In
other words, our subjective preferences make rationality difficult though
not impossible, and this same point may be derived from examination of
our language, which as Hare puts it, "shares our weakness, and gives just
where/
6. Lecky, The Rise and Influence of Rationalism, p.p.xv-xvij Downie,
Roles and Values, p.lj51.
7. J. Baillie, The Sense of the Presence of G-od. p.6.
421
where we do"* Again there is this tension between a language which
cannot, be fully logicalised or reduced to mathematical form, but which
is neither so fluid and informal that there is no continuity, meaning
or understanding. This is level two of "rationality" where people are
unable to behave and reason as they ought, and it is just this inability
which shows that this is level two and not level one, where it is
possible and necessary to behave and reason by universally accepted
standards. This is rather like hartley*s crisis of integrity; whether
9
or not we oaa live up to our purposes, claims and identity. It is
essential to guard here against changing the subject from logic and
conceptual clarification to psychology where the concepts are vague and
ill-defined, making the drawing of uistinctions a hazardous business.
We are not reduced to psychology or to silence before \ie need be.
EiaJier there is the opportunity for greater clarity and closer analysis
of the situations of disoussion and argument and the particularly relevant
psychological issues and forces. Before we retreat behind the platitude
that people are just different, it is necessary to analyse the situation,
nature and reason for suoh differences and their expression.
Looking at the psychological limits of rationality as a whole, the
forces of tradition and change have been seen, the nature of such change
and some of the steps in it, as well as the volitional and personal
problems of suoh changes. With referenoe to levels one and two of
"rationality" it may be seen that in general these factors are more
appropriate to level two of "rationality" where there is disagreement and
such/
8. Hare, freedom and dp.ason. p.73*
9. Q.p.46; RvR. p.p.8-9J Chapter Two, p.p.27
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such disagreement is resolved by referenoe to the particular context,
rather than of level one where there is no disagreement and development
by disagreement for there is universally necessary acceptance of what is
true. It may be true that there are particular psychological features
which are common to both levels of rationality and these must be examined
«
and isolated. But the emphasis has been on level two and the psyohologioal
limits actually involved in argument and discussion at that level between
competing views.
These last four sections have been an examination of some of the
actual limits of rationality in practice by reference to the pratical
situations of argument and discussion bearing in mind the basic
distinction made in part one of this chapter. I have tried to show
the style and programme of genuine argument by the examination of
standards and the relation of the two senses of "rationality" to the
natural, situational, social and psychological limits of rationality.
I have tried to correct the overlooking of these limits in the accounts
of Torrance and Bartley and also to provide an account of rationality
which is more adequate that those offered by them. I have tried to
show that it is possible for there to be argument, discussion and
disagreement between even very basic presuppositions, and not merely to
make out a oase for such a possibility, but seeking to suggest the lines,
content and style of such discussion. Under the heading of natural limits
the importance of irrational features, irrationalism as a doctrine, the
necessity/
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necessity and limits of logic, and the limits of human capacities and the
need to draw different levels of distinction were seen. Under the
heading of situational limits, the way that different situations affect
belief, criticism, persuasion, argument, justification, explanation and
ohange were shown. In social limits the role of internal problems,
imaginative procedures, dramatic and gradual changes in outlook and
social inculcation in new ideas and practices were examined. Then
attention turned to psychological limits and the problems of oonaervatism,
indwelling of beliefs, personal faotors in change and the nature and
scope of radical changes were seen.
Throughout I have sought to integrate these factors with the two
senses of "rationality11 and again stress that in tisoussion and argument
the role of rationality is twofold. ItT firfct of all requires the
decision of which level of rationality is being dealt with to ensure
that genuine argument can take place, then it requires the examination
of the practical outworking of this separation of levels in the actual
argument or discussion by reference to the natural, social, situational
and psychological limits of rationality in the particular case in mind.
Of course, not all and every limit will be relevant in all and every case,
and so there is the necessity for the development of expertise in the
application of such techniques and the exercising of them. Thus I hope
to have met my own criticism of Torrance and Bartley. The aocount
deals with the limits of rationality as they are found in praotice. It
is more adequate to the complexity of rationality in its many settings,
and it leaves not only room for the critic, but assists the development
of lines of communication between different sets of presuppositions,
beliefs and outlooks.
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Section 'Three - Conclusion
The thesis began with a ooncern with the lack of success of actual
argument as it is practised in philosophy today. This aporia in
argument was linked with two aocounts of rationality which were faulty.
I then turned to detailed consideration of the two accounts of rationality
which offered examples of metapbysioal and theological outlooks whioh
were willing to grasp the nettle of the subject of rationality. These
positions were outlined as presented by their upholders and three kinds
of criticisms offered against them. The first was that in setting out
to describe the nature of rationality they had omitted to examine the
important aspeot of the limits of rationality in actual discussion and
argument. It was also argued that if one ignored this deficiency and
allowed the view of rationality to be taken on its oto terms, that theso
accounts fell into intennal difficulties which undermined their validity
as descriptions of tire nature of rationality# These aocounts were
inadequate to the complexity of rationality. The third bone of
contention rested on one affect of both aocounts, though in different
ways. This was the denial of any point from which the critic might
attack the view in question. In other words, there was no way to call
these views in question, to discuss them, to argue against then and to
offer alternatives. This seemed to be just the sort of problem which
was an unfortunate characteristic of much moral, metaphysical and
religious controversy, today# Having offered criticism in detail against
these views at all these levels, yet dealing with them in the way they
were presented rather than forcing them into my own proorustean bed of
criticism, I argued that we are able to learn from these men both
positively and negatively, from what they dealt with and how theydid so,




It then behoved me to make good my criticism by offering an alternative
aocount of rationality. This had to meet the three criticism made. My
account had to deal with the limits of rationality in practice, to be more
aware of the complexity of the subject matter and avoid oversimplification
for the sake of ease rather than adequacy, and finally to leave room for
the critic and offer scope for discussion and argument. I tided to
achieve this by two steps. The first was the separation of two senses of
"rationality" which has been overlooked and obviates much of the breakdown
between different positions by clarifying at which level reasoning is
being conducted and the particular standards which are relevant at these
different levels. The basic distinction was made and applied to the
synonyms of rationality. It was applied to irrationality, persons and
beliefs, reason and reasons, and intelligibility. Having argued for and
shown the content of this distinction, it was applied to rationality at
the different levels of the limits of rationality. This was an attempt
to give a more adequate aocount of rationality, which was appropriate to
its complexity and aware of the role of limits in rationality. This
examination showed both that there was room for discussion and argument
and how such argument might be conducted. I therefore looked at the
natural, situational, social and psychological limits, seeing the
important features in each of these settings and isolating areas of
difficulty for the rational person in debate and discussion. Thus
I tried to give ground for the critic to stand on, to clarify the nature
of the critical process, and to offer a more adequate account of rationality
by learning from the mistakes of Torrance and Hartley and correcting their
omissions, as well as using many issues which had been correctly spotlighted.
This/
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This thesis is no easy solution, hut rather & restatement of the
complexity of genuine argument, and a request for and an attempt to
provide a closer analysis of what is involved In such argument, so that
nan may be what he claims to be* a rational animal. The nature of
rationality lies In the capacity to communicate and understand about
all that matters most in the fields of religion, morality and metaphysics.
Many apparent and real breakdowns may be resolved if different theorists
exercised the kind of programme argued for, and the eventual aim must bo
to show the kind of difference such a programme makes with reference to
particular problems in the areas of religion, morals and metaphysics.
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